STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD :: A BOOK :: by James Burnham ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Burnham ) ::
-
...
CONTENTS <Contents> Part 1. —The Problem
Part I. —The Problem (page in book )
1. The Immaturity of the United States (1)
2. Is It Really One World? 14
3. The Political Consequences of the Atomic Bomb 26
4. World Government or World Empire? 42
5. The Nature of Communism 56
6. From Internationalism to Multi-national Bolshevism 75
7. The Goal of Soviet Policy 90
8. The Weakness and Strength of the Soviet Union 114
9. Is a Communist World Empire Desirable? 122
10. The Main Line of World Politics 130
Part II. — What Ought to Be Done
11. The Renunciation of Power 136
Part III. — What Could Be Done
12. Political Aims and Social Facts 144
13. The Break with the Past 150
14. The Supreme Object of United States Policy: Defensive 161
15. The Supreme Object of United States Policy: Offensive 181
16. The Internal Implementation of Foreign Policy 200
17. World Empire and the Balance of Power 211
18. Is War Inevitable? 222
Part IV. — What Will Be Done
19. The Policy of Vacillation 231
20. The Outcome (242)
< The END > < end of the book >
COMMENT & REVIEWS
SOURCE: https://www.independent.org/publications/tir/article.asp?id=66 "James Burnham and the Struggle for the World" "... Daniel Kelly ISI Books, 2002 - Biography & Autobiography - 443 pages
... James Burnham (1905-1987) was one of the most influential anticommunist figures of the Cold War era, as Daniel Kelly's fascinating biography makes clear. But like many anticommunists, Burnham first started on the other side. Kelly tells the story of Burnham's political journey and intellectual transformation into -- as Richard Brookhiser once stated it -- "the first neoconservative." Including fascinating vignettes with characters as diverse as George Orwell, Arthur Koestler, Andre Malraux, and Ezra Pound, Kelly's lively and definitive narrative must be read not only by anyone interested in the life of this seminal conservative thinker and Cold War strategist, but by all those who want a better understanding of the forces behind the most important ideological clash of the modern age.
... From inside the book ..."
SOURCE: https://www.commentary.org/articles/maurice-goldbloom/the-struggle-for-the-world-by-james-burnham/ "... All in all, The Struggle for the World is a good enough book in part so that its failure to be better in toto becomes doubly exasperating. Perhaps this failure is due to the fact that Mr. Burnham still thinks in terms of a rigid theological orthodoxy—though this time neither Catholic nor Trotskyist—from whose premises the world may be deduced entire, and outside of whose fold there is no salvation. As to the last, he may be right. But if he is, then there simply is no salvation, at least for the Western Civilization in whose preservation Mr. Burnham is interested. ..."- SOURCE: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/1947-10-01/struggle-world "... Reviewed by Robert Gale Woolbert ( October 1947 )
The author of "The Managerial Revolution" postulates the inevitability of a conflict between the United States and a Soviet Union embarked on a calculated career of world conquest. He finds that objective conditions, in particular the atomic bomb, call for a universal state (he cites Toynbee) created under the aegis of a single Power, since the formation of a voluntary world government is presently impossible. He therefore urges the American people to prepare for the final showdown by going on a permanent war footing, with all that this involves in loss of personal, political and economic liberties. ..."
"The Managerial Revolution" "PDF" < Google
- https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.17923
- https://archive.org/stream/in.ernet.dli.2015.17923/2015.17923.The-Managerial-Revolution_djvu.txt
- https://ia801603.us.archive.org/11/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.17923/2015.17923.The-Managerial-Revolution.pdf
"THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD" (A BOOK) by James Burnham ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Burnham )
Part I THE PROBLEM < go to Contents>
1. The Immaturity of the United States THE THIRD WORLD WAR began in April, 1944. <fiction The details of an incident that then took place have not been disclosed. "Manchuria" > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manchuria The incident itself, even less dramatic than the dropping of a small bomb on a "Manchurian bridge", was hardly noticed behind the smoke of clashing armies and the rubble of cities falling. The few ships of the remnant of the Greek Navy, operating as a unit under the British Mediterranean Command, were in harbor at Alexandria. [ Google MAPs Coordinates: 31°11′51″N 29°53′33″E ] The Greek sailors, joined by some Greek soldiers stationed near by, mutinied. It was not a serious revolt, in either numbers or spirit. A few shots were fired, a few lives lost. The British rounded up the mutineers and placed them, for a while, in concentration camps. A few leaders were punished; but soon - the trouble was patched up and forgotten. It was recalled briefly by some when, later, a short, bitter civil war broke out in Greece proper. We do not know the details of what happened in the mutiny; but the details, important as they may be for future scholars, are unnecessary. We know enough to discover the "political meaning" of what happened, and for this details are sometimes an obstacle. The mutiny was led by members of an organization called ELAS. ELAS was the military arm of a Greek political grouping called EAM. EAM was a seemingly heterogeneous alliance of various Greeks with various political and social views. But EAM was [in fact] directed by the Greek Communist Party. The Greek Communist Party, like all communist parties, is a section of the international communist movement. International communism is led, in all of its activities, from its supreme headquarters within the Soviet Union.
[ communism > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communism ] "... Dissolution of the Soviet Union ( Further information: Dissolution of the Soviet Union )
With the fall of the Warsaw Pact after the Revolutions of 1989, which led to the fall of most of the former Eastern Bloc, the Soviet Union was dissolved on 26 December 1991.
It was a result of the declaration number 142-Н of the Soviet of the Republics of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union.[108] The declaration acknowledged the independence of the former Soviet republics and created the Commonwealth of Independent States, although five of the signatories ratified it much later or did not do it at all. On the previous day, Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev (the eighth and final leader of the Soviet Union) resigned, declared his office extinct, and handed over its powers, including control of the Cheget, to Russian president Boris Yeltsin. That evening at 7:32, the Soviet flag was lowered from the Kremlin for the last time and replaced with the pre-revolutionary Russian flag. Previously from August to December 1991, all the individual republics, including Russia itself, had seceded from the union. The week before the union's formal dissolution, eleven republics signed the Alma-Ata Protocol, formally establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, and declaring that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist.[109][110]
Post-Soviet communism ...
The Vietnamese Communist Party's poster in Hanoi
As of 2022, states controlled by Marxist–Leninist parties under a single-party system include: the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Cuba, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.[nb 4] Communist parties, or their descendant parties, remain politically important in several other countries.
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Fall of Communism, there was a split between those hardline Communists, sometimes referred to in the media as neo-Stalinists, who remained committed to orthodox Marxism–Leninism, and those, such as The Left in Germany, who work within the liberal-democratic process for a democratic road to socialism,[116] while other ruling Communist parties became closer to democratic socialist and social-democratic parties.[117]
Outside Communist states, reformed Communist parties have led or been part of left-leaning government or regional coalitions, including in the former Eastern Bloc. In Nepal, Communists (CPN UML and Nepal Communist Party) were part of the 1st Nepalese Constituent Assembly, which abolished the monarchy in 2008 and turned the country into a federal liberal-democratic republic, and have democratically shared power with other communists, Marxist–Leninists, and Maoists (CPN Maoist), social democrats (Nepali Congress), and others as part of their People's Multiparty Democracy.[118][119]
China has reassessed many aspects of the Maoist legacy, and along with Laos, Vietnam, and to a lesser degree Cuba, has decentralized state control of the economy in order to stimulate growth. These reforms are described by scholars as progress, and by some left-wing critics as a regression to capitalism, or as state capitalism, but the ruling parties describe it as a necessary adjustment to existing realities in the post-Soviet world in order to maximize industrial productive capacity.[citation needed] In these countries, the land is a universal public monopoly administered by the state, and so are natural resources and vital industries and services.
The public sector is the dominant sector in these economies and the state plays a central role in coordinating economic development.[citation needed] Chinese economic reforms were started in 1978 under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, and since then China has managed to bring down the poverty rate from 53% in the Mao era to just 6% in 2001.[120] ..."
Vladimir "Putin" has embraced "Democracy" < Google > ...results ...
Politically understood, therefore, the Greek mutiny of April, 1944, and the subsequent Greek Civil War, were "armed skirmishes" between, the Soviet Union, representing international communism, and the British Empire. In the Second World War, however, which had still - at that time - more than a year to run, Britain and the Soviet Union were allies against a common enemy. We have been recording, we thus see, another war. In the late summer of 1945, Japan fell. The Red Army, though somewhat tardy in arrival, took quick control over Manchuria (as defined above) and parts of North China. During the time that followed, the communist armies of what had been called the "Yenan Government" ( 1, 2, 3 ... ), sheltered, equipped and in part "officered" by the Red Army [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Army ] , attempted to establish independent sovereignty in Manchuria (as defined above - and below), northern and some of central China. [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_invasion_of_Manchuria ] These armies met in battle with the armies of the Chungking Government [link] , trained and equipped with the help of the United States Army, and transported toward the scene of action by ships of the United States Navy. But in the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union were allies. In the Spring of 1946, a little late by the diplomatic clock, the Red Army (defined in fiction & reality - above) withdrew from northern Iran .
[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran ] hh ( map)
As is the custom of occupying armies, it [ the Red Army ] left behind among the population a reminder of its stay.
The young offspring was, however, more formidable than usual:
a new little red army, trained, equipped and led by the aid of its political father,
with a new autonomous state and a new political party for its playthings.
This "new little army" faced south and southwest and southeast, toward India, toward the Persian Gulf,
toward the great oil fields of the United States and the British Empire, flanking the land bridge to Africa.
We are inured to the fact that a "great war" stirs so deeply the "social cauldron" [that]
the fumes and bubbling cannot be expected to subside at the mere official declaration of the end of hostilities.
Subsidiary wars, mass strikes, civil wars, colonial revolts are the accompaniment of the last stages of great wars,
and the usual aftermath. [ In 1947 - they did not have the International Crimminal Court - but, they did have Nuremberg. ]
This was true of the First World War, in the period from 1917 to approximately 1924,
and it is true now of the postlude to the Second World War.
The civil wars and strikes and revolts are a phase of the war.
More accurately, both they and the war are phases of a wider historical process
- which comes to an acute head in the outbreak of large-scale fighting.
VE day May 8 , 1945
> https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Experience/VE-Day/
VJ day August 15, 1945
> https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/v-j-day
* The Russian Revolution, the civil wars in Germany in the years
1918-24, the uprisings in India, the Allied intervention in revolutionary Russia,
the Balkan revolts, the Turco-Greek war, the strike waves in nearly every country, were all part of what may properly
be called the First World War. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causes_of_World_War_I < Causes of World War I
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causes_of_World_War_II < Causes of World War II
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan-Slavism "Pan-Slavism" & "Putin" > https://imrussia.org/en/nation/527-the-birth-of-pan-slavism
* (these events) Not until their conclusion was the war itself brought to an end. World political conditions quieted — relatively — down. The interim period of recuperation set in, and lasted until the preparatory stage of the new war began. [ World War III ]
We now realize that the first battles of the Second World War were fought in Spain, and in China from 1937 on.
The new war (WW2) reached its overt military climax from 1940 to 1945 (the battles of 1939 were still pre- liminary), and is now fading out, with the expected aftermath. [ Mussolini > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benito_Mussolini ] The strike waves in the United States, the end of the Third Republic in France [ link], the ousting of the Italian monarchy [link], the Labour Party victory in England [link], the colonial disturbances in the Far East (below), all these may be included as part of the Second World War.
SOURCE: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1946/12/the-far-east/656564/ ( https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/archives/1946/12/178-6/132381470.pdf )
"... The Far East -- DECEMBER 1946 ISSUE ... IT TOOK from three to five years for the results of the First World War to develop a full head of political pressure in Asia. It is therefore not surprising that only now, a year and a half after V-J Day, is it becoming possible to measure political events and trends in Asia after the Second World War with sufficient accuracy to make meaningful comparisons with the post-war Asia of twenty or twenty-five years ago. ... Already two great changes stand out. Russia, which for some years after the First World War was a wavering question mark, has become a solid exclamation point. And in the field of Asiatic nationalism, there has been a major shift from the plane of theory to the plane of action. ... A quarter of a century ago, a man like Sun Yat-sen [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sun_Yat-sen ] could see clearly, in theory, what he wanted - but methods were still experimental. The personnel of nationalist revolution was top-heavy with generals and colonels and fatally weak in steady, dependable sergeants.
Today, nationalism is a going concern. Both its conservatives and its leftists know how to tap and organize political manpower by deliberate selection along lines of social and economic interest.
These two great changes must be analyzed in combination. A quarter of a century ago the great powers had not yet conceded the ability of the Bolsheviks to survive even in Russia.
The powers which invaded Russia and backed the Kolchaks and the Denikins were also the major colonial powers.
The Russians, in their struggle for survival, therefore shouted the most bloodcurdling slogans they could think up, in order to incite the colonial peoples and create a diversion in the rear of the governments which were trying to stop the Revolution.
In the colonial countries, however, and among the colonial peoples, Russian policy had no real roots. Even the most radical colonial leaders who began to call themselves "Communists" were not Russian trained. They were intellectuals, few in number, who had been in contact with Western European radical thought, and they were labor leaders, even fewer in number, who had learned something of the technique of trade-union organization. The
Russians could in fact do very little in the way of creating colonial unrest; all that they could do was to take advantage of colonial unrest already existing.
The shift in combination can thus be well expressed by pointing out that now it is the colonial nationalists and revolutionaries who are in a position to take advantage of the fact that Russia exists.
Russia — and not just Russia, but the "Soviet Union", under Communist leadership and with a socialized economy — is a solid fact.
Asia’s leadership
Leftist leaders - in Asia - now believe that they can speed up the emancipation of their own peoples either under conditions of world hostility toward Russia or under conditions of world coöperation.
If coöperation is to be the policy, they can take part in the general coöperation. If hostility is to be the policy, then they can put pressure from the rear on any country that has turned its face in hostility against Russia.
Moderate leaders believe that the balance of world power - between Russia and the Anglo-American bloc - leaves them room for maneuver. They have long abandoned the Gandhi dream of a return to an idyllic, unmechanized, pre-Western — and unreal — Asiatic past. They are convinced that, however much they dislike their rulers, they must borrow techniques of political organization and economic production from these rulers if they are to survive in the modern world.
Many of them believe that they can also borrow from the Soviet Union short-cut methods of education, political mobilization, and speeded-up economic progress without being captured themselves by Communism, or even Socialism. They can maintain freedom of choice, however, only as long as the balance between the Russians and the capitalist countries remains a balance.
The moderate leaders therefore - resist Russian infiltration and excessive leftward trends within their own countries; but they also resist pressure from the outside to make them climb on any anti-Russian bandwagon.
They feel safer with a capitalist world to hold Russia in check; but they also feel safer with a Russia strong enough to prevent capitalism from reverting to wide-open imperialism.
For the moment, however, it is the rightists of Asia who are most active; and they, too, take advantage of the existence of Russia. Last thing at night, the rightists of Japan remind General MacArthur to look under the bed for subversive trade-unions.
They have maneuvered Mr. George Atcheson, MacArthur’s political spokesman, into the weird position of defending not only the state of affairs in Japan but Japanese aims as “virtually identical with the Allied aims.” Allied aims are presented and defended as aims which allow the Russians no elbowroom. Since the anti-Russian Japanese are also the Japanese who financed and abetted the Japanese militarists from the Mukden Incident to Pearl Harbor, the effect of such special pleading is to make Mr. Atcheson the best spokesman of the Japanese militarist point of view since the ineffable Matsuoka.
The Philippine revolt spreads
In the Philippines, the drive of the rightists is to get American equipment and aid for the suppression of agrarian unrest.
Although an old directive from President Truman, now forgotten, urged considerate treatment for the agrarian guerrillas, on account of their considerable services against the Japanese, the present drive for law and order defers the satisfaction of even legitimate grievances, and gives priority to the suppression of those who have grievances.
Thus far, the result has not been a narrowing of the area of revolt, but a spread of revolt to new areas. Several thousand former guerrillas have seized plantations which once belonged to the prosperous Japanese colonists in Mindanao, and are now squatting on them.
Title to these plantations had been transferred by the United States Alien Property Custodian, for one dollar, to the Philippine government.
The conflict with the squatters has thus become a direct conflict between the people of the Philippines and their government.
President Roxas has made some statements, which read excellently, on the subject of distribution of farm lands, but the trouble lies in an old and deeply intrenched technique of political abuse. New farm lands cannot be opened up without new roads; when new roads are to be built, knowledge of them is leaked to those who are politically on the inside, and the adjacent land is taken up by landlords before claims can be filed by bona fide homesteaders.
Since the most powerful supporters of President Roxas regard this kind of graft as a legitimate perquisite, the only way in which he could restrain them would be to increase the political rights and representation of the peasants, who are his only strong, organized opposition; and since this is exactly what he is not prepared to do, the war of internal conquest against the peasants goes on.
The Korean experiment
In Korea, the rightists also jumped into the lead at the beginning of the American occupation; but because the Korean rightists, in addition to having almost no popular support, are unbelievably incompetent, the increasingly agonizing headache of the American occupation problem threatens to outweigh the satisfaction of blocking the Russians. The word has already been spread in Washington to lay off expressions of admiration and support for Syngman Rhee, because the Military Government is now ruefully convinced that the more he is supported, the more unpopular the Americans become.
Disturbances in Southern Korea are becoming more and more widespread. Responsibility for disorder is attributed to “inspiration” from across the border in Russian-occupied Northern Korea. The rare Americans who get into the Russian zone report that the Russians are also unpopular, and that Koreans there will take the risk of sidling up to Americans to whisper, “Russians bad; Americans good.” But for some reason, in the dismal competition to see which of the two occupying forces can make itself the more thoroughly disliked, the Russians have not had to face the kind of widespread, open, and popular manifestations of resentment which harass the Americans.
This may be because the Americans do not organize “inspiration” in the southern zone for infiltration into the northern zone. Or it may be because the Russian occupation forces are much larger, and able to crack down on popular resistance before it gets organized. Or it may be that the Russians are more intensely disliked, but by small groups of people, such as the landlords, while the Americans are more vaguely disliked, but by larger groups, such as the peasants. At any rate the situation cannot be cleared up until it is thoroughly aired; and Americans returning from Korea are outspoken in saying that it is high time for an airing.
Chinese puzzle
It is in China, however, that all issues linked with the position of Russia, the influence of Russia, and even the mere idea of Russia lead up to the biggest crisis. And this crisis tends more and more to become a crisis in American politics.
Already the gloves are off. Criticism of the extent of American intervention in China will increasingly be counterattacked as appeasement of Communism and of Russia. Demand for all-out support of the Kuomintang as the “only legitimate and recognized” government in China will increasingly be identified with a policy of hostility to Russia on all issues and in all countries, throughout the world.
The first subject of debate is General Marshall’s mission. Has General Marshall failed? It is noteworthy that those who were the first to say that General Marshall had been sent on an “impossible” mission, and the first to advise that he be withdrawn, are those who demand, on all issues, a policy of hostility to Russia. On the other hand, the Chinese Communists have been increasingly reckless in accusing General Marshall of condoning aid to the Kuomintang to an extent that invalidates his function as an impartial mediator.
The truth is that General Marshall’s mission has neither failed nor succeeded. It has merely been tacitly suspended. The real issue is not the monthto-month aid we are giving to the Kuomintang. That aid has been far too little to constitute a decisive intervention. It has in fact merely kept the Kuomintang from collapse and made possible the prolongation of a military stalemate which is still evenly balanced, in spite of the loss of Kalgan by the Communists.
To say this, is the same thing as saying that the real issue is whether to grant an enormous increase in aid to the Kuomintang, in order to enable it to assert a clear military superiority over the Communists, or to decrease American aid very slightly, which would instantly force the Kuomintang to make concessions to popular demands for a coalition government. It is because this fundamental decision has not been taken that General Marshall’s mission can be regarded as in suspension; and it is a fair inference that policy in China has been under review at the White House level.
The importance of the loss of Kalgan or Chefoo by the Communists should not be exaggerated. The “prestige” troops of the Kuomintang, its American trained and American-equipped divisions, were fought to a standstill in the mountains between Peiping and Kalgan, suffering heavy attrition, which meant the acquisition of a lot of American equipment by the Communists. Kalgan was entered by the troops of Fu Tso-yi, a semi-independent war lord. Thus while the Kuomintang “won,” it won without prestige for its crack troops, and in a way which encourages independent warlordism.
Moreover the Communists, while losing Kalgan, swung around and tore up a big stretch of the strategically important Peiping-Hankow railway. By disrupting Kuomintang communications more effectively than they had ever disrupted Japanese communications, they demonstrated once more that the Kuomintang is not so formidable an enemy as the Japanese were. The military situation, in fact, is still a stalemate.
Conscription, inflation, poverty
A military stalemate can last indefinitely, but there is no such thing as a political and economic stalemate. In politics and economics, a situation either gets better or it gets worse. In China, the situation is getting worse for the Kuomintang. When Kalgan was “liberated” from the Communists, no less than a quarter of the population, instead of waiting to greet the liberators, fled into the mountains. Of those who remained, Benjamin Welles cabled to the New York Times that “it was obvious that the Chinese civilans who were drawn up along the main streets to cheer the arrival of the Nationalist officials were not moved by any overwhelming emotion.”
Hesitation in welcoming Kuomintang liberators is explained by the fact that the Kuomintang, for lack of popular support, is being forced to increasingly harsh measures. Heavy losses in the field have led to the resumption of conscription with full wartime rigor, in a war-weary country.
Two new measures are especially ominous. Communist currency is being repudiated, instead of exchanged, in areas recovered from the Communists. As a result, inflation and poverty are flooding regions which, under the Communists, had been prosperous and had been secure against inflation. Even more drastic is the cancellation of Communist land reforms — a cancellation which all too often penalizes the peasant, who fought against the Japanese, in favor of the landlord, who either ran away or collaborated with the Japanese.
Such measures bear most harshly on all nonCommunists who prospered while the Communists were around. Worst of all, they make it nakedly clear that all the Kuomintang’s financial and material aid from America is being used for civil war, and none of it for much-needed reform. ... "
<end>
But the events that I have begun by citing — the Greek mutiny and civil war, the Chinese civil war, the Iranian conflict — are of a different character.
They are not part of the Second World War, nor of its accompaniment nor aftermath. The forces basically opposed in them — opposed and clashing by arms, as well as by economic and diplomatic competition — are not aligned as were the opposing forces of the Second World War.
One of the main power groupings of the war has, indeed, been eliminated altogether.
Moreover, the new conflict [WW 3] pushes through those other disturbances which might, from one point of view, be judged as part of the war's after- math.
The comforting opinion [that] the world troubles - since August, 1945, are in a way "normal", the natural features of a time of settling- down and readjustment, like the headache and queasiness following a heavy drunk, is a delusion.
These troubles are not a hangover, but the first sips in a new bout. ( The armed skirmishes of a new war have started before the old war is finished. )
A "general peace agreement" is impossible - not because leftovers from the old war are still unswept, but - because the debris of a new war is already piling up.
After these years of so much death and suffering and exile and destruction, there is a great weariness in the world, and a hope for rest.
It is hard to say, and still harder to believe, that this hope is empty, that there will be no rest, that a new war has already begun.
Nevertheless, this is the truth, and the penalty for denying this truth will be heavy.
Preliminary skirmishes, of course, even bloody skirmishes, are not identical with the grand battle.
Sometimes, even after the skirmishes have been fought, with dead on both sides, the battle itself is delayed, or, for the time being, avoided.
Sometimes, perhaps, the battle never does take place, though only if the issues at stake are resolved by some other means.
We can, then, consider it at least possible that the Third World War may never expand much beyond these preliminary stages, might end its life in its beginning,
like a new bud late-frosted. But what chance to avoid or to win the battle would a commander have who refused to believe the reports of his scouts, who would not listen when told that shots had already been exchanged, and who lolled carelessly in his tent, playing cribbage with his aide, and arguing the tactical merits of yesterday's engagement?
The United States has made the irreversible jump into world affairs. ( The Truman Doctrine > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truman_Doctrine )
It [ the United States ] is committed everywhere, on every continent, in every major field of social action, and it can never again withdraw.
In the Third World War, the United States, whatever the wishes of its citizens, is one of the two dominating contestants.
But socially, politically and culturally, the United States is not prepared for the "world role" which it is nevertheless compelled to play.
Faced with the tasks of full social maturity, the United States is itself mature in one field alone: in the development of the technique of production.
MASS PRODUCTION
In this, Americans themselves often do not understand their unparalleled supremacy. There is not, and has never been, anything approaching American methods of production. The last war showed that it is almost impossible to set goals too high for American factories to reach. Whether hairpins or battleships, air- planes or carpet slippers, cement or the most delicate precision in- struments, machine tools or penicillin, the United States can, so far as technique goes, flood the earth with them.
It is not so much in the machines themselves, where England and Germany and perhaps Sweden and Switzerland have done better, that the specific United States superiority lies. It is rather in a talent, by now almost a national characteristic, for the large scale organization of production.
England and Germany could build finer ships and airplanes and cameras, but they could not organize the hundreds of thousands of men and machines and secondary supplies and plants and freight cars and trucks into functioning organisms out of which could issue the immense quantities of very good, if not the finest, ships and airplanes and cameras.
This abiLIty - to organize production - is so well established that it seems capable of being applied at will, or under pressure, to new and unprecedented problems.
There is an instructive contrast between the petty Nazi attempts to manufacture atomic bombs, and the colossal, integrated Manhattan Project. Almost none of the fundamental research was done by Americans. The true creative energy of the United States was expressed in the organization and its mass functioning. The achievement was the same with blood plasma, radar, new drugs, or K rations.
The same talent was notable even in the military conduct of the war. The War and Navy Departments, the generals and admirals, inferior in the niceties of military tradition and science to those of other nations, were heroic as mass organizers. They hurled at the enemy overwhelming quantities of supplies, men, shells, food, ships, trucks, tanks, planes, so that the mistakes and crudities of details were buried in the mass.
The military methods were in accord with the American genius. To send thousands of planes and two million tons of shipping against a small Pacific atoll would have been absurd for any other nation, but it was exactly American.
From this supremacy in the technique of production, a supremacy that is like one of the wild artistic talents, irrational, only half- conscious, uncontrolled, out of balance with intelligence and other impulses, there derives, for the United States, a powerful urge toward a crude, narrowly conceived economic imperialism.
Driven by the potential of their mass production factories, the directors of the American economy would like to imagine the world as an open field, waiting for the rain of American goods and machines and money.
They can provide all, they dream, for all the world, and they do not need any help from other bungling, ineffective nations, a Germany or England or Japan.
The world, all the world, should be the vast market for American goods and machines and the source of certain desirable supplies. What a blessing it would be to the world!
If only it were not for the narrowness of foreign business competitors, and the blindness of generals and politicians at home as well as elsewhere, whose careers seem to be a wilful plot against rational and efficient production.
But the politicians and generals remain, and the ability to organize mass production is not a sufficient qualification for the proper conduct of the affairs of a great world power.
Human society is more than factories, weighty as is the influence of the factories on society as a whole.
And when we leave the premises of the factories, the American, there so seemingly mature and triumphant, appears as a gawky adolescent.
For this social immaturity, the circumstances of the nation's history provide an explanation.
The United States began only three centuries ago, as a colonial offshoot of Western Civilization.
During more than two of these centuries, its energies were concentrated on the comparatively primitive task of conquering a natural wilderness.
It was removed, in those generations, from the culture and learning of the civilization of which it was nevertheless a part, and from which its historical life was drawn. Its good fortune, moreover, hindered its normal cultural growth, like a gross boy too pampered and sheltered by a foolish mother.
Its rich material resources, its continental self-sufficiency, its geographical isolation until the present age, were curtains hiding from it the way of the world.
The natural wilderness was subdued, a nation was formed, a matchless economic machine constructed, but there was no art of its own, no music, no literature, no great philosophy or religion, none of those signs of an inner and deeper wisdom.
The foolish, sheltering mother is now dead, killed by the conseqences of scientific technology. The walls of the continental home are down.
The untrained adolescent must act on the world arena, not with an obscure apprenticeship but as a spotlit, featured star.
The result is a kind of schizoid split; the accomplished, confident technician of production is fused with a crude and hesitant semibarbarian.
Let us consider, as a symptom of this schizoid adolescence, the attitude of our soldiers at the end of the recent war. Most accounts agree that it was summed up in a single objective: to go home, to Mother, the Best Girl, a local job, and the corner drugstore or saloon. Emotionally the wish is understandable and sympathetic.
But rationally - it should be plain that such an attitude on the part of its young men is incompatible with the objective requirements of a world power. This was not the attitude of the young men of the Athens of the 5th century B.C., or of the Rome of the late Republic and the Empire, or of the Moslems of the 8th century, or of modern Holland and England and France. The young men of a world power must be ready to act in the world, to seek their career and its fruition in far places.
Power is not abstract, nor is it adequately embodied in bills of exchange, or mere material commodities.
As United States power stretches out to Brazil or Africa or China or Europe or the Near East, it must be concretized in men and their institutions, in soldiers and engineers and administrators and intelligence agents, in factories and airfields and plantations and railroads.
It is contemptible to blame the young soldiers for their provincial attitude, to condemn them, as has been not infrequently done, for cowardice or shirking.
It is the nation, not the soldiers alone, that is unprepared.
It was the members of Congress, not the soldiers, who showed real cowardice and blindness when they responded to the complaints of the soldiers not by pointing out to them the re- sponsibilities of world power but by yielding to the homesickness, and seeking demagogically to gain a few cheap votes by joining in the clamor to bring the boys home at whatever cost to the interest of the nation — and of the world.
The same provincialism, flatly counter to the needs of world power, is reflected in the educational system.
There are few Americans who can speak even tolerably well a foreign language, and fewer still who bother to learn intimately another nation's culture.
Until very recently, there were only one or two schools that trained students for international careers in diplomacy or business.
Even the New York Times, the most internationalist of the country's journals, advocates as the educational reform most to be desired a new concentration on United States history — at the very moment when what is required is an understanding of world history.
Equally revealing is the nation's attitude toward its armed services. Responsible world power must be based finally upon military strength.
The nation, daily and unavoidably intervening all over the world — from Argentina to Spain to Iran to Manchuria — suffers an extended internal crisis over the perfectly obvious question of a renewed Draft Law, a necessity which is so much accepted by all other nations as to be not even subject for debate.
This failure to take the armed services seriously has, of course, a long historical background. The seriousness was, in fact, not required in the past, because, on the one hand, possible wars developed slowly, with geography an adequate first line of defense; and, on the other, the nation did not have extensive permanent commitments throughout the world.
The carry-over of this attitude into the new period, when all has changed, when the United States is one of the two decisive world powers, is another sign of the nation's adolescent schizo- phrenia.
Psychically, the United States does not want to admit to itself that it is not a child any longer, but a grown-up man.
We may note similar characteristics in the nation's economic conceptions (as distinguished from its practical abilities at economic production).
The owner or manager of a factory is delighted to sell his goods abroad at a profit, and from his standpoint there the whole matter ends.
He doesn't want to reflect that if he and others like him sell abroad, then someone inside the country must also buy from abroad. (IN 1947) He hasn't learned that for a mature world power it is even more necessary to receive than to give.
Congressmen and busi- nessmen alike argue about loans to Britain or France or China as if they v/ere niggling credits arranged by a store at a local bank, in- stead of conceiving them in their actual meaning as instruments of world policy. Ship owNers and airways companies haggle over a foreign contract - to make it net a few more dollars, without any concern for the fact that they might be driving a potential ally into the network of the world opponent.
I have been mentioning a few symptomatic illustrations of what I have called the immaturity of the United States.
STOPped 6-13-2022
This "immaturity" may be described more abstractly as a form of what sociologists call "cultural lag"; specifically, the persistence of habits, attitudes, ideas, customs, and to some extent institutional structures, appro- priate enough to the United States of the 19th century, into a new period where the actual position of the United States has com- pletely changed, and where these persisting habits, attitudes and ideas are incongruous and stultifying. The United States, become in fact a world power, potentially the greatest world power, cannot function properly as a world power because it still conceives itself and the world through the medium of ideas suited to what was, in reality, a province, out of the main stream. The illustrations could readily be multiplied. I propose, however, to restrict myself to one further instance, the most important of all, and the one most directly relevant to the subject matter of this book: the immaturity of the United States in political understanding. Three features of United States foreign policy during the past £vc years (though they are not confined to that interval) must have struck nearly every reflective observer. First, the policy abruptly shifts, without any adequate motivation. The United States forces Argentina into the United Nations, then takes the lead against Argentina by publishing the Blue Book on Peron; the pubHc is com- pelled to accept Tito, then the effort is made to help Mikhailovitch at his trial, and thereby to injure Tito; in China there is a flip-flop ■every few months; Soviet-dominated Poland is recognized at the same time that anti-communist exile Polish troops are aided; and so on. Second, the United States has not been securing political re- sults commensurate with its material strength. After all the con- ferences, Teheran or Yalta or Potsdam or London or Paris, it always turns out that the United States has made the significant conces- sions. This feature is the more striking in comparison to the habit of Soviet diplomacy, during these same years, to get results far greater than would seem to follow from its material strength. Even when the Soviet Union was on the edge of military defeat, it could still win political victories. Third, there is a peculiar ineptness about United States political actions. The political representatives are al- ways making mistakes, getting mixed up, getting lost in procedure, having to retract and start over. These features are all related to the fact that the United States does not have at its disposal among its citizens, governing or gov- erned, a trained understanding of' the field of politics in its more general sense, or, in particular, of contemporary world politics. Many of the poHtical representatives of the United States do not know either what they are doing or what they are up against; they do not even know, usually, what the problems are. The prevailing conceptions of politics in the United States have two chief sources, both extending back to the early years of the unified nation. One is the abstract, empty, sentimental rhetoric of democratic idealism, as established for us first by Thomas Jeffer- son. This is for speeches, conscience-soothing, and full-dress occa- sions. The other is the ward-heeling, hotel-and-saloon, spoils-system, machine practices, put on a working basis first by Jefferson's party colleague and first vice-president, Aaron Burr. This is the traditional American combination, holding as much for the Republican as for the Democratic Party. The amalgam, under Franklin Roosevelt, of the "idealistic" New Dealers with the "vicious city machines," so puzzling to many liberal commentators, is in the standard American style, and is to be found just as plainly functioning in Jefferson's election, through Burr, in 1800. Jeffersonian rhetoric has no connection with reality, and I shall not, therefore, be further concerned with it. When it is taken seri- ously, as it is not by many of those who most frequently employ it, it prohibits the understanding of political events. American machine politics, and the ideas corresponding to ma- chine politics, are remarkably effective within a limited range of political action, especially under more or less stable social conditions.
They can take over and keep control of a city administration or a State government, or swing the outcome of the national nominating convention of one of the political parties. They can, within their restricted sphere, suitably reward political friends and punish enemies. When, however, either the scale of political action sufficiently expands or the social conditions underlying politics enter a period of crisis, the machine conceptions are no longer adapted. Great nations, with a tradition and a culture, do not operate in terms of quashed parking tickets, building contracts, and soft jobs in the local courthouse. To deal successfully with them on a world scale, it is necessary to know something about world geography and eco- nomics — and even religions and morals, and about the history and behavior of civilizations. Moreover, in times of crisis, the control of the movements of the masses cannot be won by cigars and hand- shakes and postmasterships. The masses become subject to the in- fluence of ideas, of world-shaking myths, of vast, non-rational impulses. Here, also, the usage of the educational system is instructive.
In United States educational institutions, from primary school to uni- versity, politics is taught under such headings as "Civics" or "Gov- ernment."
The courses bolster the usual rhetoric
with sterile charts of outward governmental forms — constitutions and bureaus and uni- or bi-cameral parliaments and departments and councils.
For practical training, students are taught case-work technique in social service, and how to become a Grade 8 civil servant.
We seldom find courses offered in world political history and its correlated fields, in geopolitics, world economics, military history.
In the United States, the "practical politician" despises the men of learning in the political sciences — for there are a few; and the men of learning, blocked from contact with the springs of power, become academic and sterile. We live in what Lenin correctly described as an "era of wars and revolutions," in the midst, indeed, of a great world revolution.* A distinguishing and all-important development of this era has been the rise of the totalitarian political movements, of the essentially similar though variously named Nazi, fascist, and communist varieties. Nowhere is the political illiteracy of Americans more fully and disastrously shown than in their lack of understanding of these totalitarian movements. Many of our political leaders believe that the totalitarian parties, though somewhat strange and "foreign," are fundamentally similar to our own Democratic and Republican parties, -- those loose, shifting aggregations of millions of diverse- minded men and women, held together by vague sentiments, vaguer traditions, and the business of office-seeking. When General Patton slowed up in his de-Nazification of the Third Army's zone in Ger- many, he explained that after all the difference between Nazis and anti-Nazis was pretty much like that between Democrats and Republicans at home. He was relieved of his command; but his error was no greater than that of Roosevelt or Hull or Stettinius or Byrnes or Acheson or Wallace - when, all over the world, they accepted without protest the inclusion of the communists among the "democratic parties" that should be permitted to function with full freedom in liberated or conquered nations, and when they welcomed commu- nists into reconstituted governments. In China, indeed, the United States government compelled Chiang Kai-shek to propose, in the autumn of 1945, the inclusion of the Chinese communists in the Chinese government.
[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Totalitarianism ]
SOURCE: https://online.ucpress.edu/cpcs/article-abstract/53/1/13/107200/Theory-behind-Russian-Quest-for-Totalitarianism?redirectedFrom=PDF
March 2020
RESEARCH ARTICLE| MARCH 01 2020
Theory behind Russian Quest for Totalitarianism. Analysis of Discursive Swing in Putin's Speeches
Communist and Post-Communist Studies (2020) 53 (1): 13–26.
https://doi.org/10.1525/cpcs.2020.53.1.13
These totalitarian movements, with their steel discipline, their
monolithic structure, their cement of terror, their rigid and total
ideology, their pervasion of every aspect of the lives of their mem-
bers, are of a species totally different from what we are accustomed
to think of as "political parties."
No wonder the United States political representatives are constantly surprised by the behavior of
the Soviet representatives at every conference, just as they were always surprised by the Nazis.
Our diplomats believe that they are
bargaining with other men who, though tough and shrewd, are of
a similar kind to themselves, and who operate according to the same
underlying rules.
For the Soviet men, the bargaining is the lesser detail.
They are there to use the conference as a forum from which to speak to the masses,
and as a device not for gaining agreement with, but for promoting the destruction of, their fellow-conferees.
Gromyko's rude behavior at the Security Council is unintelligible to Byrnes;
but Byrnes' vacillating behavior, unfortunately, is not unintelligible to Gromyko.
The low level of political knowledge in the United States is shown
(also) by the books, articles, speeches, editorials and columns on political affairs.
Here direct comparison can be made, and it is safe
to say, I think, that our [United States] level is lower than that of any other nation.
To an informed Russian or Englishman or Chinese or Brazilian, it
must seem incredible that tens of millions of the citizens of the
United States guide their political sense by columnists and radio
speakers educated by years of scandal-mongering, sports writing, or
cigar salesmanship; and try to find out what is happening in the
world by reading the careless notes of journalists who consider themselves qualified
as "political analysts" because they call famous men [1947] by
their first names and know the fashionable bar in each capital.
It would be absurd to believe that a mere increase in political
understanding could solve the catastrophic political problems that lie ahead.
In spite of Bacon, knowledge is not of itself power.
But - ignorance is weakness, because ignorance is not able to direct
whatever resources may be available toward the goals that may be selected.
Nonsense is a safe luxury only in times more tranquil than ours.
The purpose of this book may be simply stated. I [ James Burnham ] propose to analyze, in its primary and most fundamental lines, the world political situation as it exists in this period following the conclusion of the Second World War; as it exists in reality, not as it is distorted in wishful dreams or in the lies of propagandists. I propose, further, in terms of the actual situation, to examine the alternatives of political action which are at the disposal of the United States. < go to Contents>
2. Is It Really One World?
( https://archive.org/details/struggleforworld00burn/page/n7/mode/2up )
WENDELL WILLKIE, with an enthusiasm touched off by the
wonders of modern air transport, popularized the phrase, "one
world." The complex o£ feelings and ideas associated with the phrase
were not, however, Willkie's discovery. They have a longer history.
It is worth while to be clear about this question of the unity of
the world, since more is at stake than a fruitful subject for after-
dinner conversation or election campaigns. To many, there seem to
follow, from the belief that the world is one, certain political con-
clusions of great import. If the world is one, they argue, then it can
and ought properly to be politically united; then there can, and
should be, just one world government. In order to unite the world
in a single world government, all that is necessary is to make known
to the peoples of the world this fact that their world is one.
Is it true that the world is one ? Or rather, since this first quesdon
is ambiguous, is a way of confusing several different and independent
questions, let us put it : in what sense or senses is the world one ? in
what sense or senses is it many? In both cases, the answer must be
in terms that are relevant to the problems of world politics. The fact
that the world is one in an astronomical sense, as a single planet
located in the gravitational field of a definite star, is not of political
importance.
The first expression, in the West, of the notion of the unity of the
world was, according to tradition, by Alexander the Great, who
therein went beyond the philosophic ideas of his tutor Aristotle. It
was developed further by the Stoics of the Roman Empire, by
Dante, partly under Stoic influence, and by the medieval philoso-
phers, with their doctrine of a universal "natural law." Kant, in his
moral philosophy, gave it a new variation; and it reappears today
among the beliefs of many internationalists.
The oneness of the world, as interpreted by the core of meaning
shared in this lineage, extended over 2300 years, and to be found
also in Confucius and in the earliest, non-supernatural form of
Buddhism, is a secular philosophic conception that all men are one
because they share in a "common humanity." Whatever the diver-
sities in their talents or circumstances, all men are subject to the
laws of the universal cosmos, all men have reason, all men are moral
beings, equally able to exercise moral will and equally bound by
moral duty. "World humanity," "the world community," therefore,
are not empty abstractions, but are phrases which sum up the ob-
jective metaphysical reality of a single universal human nature.
In recent years, this philosophic conception has been given a more
naturalistic, empirical slant. Emphasis is sometimes put not so much
on reason, moral will, and natural law that men are, in some com-
plicated metaphysical manner, presumed to share, as on the basic
biological and psychological needs, desires and impulses that they
undoubtedly do share : needs for food, sex and shelter, the desire for
some sort of security, the impulse toward sociality.
A content similar to that of these secular conceptions is to be
found, transferred into religious language, in the ideas of the great
world religions, particularly in Christianity, Hinduism and Bud-
dhism. In Christianity this is summed up in the New Testament
doctrine of "the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man."
Since God is the Creator and Father of all men equally, since our
being is alike derived from Divinity, we are therefore all brothers.
This, then, is the first specifiable meaning, or rather set of mean-
ings, that can be given to the phrase, "one world." The world is one
because all men share a common humanity, whether that humanity
is interpreted in naturalistic, metaphysical or religious terms. What
bearing, then, does the oneness of the world, so understood, have
upon the cold historical problems of world politics in our time?
The answer, unfortunately, is that it has almost no bearing at all.
Whatever common humanity men may have, they must have had
it from the beginning. Men have existed on the earth for at least
several hundred thousand years, and probably for several million.
Their common humanity has never prevented them from always
being divided, from always fighting, killing, torturing and oppress-
ing each other. The very philosophers who proclaimed the meta-
physical doctrine have been conspicuous in the fighting and the
torturing; the religions which profess the Fatherhood o£ God have
inspired among the fiercest of the wars and persecutions; the fash-
ionable naturalists of common humanity in our own time have not
been backward in defending the saturation bombing of helpless
cities, where common humanity was thoroughly disintegrated in
common.
Experience does not, then, suggest that common humanity has
had much effect in contributing to the historical goal of one world
community. The trouble with the doctrine is, first, that in its selec-
tion of certain common factors from the totality of human nature
it neglects many less desirable but equally universal factors, such as
man's impulse to destruction and pain as well as to fraternity, his
need for hate, his desire for domination, in short his irrationality,
which is at least no less plain than his reason. Second, the doctrine,
having decided on its common factors, fails to note that, in concrete
reality, these are inextricably bound up with many other factors,
both common and special, both universal and particular: with the
other, neglected common factors, and with all the particulars of
tribe, family, city, nation, property relations, language, wealth and
poverty, customs and taboos, material resources, science and religion
and technology and art. What men actually do in history, and
notably the conflicts they get into with each other, are determined
not so much by the abstracted factors which they have in common
as by the specific circumstances of place and social structure and
time, wherein their interests diverge and their objectives clash. The
humanity common to a Soviet commissar, a Trobriand native, a
Midwestern small farmer, and a Spanish Jesuit is a rather pale resi-
due, a not very substantial foundation for the construction of one
world.
Moreover, the common needs and impulses that men have — for
food, shelter, women, pre-eminence, wealth, pleasure — ^far from
invariably bringing them together in brotherhood, are more usually
sources of their mutual struggle. When there is not enough food to
go around, reason and the moral will have never proved adequate
to the task of deciding who gets what. The nomads of steppes be-
come arid through climatic change descend on the plain, with as
much and as little attention to the claims of moral duty as die house-
wives who throw themselves into the frenzy o£ the black market.
It would, nevertheless, be wrong to dismiss altogether the doctrine
of common humanity and the brotherhood of man. Taken as a
description of what men have been and are, of how they behave, it
is distorted and even dangerously false. Projected as a guiding ideal,
as a goal and purpose, the doctrine has not only a splendid nobility,
so wonderfully expressed in those passages of St. Matthew where
Christ corrects the jealous separatism of the Scribes and Pharisees;
but it has also, through the loyalty of those who believe in the ideal,
a chance of influencing, toward the goal of brotherhood which it
states, the course of history.
It is not sentimental, but simply human, to have ideals. What is
sentimental, and what so often leads to disaster, is to confuse ideals
with present facts. Men are in fact not one but divided, not rational
in their actions but predominantly irrational, not filled with love
only but also with selfishness, not good but a strange mixture of
evil and good. The facts remain, whatever words we use. But men
can become less divided; and even if the hate and irrationality and
evil cannot be eliminated, their consequences can, perhaps, be made
less terrible. We rightly honor the ideal of common humanity. How-
ever far it is from solving, or even helping us much in solving, the
problems of today, it remains a hope, and the best hope, for tomor-
From the time of Karl Marx, the notion of one world has been
given another, very different interpretation, an interpretation ac-
cepted by many who are not at all Marxists. The world has not in
the past been one, the Marxists say, but it has become potentially
one — will, they would say, inevitably soon become one — through
the results of modern technology. Machines and mass production,
rapid transportation and communication, world-wide economic in-
terdependence through the world-wide division of labor and re-
sources, the spread of science and its applications, all these have so
linked all parts of the world together, so reduced the time and space
dimensions applicable to human society, that the world is today as
intimate a community as a county was a thousand years ago. When
these facts are recognized, or merely through their effect even if
unrecognized, the world as a whole will necessarily be organized,
socially and politically, into a single world state or society, so that
its political form will come into balance with its technological base.
This Marxian conclusion rests upon an assumption drawn from
the Marxian theory of history. According to the theory, the nature
of human society and the process of historical change depend "in
the final analysis" (to use Engels' ambiguous words) upon the
development of technology ("the means of production," in Marxian
language). In the long run, everything else, property relations, class
divisions, political organization, philosophy, art, morality and reli-
gion, follow causally from the state of technology as applied in the
means of production. Therefore, Marxists reason today, since a single
basic technology, a single means and method of production, are
now world-wide in extent and influence, it follows that government
(along with everything else) is, or is ready to be, world-wide. Man-
kind has become one because mankind as a whole now depends
upon a single means and method of production.
This Marxian doctrine is in part true, and I shall 'separate out its
truths before proceeding to state its errors.
Through scientific technology, factories and machines and assem-
bly lines, and an extreme division of labor. Western Civilization*
has constructed the extraordinary mechanical appliances and the
remarkable method of production with which we are all familiar.
These appliances, especially during the past century, have been spread
into all parts of the earth. For the use of the Western productive
plant, raw materials of many kinds, agricultural and mineral, have
likewise been drawn from all parts of the earth. Some regions —
notably Japan, Russia, and sections of such countries as China, India
and Turkey — not themselves part of Western Civilization have even
borrowed the method of production itself, and are turning out on
their own account the mechanical appliances.
We must further note that historical geography depends upon
* By "Western Civilization" I refer in this book to that civilization whose original
home was in the European peninsula, whose traditional religion has been Christianity,
and whose historical career began at the end of the Dark Ages that followed the col-
lapse of Hellenic Civilization.
... an Einsteinian rather than a Newtonian function; that is, upon a
combined space-time function. The devices for rapid communication
and transportation, and for long-distance warfare, have historically
speaking greatly reduced the size of the earth. The historical, polit-
ical distance between two places depends primarily upon how long
it takes to get from one to the other, either in person, or in influence,
as by the proxy of a message or a bomb. Today it takes much less
time for a man to go from New York to Moscow than it took him
150 years back to go from New York to Boston; and it takes in-
comparably less time for a radio message or a rocket to travel either
distance.* Therefore it is correct to say that, in certain respects at
least, the world today is a community as geographically intimate as
a county a thousand years ago.
A conclusion of great importance does follow from these truths.
They do not prove that the world and its civilization are one, or
that a world community is inevitable; but they show that the ad-
ministration of the world, or most of the world, as a single state is
now technically possible. There is no longer any insuperable tech-
nical obstacle to a degree of integration in armed power, police,
courts, finances and economy sufficient to constitute a unified world
state.
From this positive conclusion, which I shall later use in positive
analysis, we may turn to the errors in the Marxian doctrine. Of
these, there are principally two. First, the existing facts are over-
stated. Though it is true that the mechanical appliances of Western
Civilization are found all over the earth, they are in many regions
far from abundant, in not a few so rare as to make hardly a ripple
in the sea of the local culture. Airplanes have by now been seen,
probably, by most human beings; but there are comparatively few
places where airplanes have become part of ordinary daily life. A
* This fact alone shows the absurdity o£ those who argue that there can be two
great nations today — the United States and the Soviet Union, for example — ^with no
potential basis of conflict because they have no "points of contact": that is, their
borders do not meet on a conventional map. Today the real borders of all nations —
the limits of their interests — all overlap.
... radio or an electric iron or a light bulb is still a magical sensation
among well over half the peoples of the earth. If we study economic
maps of the distribution of railroads or electric power plants or auto-
mobiles or telephones, what impresses us is not that they diffuse the
earth, but quite the contrary, that most of the world is almost en-
tirely without them.
If we consider the advanced Western means of production, we
find that their distribution is even more narrowly limited. The maps
show only a few major concentrations: in the United States, in Eng-
land, in certain areas of the Soviet Union, in Japan and the adja-
cent Chinese coast, and in part of Continental Europe; and the
Second World War has considerably reduced the last two. Else-
where, it is only in a few seacoast city areas in India, Brazil, Argen-
tina, Australia and perhaps one or two other nations that we find
significant quantities of the typical Western means of production
— the factories, mills, power plants.
The mechanical appliances of the West are not, therefore, literally
present everywhere in the world. The most that we can correctly
say is that their power and influence are felt, directly or indirectly,
everywhere in the world.
The second Marxian error is deeper. It is the error in the assump-
tion drawn from the general theory of history, the error in the belief
that technology is the sole determinant of the nature and process of
history and civilization. Technology is unquestionably one of the
decisive causal forces in history, and in the history of Western
Civilization, especially since the Renaissance, it has been perhaps
more influential -than any other causal force; but in the history of
civilizations in general it must be reduced to merely one among
several determining influences. Climate, custom, institutional forms,
religion, moraUty, even intelligence and individual genius, all have
at least a relative autonomy as historical forces. The nature and fate
of civilizations is the resultant of the interaction of all of these, and
still others, with each other, and with, of course, technology as well.
We who belong to Western Civilization have our vision distorted
by a parochial blindness. We assume the identity of mankind as a
whole with ourselves. All that we can see of the peoples of the earth
is ourselves — the "civilized" — and a dim outer fringe of "natives."
And since we are peculiarly distinguished by our technological
prowess, we further confound civilization with technology. Through
this narrow slit, this egocentrism, the world can appear as one, or
almost one. If, however, we try for a moment to lift and expand our
vision, if we get rid of the filters of Westernization and technology,
the map of the world falls into more profoundly varied contours.
The nations of Western Civilization are themselves, for that mat-
ter, bitterly and obviously divided, so bitterly that they have been
engaged during the present century in the effort, not without suc-
cess, to annihilate each other. They are divided in language, in
economic interest, in governmental forms, in the axioms of juris-
prudence. The fiercely divisive influence of nationalism is itself a
phenomenon of our age. Our kind of nationalism arose in conjunc-
tion with the French Revolution, and today it shows few signs of
abating. It is a remarkable fact that during the Second World War
the effective resistance in Europe to both Nazism and communism
turned out to be nationalist in motive. Neither freedom in the ab-
stract nor "class war" nor "United Europe" nor "World Govern-
ment" proved to be the rallying ideas of the undergrounds and the
resistance movements. It was the idea of "France," of "Poland,"
of "Greece."
If there are these divisions within Western Civilization, how much
more profoundly divided, then, is the world as a whole, where there
simultaneously exist, along with Western Civilization, at least four
other distinct civilizations — the Far Eastern, the Islamic, the Hindu,
and the Orthodox Christian — together with the remains of several
earlier civilizations, and even a number of surviving primitive cul-
tures ?
The misleading feature in the social environment has been the fact
that, in modern times, our own Western Civilization has cast the
net of its economic system round the World and has caught in its
meshes the whole living generation of Mankind and all the habitable
lands and navigable seas on the face of the Planet. . . .
[Western observers who believe in "the unity of civilization," in
"one world"] have exaggerated the range of the facts in two direc-
tions. First, they have assumed that the present more or less com-
plete unification of the World on a Western basis on the economic
plane and the large measure of unification on the same basis which
has been accomplished on the political plane are together tantamount
to a perfect unification on all planes. Secondly, they have equated
unification with unity. . . .
[Their] vision of the contemporary world must be confined to the
economic and political planes of social life and must be inhibited
from penetrating to the cultural plane, which is not only deeper
but is fundamental. While the economic and political maps of the
World have now been "Westernized" almost out of recognition, the
cultural map remains today substantially what it was before our
Western Society ever started on its career of economic and political
conquest. On this cultural plane, for those who have eyes to see, the
lineaments of the four living non-Western civilizations are still clear.
Even the fainter outlines of the frail primitive societies that are being
ground to powder by the passage of the ponderous Western steam-
roller have not quite ceased to be visible. How have our historians
managed to close their eyes lest they should see? They have simply
put on the spectacles — or the blinkers — of their generation; and we
may best apprehend what the outlook of this generation has been
by examining the connotation of the English word "Natives" and
the equivalent words in the other vernacular languages of the con-
temporary Western World.
When we Westerners call people "Natives" we implicidy take all
the cultural colour out of our perceptions of them. We see them as
trees walking, or as wild animals infesting the country in which
we happen to come across them . . . Their tenure is as provisional
and precarious as that of the forest trees which the Western pioneer
fells or that of the big game which he shoots down. And how shall
the "civilized" Lords of Creation treat the human game, when in
their own good time they come to take possession of the land which,
by right of eminent domain, is indefeasibly their own? Shall they
treat these "Natives" as vermin to be exterminated, or as domesti-
cable animals to be turned into hewers of wood and drawers of
water? .... Evidently the word ("Native") is not a scientific term
but an instrument of action ... It belongs to the realm of Western
practice and not of Western theory; and this explains the paradox
that a classificatory-minded society has not hesitated to apply the
name indiscriminately to the countrymen of a Gandhi and a Bose
and a Rabindranath Tagore, as well as to "primitives" of die lowest
degree of culture, such as the Andaman Islanders and tlie Australian
... Blackfellows, For the theoretical purpose of objective description,
this sweeping use of the word makes sheer nonsense. For the prac-
tical purpose of asserting the claim that our Western Civilization is
the only civilization in the World, the usage is a militant gesture.*
Wendell Willkie, in his hurried trip, visited large cities, factories,
airports and government offices. He talked to factory managers, gen-
erals, bureaucrats and high administrators, who were besides anxious
for favors, through a good report, from the United States. Not un-
naturally Willkie saw that world as one. But it does not take a
very long trip in from the seacoast of India or New Zealand or
China or Arabia or Africa or Burma or Ceylon to remind those who
are willing to see that culturally the world is not one but many. It
does not, indeed, take a trip longer than that to our local museum
or library, where songs and pictures and statues and symbols and
religious books will offer the same evidence. The diversity, moreover,
is not just a surface paint. There are even, hard as it is for a West-
ern mind to understand it, "natives" — of China and India and
Morocco and Turkey — who not only have no automobiles and bath-
tubs and radios but who do not want them.f
We may summarize the analysis, up to this point, of "one world":
The world is potentially one in the light of a possible ideal of
brotherhood, of common humanity. The world is actually one, at
least at a certain level, through the direct or indirect influence of a
particular technology and method of economic production. Politi-
cally, and, most deeply of all, culturally, the world is many.
* Quoted by permission from A Study of History, by Arnold J. Toynbee, Vol. I,
I, C, III, {b), pp. 150-153, published by the Oxford University Press (London) on
behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. In this chapter, and in
Chapter 4, I have drawn considerably from this great work.
t Toynbee, op cit., recalls "the story of the Sharif of Morocco who, returning
home after a visit to Europe . . . , was yet heard to exclaim, as he sighted the
Moroccan coast: 'What a comfort to be getting back to Civilization!' When our
great-grandchildren make the same remark as their ship enters the Solent or the
Mersey, will the joke be published in the comic papers of China and — Morocco?"
I have dealt so far in this chapter with long-term phenomena: of
more than a century in the economic and political instances; of a
great many centuries in the case of the cultural plurality. I have left
unmentioned one growingly familiar and outstanding fact, of direct
bearing upon the question of "one world," which is a phenomenon
of decades rather than of centuries. This fact more than any of the
others has direct relevance to the question of political policy. Politi-
cal action, however wise, cannot be meaningfully conceived in terms
of centuries, but at most, of decades or a generation. Rational politi-
cal action does not disregard the slow, vast, centuries-old phenomena,
but it is compelled to accept them as an element of the situation
which is merely "given," like the slowly changing sea for marine
life, or the atmosphere. Deliberate political policy must concentrate
on the main issue of today and a few years from today.
The additional fact is that, independently of the unities and diver-
sities which we have been considering, the world today is split
sharply and decisively into two incommensurate regions, the com-
munist and the non-communist. The very metaphors of contempo-
rary rhetoric give witness to this split, and to its sharpness. We all
know about the "iron curtain" at the dividing line. This metaphor,
however, is misleading. The division is not correctly to be thought
of as crystallized along a particular geographical line. The com-
munist region infiltrates into every geographical area of the earth;
and the split, though plainest along the boundaries of the Soviet
Empire, is to be found also' within each nation outside of those
formal boundaries, dividing within that nation the communists
from the non-communists as formidably as, at a given moment, the
Elbe divides Germany.
Since much of this book will deal with the split of the world into
communist and non-communist fragments, I shall here do no more
than note the fact. It is a fact toward which every communist is long
adjusted. From the time of Lenin, and implicitly before Lenin, every
communist has been drilled to believe that in the world there are
only two divisions of mankind: the communists, and all the rest.
From the point of view of communist theory, all the thousand dif-
IS IT REALLY ONE WORLD? 25
ferences, among non-communists, o£ nation or wealth or learning or
class or color or religion or policy are as nothing when weighed
against that difference which separates the communist from all
others. When the communist sings, "The international Party shall
be the human race," he means what he says, and he expresses his
view of the process by which alone he thinks that ultimate differ-
ence can be overcome.
< go to Contents>
3. The Political Consequences of the Atomic Bomb
MOST OPINIONS about the historical meaning of the discovery
and use of atomic weapons * can be divided into two general types.
One, the less conspicuous, though adhered to by a number of mili-
tary leaders, maintains that no essential change in warfare or in
history is brought about by the introduction of atomic weapons.
Atomic weapons are just one more item in a long list: clubs and
stones, swords, spears, ships, bows and arrows, gunpowder, rifles,
cannon, machine guns, airplanes, gas, rockets, atomic bombs. . . .
New weapons have altered the range at which killing and destruc-
tion can take place, and have increased the amount of killing that
can be accomplished at one moment. The differences, however, are
only of degree. Tactics, defensive and offensive, must accommodate
themselves to the quantitative changes. The great principles of mili-
tary strategy stand unaltered. An atomic war will look quite differ-
ent from older fashioned wars, and will require different tactical
preparations and dispositions; but it will be decided by the same
combination of resources, morale, and strategic superiority that has
always been in question.
The other set of opinions, in extreme contrast, holds that the dis-
covery of the use of nuclear energy, and its adaptation to warfare,
have thrown us into an altogether new stage of world history. War,
and in time human life, are at the beginning of a total change, un-
* Atomic bombs are not, of course, the only new weapons of mass destruction. It
has been claimed that some others, not yet disclosed, are still more devastating in
effect than atomic bombs. For the sake of simplicity, I shall speak of "atomic
weapons" or merely of "atomic bombs"; but I wish to be understood to refer in
each case to the entire group of new weapons of comparable, or greater, destructive
power. I may add, as my own opinion, that I should expect the nuclear weapons,
based as they are on the unlocking of a new level of physical reality, to prove of
much the greatest importance,
26
CONSEQUENCES OF THE ATOMIC BOMB 27
recognizable and unpredictable from the point of view of the past.
Experience can no longer be a guide. To be in accord with the revo-
lutionary "nuclear age," we must also revolutionize our ideas.
When confronted with two extreme and seemingly opposed views,
the liberal mind customarily feels that the truth must lie in a com-
promise halfway between them'. In this way, liberalism avoids the
often rather grim duty of facing the flat truth, and recognizing that
on most matters all views except one are simply false.
In this instance, the truth is more complex than usual. Both ex-
treme views happen to be true. There is no paradox, because those
who maintain the two views are talking about different things.
The first view is correct in recalling that atomic bombs were not
created ex nihilo, and do not begin their career in a social vacuum.
They do not make themselves, but are made and used by groups
of human beings. These human beings do not change their biolog-
ical and psychological traits at the moment of constructing atomic
bombs. As human beings, they are parts of organized, institutional-
ized societies; psychologically, individually and institutionally, they
conduct themselves in behavior patterns largely determined by a
long and continuing past. As a physical fact, the atomic bomb is
for human knowledge something new, unique, startling. As a social
fact, it is linked into the great chain of social facts. Its appearance,
as a physical fact, is without human significance. The human prob-
lem is : what is to be done with it, how is it to be used ? and this is
a problem not of nuclear physics but of human behavior, a moral
and social problem. Such problems did not begin with the cyclotron.
The atomic bomb does not make men more intelligent or more
unselfish; it does not abolish their impulses toward love or hate,
power or kindness; it does not eliminate the struggle of classes for
wealth and privilege, or of nations against other nations, or of free-
dom against tyranny; it does not make a great country small, or a
small one great, or a backward land advanced. What happens to
atomic bombs, what is done with them, in short, is decided not by
atomic bombs but by men; and men, in turn, make their decisions
under the social conditions accumulated through the centuries.
Looked at in such a context, therefore, it is correct to say that the
introduction of atomic weapons involves no essential change. And
it would be fatal to believe that the lessons from past experience
have no application: there are no other lessons. It is, more narrowly,
correct also to insist that the great principles of military strategy still
apply. These principles, after all, are merely a statement of the gen-
eral methods whereby any deliberate action in any field can be suc-
cessfully carried out.
Nevertheless, the second view has also its truth. Though as a social
fact atomic weapons are like other social facts, and will be dealt
with as other social facts have been, there is in the case of atomic
weapons much more at stake than in that of almost any other social
fact, far more than in any previous discovery of a new weapon; so
much more that we may reasonably consider the problem they pre-
sent as in decisive respects unique.
Warfare has always been, with only a few minor primitive ex-
ceptions, endemic to mankind as a whole. Up to the present, men
have been able to assimilate warfare to the general conditions of
human life sufficiently well to permit not merely life itself to con-
tinue, but civilizations, with all their varied achievements, to develop
and flourish. From a Malthusian standpoint, warfare can be under-
stood as one of the checks which have kept population from exceed-
ing too greatly the available means of subsistence; but war, together
with the other checks, has never for long kept the world popula-
tion from gradually increasing. In that sense mankind might be said
to have been winning in the struggle for existence. It is remarkable
that even during the very years of the first two world wars, in which
the greatest mass slaughters of all time took place, the world popu-
lation was apparently increasing not only as a whole but in almost
all of the belligerent countries themselves.
The uniqueness of atomic weapons is to be found first of all in
this: that they create a definite material possibility of the total an-
nihilation of human life.* This possibility could be realized in at
least two obvious ways. By-products of atomic explosions, rays, gases,
and so on, might so diffuse the global atmosphere that it would no
longer support human life; or they might poison the soil in such a
way that it would not bear the means of subsistence. Second, a
* The possibility is also present in the methods of mass biological warfare.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE ATOMIC BOMB 29
chain reaction involving some common, widespread element might
eliminate life at one stroke.*
I am aware that the nuclear scientists are anxious to deprecate
both o£ these possibilities. They have, they assure us, everything
under control. They calculate in advance just how much of what
will be diffused, to make sure that only the proper air and soil and
persons will be disintegrated. And their explosive chain reactions
occur in the cases only of a few odd unstable elements at the top of,
or beyond, the natural periodic table. I do not, however, have full
confidence in the pubHc statements of the scientists.
The basic ideas of nuclear physics are not too difficult for a lay-
man. It is already evident — from, for example, the questions
unsolved in advance about smoke dispersal at the Clinton plant, of
water radioactivity at Hanford, or from the curious data on the
smudging of photographic film hundreds of miles from Los Alamos
some time following the test explosion — that the scientists do not
understand thoroughly the question of the diffusion of the by
products of atomic explosions. If they do not when the explosions
are of single, extremely inefficient bombs, how much less are they
aware of the total effects from the simultaneous explosion of thou'
sands of efficient bombs.
Moreover, though their own controlled results have been achieved
only with critical concentrations of unstable elements high on the
periodic table, they are not fully aware of the general conditions for
chain reactions. By their own account, the energy cycle of the sun
involves such common elements as hydrogen, carbon and helium.
There can be no a priori reason for ruling out comparable reactions
on the earth, started, perhaps, quite accidentally from the point of
view of the intentions of the scientists.
If we wish to know the historical meaning of nuclear technology,
as it might be called, we must begin, then, by recognizing its most
distinctive consequence: that it makes possible, not at all probable
* There are other, more remote, but still conceivable, possibilities : climatic changes
induced by alterations in ocean currents or the melting of polar ice; land displace
ments through earthquakes and volcanic eruptions set off by atomic explosions; and
30 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
but quite definitely possible, the early total annihilation o£ human
life.
This, however, Is perhaps not to be considered a "political con-
sequence" of atomic weapons. Annihilation would, after all, end
political problems. It is also possible, though still less probable, that
life might be annihilated by an overlarge meteor or an unexpected
comet or a hitch in the orderly processes of the sun; but we do not
bring such possibilities into our political calculations. Let us turn,
therefore, to consequences of atomic weapons, short of annihilation,
which have a more direct relevance to political policy.
First, we may note that, if the annihilation of life is improbable
though possible, the early destruction of civilized society by atomic
weapons is on the whole rather probable. One or two large scale
wars in which both sides had and made use of atomic weapons
would quite probably destroy what we call civilization.
Modern civilization is dependent upon a very complex interlock-
ing network of physical and institutional arrangements. The keys
to this network and its maintenance are concentrated in large cities.
Atomic weapons are peculiarly fitted to the destruction of cities.
With an accumulation of such weapons on hand on both sides of a
new war, and with the devices for launching them at long distance
available, the rapid joint destruction of a great many cities and other
industrial areas is feasible, and to be expected. This might cause a
breakdown in the social processes beyond the possibility of recupera-
tion, because the material means for recuperation would have been
eliminated. Human life, reduced in numbers, would still continue,
but at a much more primitive social and cultural level. "Our world"
would have disappeared, as fully as the Minoan civilization dis-
appeared after the sudden and mysterious calamity which visited
its centers on its controlling island of Crete.
It is our own Western Civilization that is in particular vulnerable
to atomic weapons. The greatest world cities of the present are ours,
and we are most dependent on cities. Our intricate, industrialized,
mechanized social machine, which can be brought almost to a stop
CONSEQUENCES OF THE ATOMIC BOMB 31
by no more than a strike o£ a few thousand persons, is the most
exposed. A tractor can plow more land than a horse, but a horse
needs only a little food and water and a peasant to keep going; and
the peasant alone can still make the land yield.
The more heavily industrialized a nation, the more concentrated
its industrial areas, the more intertwined its communication and
transport, the more vulnerable it is : England most of all, the United
States, Germany as it functioned before the war, Belgium, northern
Italy, parts of France. Where non- Western nations have taken over
Western methods of production, they too have made themselves
vulnerable: Japan — though in this last war it was not atomic weap-
ons that brought about Japan's defeat; and Russia, though with her
great spaces in the remote Heartland and her lower level of in-
dustrial development, she is less vulnerable than the technologically
advanced nations of the West.
China, India, most of the Middle East, and, still more evidently,
the African interior are in an incomparably better condition to sus-
tain atomic warfare. Atomic weapons could, no doubt, wipe out
Bombay, Calcutta, New Delhi, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Peiping, Can-
ton. . . . Unless, however, the weapons were developed to a point
that imminently promised the annihilation of all life, the Far East-
ern and Hindu civilizations would still remain: a few tens of mil-
lions of humans killed, perhaps, but their cultures hardly dented.
The explosions would not disturb the African tribes in the jungles,
on the veldt and along the river banks. The Chinese and Indian
peasant and the African primitive, who do not know the blessings
of the mechanical appliances of the West, are at the same time free
from dependence upon them.
It may very well turn out, then, that Western Civilization, by
releasing nuclear energies, has committed suicide.
3
An already observable consequence of atomic weapons is a still
greater speedup in the rate of historical change, which had already,
during the past fifty years, reached the highest level in history. The
political, social and institutional changes of previous decades, or
32 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
centuries, are becoming crowded into a year or two. Crisis succeeds
crisis; there is no lengthened, restful interlude. We have already
examined a major example of this speedup : the prelude to the Third
World War has opened before the close of the Second. It is plain in
every field: laws, regimes, boundaries, monarchs, property relations,
constitutions, the value of money, change overnight. The nationaH-
zation of whole industries, in France or Czechoslovakia or England,
is carried through with less fuss than used to accompany a minor
parliamentary investigation. Diplomatic showdowns, on Argentina,
Iran, Manchuria, Germany, Spain, Palestine . . . trip each other's
heels. A world bank starts one week, a civil war the next; evening
headlines of a mass strike replace the morning's news of the revolt
of great colonies. The United States seizes billions of dollars' worth
of property more quickly than it once condemned a few acres for a
new bridge or highway. Governments are rearranged like players in
a progressive bridge tournament.
Atomic weapons are not, of course, the sole cause of this speedup;
they are, in some respects, rather a symptom than a cause. A more
rapid rate of historical change is characteristic of revolutions — is, for
that matter, the meaning of "social revolution" — and a generation
ago, there began, on a world scale, a great social revolution, which
has not yet run its course. The discovery of atomic weapons, how-
ever, exacerbates the whole process, like oxygen under pressure
added to an already flaming fire.
The reason for this is that the existence of atomic weapons pro-
hibits any long postponement of a showdown. The threat of atomic
weapons presents the perspective of social annihilation, at the very
least for the losers, not in centuries or generations, but on the imme-
diate horizon. The Second World War itself, with its unprecedented
slogan of "unconditional surrender" and its pulverization of the
defeated, shows that the nations are morally prepared for wars of
extermination. The nuclear discoveries place the physical means at
their disposal.
Everyone really knows, or senses, the change; and this general
awareness accounts for the feverishness of the social atmosphere.
Many respond with a crude hedonism, aiming to get what they can
— money, pleasure, women, liquor — in what time is left. Some turn
CONSEQUENCES OF THE ATOMIC BOMB 33
to religion, often of a mystical type. The generals respond by trying
to hold their armies together, and by herding the scientists and tech-
nicians into the martial laboratories. The statesmen frantically test
one political combination after another.
The atomic weapons, poised in their secret United States nests,
just hatching from the laboratories of other powers, will not permit
the world to wait. It therefore follows that no political program to-
day has any concrete meaning unless it can provide, within a very
few years, some sort of at least temporarily workable answer to the
problem of atomic weapons. There is no time for ideal societies to
be reached by education or other slow processes in a century or two.
The goal for a significant political policy must be capable of being
reached, at least sufficiently, within at most a decade.
The logic of this conclusion is, I think, inescapable. With it a
host of well-intentioned and abstractly worthy political programs
fall at once in pieces. They do not, perhaps, have to be abandoned
entirely; but any long-term program must be supplemented by a
short-term policy, or it cannot meet the issue. It can only be Utopian,
trivial, politically irresponsible. If a house is burning down, a pro-
gram of reform for its inhabitants counts for nothing unless some
action is meanwhile taken to put out the fire.
Further, if we now relate the fact of the historical speedup to the
considerations of the preceding section, an additional conclusion
may be drawn:
If a workable solution for the problem of atomic weapons is not
found within a relatively few years, Western Civilization will cease
to be the dominant civilization of the world (if it does not disappear
altogether) , and will be replaced probably by one of the other exist-
ing civilizations; or, if none of these retains enough creative power
for the task, then Western Civilization v/ill be replaced at a much
later date by some new civilization not yet in evidence. It is difficult
in these questions to specify with any assurance what should be
meant by "a relatively few years." The evidence — primarily consisting
of the fact of the existence of atomic weapons and the probability, on
the basis of present indications, of their early use — seems to show
that the decision will certainly come within a few decades, a calcu-
lation which allows for the possibility of Western Civilization's
34 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
surviving the Third World (and First Atomic) War, and collapsing
only, as it surely would, in the Fourth.
This conclusion is so drastic that it will doubtless be thought by
many to be mere rhetoric. Such a dismissal would rest on the illu-
sion that our civilization is identical with civilization in general, our
history with the history of mankind. Though we can realize that
each of us individually must die, it is inconceivable that our entire
mode of life should cease to be. "Doubtless," Toynbee observes, "the
last [Egyptian] scribe who knew how to write the hieroglyphic
script and the last sculptor who knew how to carve a bas-relief in
the Egyptiac style cherished the same illusion, when the Egyptiac
Society was in articulo mortis, that had been cherished by their
predecessors at the time when the Egyptiac Society was still holding
its own among its kind, and at the still earlier dme when, for all
that its members knew, it was the only society of the kind that ever
had existed or was destined ever to exist in the World." *
Toynbee tells also the story of a conversation between a British
statesman and a Persian visitor, in which the statesman sought to
justify the cynical British policy toward Persia on the grounds that
only through it was Russia brought into the First World War on
the side of the Allies. " 'If,' concluded the statesman, 'seven years
later, Germany had started the Great War with Russia as an ally
or indeed as a neutral, she would certainly have won the war; and
that would not only have been the end of the British Empire. It
would have been the end of Civilization. When Civilization was at
stake, how could we act otherwise than we did ? Put yourself in our
place, and answer me with your hand on your heart.'
"At this the Persian, who had at first been mildly puzzled and ag-
grieved, completely lost his temper. His heart burnt within him and
a torrent of denunciation issued from his lips: 'Your policy was
infinitely more wicked than I had suspected! The cynicism of it is
beyond imagination! You had the effrontery to look me in the face
and tell me complacently that you have deliberately sacrificed the
unique treasure which Persia preserves for Humanity — the priceless
jewel of Civilizati9n — on the off-chance of saving your worthless
Western Society from the catastrophe which its own greed and pug-
* Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, Vol. I, I, C, iii, {b), p. 158.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE ATOMIC BOMB 35
nacity were inevitably bringing upon its head! Put myself in your
place, indeed! What should I have cared, and what do I care now,
if Europe perish so long as Persia lives!' " *
If, however, we are not yet ready to accept passively the final col-
lapse of Western Civilization, we may state the following as a
necessary first condition of any workable solution of the problem of
atomic weapons: there must be an absolute monopoly of the produc-
tion, possession and use of all atomic weapons.
It might be argued that a much simpler and surer solution would
be to get rid of all atomic weapons, and all the apparatus that might
be used to produce them. This would be an example of the usual
kind of argument in a historical vacuum. Atomic weapons and the
apparatus which produces them did not jump fully primed out of
the forehead of a 20th-century Zeus. They are a climactic end
product of the whole long development of Western science and
technology. To get rid of them, it would not be enough to bury
them, denatured, in the sea, and to wreck the atomic plants and
laboratories. We should have also to get rid of what had once
brought them about, and would promptly do so again: that is,
modern science and modern technology, as well as the scientists and
technicians who are the carriers of science and technology. This
would be the equivalent of wiping out Western Civilization, the
same result that the atomic weapons themselves threaten, and would
thus solve nothing.
The only way in which atomic weapons could actually be elimi-
nated is the way in which a monopoly often eliminates products
which it controls: by withholding, at its own discretion, their
manufacture and use.
That monopoly control is a necessary (though by no means suf-
ficient) condition for solving the problem of atomic weapons seems
to me so evident, after reflection, as to be hardly open to doubt.
Let us assume that more than one (two is enough for the assump-
tion) power possesses, and is producing, atomic weapons. Each will
* Toynbce, loc. cit., pp. 162-3.
36 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
be improving the efficiency and destructive potential of the weapons
as it goes along. Now let us try to reason as the leaders of these
powers would be compelled to reason.
Each leader of Power A could not but think as follows : Power B
has at its disposal instruments which could, in the shortest time, de-
stroy us. He has possibly made, or is about to make, new discoveries
which will threaten even more complete and rapid destruction. At
the moment, perhaps, he shows no open disposition to use these
instruments. Nevertheless, I cannot possibly rely on his continued
political benevolence — above all since he knows that I also have at
my disposal instruments that can destroy him. Some hothead — or
some wise statesman — of his may even now be giving the order to
push the necessary buttons.
Therefore? Therefore, in order to defend ourselves, we, since we
have on hand a sufficient atomic armament for the purpose, must
strike, striving by all means, political, diplomatic, psychological and
economic, as well as military, to catch him off guard. Even thus, we
must expect severe retaliation. But, if we are lucky, we shall be able
to sustain it; and we shall have crushed, at one massive blow, the
permanent foundation of his defenses, so that he can never recover
for more than a futile death grapple.
So also, each leader of Power B.
How else would it be possible for them to reason ? Thoughts such
as those should not be piously dismissed as the ravings of perverted
and Satanic madmen. Serious leaders cannot, in their practical plans,
accept the sentimental versions of political life given in primary
school or liberal weeklies or their own holiday speeches. Nor would
they, as the world goes, be in such reasonings irresponsible or even
immoral. Their primary duty is understood to be to themselves and
their own group. They know that no social group in history has
ever been saved by reliance on the innate goodness of man.
Even if there were no atomic weapons, many of the leaders
would undoubtedly be reasoning today along these lines. Atomic
weapons are, after all, not responsible for warfare, not even for the
Third World War, which has begun. The fact that the political and
social causes of a war are abundantly present stares at us from every
edition of every newspaper. The existence of atomic weapons merely
CONSEQUENCES OF THE ATOMIC BOMB 37
raises the stakes immeasurably higher, and demands a quicker
decision.
It is true that few men and few leaders reason with unrelieved
consistency. The force of the above assumed deduction might not
be at once apparent to them, or they might not for a while be will-
ing to accept it. But to assume, as do some foolish commentators,
that fear of retaliation will be the best deterrent to an atomic war is
to deny the lessons of the entire history of war and of society. Fear,
as Ferrero so eloquently shows, is what provokes the exercise of
force. Most modern wars have been, in the minds of every bellig-
erent, preventive: an effort to stamp out the fear of what the other
side might be about to do.
Some delay in acting upon the deduction might also result from
the intervention of other forces not completely under the control of
the leaders of Powers A and B. In particular, public opinion might
be operating against such a preventive atomic attack. Public opinion
can, however, be directed. In the case of a totalitarian nation, the
leaders are, on the one hand, accustomed to strict logic in their
political deductions, and, on the other, relatively immune from the
influence of an independent public opinion.
The existence of two or more centers of control of atomic weapons
would be equal to a grenade with the pin already pulled.
An absolute monopoly of control, by whomever exercised, would
not, if is true, make certain that atomic weapons would never be
used. But it would automatically remove, from those in charge of
the monopoly, by far the greatest motive for their use : the fear that
someone else will use them. Responsibility, moreover, will be open
and unavoidable before the whole world; and the opinion of all
humanity would be brought to bear upon the actions of the mo-
nopolist. If I possess the only gun, there can be no question who is
the murderer when a man is found shot through the head. The
atomic monopolist can never plead that he unleashed his atomic
weapons because some other side was ready with its own. And —
though this is perhaps cause for only minor satisfaction — monopoly
control would at any rate guarantee that not all the earth would be
turned into an atomic waste. It would at most be only the other
side's section. Responsible statesmanship could, and would, decide
38 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
on atomic warfare if control of atomic weapons is divided. But it
would in truth need an insane leadership to launch general atomic
destruction if it alone held the means of that destruction.
If there is to be monopoly control of atomic weapons, who is to
be the monopolist?
Though there are various approaches to the argument, there is a
fairly wide recognition of the necessity for monopoly control of
atomic weapons. The usual answer to the question, "Who shall be
the monopolist?" that must then follow, is: a "world government"
or some kind of "international body." I shall return in the next
chapter to the problem of "world government." Here I shall remark
only that a world government does not exist, and cannot therefore
be a present candidate for the monopoly position. If a world gov-
ernment should come to exist in the future, there would no longer
be any problem in the control of atomic weapons. The world govern-
ment would exercise the sole control, or it would not be a world
government.
As for "international bodies" or "international commissions," such
as those that are, as I write, being proposed through the United
Nations, they cannot possibly answer; they will come to nothing, no
matter what nominal agreements are made. All such bodies are, like
the United Nations itself, not in any sense genuine "world institu-
tions," since they have no independent sovereignty. They are merely
talking, paper committees, or at most alliances, of individually sov-
ereign states. Their political possibilities reduce in functioning terms
entirely to the separate functioning of the individual states. To place
atomic weapons in the hands of any commission composed through
and out of the United Nations, or any comparable commission, does
not in the least establish a monopoly. In practice, it would merely
symbolize the fragmentation of the control, its division among the
member-states. This would necessarily be, and remain, the case
unless the "Atomic Commission" itself became the World Govern-
ment.
Any hope, therefore, that some kind of United Nations sleight of
CONSEQUENCES OF THE ATOMIC BOMB 39
hand is going to provide an easy, short-cut sohition to the problem
o£ atomic weapons will in due course — perhaps even before this
book appears in print — end in disillusion.
Among those observers who believe that atomic weapons have
upset all those principles heretofore applicable to warfare and to
social action in general, there are some who hold that a small nation
or even a group of private individuals (scientists and technicians,
for example) could now, by means of atomic weapons, conquer
great nations, or even the world. This opinion is mistaken.
In the first place, the production of atomic weapons * requires the
possession of comparatively large amounts of raw materials which
are found in sufficient concentration in only a few places. This rules
out at once most nations. Second, it requires, directly and indirectly,
an enormous, advanced industrial plant, which hardly any small
nation has at its disposal. Third, it requires large numbers of
trained workers, scientists and technicians, which, again, are not
available to small nations. As for groups of private individuals,
obviously no state will permit them to function.
If it remains still conceivable that one or two small nations (Switz-
erland or Sweden, for example, which have precision industry and
scientists) might produce atomic weapons, even this would not
pose, on a world scale, a total threat. It would be like a single
maniac, loose in a city with a machine gun. Terror and death, on a
certain scale, could result. But nothing permanent would follow.
The small nation would not have the men to follow up and con-
solidate a quick orgy of destruction.
The truth is that the role of a small nation in the production of
atomic weapons could only be that of a front for a great and popu-
lous nation. The apparent source of the atomic weapons might be
a small nation (say, Czechoslovakia or Ecuador), but the controlling
hand would be that of a great nation which could have some hope
of administering the world of its defeated rivals.
Most of the great and populous nations can likewise be quickly
ruled out as candidates for monopoly control of atomic weapons.
* It is possible, of course, that new methods of making atomic weapons more
simply, from easily available materials, will be found. This does not seem probable
for the future in which the issues will be decided.
40 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
Since production depends upon an advanced industrial plant and a
large group of scientists, only nations with those resources are in
the field. Therefore India and China or Java or Brazil, for example,
are not, for the present, in the running. Japan and Germany are
crushed, as a result of the war, and could have, if any role at all,
only that of "front," like one of the small nations. (The German
nuclear scientists have, for that matter, been appropriated by the
victorious great powers.)
France, in any case not sufficiently populous, has been too weak-
ened by the war and its own continuing internal crises to be ad-
mitted. France, in international policy, can at best only go on as she
has been doing, trying to preserve a partial independence by jockey-
ing between the active powers.
What remains?
Abstractly reasoned, it might be thought that England, with the
British Empire, remains on the list. England and Canada did, we
know, have a prominent part in the first development of atomic
production. In the concrete, however, we must recognize that Eng-
land is on the historical defensive. England retains the potential for
great achievement, but she can no longer take the initiative. Her
empire is weakening, her independent expansive force has ended.
It is only in association with a dynamic power that England can
henceforth operate : as a subsidiary or associate or partner, but with-
out an individual freedom of action. This has already been proved,
in its own way, by the first stage of atomic development. Though
England and Canada contributed greatly, the plants were built, the
final secrets held, and the weapons themselves exclusively retained,
in the United States.
There remain, then, among existing social institutions, two, and
just two, serious candidates for the monopoly control of atomic
weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union alone possess all
the necessary qualifications.
The issue of atomic weapons, of atomic warfare, is an issue be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union. This is the reality
that lies beneath the complex appearance through which the issue
expresses itself in the press, in speeches, in the United Nations and
at the conferences. It is a reality, moreover, which, in spite of all the
CONSEQUENCES OF THE ATOMIC BOMB 41
irrelevancies o£ discourse, is well enough known by the leading
parties to the disputes. Wherever and whenever the problem o£
atomic weapons comes up for discussion or debate, no one is really
worried about Norway or Poland or Peru or China or New Zealand
or Italy or Afghanistan or Greece or England or Spain. The sole
"question of substance" (as the United Nations parliamentarians
like to phrase it) is: What are the United States and the Soviet
Union going to do ?
< go to Contents>
4. World Government or World Empire?
A RECOGNITION o£ the fact that the survival of Western Civili-
zation, and perhaps of mankind, depends upon the early establish-
ment of a monopoly control over atomic weapons usually leads, we
have noted, to the conclusion that a "World Government" must be
formed. The World Government would exercise supreme world
sovereignty. In it the atomic monoply would be vested. Since there
would no longer be independent, sovereign nations, international
war would "by definition" become impossible, and mankind would
thus be saved from the general atomic destruction which another
war or two would make probable.
Abstractly considered, the project for a supreme World Govern-
ment seems to be much the best solution. Long before the birth of
atomic weapons, and on more positive grounds than the defense
against destruction, the ideal of World Government had been re-
peatedly put forward. It has to recommend it the humanitarian,
moral, and technological arguments which we discussed in Chapter
2. True enough, a World Government would not of itself accomplish
quite all that is claimed for it by its advocates. It would not guar-
antee the end of wars. Wars as physical facts cannot be stopped "by
definition." If, under a World Government, international wars could
not take place for the semantic reason that there would no longer
be nations, nevertheless mass warfare could still go on under the
title of "civil war" or "rebellion." Death and suffering are not much
changed by a switch of labels. However, if there were, or came to
be, a World Government, it would in fact provide the most rational
structure within which to meet the problems of modern world
polity, economy and technology. And it would give the complete
answer to the greatest of all immediate issues: the issue of control
of atomic weapons.
For the eloquence, wisdom, and goodness of heart with which the
ideal of World Government has been in our time so well defended
42
WORLD GOVERNMENT OR EMPIRE? 43
I have only admiration. I add nothing here to that defense only
because I feel I have nothing new to say. I share the ideal; and
what I am writing, however paradoxical this may often seem, is in
its service.
Unfortunately, however, the present advocates of a World Gov-
ernment, now organizing in dozens of new Committees and Coun-
cils, do not seem to understand either what a "government" is, or
how, historically, a government comes to be. They think of a gov-
ernment as a title, a name, a letterhead, or an imposing Committee.
They seem to believe that if there "were some body — the United
Nations, for example — that we would agree to call a World Govern-
ment, then that body would be a World Government. They conceive
of the means whereby a World Government might be brought into
existence after the manner of a kind of international trick: a well-
worded treaty to be signed, a pledge to be taken by individual per-
sons all over the world, or a clever amendment to the United
Nations Charter. It is not so easy.
A genuine government is not an abstraction. It is composed of
actual human beings, organized into institutions, and cemented by
a common body of shared ideas. A considerable percentage of the
subjects, or citizens, of a genuine government must be ready to
recognize, freely or through coercion, that there is no political power
superior to the government. That is what is meant by calling a gov-
ernment "sovereign"; and without sovereignty it is not a govern-
ment. That is why the League of Nations was not and the United
Nations is not a world government or even a step toward world
government. No one has ever recognized either of those organizations
as the supreme political power. The charters of both of them, as
well as their rules and practices, were so designed as to make im-
possible their possession or assumption of sovereignty.
The functioning institutions which are an essential part of any
possible government must include at the very least those capable of
executive, legislative, and judicial action. The same body can act in
all three spheres; but all three functions must be performed, or sov-
ereignty remains non-existent. The government must be able to
make laws that are binding on all the citizens and subjects. It must
be able to administer those laws. It must have courts, police, jails
44 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
and armies to enforce them. If it does not have all these things, if
it cannot do all these things, then it is not a government. If indi-
vidual citizens or subjects, or groups of citizens and subjects, are at
liberty to accept or reject the government's laws as they themselves
see fit, if they can execute them after their own manner, if they can
refuse to grant the jurisdiction of the courts and can resist the
power of the police, if they can veto by their will an act of the gov-
ernment, then it is not a genuine government, then it is only a name
or a form, and the real power rests elsewhere.
All of this is not yet enough. In order that a government should
be established and maintained, its citizens or subjects, or a consid-
erable percentage of them, must share at least a minimum set of
ideas or formulas or myths. For the government to be in truth
sovereign, the citizens or subjects must believe that it is sovereign.
The sources of the belief may be various; but the question of source
is secondary to the question of content. They might believe that the
sovereignty is divinely ordained, or biologically inherited, or expres-
sive of the will of the people, or rationally desirable; or they might
simply believe that the government's power is unassailable. No
matter, so long as the practical content of the belief — namely, the
acceptance in action of the government's authority — is the same.
But if they do not believe at all in the government's sovereignty,
then that sovereignty itself is an illusion.
This is the meaning of "government," any government, including
a hypothetical World Government. A short reflection on the mean-
ing is enough to show us how far from reality are the plans of the
World Government's advocates.
Our analysis has taken its departure from the fact of the existence
of atomic weapons, understood as the principal material ingredient
of the extreme crisis of world politics. We have observed that the
destruction of Western Civilization is an immediate, not a distant,
perspective. Granted the desirability of the attempt to preserve West-
ern Civilization, we have therefore recognized as a first requirement
WORLD GOVERNMENT OR EMPIRE? 45
for any solution to the crisis, a chance that it can be reaUzed within
a comparatively few years.
The achievement of a World Government is not impossible. We
cannot correctly argue that because there has never been a World
Government, one therefore can never be. Because, for tens of thou-
sands of years, no human society exceeded a few thousand souls, it
did not follow that no future society could comprise many scores of
millions. Inferences from the past can be drawn only when they
also take into account new material and social factors that were not
present in the past. On the other hand, it is even more grossly fal-
lacious to argue that because a certain solution is desirable or
"needed," therefore it will come about. There is nothing whatsoever
in either individual or social experience to suggest that men will get
out of their difficulties in the way which, rationally considered, is
best for them. Pointing out to an alcoholic that alcohol is bad for
him does not stop him from drinking, any more than a lesson on the
general evils of inflation will lead a farmer to sell his grain below
the market price. A World Government would be the best solution
to the present crisis. But this truth, even if it were far more generally
accepted, is not enough to bring a World Government into being.
If we judge by facts and not by wishes, we cannot escape the
following conclusion: within the given time limits, the free and
voluntary establishment of a World Government is historically im-
possible. It is impossible because the necessary historical pre-condi-
tions do not exist.
A World Government means world political unity. Historical
experience shows that political unity is achieved by cultural diflu-
sion plus military conquest, or simply by conquest. The Roman
legions plus the Roman educators and architects and language could
unify Gaul and Italy; the soldiers and priests of Ancient Egypt
could unite, politically, the valley of the Nile; Kultur plus diplomacy
plus the best trained soldiers of Europe could bring together the
small German states; by direct conquest, without cultural penetra-
tion, the Ottoman Turks could unite the various Byzantine states of
Asia Minor and the Balkans. But we find in history almost no ex-
amples of the political unification of hitherto separate autonomous
communities brought about by deliberate, voluntary decision.
46 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
The seemingly voluntary unification of separate communities
shows, on more careful examination, two conditions always present:
a pre-existing cultural unity shared by the communities; and the
actuality or strong threat of an external force directed against the
communities which unite. Even these conditions are seldom enough
to bring about unity. From the 4th to the 2nd centuries b.c, the
Greek city-states shared a common traditional culture, a culture so
deep that from the point of view of its language all non-Greeks were
barbaroi — "barbarians." The Greeks faced both the threat and the
actuality of an external force — ^from Macedonia and then from Rome
— so mighty that every adult Greek understood that the separated
city-states had no chance against it. Nevertheless, the city-states did
not succeed in uniting politically. Their various leagues and coali-
tions fell periodically to pieces, and Greece ended as a subject prov-
ince. The history of the great Italian city-states of the pre-Renaissance
was the same. In their case, too, there was a profound and splendid
cultural unity. They, too, were battered by external force, by the
armies of Spain and France and the Empire. They were, moreover,
made fully conscious both of their situation and of the only possible
solution for it, by the superb analysis and the moving rhetoric of
Machiavelli. Still they did not unite.
If the uniting of England and Scotland seems peaceful and volun-
tary, this is only because we confine attention to the unimportant
final act, and forget the many centuries of war and bitter conflict
which preceded it. And in that case, too, there was the Christian
civilization of the West shared in common. Before the Swiss Fed-
eration became a united nation, centuries of changing leagues and
coalitions, of foreign intervention and temporary conquest, had to
be buttressed by the impact of Napoleon, the pressure of the Holy
Alliance, and a sharp if brief and relatively bloodless civil war.
It is above all in the founding of the United States that the be-
lievers in World Government seek their precedents. There, they
hold, is a positive example, by following which we could, today,
voluntarily and peacefully, set up and maintain a unified govern-
ment of the world. Analysis can easily show, however, that this
analogy, so persuasive at first hearing, breaks down at every relevant
point.
WORLD GOVERNMENT OR EMPIRE? 47
The thirteen colonies, to begin with, shared not only the common
Western culture, but, for the most part, the specifically English form
of that culture, including the English language. As all dependencies
of a single great power, they were accustomed to think of them-
selves together politically, as united in a common political fate; and
they had no tradition of separate sovereign existence. Spatial conti-
nuity with each other and isolation from the rest of the world, with
the vast sea to orie side and the vast wilderness to the other, imposed
on them a geographical unity. They had fought together the long,
difficult revolutionary war, and had together conquered. In the war,
though their unity had been far from complete, though in many
respects it was fought as a coalition of independent powers, they had
come to possess in common many symbols and traditions of unity:
a single Congress, no matter how limited in power; united and
often thrilling Declarations; joint victories and defeats and treaties;
national heroes. Influential classes of the population stood to gain by
unity, and to lose much by separatism. Moreover, the very real
threat of external force was by no means removed through victory
in the War of Independence. Almost all of the leading statesmen of
the colonies understood that the failure to become a strongly united
nation would surely open the road to constant intrigue by the great
European powers, playing off one set of States against others, with
the long-term aim of re-establishing European domination.
Even all of this was not enough to bring about a free, deliberate
decision to unite. What was in reality a minority coup was in addi-
tion required. The Philadelphia Convention had to violate its spe-
cific instructions which limited it to the mere amendment of the
Articles of Confederation. The new Constitution itself contained a
blatant threat of coercion through the provision that the new gov-
ernment would come into being after the adherence of only nine of
the States. In the doubtful States, the bold campaign for adoption
joined open intimidation to rational argument and demagogy. New
York City's declared intention to secede from the State doubtless
weighed as much at Poughkeepsie as Hamilton's speeches. And,
finally, the unity was sealed only with the blood of one of the most
terrible of Civil Wars.
Even, then, if we were to grant the American precedent, it hardly
48 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
suggests a soft slide into World Government. The precedent itself,
however, is plainly inapplicable. In the world as a whole there is
not cultural unity, but cultural plurality, and, in addition, the super-
imposed fracture into totalitarian and non-totalitarian segments.
Western CiviUzation is itself harshly divided into separate com-
munities, with the inertial weight of centuries reinforcing the divi-
sions. By the nature of the case, at any rate until the era of
inter-planetary wars begins, there can be no exterifal force prompt-
ing a move toward world unity. The evidence of experience is un-
ambiguous. We can have no reason to believe that the people of
the world will, in the predictable future, establish, through any
form of free, deliberate decision, a World Government.
We have been considering the prospects of a World Government
achieved by free and deliberate decision. If, however, we shift the
locus of the problem, and consider, not such a World Government,
but rather a World Empire, established at least partly through
force and the threat of force, the evidence from historical experience
no longer dictates the same negative conclusion. '
There has, of course, never been a World Empire in the sense of
an Empire the dominion of which comprised literally the entire
earth. What Toynbee* calls "Universal Empires" have, however,
come into being many times; and are, indeed, a usual stage — the
next to final stage — in the history of civilizations. In the instances of
those civilizations of which we have knowledge, what seems usually
to happen is more or less this: Each civilization expands gradually
from its original, comparatively limited home, by diffusion, coloni-
zation and conquest. It becomes articulated into a number of inde-
pendent (sovereign) political communities. At some point in the
development there occurs a long series of catastrophes and crises —
named by Toynbee the "Time of Troubles." At the culmination of
the Time of Troubles, some one state succeeds in eliminating all
rivals and founding a Universal Empire, the extent of ^^'hich coin-
cides roughly with the sphere of cultural influence attained previ-
* In this section I have made considerable use of Toynbee's ^-1 Study of History.
WORLD GOVERNMENT OR EMPIRE? 49
ously by the civilization. The Universal Empire, in its turn, has so
far always been followed by the breakup and destruction of the civili-
zation in question.
In some such order, there came into being the Universal Empire
of the Han dynasties (for the earlier Chinese, or "Sinic" civiliza-
tion); the Empire of the Guptas for the earlier Indian civilization;
the Abbasid C^iphate (resuming the interrupted Achaemenian
Empire) for Syriac civilization; the Ottoman Empire for the Ortho-
dox Christian (Byzantine) civilization; the Empire centered on
Crete for the Minoan civilization; the "Empire of the Four Quar-
ters of the World," restored, after an interruption, by Hammurabi
for Sumeric civilization; the Roman Empire for Hellenic civiliza-
tion; the Empire of the Incas for Andean civilization; the Empire
of the Mongols and later the British Raj for more recent Indian
civilization; and so on.
It should be noted that the state which succeeds in founding the
Universal Empire of a given civilization sometimes (as in the case
of the Hellenic, Egyptian, Sinic, Andean civilizations) belongs to
that civilization. In other examples (such as those of the Indian or
Orthodox Christian civilizations) it is a nation or tribe that comes
raiding in from outside, and is culturally unrelated to the original
civilization. In these latter instances, it is as if the original civiliza-
tion, following a sequence of disasters, confronts an impasse for
which a Universal Empire provides the only way out; but it fails,
on its own initiative, to take that way, and must therefore be led
through it by an alien hand.
We who belong to Western Civilization are, with a natural pro-
vincialism, best acquainted with the Roman Empire, since it was in
the breakup of that Empire that the seeds of our own civilization
were fertilized. For the sake of a possible analogy to our own
present situation, we may recall the general form of the develop-
ment of the Roman Empire.
Following the breakup of the Minoan Society, Hellenic Civiliza-
tion had its origin along the littoral, and on the islands, of the
Aegean. From this source, for a number of centuries it gradually
expanded. Politically, it was for the most part articulated into inde-
pendent small city-states, many of them with various sorts of col-
50 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
onies. After the victory over Persia during the first part of the 5th
century B.a, two great coaHtions arose, under the leadership of
Athens and Sparta. One or the other of these might have succeeded
in unifying the Hellenic world; but, as it turned out, the long clash
between them, in the Pelopennesian Wars at the end of the 5th
century, ended with a mutual exhaustion from which the original
homeland of the civilization never recovered. The mother cities lost
the creative initiative.
The problem of unification remained, however. Its challenge was
taken up by the "semi-barbarian super-states of the periphery," as
Toynbee calls them. For nearly three centuries, with intervals of
relative quiet, Macedonia, Carthage, and Rome struggled to de-
liver "the knock-out blow." War took on a new meaning, vastly
enlarged in scope and fierceness, with limited specific aims trans-
formed into the objective of annihilation — Carthago delenda est.
These wars merged into gigantic class and social struggles, revolu-
tions and civil wars. Spartacus, the Gracchi, Sulla, Marius, Pompey,
Julius, Antony, Octavius fought in cross-tides over the entire area
of the civilization, purged their own followers, overthrew the old
social forms, proscribed and slaughtered the ranks of the defeated,
until the definitive victory of Octavius established the Empire as a
functioning and universal fact.
How close is the parallel? The source of Western Civilization is
in the western half of the European peninsula. Political separatism,
becoming ever more intense since the Renaissance, poses more and
more inescapably the problem of political unification. From within
the homeland, first France, under Napoleon, attempts to meet the
challenge, and fails. Then Germany tries twice, with an intervening
collapse of all proposals for peaceful union. In the recently con-
cluded second attempt, for the first time in Western history, anni-
hilation of the defeated becomes the objective of war. The lists of
the proscribed are drawn up in advance. The social and revolu-
tionary wars cut across the lines of the international battles. The
homeland has failed. There remain the two mighty, semi-barbarian
super-states of the periphery, the American and the communist. If
either of these succeeds, the resultant Universal Empire of Western
Civilization, unlike the Universal Empires of other civilizations.
WORLD GOVERNMENT OR EMPIRE? 51
will also be a World Empire. This will follow because, though
Western Civilization is not culturally world-wide, its political influ-
ence and material power dominate the world.
Toynbee nowhere commits himself to acceptance of a positive
analogy between Hellenic and Western history, although he outlines
it in details that go much beyond the political scheme into parallels
of philosophy, literature, moral attitudes and emotional moods. It is
not, however, necessary to derive our forecast of world political
developments from analogies based on past civilizations, the laws
of which are, it may be admitted, very doubtfully known. The
over-all nature of the present world political situation, the tendencies
therein observably at work, can make sufficiently plain what, in
general, is happening, and what is going to happen.
It is now apparent to everyone that the pre-1939 world political
division into a comparatively large number of independent, sov-
ereign nations is finished. Two of the great independent powers
have been destroyed by the war. Smaller nations are no longer seri-
ous independent factors in world politics. The United Nations
Charter drops even the fiction of the equality of small nations,
which would be incompatible with the veto rules and the assign-
ment of permanent seats on the Security Council.
In The Managerial Revolution, written in 1940, some years before
the advent of atomic weapons, I considered what might be expected
to replace the dissolving world political structure. It seemed to me,
then as now, that a single world state was the solution both ration-
ally and morally best, and most in accord with economic and social
needs. I believed then, however, that cultural diversities combined
with administrative and military difficulties were so imposing as to
make a single world state unlikely. It seemed to me more probable
to expect a division of the world among a small number of super-
states, possibly three chief such states centering around the main
world industrial areas in Europe, Asia and the United States. At the
same time, I predicted wars fought among these super-states with
52 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
the aim of securing undisputed world control, an aim which I
thought would probably not be achieved.
This earlier prediction may still, in the end, be confirmed. It con-
tains in any case, I still think, important elements of the truth, to
some of which I shall return in a later chapter. For the historical
period which we now immediately face, however, two decisive new
elements have been introduced: first, the existence of atomic weap-
ons; second, the fact that the Second World War has left in the
world only two dynamic super-states, with the consequence that the
kind of power-balancing that might have occurred if there were
three or four has become impossible.
The transcendent power concentrated in atomic M^eapons makes
politically possible — as I did not believe it to be when there were
no atomic weapons — the domination of the world by a single suffi-
ciently large state, provided that state holds the monopoly of atomic
weapons. The threat of mutual destruction by atomic weapons of all
the states that might possess them, assuming that there are more
than one, makes certain that each such state will strive to acquire
the monopoly. But a monopoly of atomic weapons can be secured
only by gaining world domination.
The problem of the control of atomic weapons is identical with
the problem of world political control. This identity is being ex-
pressed in an illuminating way through the complex procedures
of the United Nations. Politically, the highest body of the United
Nations is the Security Council (or, formally, the Assembly,
which is merely the Security Council with decorations). In the
Spring of 1946, an Atomic Commission, presumably a subordi-
nate body, was set up by the United Nations to handle the ques-
tion of atomic weapons. But it became rapidly apparent that
whatever body, however named, actually made the basic decisions
about atomic weapons would be the supreme body. Therefore, two
proposals had logically to follow, and were made : either basic deci-
sions about atomic weapons had to be passed back to the Security
Council itself, thus reducing the Atomic Commission to a purely
technical bureau; or a new organization, outside the United Na-
tions, had to be created for handling atomic problems. But in the
latter case, it was at once clear to reflective observers, this new
WORLD GOVERNMENT OR EMPIRE? 53
organization would supplant the Security Council, which would
become a political subordinate. The naive belief that the insuperable
political difficulties which stultified, and will continue to stultify, the
Security Council, might be overcome in the case of atomic weapons
by the mechanical device of setting up a separately named special
commission exploded at the first touch of political reality. Who con-
trols the atom will control the world.
Whether we approach the problem from the point of view of the
general pattern of history, or from that of a more or less Marxian
analysis of socio-economic needs and possibilities, or from that of the
potentialities of the new military weapons, or from that of the exist-
ing division of the world into the two major power spheres, we are
led to a single conclusion. A World Empire has become possible, and
the attempt will be made to establish a World Empire. A World
Empire would, moreover, solve the problem of atomic weapons,
within the terms set in Chapter 3. That is, it would institute a
monopoly control over such weapons.
I wish to clarify the distinction which I have made between the
terms "World Government" and "World Empire."
The former I have been using in the sense which I believe is given to it by those
who regard themselves as advocates of World Government. It means
a world state set up by peaceful means, through some sort of con-
stitutional or democratic processes, and in which the various peoples
of the world would have, more or less, political equality. It is such
a state that I regard as impossible for the next historical period.
By a "World Empire" I mean a state, not necessarily world-wide
in literal extent but world-dominating in political power, set up at
least in part through coercion (quite probably including war, but
certainly the threat of war), and in which one group of peoples (its
nucleus being one of the existing nations) would hold more than
its equal share of power.
Let us suppose that the United States had been founded not
through acceptance by all the States of the Philadelphia Constitu-
tion, but in some such way as follows. New York and Pennsylvania,
54 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
convinced that the unity of the colonies was necessary, and despair-
ing of getting it in time through peaceful agreement, determined
to force it. Through a combination of negotiation, threats, conces-
sions, bribes, and perhaps some actual fighting, they succeeded; and
brought all the colonies under the jurisdiction of a government so
constituted that a predominant (though not necessarily exclusive)
pov^^er over certain key questions, such as foreign affairs and the
army, v^^as guaranteed to New York-Pennsylvania. Then, in the
sense I am giving, the result would have been an "Empire."
The word "Empire" has, for Americans, connotations of extreme
tyranny and despotism which are historically unjustified. There
have been many kinds and degrees of Empire, and I shall discuss
later (in Chapter 17) some of these variations.
An Empire is not incompatible with democracy in the imperial power — indeed,
Athens and England, two of the greatest imperial powers in history,
are the two most democratic governments so far known. The British
Empire, as well as other lesser Empires, prove also that democracy
can exist and develop within the subordinate realms of the Empire.
The relations between the imperial power and the subordinate
realms need not in all cases be the same, but may vary all the way
from the harshest exploitation to nearly equal partnership.
The imperial power need not be totalitarian — that is, intervening
in all phases of social activity. It can be restricted to what is neces-
sary in order to maintain the integrity of the empire. There is, in
fact, only one absolutely essential world task of the possible World
Empire of tomorrow: the preservation of the monopoly of atomic
(and comparable) weapons. The fulfillment of the central task is
compatible with much looseness of the imperial structure in other
fields.
It goes without saying that the attempt at World Empire will not
be carried out under the open slogan of "World Empire." More
acceptable phrases, such as "World Federation," "World Republic,"
"United States of the World," "World Government," or even
"United Nations" will be used. But in this book, I am concerned
with realities, not with words. The truth is that the growing belief
in, and propaganda for, various sorts of World Government are in
historical actuality both a symptom of the need for a World Empire,
WORLD GOVERNMENT OR EMPIRE? 55
a support for the attempt to achieve such an Empire, and a psycho-
logical preparation for its acceptance, if it comes. A similar longing,
similarly expressed, was widespread throughout the Hellenic world
during the century preceding the foundation of the Roman Empire.
It is like a bachelor who begins to prepare himself for the restric-
tions of matrimony by discoursing on the beauties of "true love."
Finally, it should be noted that there is not, historically speaking,
an absolute opposition between World Empire and World Govern-
ment. Rather is it the case that World Empire is the only means
through which genuine World Government might be achieved.
World Empire might, it is true, be at the outset, or evolve into, a
word totaUtarian tyranny. But such a development is not inevitable.
The believers in a free world government, if they are politically seri-
ous, if their beliefs are more than dreams whereby they compensate
for the grimness of actual experience and their own weakness, are
in practice committed to an acceptance of the perspective of World
Empire, because through that alone is there a chance for the realiza-
tion of their more ultimate ideal.
We may now summarize the result, up to this point, of our
analysis:
The discovery of atomic weapons has brought about a situation
in which Western Civilization, and perhaps human society in gen-
eral, can continue to exist only if an absolute monopoly in the con-
trol of atomic weapons is created. This monopoly can be gained and
exercised only through a World Empire, for which the historical
stage had already been set prior to and independently of the dis-
covery of atomic weapons. The attempt at World Empire will be
made, and is, in fact, the objective of the Third World War, which,
in its preliminary stages, has already begun.
It should not require argument to state that the present candidates
for leadership in the World Empire are only two : the Soviet Union
and the United States.
< go to Contents>
5. -The Nature of Communism
THE MOST COMMON source of errors about the nature of social
and political movements is the idea that the words used by adher-
ents of the movements, in alleged' explanation of their aims and
activities, can be taken at face value. The words are not unim-
portant, and sometimes they tell the truth. More frequently, how-
ever, their function has nothing to do with the truth, but is to ex-
press, as a kind of poetry, hidden sentiments, hopes and confusions.
The words used publicly by communists about themselves and what
they do are particularly misleading, because deliberate deception of
others, as well as the normal unconscious self-deception, are an in-
tegral part of communism.
Most books on communism or the Soviet Union offer, as pre-
sumptive evidence for their conclusions, citations from speeches,
manifestoes, articles and books by communists, and from the Soviet
Constitution, laws and decrees. Because a Constitution or set of laws
says that there is racial, cultural, and national equality within the
Soviet Union, it is taken as proved that such equality in fact exists.
Because communists outside the Soviet Union declare that they be-
lieve in democracy or free trade unions or civil rights or national
prosperity and defense or wider educational opportunities, it is as-
sumed not only that they do so beUeve but that they are practically
striving toward such ends. Because a report on a Five Year Plan
states that workers' housing, food and clothing have improved such
and such a percentage, it is believed that this has indeed happened.
Because a Soviet diplomat speaks for disarmament or the outlawing
of atomic weapons, it is granted that he is really in favor of dis-
armament and the outlawing of atomic weapons. Even those who
have become rather skeptical about the current practices of com-
munists are inclined to say that "Their goal — of a free classless
human society — is a great and noble ideal," thus assuming that the
56
THE NATURE OF COMMUNISM 57
goal which the communists profess in words is the real goal (that
is, the probable outcome in action) of what they are doing.
To understand political and social movements, we must approach
reality by a route very different from this verbal boulevard. We
must begin not with words but with social behavior. We must ex-
amine the deeds of the movement, its history in action, its record in
practice, its dynamic tendencies, the direction of its evolution. The
words it uses must always be checked in terms of behavior, and
may be taken at face value only when they sustain the check. We
will find, in the case of communism, that some of its words, es-
pecially those written not for a general audience but by communists
for communists, are unusually revelatory of its inner meaning. But
toward all words we must take the attitude: false, unless proved true.
We are sometimes told that communism is young, new, untried,
so that we do not yet have enough evidence for judgment. This
argument is a device to try to stop us from rendering the judgment
that the facts warrant. As a specific, differentiated socio-political
movement, communism (or Bolshevism) was founded in 1903, forty-
four years ago. It developed out of one emphasis in Marxism, which
took fairly clear form in 1848 (that is, a century ago), with certain
added elements from nihilism and Blanquism, which also had a
considerable prior history. Since 1903, communism has developed
consistently, with no discernible historical breach in its tradition or
its pattern of behavior. For thirty years it has been in control of a
great nation, and it has lately extended its full control to more peo-
ples and areas. Throughout the world, it has for decades functioned
in parties, unions, governments, industries, publications, and in thou-
sands of committees and organizations. Communism can be studied
in action in every type of social, political, cultural and moral en-
vironment, in relation to every type of problem occurring in our
society, in war and in peace, in power and out, on a large scale and
on the most minute, in a bridge club or a Boy Scout troop as well
as in a mighty army. The evidence by now at hand is not merely
ample but overwhelming. The only excuse for not coming to a
decision in our judgment of the nature of communism is ignorance
or an unwillingness to face the truth.
For Americans, Englishmen, and in general those whose concep-
tions o£ politics are based upon acquaintance with the customary
poHtical parties of democratic countries, there is a further obstacle
to the understanding of communism. Though communism is recog-
nized as having a "different program," it is assumed to be a political
party in the same sense that applies to the Democratic or Republican
or British Conservative or French Radical-Socialist parties. A mem-
ber of the Communist Party is thought to be the same type of being
as a Democrat or a Conservative. He has merely joined a different,
but comparable, organization.
Reasoning and acting on this assumption, it seems natural to deal
v^ith communists in much the same way that one deals with the
members of any other rival political party. One negotiates with the
communist-controlled Soviet Union as one negotiates with any other
nation. Communist parties are permitted to function legally, like
any other party, and are welcomed or at least accepted into coalition
governments. Electoral deals are made with communists, not only
in Hungary or France, but in New York. Good citizens do not
hesitate to join with communists in all sorts of committees for
worthy purposes, or to form with communists editorial boards for
magazines and newspapers. Liberals respond with indignation
whenever communists complain that their civil liberties are being
infringed.
This assumption is grotesquely false. Apart from those generic
traits which characterize all organizations, in this case of secondary
practical significance, the Communist Party has nothing in common
with democratic, parliamentary parties. It exists on a totally differ-
ent plane of political reality. The parliamentary parties with which
we are familiar are sprawling aggregations of diverse individuals,
limited in their objectives, loosely united as electoral machines. They
have no systematic program, at most a few traditional ideas, and
periodic, not very seriously meant, "platforms" covering a few items
of current political interest. For most persons, "to be a Republican"
means little more than to contribute a few dollars now and then,
and to vote the party ticket on election day. Even for the professional
parliamentary poHtician, "politics" is comparable to any other "busi-
ness," one and not necessarily the chief among the varied interests
of life.
THE NATURE OF COMMUNISM 59
The true communist, in complete contrast, is a "dedicated man."
He has no h£e apart from his organization and his rigidly systematic
set o£ ideas. Everything that he does, everything that he has, family,
job, money, belief, friends, talents, life, everything is subordinated
to his communism. He is not a communist just on election day or at
Party headquarters. He is a communist always. He eats, reads,
makes love, thinks, goes to parties, changes residence, laughs, in-
sults, always as a communist. For him, the world is divided into
just two classes of human beings: the communists, and all the rest.
In his eyes, there are simply his own Communist Party on the one
side, and all the rest of the world on the other. All non-communist
parties are, as he would put it, "agents of the class enemy"; "openly"
or "unconsciously," they are all "objectively counter-revolutionary."
In order, therefore, to understand the nature of communism, we
must rid our minds of all preconceptions drawn from our experi-
ences of the traditional parliamentary parties. If we do not, it will
be like trying to infer the nature of chess from an acquaintance
exclusively with checkers, merely because they happen to use a
similarly constructed board. Our success in dealing with commu-
nists will be comparable to that of a checkers player, so instructed, in
a chess tournament.
On the basis, then, of the full evidence, communism may be sum-
marily defined as a world-wide, conspiratorial movement for the
conquest of a monoply of power in the era of capitalist decline.
Politically it is based upon terror and mass deception; economically
it is, or at least tends to be, collectivist; socially it is totalitarian.*
* I am well aware that this definition may be applied almost without change to
fascism also. This is not surprising because the two, fascism and communism, are
variants of the same fundamental kind of socio-political movement. Their differences
are primarily in the always secondary factor of the ideology or myth through which
their activities are rationalized, and in the special circumstances of their origins. In
their historical evolution, they have demonstrably approached a common norm. They
are rivals only in the sense that, say, t\vo candidates for the heavyweight boxing
championship are rivals; their aim and methods are identical. The communist claim
to be "the world leader in the struggle against fascism" is, from the point of view
of those who are neither fascists nor communists, one of the most ironic jokes in
history.
6o THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
Every word in this definition is meant in the strictest sense, and I
shall therefore proceed to elaborate its content.
Official communism is, and has always, from the time of Marx,
been conceived to be, a world-wide movement, recognizing no polit-
ical, geographic or cultural boundaries. Since the founding of the
Third International, this internationalism has been concretized in a
rigid organizational form, so that all major policies of all official
communists everywhere are controlled from a common center. It
is a major effort of the propaganda of communists, and their dupes,
to make us believe that Russian communists and American com-
munists and Chinese communists and Yugoslavian communists are
not the same thing. Such a belief is a naive illusion. The program-
matic differences among the communist parties of various nations
are themselves decided by the common center. These are never more
than tactical variations, suited to the particular national conditions
at the particular time. The central strategy is always one and the
same.
For communists, the formal dissolution of the Third International,
in May, 1943, which created such a stir of speculation in the general
press, had not the slightest significance. Communists never worry
about "organizational forms." They knew that nothing had really
changed, that the International had long before become a "bureau-
cratic excrescence," not operationally necessary, and besides awk-
ward in Soviet diplomatic negotiations. Already, in 1937, the Chinese
Communist Party had withdrawn formally from the International,
in order to further its local policy. In 1940 the United States Party
took the same formal action, so that it might conform nominally to
the provisions of the Smith-Connally Act. After May, 1943, nothing
changed in communist world strategy, or in the subordination of the
world movement to the central direction. Agents, funds, directives
came and went as before — Tito, Thorez, Anton, Berger, Ibarruri,
Mao, Togliatti continued to be as much at home in Moscow as in
Yugoslavia, France, Mexico, the United States, Spain, China, or
Italy.
THE NATURE OF COMMUNISM 6i
To many, it may seem odd to call the communist movement "con-
spiratorial" when we all know that communist parties and multi-
tudes of communist-controlled organizations flourish openly in all
countries. The paradox here is within the non-communist world,
not in communism. A conspiracy means a plan which, though it
may also have legal phases, is in its basic aims and methods illegal,
outside the law. From the communist point of view, legal work is
always secondary, is no more than a cover for illegal activity. It
could hardly be otherwise when, as Marx and Engels put it in the
original Manifesto, the communist "ends can be attained only by
the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions." "Legal
work," Lenin declared,* "m.ust be combined with illegal work. The
Bolsheviks always taught this. . . . The party which . . . does not
carry on systematic, all-sided, illegal work in spite of the laws of the
bourgeoisie and of the bourgeois parHaments, is a party of traitors
and scoundrels."
It is this attitude that dictates the communist conception of re-
forms. To wish and work for reforms is, of course, "legal work,"
and Stalin sums up as follows, in his Foundations of Leninism:
"The revolutionist will accept a reform in order to use it as a means
wherewith to link legal work with illegal work, in order to use it
as a screen behind which his illegal activities for the revolutionary
preparation of the masses may be intensified." The communist eval-
uation of the "legal work" of elections, the climactic political activity
of parliamentary parties, is identical: "Comical pedants. They have
failed to understand that voting in the limits of bourgeois parlia-
mentarism is part of the bourgeois state apparatus which must be
broken and smashed from top to bottom in order to realize the
dictatorship of the proletariat . . . They fail to understand that, gen-
erally speaking, it is not voting, but civil war that decides all serious
questions of politics when history has placed the dictatorship of the
proletariat on the order of the day,"f
Conspiracy is so much a part of the essence of communism that
it persists unchanged and in fact intensified even in a country where,
*In an attack on Ramsay MacDonald, written in 1919.
t Lenin, loc. cit. "Dictatqrship of the proletariat" is the circumlocution whereby
communists refer to the "monopoly dictatorship of the communists."
62 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
as in the Soviet Union, the communists are legally in control. Krav-
chenko notes, in / Chose Freedom: "The G.P.U, had its eyes and
«ars carefully deployed so that they would see and hear everything.
Behind the backs of the formal authorities and the economic man-
agers, I realized, there was a network of spies — spies of the secret
police system and others of the Party, unknown to one another.
Behind the ostensible government was a real government."
All of communist policy is dependent upon the belief that tra-
ditional, individualist capitalist society is in inescapable decline. This
belief is probably true; but unless it is true, the communists are
aware they would have no chance of reaching their final goal.
It is the disintegration of capitalism that provides the opportunity
for a compact, disciplined army of revolutionists to acquire a monop-
oly of power. This belief, moreover, is one of the two sources of the
communist economic policy of collectivization. Convinced that com-
petitive private ownership cannot handle the problems of modern
mass industry, that it must result in chronic economic dislocation,
mass unemployment and periodic crisis, the communists reason that
collectivization of industry will in the long run operate more effec-
tively, will eliminate the worst of the economic troubles, and will
thereby provide the strongest possible foundation for their regime.
There is, however, another quite different and more decisive com-
munist motive for collectivization. Property rights in the instruments
of production are a form of social power. If these rights are exercised
by individuals, at their own discretion, this means a decentralization,
a plurality of power. The supreme objective of communism, to
which everything else is subordinate, is a monopoly of power. They
therefore look upon private property, correctly, as a threat to their
monopoly. Their tendency is to minimize or wipe out important
property rights as soon as this is technically possible. A certain flexi-
bility would, however, seem to be possible on this point. Commu-
nism, consistent with its own nature, can permit, at least temporarily,
some retention of property rights, or even their mild revival, if this
is an expedient maneuver (as under the Soviet New Economic
Policy of 1921-28, or in some of the newly dominated puppet States
THE NATURE OF COMMUNISM 63
of Eastern Europe), provided only that this does not seriously en-
danger communist power.
Economic collectivization, thus, w^hich was originally advertised
as the guarantor o£ the economic emancipation of all mankind,
turns out in practice to permit the most concentrated of all forms
of mass exploitation.
By calling communism "socially totalitarian" I mean that its
power monopoly extends to all phases of human life: not merely to
the limited ranges of experience that have been traditionally re-
garded as within the sphere of politics, but to art, industry, agricul-
ture, science, literature, morality, recreation, family life. A novel or
a divorce or a painting or a religion or a symphony or a biological
theory or a vacation or a movie are as much a "weapon of the class
struggle" as a strike or a revolution.
Every political regime is based upon force and myth, upon police,
armies and jails, and upon an ideology which is at least partly at
variance with reality. What distinguishes communism is that terror
constitutes the force upon which it is founded, and deliberate decep-
tion the content of its myth. Law, like everything else from the
point of view of communism, is exclusively an instrument of power,
to be used or by-passed as the expediency of the moment decides.
Under communism, open, legal force is always subordinate to the
secret, conspiratorial terror. The leading agent of this terror is the
secret police, the N.K.V.D.,* numbering about 2,000,000 operatives
active in every part of the world. These, however, are supplemented
and at times counter-checked by many other agencies: the secret op-
eratives of the official party and its Control Commissions, the mili-
tary intelligence, the private spies of great bureaus or bureaucrats,
and millions of voluntary or dragooned informers and provocateurs.
The terror is everywhere, never ceasing, the all-encompassing at-
mosphere of communism. Every act of life, and of the lives of
parents, relatives and friends, from the trivial incidents of child-
* This organization, formerly referred to as the "G.P.U.," and still earlier as the
"Chcka," has recently changed its label to "M.V.D." I retain what I take to be the
most familiar title.
64 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
hood to major political decisions, finds its way into the secret and
complete files o£ the N.K.V.D. A chance meeting with a stranger,
a casual remark to a fellow-worker, a nostalgic reminiscence with a
lover, a letter to a child or mother, all may be recorded, to rise to
condemn a victim during his examination in one of the great purges.
The forms of the terror cover the full range: from the subtlest psy-
chological temptings, to economic pressure, to months-long third
degrees, to threats against wives and children, to exile and forced
labor, to the most extreme physical torture, to a shot in the back of
the neck in the corridors of the Lubianka, to the trained assassina-
tions, in a city street or a railway train, of the special Terror Section
of the N.K.V.D.
The scale of the terror is beyond computation. Its direct victims
are numbered not in occasional dozens or scores, but in many mil-
lions. During 1932-33, as a stimulus to the agricultural collectiviza-
tion program, 3,000,000 Ukrainian peasants were deliberately starved.
In the purges, tens of thousands are shot, hundreds of thousands
jailed, and millions sent to the N.K.V.D.'s concentration camps and
slave-labor gangs.
The terror, though it can operate to the full only where the com-
munists are in absolute control, as in the Soviet Union, is by no
means confined within the Soviet boundaries. The N.K.V.D. oper-
ates throughout the world. It advances with the Red Army into
Eastern Europe, and there supervises the liquidation of the oppo-
sition. In Spain, during the Civil War, it had its own prisons and
torture chambers. Hundreds of anti-communist Loyalists were kid-
naped or assassinated by its agents. It reaches into France to kill
the secretary of the anti-Stalinist Fourth International, and, since the
war, to arrest or kidnap Russians who have renounced Stalin; into
Switzerland to assassinate Ignace Reiss, one of its own agents who
thought he could resign; into Cuba, to murder Paul Maslow; into
Mexico, to stab Trotsky; into China, to help settle with the Kuomin-
tang; into Washington, to stage the faked suicide of Krivitsky; into
New York, to shanghai Meyer London or Juliet Poyntz.
It should not be supposed that the terror with which communism
is linked is a transient phenomenon, a temporary device used and
perhaps abused tor some special "emergency of the revolution."
THE NATURE OF COMMUNISM 6$
Terror has always been an essential part of communism, from
the pre-revolutionary days when Stalin, as "Koba," was directing the
bombings whereby Bolshevik funds were assembled, through the
years before 191 7 when Lenin was approving the private tortures
administered to political dissidents, into every stage of the develop-
ment of the communist regime in power. Terror is proved by his-
torical experience to be integral to communism, to be, in fact, the
main instrument by which its power is increased and sustained.
From the beginning of the communist regime in Russia, every major
poHtical and economic turn has been carried through by terror. The
liquidation of the opposition parties, the reintegration of the inde-
pendent state of Georgia (both these under Lenin), the institution
of the first Five Year Plan, the collectivization of agriculture, the
liquidation of the old "specialists" inherited from the Tsarist regime
and the later liquidation of the "Red Specialists," the turn to the
popular front policy after the victory of Hitler in Germany, the in-
troduction of "single responsibility" in the factories, the ending of
the independence of the trade unions, the liquidation of factions
within the Communist Party itself, the turn to the Hitler Pact, the
early turn toward exaggerated nationalism in the constituent re-
publics as well as the subsequent reverse of that turn, the mobiliza-
tion for the war, and now, as I write, the attempt to re-consolidate
politically after the partial demoralization left by the war: in every
case, the basic reliance for the achievement of the objective has been
put, not upon a law or a decree or education or appeals to loyalty
or even self-interest, but upon terror. Each step has been driven
through by its correlated purges, imprisonments, exilings, tortures
and assassinations.*
i * Apart from direct experience in the revolutionary movement, which is the only
source for adequate knowledge of some aspects of communist operations, there is
extensive first-hand documentation for these generalizations about communist terror,,
in the writings of the following: Boris Souvarine, Anton Ciliga, Vladimir and
Tatiana Tchernavin, Victor Serge, W. G. Krivitsky, Markoosha Fischer, Alexander
Barmine, Victor Kravchenko, Jan Valtin, and the Poles who were Soviet prisoners
during 1939-41, as well as many journalists, including pro-Stalinist journalists. Much
can also be directly learned and easily inferred from official Soviet publications on the
various purges and trials, the records of Party meetings and Congresses dealing with
these problems, and the theoredcal justifications of terror which have been written
by nearly all leading communist writers. What has been understood by only a very
66 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
The tens of thousands of fellow-travelers of the communists in
this country, the hundreds of thousands of innocents who serve the
communists by working on the magazines and committees and
fronts and appeals which the communists daily construct, the work-
ers who follow their trade-union leadership, even the outer fringe
of the Communist Party members, do not, most of them, under-
stand in the least the meaning of the terror, though by their actions
they support and defend it. They have no idea that it operates, though
as yet on a small, guarded scale, within their own country. Much
less have they any imagining of what it would mean if transferred
intact, a possibility by no means too remote for imagining. During
the years 1940-41 the United States made the political "turn" to the
war. The method of terror would have meant: the arrest — in the
middle of the night, without court warrant — of every person who
had expressed "anti-war sentiments," and, under the convenient pre-
text, of every actual or potential "opponent of the regime" as well
as those against whom any high official or low informer happened
to have a grudge; months of sleepless grillings, tortures, beatings of
the "accused," along with more informal miscellaneous beatings and
grillings throughout the country; confessions, prison sentences, slave-
labor camps, starvation, death for hundreds of thousands. So, also,
not only for so crucial an issue as war, but for the beginning (and
end) of N.R.A., the start or stop of rationing, the arrival of an eco-
nomic depression or a change in foreign alignments. The "enemies
of the people" — that is, all who oppose, or once opposed, or might
possibly sometime oppose, the party in power — are "scum," "offal,"
"mad dogs," and are rightly thrust into the outer darkness.
The positive supplement to terror, as the second pillar of com-
munism, is the deliberate deception of the masses. Truth, too, is "a
few, however, is that terror is an integral part of communism as a functioning move-
ment. Official communists defend terror as a legitimate and necessary temporary de-
fense of the revolution against its class enemies. Opposition communists accept terror
in principle, but say that Stalin has gone to excess. Non-communists who have be-
come acquainted with the facts are too horrified to be able to grasp its general sig-
nificance.
THE NATURE OF COMMUNISM (f]
weapon in the class struggle." This deception takes two forms. One
is the direct lie: to deny that millions are starving when millions
are dying of starvation; to affirm that a political opponent has met
with Hitler or Trotsky or Churchill or the Mikado in Stockholm
or Paris or Berlin or Denmark or Tokyo, when he had never been
within a hundred miles of the place or the person; to destroy the
records of a census (as in 1937) and kill the statisticians who made
them, when the results are "not according to plan"; to confess to
crimes not committed and often not even possible; to falsify, month
by month, the records of industry, agriculture, wages, finance; to
corrupt quotations and fake up photographs; to re- write every three
years the history of Russia and the world, so that history itself will
always be a confirmation of the immedate line of the Party. In
London, a communist trade-unionist frames a non-communist official
of his union; in New York a communist teacher * at City College,
for years the Party leader of a large communist fraction of fellow-
teachers, denies in court that there is any other communist on the
faculty. They exhibit the same communist consistency with which
an editor of Pravda denies Soviet interference in Iran, or Stalin at
Yalta promises freedom for Poland or Rumania, or Molotov signs a
non-aggression pact with Finland or Esthonia.
The second form of deception is the manufacture of abstract
formulas which distort the comprehension of reality. According to
this method, the terrorist dictatorship of the Communist Party be-
comes "the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat"; the expropri-
ation of the lands, livestock and tools of the peasantry by terror and
mass starvation becomes "voluntary collectivization"; the extreme
inequality of income and living conditions within the Soviet Union
becomes "a triumph for sociaUst realism"; the kiUing of potential
opponents becomes "the liquidation of fascist agents of world im-
perialism"; lies, sabotage, and terror directed, anywhere, against
non-communists become "self-defense of the proletariat against its
enemies"; the immeasurable suffering and misery of the Russian
people become "the self-reUant happiness of the people of the land
of socialism."
* Morris U. Schappes, convicted and sent to prison for this perjury.
68 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
All political parties seek power. That is the object for which polit-
ical parties exist. The peculiar characteristic of communism is that,
wherever it operates, it seeks an absolute monopoly of all power.
When, say, the Republican Party in the United States wins a
national election, it temporarily gains thereby more power within a
certain limited field of the national life than any other party or or-
ganization. It distributes to its own members a large number of
official posts in the Administration and the bureaucracy. It passes
certain laws, assigns revenues and readjusts taxes at least partly in
accordance with what it takes to be its own special interests. It takes
advantage of the control of the governmental agencies to present
itself favorably to the public, and to pick up, for its members and
friends, some of the informal fruits of office — juicy contracts and
expense accounts, privileges in housing or transportation that can
be charged to the government, an occasional bit of graft.
At the same time, however, it does not seek literally to destroy
all rival political organizations. Doubtless it tries to weaken them,
and to provide the best chance for its own continuance in office;
but it accepts as a practical axiom the right of its rivals to continuing
social existence, and it takes for granted that some day one of the
rivals may have its turn at the government, while Republicans redre
to the oppositional sidelines. Moreover, the RepubUcan Party in
office, or any such parliamentary party, recognizes in practice limits
to the range of its power extension. Political parties are not the only
power organizations in non-totalitarian society. Churches, trade
unions, armies, farms, industries, banks, fraternal and other associa-
tions, all are, in at least one aspect of their functioning, concentra-
tions of social power. The Republican Party will consider it
legitimate that this should be so, and that these organizations should
continue to hold their independent share of the total power, even
if, as will often be the case, their power is directed counter to the
power interests of the Republican Party itself.
What is in question here is a fundamental premise or rule not
only of parliamentary parties, but of democratic society. In a free
society, there, must be a multiplicity of relatively independent interests,
there must be a fragmentation of power. According to the rules
of a democratic society, it is proper for a political party or other
organization to try to gain for itself more power than it already has,
or even more power than any other single organization. But the
rules provide that it must always grant the right of other organiza-
tions to make the same try, that it accept the principle of the plural-
ity of power.
Historical experience has shown that the relation of communism
"to power is of a totally different kind, that communism operates
according to a different set of rules, a different principle. The com-
munist party aims not merely at securing for itself more power than
that possessed by any other political party or movement; its object
is the possession of all power, not only all direct political power but
all social power whatsoever. Therefore, negatively, it aims to destroy
all rival, independent foci of power in society as a whole.
That this is the aim (indeed, the supreme aim) of communism
is proved by the fact that communists act in accordance with it
wherever, and to the extent that, it becomes technically possible. It
is exemplified just as plainly in the conduct of a communist frac-
tion on a magazine's editorial board or in an American trade union
as it is by communist behavior when they take charge of a nation.
The necessity for the communist monopoly of power receives the
customary distorted expression in the abstract formulas of com-
munist theory. The nominal ultimate goal of communism is "the
free, classless communist society." Communist society can be reached,
however, only by the interim stage of the "proletarian dictatorship."
Lenin is careful to remind us * that "the transition from capitalism
to communism represents an entire historical epoch," in which is
carried on "a long, stubborn and desperate war of life and death, a
war which requires perseverance, discipline, firmness, inflexibility,
and unity of will."f But the proletariat is ignorant, corrupted by
centuries of capitalist rule, and therefore cannot itself exercise "its
own" dictatorship. This can be done only by the "conscious van-
guard" of "professional revolutionists" — namely, the Communist
Party— whose integrity is guaranteed by its adherence to the correct
* In The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky.
\ Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder.
70 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
"ideology." The communists, and only the communists, have this
ideology; and therefore they and only they can be the dictators.
Everyone else, every other movement, is and must be an open or
disguised agent of the counter-revolution, and must therefore be
deprived of all powder, if the revolution is to succeed. "The only
choice is: Either bourgeois, or Socialist ideology. There is no middle
course (for humanity has not created a 'third' ideology, and, more-
over, in a society torn by class antagonisms there can never be a non-
class or above-class ideology). Hence, to belittle Socialist ideology
in any way, to deviate from it in the slightest degree means strength-
ening bourgeois ideology." *
While communists remain a small and weak sect, operating
within a society controlled by others, this principle has to remain
submerged. But as soon as, and to the degree that, they get material
power, it is put literally into operation. Thus, after the Revolution
in Russia, we note: first, the destruction of all Tsarist, "bourgeois"
and liberal parties (1918-19); then the destruction of all non-
communist peasant or working-class parties (1918-21); then the
smashing of the independent power of the Orthodox Church (191 8
on); then the reduction to impotence of the Soviets, co-operatives,
trade unions, etc. (1925-29); then the suppression of opposition
factions within the Communist Party itself (1927-29) ; then the liqui-
dation of all individual actual, former, or potential dissidents (in
the Purges, especially those during the years following the assassina-
tion of Kirov in 1934) ; and along with all these steps, the reduction
of all social agencies whatsoever, from the most trivial to the great-
est, to the single control.
However, it is not necessary to look inside the Soviet borders to
observe the principle operating. It operates, wherever there are com-
munists, to the limit that is materially possible. It is operating today,
on national scales, in Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-
slovakia, Yugoslavia, Albania, eastern Germany and Austria, north-
ern Korea and Iran. It operates in the Chinese territories controlled
by the communists, as it operated in the Spanish LoyaUst armies. It
operates within every trade union where communists are active or
in control — in the American Communications Association; the Fed-
eration of Architects, Engineers, Chemists and Technicians; Harry
Bridges' Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union or Michael
Quill's Transport Workers' Union; the United Public Workers of
America; the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers; the
Fur and Leather Workers' Union; and so on. It operated, very effec-
tively, and to success, in New York's American Labor Party. It
operates, though here still for the time being restrained by "unripe
conditions," on the Political Action Committee; or the Independent
Citizens' Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Professions, behind its
changing facade of a Harold Ickes, Claude Pepper or James Roose-
velt; in the Democratic State Committees of California and Wash-
ington; in the New York City Council; and at a still earlier level
in Congress or the State Department. Always and everywhere, the
principle is the same: the conquest, for the communists, of an abso-
lute monopoly of all power.
From this principle, which is the central fact of communism, the
essential and suiScient key to the basic understanding of the nature
of communism, a conclusion follows: After communism has grown
beyond the limits of a narrow sect, it is impossible for any other
power grouping to coexist for any length of time with communism.
A plurality of power is incompatible with communism. Communism
must conquer, or perish.
There is one communist tactic, so important at every level of com-
munist activity, and so fundamentally misunderstood by most non-
communists, that it is advisable to explain it briefly from the point
of view of the analysis of the nature of communism. This tactic is
what communists call "the united front."
Whenever communists support or engage in an activity, or set up
an organization, jointly with non-communist individuals, groups or
organizations, this constitutes what can be called in general a "united
front." Thus, a magazine like Science and Society is a united front;
or a Committee to Save the OP A; or a League for Constitutional
72 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
Liberties; or a Council for Soviet-American Friendship; or a League
for a Free Africa; or a Political Action Committee; or a Federation
of Atomic Scientists; or a Hollywood Screen Writers' Guild; or the
lists of signers to some petition or open letter; or, at much higher
stages, a popular front such as that formed before the war in France;
or coalition governments which include communists, like those at
present in France, Italy, and the East European nations; or the
Allied coalition in the Second World War; or the United Nations;
or even, in the Soviet Union itself, the electoral front of the "union
of the Party and the non-Party masses."
If we examine the individuals and organizations that belong to
these various fronts — of which there have been tens of thousands
during the past generation — we discover that some of the fronts are
altogether counterfeit. They are limited to communists and close
sympathizers, and are created for the sake of a nominal masquerade
through v/hich the communists can hide their hand, manipulate
finances, or gain legal immunities. Of this sort are, for example, the
International Labor Defense, or the magazine New Masses. Other
united fronts, however — such as the Political Action Committee or
the Independent Citizens' Committee of the Arts, Sciences and
Professions — include a maximum ideological range, from anti-
communists to non-communists to innocents to fellow-travelers to
communist party members to, in many cases, the N.K.V.D. itself.
Entry into a united front presents itself to a communist in a way
altogether incommensurate with the motives of a non-communist.
The non-communist sees a certain task to be done — an arrested
Negro to be defended, Chinese children to feed, trade unions to
organize, colonial independence to further, a nation with no clear
majority to be got somehow through a difficult period, a war to be
won. He is willing, even eager, to join with everyone, including
communists, who will promise to work jointly with him to accom-
plish the task in which he is interested. Or, on some occasions, he
sees no way to carry through the task alone, and feels compelled to
join with others of different views and organizations, including
communists. Nothing could, apparently, be more natural.
But this is not the way the communist reasons. He may or may
not be interested in the specific task for which the united front is
THE NATURE OF COMMUNISM 73
ostensibly organized — very often he is indifferent to it, or even anx-
ious that it fail. As aWays, he is interested centrally in advancing
the monopoly of communist pov^^er. The primary purpose for which
he enters into the united front is to get a chance to weaken the non-
communist individuals and organizations that belong, with him,
to the united front, and to destroy their political influence. The in-
nocent or morally worthy ostensible purpose of the front is the bait
to a trap. The communist, able to work from the inside through the
device of the united front, can undermine the non-communist or-
ganizations, win over their members, and either capture or "expose"
and crush politically the leading individual non-communists.
It is a law of modern politics without exception that non-
communists always lose by entering into a united front, for any
purpose whatsoever, with communists. They lose no matter what
happens to the supposed specific purpose of the united front. As a
rule, that purpose gradually evaporates after a few rounds of activity,
when the communist line takes a new turn, or the communists feel
that they have exploited the situation as far as is profitable. Very
often the supposed purpose is quietly perverted, as when funds
raised to provide medical relief to Spanish loyalists or Yugoslavian
children go to provide jobs for deserving communists and finances
for the Spanish and Yugoslavian sections of the Party and the
N.K.V.D. But in every case, whatever else happens, the primary
purpose of the communists is to use the united front as a vantage
ground; to acquire a useful and respectable disguise for themselves;
to recruit new members and fellow-travelers; to gain a platform
through which they can speak to an audience not otherwise acces-
sible or so favorably accessible to them; and, finally, to destroy the
independent power of the other constituent organizations (or in-
dividuals) either by capturing them, or, if this proves impossible, by
crushing them.
When Byrnes and Cadogan and the others sit with Gromyko at
the sessions of the Security Council, they are constantly puzzled
by Gromyko's behavior; they find it "incomprehensible." It is, how-
ever, far more rational than their own. They are not aware that
Gromyko sits there not because he has the slightest interest in solv-
ing fruitfully any problems of peace or prosperity, but precisely to
74 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
aggravate those problems; not because he has any wish to make
genuine agreements with his fellow Council members, but because
he is instructed to use the United Nations as a helpful wedge for
weakening and destroying the other members and the nations they
represent. When the Communist Party enters into a French coalition
government, it is not because it proposes to aid in the reconstruction
of France as a strong and prosperous power, but just the opposite:
because it wants an inside post from which to make certain that
independent French power will never be revived, that France will
live again only as a communist-controlled state. Claude Pepper and
Joseph Davies and Elliott Roosevelt and Henry Wallace and all the
ministers and actors and writers and busy journalists are, I suppose,
quite unconscious of the contempt with which they are regarded by
the communists for the light-hearted way in which they make their
speeches before united front meetings in Madison Square Garden,
and permit their names to grace the imposing letterheads of united
front committees.
During 1946, as I write, there is being carried through a classic
example of the united front tactic in Eastern Germany. First there
are the separate socialist and communist parties. Then, stimulated
by the Red Army and the N.K.V.D., there is a united front of the
two parties. Then, in the late Spring of 1946, there is the culmination
of the united front tactic — which is, of course, "unity." The Sociahst
Unity Party comes into being. Now, the completion of the process
will take place. The socialists in the Socialist Unity Party will either
cease being socialists, or will cease to be. And the Socialist Unity
Party will become, "not accidentally," as communists would say, the
German Communist Party at a "higher stage of development."
For communists, the only admissible form of unity is, in all
things, total communist domination.
< go to Contents>
6. From Internationalism to Multi-national Bolshevism
DURING RECENT YEARS there has been much dispute about
the question: has communism taken over Russia, or Russia taken
over communism? Are we to understand communism as primarily
an international movement, acknowledging no fatherland, that hap-
pens to have had its chief local success to date in Russia; or are we
to believe, as many analysts contend, that communism is, or has
become, no more than a new outward form for the older nationalism
and imperialism of Russia ?
These two views seem incompatible; and there seems at hand
much evidence, especially from the last decade, for the second. It is
a fact that the Russian communists control the world communist
movement. It is a fact that during the past ten years there has been
within the Soviet Union a revival of Russian nationalist tradition.
The cult of the traditional heroes of Russian history, tsars and sol-
diers and even legendary figures, has reappeared with official ap-
proval. Literature and the arts express pride in Russian themes.
Tsarist military decorations, uniforms and even modes of address
have been reinstated. The Orthodox Church has been permitted to
resume a less hampered activity. During the war, internal propa-
ganda stressed the patriotic defense of the holy motherland. In addi-
tion, many of the aims of Soviet foreign policy, both those achieved
and those still in process, are seen to be continuations of the foreign
policies of imperial Russia.
Nevertheless, these facts are deceptive. The truth is that the two
views are not contrary to each other. Communism is both an inter-
national movement and Russian imperialism.
The communist world movement first came to complete power
in the great and populous Russian Empire. There is nothing surpris-
ing in the subsequent result that the Russian communists became
75 .
76 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
dominant in the world movement. This would have been true of the
German communists, if Germany had been the first nation con-
quered; or of the British communists if it had been England. And
the succeeding stage of communist development would then have
had a German or an English bias. Since 1917 the Russian com-
munists have had at their immediate disposal the greater percentage
of the material substance of power — human beings, funds, lands,
factories, armies. Naturally, so backed, their voices have been louder
in international communist councils than those of any others. Natu-
rally, also, when it came to choices on international policy — in con-
nection with Germany or China or Austria or Argentina — they
would tend to support a decision which would be favorable to their
own special interests, even if that decision meant difficulties for com-
munists in Germany or China or Austria or Argentina. The Russian
communists discovered, moreover, that to control the masses of the
Russian people, to get them to endure uninterrupted sufferings and
to die in wars, the symbols of Russian nationalism and even Russian
religion were useful instruments.
But to conclude from this that international communism is only
"the Russian state party," an extension throughout the world of the
Russian foreign office, and that communism is "nothing but Russian
imperialism," would be a disorienting mistake.
From the point of view of communists themselves, communist
Russia is not a "national fatherland" in the ordinary sense, but a
"fortress of the world revolution," just as a conquered trade union
in a non-communist country might be considered a pillbox, or a
communist cell in the State Department, a sentry post. The dispute
between Trotsky and Stalin, so far as it was more than a struggle
for personal power, was not over "world revolution" versus national-'
ism. Both Trotsky and Stalin, like all communists, believed in both
world revolution and the defense of a communist Russia. The
principal issue between them was a purely tactical problem. What
percentage of communist resources and energies should be assigned
directly to the Russian fortress, and what to operations in the still
unconquered sections of the earth ? Trotsky argued for a faster pace,
and for a bigger allotment to the non-communist hinterland. Stalin
wanted more time, and a relatively greater share given to increasing
INTERNATIONALISM TO BOLSHEVISM 77
the armaments and strengthening the walls of the fortress already
won.
The internal consolidation of the proletarian dictatorship in the
U.S.S.R., the success achieved in the work of Socialist construction,
the growth of the influence and authority of the U.S.S.R. among the
masses of the proletariat and the oppressed peoples of the colonies
signify the continuation, intensification and expansion of the Inter-
national Social Revolution. . . . The U.S.S.R. inevitably becomes
the base of the world movement of all oppressed classes, the center
of international revolution, the greatest factor in world history. In
the U.S.S.R., the world proletariat for the first time acquires a
country that is really its own. . . . The U.S.S.R. is the only father-
land of the international proletariat, the principal bulwark of its
achievements and the most important factor for its international
emancipation. . . .
These words are not from Trotsky, but from the 1928 Program of
the Communist International, written under the direct supervision
of Stalin.*
Soviet patriotism, with its Russian component, is therefore not
merely consistent with communist internationalism, but obligatory
upon genuine communists. When the communists conquered power
in one nation, the strategy of the world communist struggle for a
monopoly of world power was thereby necessarily altered. Before
that, communists were against the governments of all nations, and
for their overthrow. Thereafter the communists had an existing state
of their own; and every extension of the power or boundaries of that
state became automatically an extension of world communism.
Now Soviet Russia assumed, in the Communist creed, the role of
an instigator, of a pioneer. To liberate the "oppressed peoples" be-
came the function of a state, not of the revolutionary party [as
formerly distinct from any state].
Thus, in 1939-40 [in the seized Baltic countries] socialization was
carried out along new lines which were different from the classical
concept of revolution. In the newly occupied countries industrial
*This Program and the Constitution and Rules of the International are of very
great significance, and should be read in their entirety.
78 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
plants were not seized by the workers; on the contrary, the new
regime ruthlessly suppressed all attempts of this kind. A complete
scheme of "socialization of society" had been prepared beforehand
and was systematically put into effect by the new authorities. Ties
were established between industrial centers in Moscow and the cor-
responding factories in the newly acquired territories. Special in-
structions were issued concerning political reprisals against anyone
guilty of ofiFering opposition.*
Soviet "neo-Russian" imperialism is thus identical with "revolu-
tionary emancipation." Nor is it surprising that there is a continuity
between Soviet imperialism and Tsarist imperialism, since the gen-
eral lines of both are in considerable part dictated by evident geo-
political considerations. Soviet state policy is identical with world
communist policy. That is why we can get light on Soviet policy by
reading the New York Daily Worker and observing the activities of
American communists, just as we get light on American commu-
nists by noting what the Soviet government is doing.
I propose, then, in the next two sections, to review certain develop-
ments o£ Soviet policy not as "Russian incidents," but in their true
sense, as the Soviet expression of developments in world communist
policy which have in each case their complete international cor-
relation.
Since the time of the Revolution, Soviet (that is, international
communist) policy has been featured by periodic abrupt "turns," in
which what was formerly good becomes, seemingly, suddenly bad,
what was true becomes false, and what was white becomes in one
stroke black. These turns are the source of the feeling so many per-
sons have that there is something mysterious and unknowable about
Soviet policy and intentions. They are also the source of many hun-
dreds of misleading books. With each new turn, several dozen
authors believe that a pet theory of their own has been finally
* David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, fg^g-42, p. 247. Quoted with
the permission of the publishers, the Yale University Press. These remarks would, of
course, apply equally well to Poland, eastern Germany and Austria, and the Balkan
countries a few years later.
INTERNATIONALISM TO BOLSHEVISM 79
proved; they assume that the turn is permanent; and they write a
book interpreting Soviet history and perspectives in terms of it.
What with the time required for writing and pubhshing, each set
of books usually appears at just about the time the next turn in the
series gets started. The books are thus out of date before they are
read. Among the authors so caught are often prominent commu-
nists themselves, whose books are hastily withdrawn from circula-
tion and whose persons are not infrequently purged.
Soviet, and world communist policy, since the 1917 Revolution,
divides into seven clearly demarcated major periods, with a sharp
turn occurring between each of them. The list is as follows:
LEFT RIGHT
I. War Communism (1918-21)
2. The NEP (1921-28)
3. The Third Period (1928-
35/36)
4. The Popular Front (1935/6-
39)
5. The Hitler Pact (1939-41)
6. The Teheran Period (1943-45)
7. The Seventh Period (1945- )
(From June, 1941, until the end of 1943, that is, from the begin-
ning of the Russo-German war until Stalingrad, there was an inter-
regnum. The Soviet Union was fighting for existence, and the issue
of the war was in doubt. The military struggle absorbed all energies,
and "policy" was restricted for the most part to the immediate, des-
perate reflex of the battlefield. Not until the victory at Stalingrad
did the prospect of a successful outcome to the war become serious
enough to permit a major new positive development in policy. It
was only, therefore, at the end of 1943 that the Teheran Period took
definite form. However, even in the course of the preceding year
and a half, the groundwork for that period had been shaped.
(The names for the first six periods are established in communist
terminology. Since no, special title has yet emerged, I call the last
noncommittally "the seventh period.")
8o THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
The first period covers the years of overt revolution and Civil
War vi^ithin Russia. The second corresponds with the partial revival
of small scale private enterprise. The third extends over the begin-
nings of the Five Year Plans, and the agricultural collectivization.
The fourth is the somewhat tardy reaction to Hitler's victory in Ger-
many. The fifth is the deal with Hitler. The sixth is the political
correlate of the joint fight, with the Allies, against Germany, and the
effort to end the war on the basis most favorable to the Soviet
Union. The seventh is the first stage in the specific preparation for
the Third World War.
I have already remarked that the turn or transition from one
period to another is accompanied by a terrorist purge. The turn
from the first to the second periods was linked with the liquidation
of the "leftist" opposition parties and groups, which had outlasted
the already liquidated right opposition parties; the turn from the
second to the third, by the "Shakhty" trial and the other so-called
"trials of the engineers," and by the liquidation of factions in the
Party; the turn from the third to the fourth, by the great wave of
purges and trials that followed the Kirov assassination (1934); the
turn from the fourth to the fifth, by a smaller scale elimination of
those opposing a united front with Nazism; the turn to the sixth,
by the exiling of the Volga peasants of German stock, and by
measures against miscellaneous persons who might have used the
war for opposition. The new purge for the seventh period, a little
delayed by the confusion following the war, is getting under way on
a big scale as I write (in 1946).* It should be remembered that the
Show Trials, usually staged with twenty or thirty rehearsed de-
* The first public announcements of the post-war purge were published in the
Moscow press during June, 1946. During the following summer and autumn, several
American newspapers, especially the New York, Times, gave in their Moscow dis-
patches frequent (though as a rule not featured) reports of its progress. The first
wave of the purge evidently struck against administrative and technical personnel in
industry, the trade unions, and to a lesser extent the collective farms, under various
charges of "non-fulfillment of quotas," "holding back of wages," "falsification of
statistics," etc. Then there was a concentration in the Ukraine, where much of the
Party apparatus was ousted. The American news stories paid particular attention
to a third wave of the purge which fell on many well-known personalities in litera-
ture, the theater, and the movies, who were convicted of "bourgeois deviations." The
tragic, broken Sergei Eisenstein, once the greatest movie director in the world, was
among those compelled, not for the first time, to make public confession of political
INTERNATIONALISM TO BOLSHEVISM 8l
fendants in Moscow, are only the star acts of a drama that numbers
its cast in milHons, and takes place in every town and most villages
o£ Russia, as well as in all communist parties throughout the world.
It will be noticed, from the list of periods, that communist policy
has shifted in a Left-Right alternation. The ist, 3rd, 5th and present
7th periods have all been "leftist." They have featured extremist,
openly revolutionary, "class struggle" slogans. They have been con-
temptuous of "bourgeois democracy," have denounced "social-
fascists," made revolutionary attacks on "imperialist war," called for
"colonial revolts," and insisted on "proletarian" orthodoxy in science,
philosophy and the arts. The 2nd, 4th and 6th periods have in con-
trast been much milder in slogan, have stressed the call for united
and popular fronts, have preached the "peaceful co-existence" of
socialism and capitalism, and advocated moderate "reformist"
measures.
Nevertheless, it would be an error to conclude that the develop-
ment of communist policy is a simple pendulum motion from Left
to Right, and back. The four Left periods are not identical with each
other, nor are the three Right. The direction of motion is rather
that of a spiral, in which, along with the swing from one side to
the other, there goes a cumulative progression from the starting
point.
Indeed, the alternations from Left to Right are the secondary, less
important elements of the motion. They are confined to "tactics,"
which periodically change in response to real or imagined changes in
internal Soviet conditions or world affairs. The fundamental "strat-
egy" — with its univocal aim of the conquest of a monopoly of power
— does not zig-zag, but develops through a continuous process. This
difference, incidentally, explains a fact that is puzzling to outsiders :
namely, the ease with which trained communists accept a sudden
change in "line." The communists, unlike the outsiders, understand
that the change is only tactical, and that the basic strategy remains
unaltered.
We may illustrate the cumulative strategic development by ana-
sins. Even Dmitri Shostakovitch, the international communist musical hero during
the war years, was not exempted from a denunciation for the "anti-Soviet triviality"
of his latest work.
82 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
lyzing an important contrast in the application of the united front
device in the various periods. The first use of the united front was
during the second (NEP) period. It was Hmited, then, to other
non-corrimunist "working-class" organizations, and is best shown
by the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee of that time, a bloc
between the Soviet and English trade unions. In the fourth (the
second Right) period, the "united front" evolved into the "popular
front": that is, a bloc which includes not only non-communist work-
ing-class organizations but also liberal-democratic bourgeois groups.
This may be illustrated by the French Front Populaire (from which
the period takes its name), which was a bloc between the French
communists, socialists, and bourgeois-democratic Radical Socialists.
In the sixth (Teheran) period, the popular front in its turn evolved
into the "national front." In a national front, the communists are
now prepared to extend their bloc to include any group or individual
whatever, not merely proletarian and democratic-bourgeois, but con-
servative, reactionary, monarchist, and fascist. In the Moscow Free
Germany Committee, set up in 1943, there were (are, for that mat-
ter, since the Committee still exists) communists, socialists, liberals,
anti-Hitler Nazis, and extreme Junker reactionaries such as Generals
von Seydlitz and von Paulus. In the second Badoglio government in
Italy, the communists sat with the fascist Badoglio in the King's
Cabinet. The Spanish "Supreme Council of National Union," formed
by the communists in April, 1944, included communists, monarch-
ists, conservative Catholics, and reactionary industrialists. The com-
munists had no difficulty in dealing with King Boris of Bulgaria or
ex-King Carol of Rumania. They have supported Peron in Argentina,
and are today utilizing in eastern Germany millions of Nazis, while
recruiting tens of thousands of them into their own ranks. For the
United States, Earl Browder,* in 1944, summed up the new meaning
* It is important not to be deceived by Biowder's expulsion from the Party for
alleged "deviations from Marxism-Leninism." Browder, as leader of the Party, did
not "deviate" during the Teheran period, but, as always, exactly followed orders.
His nominal expulsion was part of the turn to the seventh period. He is, however,
being kept by the communists in reserve, as a "second string to Stalin's bow," hold-
ing out to the United States the prospect of a new "collaborationist" line to replace
this leftist seventh period, and hoping for "vindication" in the by no means impos-
sible next turn to a rightist eighth period.
INTERNATIONALISM TO BOLSHEVISM 83
o£ the united front as follows: "If J. P. Morgan supports this coali-
tion and goes down the line for it, I as a Communist am prepared
to clasp his hand on that and join with him to realize it." And he
added in an interview with the newspaper PM (March 15, 1944) :
"I am not sorry when you say that leading members of the N.A.M.
talk like me."
There is another significant general difference between the early
and the late periods. The first four periods were, on a world scale,
mechanical and uniform in their "leftism" or "rightism." In a left
period, every communist everywhere spoke and behaved as if he
expected to be on the barricades tomorrow, and scorned even a
haircut or a clean blouse as degraded symbols of bourgeois deca-
dence. The united front itself was suspended, as suspect of "collabo-
rationism." In a right period, every communist everywhere became
respectable, shined his shoes, and kept begging non-communists for
friendship and co-operation.
From the fifth period on Vv^e may observe a much greater flexi-
bility. Collaboration with Hitler can coexist with "leadership of the
anti-fascist forces" in democratic nations. Friendship with J. P.
Morgan can accompany open revolutionary struggle in the Balkans.
In 1946, Nev/ York City communists can vote for candidates of the
Democratic Party while their comrades in the United States and
elsewhere denounce the government run by the Democratic Party
as the world leader of imperialist counter-revolution.
Both this change in the meaning of the united front and the in-
crease of flexibility in the application of the "general line" are
reflections of the inner development, since the 191 7 Revolution, of
the world communist movement. This development is, simply, the
mighty expansion, both quantitative and qualitative, of the power
and independence of world communism.
The temporary circumstances of the origin of communism gave
it a special relation to two classes of the general population, the
working class and the poorer peasantry. The communists themselves
have always been an elite of professional revolutionists; but these
two classes were, in the early days, the primary "mass social base"
84 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
upon which communism rehed (much as the unemployed and cer-
tain sections of the middle classes were the primary initial social
base of Nazism), and with the help of which the communists car-
ried through the 1917 Revolution. Following the revolution, the com-
munists were still "tied," to one or another extent, to this original
social base, and thereby limited in their freedom of action. That is
why the original united fronts had to be restricted to proletarian and
peasant organizations; and why the earlier propaganda and tactics
had to have a relatively narrow class appeal.
With sufficient power and resources, the communists were in a
position to cut their original ties (except where they may wish to
manipulate them again in taking over new peoples), and to gain
almost complete freedom for themselves. This cutting of the original
social cord was accomplished in particular by the terror, and was
achieved at the time of, and largely through the culminating mecha-
nism of, the great trials and purges of 1936-38.*
This emancipation from the original social base might be called
the sociological pre-condition of the new style of communist tactics.
It is this that, sociologically, now permits communists to form a
bloc with any social group, with any individual from any class, to
adopt as easily a "no strike" as an "always strike" policy, to support
or conduct an imperialist war in one month and a league of paci-
fists the next.
The organizational pre-condition for the new style is the maturing
of the "cadres" of the world communist movement, in particular
including the N.K.V.D. World communism now disposes, within
and outside of the Soviet Union, an absolutely rehable and steeled
core of men and women, hardened both ideologically and practi-
cally. It is this core which is able to make any political turn instan-
taneously (Hitler Pact, war with Germany, attack on Peron or
support of Peron, support of Badoglio or of monopolies, collabora-
tion with the United States or the attempt to smash the United
States, strikes everywhere or strikes nowhere) . It then swings behind
itself the various layers of less conscious, less politically skilled party
members, fellow-travelers, sympathizers and dupes. "Above all," the
* The best estimates are that in this series of purges from eight to ten million
persons were shot, jailed, exiled, or sent to concentration and forced-labor camps.
INTERNATIONALISM TO BOLSHEVISM 85
French communist leader, Andre Marty, remarked in 1944, "the
Party has shown absolute firmness, changing its tactics three times
in succession since September, 1943, without the least sign o£ a
fissure."
This organizational pre-condition was also largely fulfilled during
1936-38. The purges sought to eliminate all real, potential or imag-
ined opposition. Those who remain in the inner communist core are
firm, flexible, true "Stalinists" — that is "men of steel." Only with
such an organizational preparation could so drastic a turn as the
Hitler Pact have been carried through with scarcely an organiza-
tional loss.
It is this organizational preparation which permits the communist
leaders to dispense with organizational formalities. They can dissolve
the Communist International, dissolve and re-constitute national
communist sections, merge into other parties and split from them,
enter governments and leave them, confident that the cement which
binds their own ranks is firmer than any organizational formula.
Moreover, because they are subject to a minimum of external social
restraint, they can move politically with that startling rapidity which
dazzles their world rivals, and keeps the initiative in communist
hands.
They are, in short, ready.
Independently of the separate tactical shifts from period to period,
there has taken place in world communism since the 1917 Revolution
a slower general development of major import. This is a transforma-
tion of the form of communist "internationalism," into what Molo-
tov has defined as "multi-nationalism." "This transformation,"
Molotov explained in a speech delivered to the Supreme Soviet on
Feb. I, 1944, "is in direct accord with the principles of our Lenin-
Stalin national policy." In it there is one of those personal correla-
tions so frequently found in history. Stalin, from his early days in
the Party, made himself a specialist on "the national question." As
Molotov put it, Stalin is "the best authority on the national question,
not only in our party and not only in our country." Multi-national-
86 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
ism is, in fact, the most distinctive creative advance in communist
theory and practice under StaUn's leadership.
The internationalism of earlier communism — of communism
while it vv'as still comparatively weak, still a relatively isolated sect —
was doctrinaire, abstract. It was based upon a presumed identity of
international "class forces," independent of all national divisions.
The communists proclaimed that the masses had no true fatherland,
that nationalism was just a trick whereby the class enemy forged
heavier chains, that the main enemy was always one's own govern-
ment, that sentiments of patriotism were shameful treachery to the
revolution. These ideas were at variance both with reality and more
especially with the deep traditional feelings of the masses. Conse-
quently, this earlier internationalism, or rather anti-nationalism,
often found itself crashing head on against the powerful sweep of
national sentiment, which, far from subsiding, has reached a new
intensity in our times. Potential recruits or followers of the com-
munists were offended and repelled by the anti-nationalism; it v>^as
a difficult barrier between communism and "the mind of the
masses."
Social democracy, in accordance with Marx's own precepts, was
also originally internationalist in this same doctrinaire sense, and
met the same troubles. In 1914, at the outbreak of the First World
War, social democracy ended the dilemma by succumbing to na-
tionalism. Within each of the warring nations, the socialists aban-
doned their previous abstract formulas about the unity of the
workers of the world, the duty of opposing "their own" govern-
ments and fighting against "imperialist v/ars," and so on. They
decided to be patriotic citizens and soldiers, fighting for their re-
spective governments against the national enemies. The end result
of this solution has been the disintegration of social democracy as an
independent historical force. Social democracy (called simply "so-
cialism" in the United States), in any crisis such as war or revolu-
tion, henceforth became subordinated to one or another national
state. Thus the socialist parties in many of the Allied powers in the
Second World War became the governmental leaders in the fight
for national survival. After the war the British (sociaHst) Labour
INTERNATIONALISM TO BOLSHEVISM 87
Party or the French SociaHst Party is first o£ all English or French,
and only secondarily socialist.
Communism has taken a different path, o£ far greater historical
weight. It is not succumbing to nationalism, but absorbing national-
ism, and thereby integrating into one movement two of the greatest
— perhaps the two greatest — historical forces of the present age.
There is here a typical "triumph of Stalinist realism." The Stalinist
method has always been to try, as far as possible, to swim with the
tide, never directly counter to it, but always to keep on top of the
water, not to be dragged under.* Since nationalist sentiments do
exist, let us not weaken and isolate ourselves by bucking them, but
rather let us exploit them, let us make them an avenue of approach
to the masses instead of a wall of separation.
A decade ago the national flag, in each country, began to appear
on party platforms along with the Red Banner; comrades sang "The
Star-Spangled Banner" or "God Save the King" as well as "The
Internationale"; the portraits of the traditional patriotic heroes were
hung beside those of Marx, Lenin and Stalin; the communist school
in New York was re-named "The Jefferson School," and the
N.K,V.D. recruited a contingent for the Spanish Civil War as "The
Abraham Lincoln Brigade." The Red Army, during the war, organ-
ized Czech divisions and Polish divisions and Hungarian and
Spanish, and for that matter German divisions. Communism be-
comes a kind of world political chameleon, more American than
Washington or Lincoln ("Communism is 20th Century American-
ism"), more French than Joan of Arc, more Chinese than Sun
Yat-sen, more German than Frederick — and, needless to say, more
Russian than Peter the Great.
As an instrument of world political policy, the starting premise
of "multi-national Bolshevism" gives it a considerable superiority
over "national socialism," which it otherwise so closely resembles.
National socialism, beginning with an intensification of Germanic
* A revolutionist I knew, who later became a prominent communist, once ex-
pressed the method through a personal anecdote. "In the First World War," he said,
"I was an aggressive pacifist. One night a crowd o£ several thousand persons came
to my house to lynch me, and I just managed to escape with my life, I resolved
then and there that in the next mobs I had anything to do with, I was going to be
leading them, not chased by them."
88 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
nationalism, was brought into direct conflict with rival nationalisms
when it went beyond the Germanic Fo/^. Communism, beginning
with a non-nationalist ideology, now adapts itself to existing nation-
alisms as it finds them, and thus can under many circumstances
absorb their dynamic in order to utilize it for communism's own
ends.
Stalin has written several tens of thousands of words about the
national question; and on these there have been many million words
of commentary. His "solution" of the national question, however,
boils down to a very simple formula: grant nationalities everything
expedient except power. Let them keep native costumes, songs,
language, food, dances (it is all these that make big conferences in
Moscow so colorful *) ; anything so long as they do not have power.
Power, under the communist system, is a monopoly; that is the
constant. The method was gradually worked out for the nationalities
within the borders of the twelve original Soviet republics; it was
extended to the four new republics formed during the war; and it
is being used, with suitable adaptations and at various stages, for the
nationalities that are brought under the expanding communist in-
fluence. Many puzzling and seemingly irreconcilable features of
present-day communist policy make ready sense when they are
understood in terms of multi-nationalism. It would, moreover, be a
grave mistake to underestimate the power of this remarkable hy-
brid. Its career is not ended, but only beginning.
The official recognition of multi-nationalism, and its formal in-
corporation as part of the practicing doctrine of communism, took
place when the Supreme Soviet, early in 1944, adopted — unani-
mously, of course — the so-called federalist amendments to the Soviet
Constitution. In the general press at that time, there was the usual
idiotic comment on the meaning of the amendments. Most inter-
preters discovered, as they periodically discover, symptoms of "de-
centralization" and "democratization." ("Federation," Lenin wrote
* And so impressive to those, like Corliss Lamont, who write books singing the
praises of the freedom of races and nations granted by the Soviet s^'stem. A sufficient
comment on the freedom is the fact that, during the purges of 1936-38, all the lead-
ing personnel of all the "governments" of all the professedly autonomous constiment
Soviet republics and "autonomous regions" were liquidated by the N.K.V.D.
INTERNATIONALISM TO BOLSHEVISM 89
in 1920, "is a transitional form to the complete unity * of the toilers
of all countries.") Soon thereafter the incident was forgotten.
Such forgetfulness about these communist rituals is not advisable.
There were two immediate purposes to be served by these amend-
ments. The lesser was to prepare for the demand that the Ukraine
and White Russia should be granted independent status in the
United Nations. The second was to provide an easy juridical struc-
ture for the incorporation into the Soviet Union of the four new
republics, then on the agenda: the Latvian, Esthonian, Lithuanian,
and Moldavian Republics. Their admission was voted by the Su-
preme Soviet in the sessions following that which adopted the
amendments.
These four, however, are not at all the only candidates eagerly
awaiting their chance to join the growing Hst of the Union of Social-
ist Soviet Republics. A fifth, Mongolia, has already been signed up.
A dozen others, in Eastern Europe and in Asia, are, we shall prob-
ably discover before long, impatient. The Soviet club is not exclusive.
Why should we suppose that the nations of the rest of the world,
when properly educated by the N.K.V.D., will prove reluctant
candidates?
The truth is that these amendments, or more exactly the policy
of multi-nationahsm which they express, are an integral and major
part of the preparation for that ultimate goal which now, in the
plans of the communist leaders, looms much closer on the historical
horizon: the communist World Empire, entitled in communist
terminology the World Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.
*In communist language, the word "unity" means "complete subjection to unified
communist control."
< go to Contents>
7. -The Goal of Soviet Policy
WE HAVE ALREADY discovered, from several convergent direc-
tions, that the ultimate goal o£ communist, and therefore of Soviet,
policy is the conquest of the world. This is not a surprising or a
fresh discovery. It is a secret only to the ignorant or the deceived.
There has never been any mystery about this goal, except for
those v^^ho have wanted it to be a mystery. From the very beginnings
of communism, not only from the formation of the Bolshevik fac-
tion in 1903 but from the time of Marx' and Engels' Manifesto, this
goal has been reiterated in theory and furthered in practice. Marx
told his followers, "You have a world to win," just as Stalin pro-
claims in his chief textbook: "Here is the greatest difficulty of the
Russian Revolution, its supreme historical problem — the need to
solve international problems, the need to promote the world revo-
lution." The Program of the International boasts in its introduction
that it "is the only international force that has for its program the
dictatorship of the proletariat and Communism, and that openly
comes out as the organizer of the international proletarian revolu-
tion'' It announces with confidence and satisfaction "the inevitable
doom of capitalism." Part III of the Program of the International
has as its title : "The Ultimate Aim of the Communist International
— World Communism." The official History of the Communist
Party, required reading for all communists everywhere, declares:
"Study of the history of the Communist Party strengthens the cer-
tainty of the final victory of the great task of the Lenin-Stalin Party :
the victory of Communism in the whole world."
The fact that this is the communists' belief, that world conquest
is, in their own minds, their goal, is not, by itself, particularly im-
portant. There have been, and still are, other groups and even indi-
viduals who have believed in this same goal of world conquest.
Several such individuals can be found in almost any insane asylum.
There the belief is not taken seriously in objective terms. It is
90
THE GOAL OF SOVIET POLICY 91
regarded as a delusion which, far from being coherently related to
the total behavior of the maniac, is symptomatic of the breach
between his diseased mind and its social environment.
The situation is analogous when this goal is professed, as it has
often been, by small and weak sects. Then, too, it can be treated as a
more or less troublesome delusion. It is not materially possible for
the sect to do anything about the goal, and the rest of the world
does not have to be concerned. Often the actions of the sect, in spite
of the professed goal, do not have any positive relation to it: the
grandiose goal is no more than an inverted answer to some ob-
scure psychotic need. Implicit in at least one interpretation of the
doctrines of Mohammedanism, Judaism, and even Calvinism is a
goal of world conquest; but none of these groups is acting in prac-
tice to realize the goal; and none of them is in a material position
to have a chance in this historical period to achieve it, even if they
should attempt to do so. Therefore, in these cases also, the goal may
be disregarded.
When, however, we find that a belief in the goal of world con-
quest is combined with both sufficient means to give a chance of
achieving it, and actions which in fact work toward it, then the
purpose must be taken quite literally, at face value. This was the
case with Nazism; and it seems also to have been true of at least
one section of the Shintoist-militarist Japanese leadership. It is much
more obviously true of communism. In communist doctrine, there
is not the slightest ambiguity about the goal of world conquest. In
action, communists work always and everywhere toward that goal.
And at the present time the means at their disposal, in numbers,
material resources, and psychological influence, are enough to give
them a very substantial probability of reaching it.
However often this plain truth is repeated, very few of the leaders
and citizens of the democratic nations really believe it. They do not
believe it, I suppose, because they do not want to believe it. It is, we
may grant, an uncomfortable belief, putting a pistol to the will, and
demanding just Yes or No as an answer. Nevertheless, and in spite
of however many exorcisms by Henry Wallace or the Dean of Can-
terbury, it is true, and will continue to be true, until the issue is
decided.
92 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
The communist doctrine, hardened as it is into a fixed mental
pattern by a century's tradition, is not the only force impelling com-
munism toward the goal of World Empire, though it alone is suffi-
cient to establish and maintain World Empire as the goal of com-
munist activity. At least three other major pressures are operative:
1. We have already noticed, in some detail, the senses in which
contemporary society is ripe for World Empire. This is evident to
all observers, but seems particularly clear when analyzed from the
Marxian point of view, in terms of which communists understand
the world. The international division of labor, the development of
rapid transport and communication, the complex inter-relationship
of world industries, the unavoidable impact of each region of the
world upon every other, the patent archaism of the present political
divisions, the class stratifications ignoring national boundaries, all
constitute what Marxists call the "material conditions" for a world
state. A world state, Marxian reasoning concludes, must therefore
necessarily come into being, since "political super-structure" is nec-
essarily determined by "material conditions." There is no doubt, it
may be added, that these conditions do act, not only upon the com-
munists but upon other powerful groups and states also, as an ob-
jective pressure directed toward world political integration. The
communists themselves, independently of their ideas, are acted upon
by these pressures. In addition, they reason consciously from them
to the inference that if they do not themselves organize a World
Empire for their own benefit, then others will at their expense.
We have already seen how the advent of atomic weapons makes
the question of World Empire incomparably sharper and more
immediate.
2. Another force driving the communists toward world expansion,
of a type very familiar in historical experience, is the effect of
economic and social failure within the Soviet Union, the primary
base of communist power.
The stories about the mighty successes of socialist industry within
the socialist fatherland, about the communist "solution of the eco-
nomic problem," are, of course, mythical. The fact is that the great
THE GOAL OF SOVIET POLICY 93
mass of the Russian people has hved, under the communists, at
a material level well below that which it had under Tsarism, and
that this level has declined during the Five Year Plans. Hunger,
cold, and squalor, as well as terror and slavery, are the products of a
quarter century of communist victories. Soviet industry is for the
most part incompetent, inefficient, and qualitatively at a low level.
The mass of the terrorized population, moreover, bitterly hates, as
well as fears, the communist masters.*
Under these circumstances, the expansion of communist rule
holds out several substantial promises.
First, according to the time-tested formula, it serves to divert
attention from the internal difficulties. Victories elsewhere make up
for defeats at home. A ready-made excuse is provided for the
wretched living conditions. The discontent and anger of the people
is deflected from the heads of the communist rulers.
Second, the looting of conquered territories means a temporary
addition of desperately needed consumers' goods. From the start of
the present stage of expansion in the Baltic nations, the communists
have systematically stripped the stores, warehouses, barns and homes
of the conquered territories. It should not be imagined that the
individual soldiers who have done the initial looting have been
permitted to keep commodities other than what they have put into
their stomachs. After the first outbursts die down, the soldiers are
in turn looted by the state, and the goods distributed according to
the plans of the rulers.
Third, the new territories yield the communists vast new reserves
of manpower, upon which they rely to make up for industrial
inferiority.
Fourth, the communists gain new capital goods — factories, mines,
railroads, machines.
3. Finally, even if World Empire were not the positive goal of
communism, it would, from the communist standpoint, be a neces-
sary aim as a defensive measure. The communists believe, and have
always believed, that there are only two alternatives for modern
society: communism or capitalism. In spite of what people may
"subjectively" think, they are all "objectively" lined up on one side
* See the Note at the end of this chapter.
94 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
or the other: there is no in-between. When, therefore, communism
became a serious world force by conquering a large section of the
earth and its inhabitants, an inescapable historical dilemma was
presented. Either capitalism would destroy the new communist
world, or communism would conquer the remainder of capitalism.
(Somewhat paradoxically, the communists hold the latter result to
be in the long run "inevitable.") The showdown might be drawn
out or for a while postponed, but it cannot be avoided.
World capitalism (in which they include everything except them-
selves) is at present, they believe, in its death agony. It is driven by
its internal contradictions to an ever more ruthless policy of world
exploitation. Above all, it hopes to get renewed strength by opening
up to exploitation the areas and peoples of the Soviet Union, now
shielded by the proletarian dictatorship. This objective, the com-
munists believe, has nothing to do with the personal opinions and
wishes of the capitalists themselves, or their political leaders. It fol-
lows necessarily from the nature of capitalism in decline. It is
inevitable, just as war under capitalism is inevitable; and just as it
is inevitable that the "real meaning" of every war of the present time
is an onslaught against the communist fortress of the Soviet Union.
Stalin, in his principal theoretical work, Problems of Leninism,
has summed up the issue as follows :
The basic fact ... is that there no longer exists a worldwide
capitalist system. Now that a Soviet country has come into exist-
ence . . . worldwide capitalism has ceased to exist. The world has
been severed into two camps, the imperialist camp and the anti-
imperialist camp. [Vol. I., p. 369.]
We are living, not merely in one State, but in a system of States;
and it is inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue to
exist interminably side by side with imperialist States. Ultimately,
one or another must conquer. Pending this development, a number
of terrible clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois
States must inevitably occur, [Vol. I., p. 56, quoting from Lenin,
Works, Russian edition, Vol. XVI, p. 102.]
As if to make certain that the entire world should know that
nothing of this doctrine had been abandoned as a result of the re-
THE GOAL OF SOVIET POLICY 95
formist demagogy of the Teheran Period, Stalin declared in his
election speech of Feb. 10, 1946:
It would be incorrect to think that the war arose accidentally or
as a result of the fault of some statesman. Although these faults did
exist, the war arose in reality as the inevitable result of the develop-
ment of the world economic and political forces on the basis of
monopoly capitalism.
In terms of these beliefs, world conquest is for the communists
the only means of self-defense. Any war which they conduct, no
matter who fires the first shot or first invades — as, for example, the
Finnish War of 1939 — is by definition a defensive war.
The naive appeasers of the communists imagine that these beliefs
of theirs can be altered if we show the communists that we are
really their friends, if we talk softly to them, and grant everything
they want. They overlook, to begin with, that what the communists
want is the world. And they do not understand that, in the eyes of
the communists, this friendliness from the class enemy must be
either a hypocritical deception or a symptom of stupidity and weak-
ness. Nothing is going to change these beliefs. Certainly no rational
argument or evidence is going to change them, because, in the
fundamental point that communism must either conquer the world
or be itself destroyed, the communist belief happens to be true.
Within the framework of the ultimate goal of World Empire, the
specific present commuiiist objective is the preparation for the open
phase of the Third World War. Preparation for the war is the basic
communist "line." As always, this means that every communist
activity, no matter how seemingly remote, is directly or indirectly
subordinate to the "line." The Fourth Five Year Plan, the policy in
the C.I.O., the new purges, Gromyko's behavior at the Security
Council or the Atomic Commission, the seizure of Austrian indus-
tries, the coup in Iran, the formation of the World Federation of
Trade Unions or the recognition of Peron, the fighting by the
Chinese communists or the anti-United States agitation throughout
96 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
Latin America, the application by the British Communists to join
the Labour Party or the campaign on the Franco question, the reor-
ganization of the Red Army and Navy or the attempt to unify the
United States seafaring and waterfront unions, the call for a monop-
olistic American Authors' Authority or the intransigence on Ger-
many, the step-up in activities among the U.S. Negroes and the
nursing of Moslem friendship: all these and all the rest are simply
part of the preparation for the war. Soviet policies are mysterious
only to those who persist in looking at them from the outside,
separately and piecemeal, who refuse to use the key which the
communists themselves supply to all who wish to use it. If we have
a general understanding of the nature and goal of communism, all
that we further need is a grasp of the main current line. Then every-
thing fits into place, from slogans to assassinations, and the policy as
a whole is revealed to be not in the least mysterious, but more direct
and simple than any other in the world.
For convenience, the task of the preparation for the Third World
War may be subdivided into the following:
1. The attempt to consolidate effective domination of the Eura-
sian continent.
2. The simultaneous attempt to weaken and undermine all gov-
ernments and nations not under communist control.
In the present section, I shall confine myself to the first of these.
In August, 1939, the communists, in this respect heirs of the Rus-
sian Empire, held control of what geopoliticians call the "inner
Heartland" of the "World Island." * For the first time in world
history, the inner Heardand (Central Eurasia) possessed a mass
population, a high level of political organization, and a considerable
industrialization.
In August, 1945, communist domination, though not yet fully
consolidated, extended in the West to a line from Stetdn south to
the Dalmatian coast, and East to include all of the Balkans except
* I am using, in particular, Sir Halford Mackinder's terminology. Cf. his Demo-
cratic Ideals and Reality.
THE GOAL OF SOVIET POLICY 97
Macedonia, Thrace, and the geopolitically unimportant Greek Pen-
insula. This line on the West, except for the omission of Macedonia
and the Turkish territory north of the Dardanelles, corresponds
exactly with what Mackinder defined a generation ago as the outer
border of the Heartland.
In the East communist domination reached via the Kuriles to out-
flank the Americas on the North, and moved into northern Korea,
Manchuria, and North China. Its two lines of egress from the
Heartland into China (into Manchuria, and futher south into
Sinkiang) are also those previously defined by Mackinder.
In the West, the communist pressure pushes against the northern
flank (Scandinavia), with the main force exerted against Germany,
the key to the rest of Europe. This thrust is combined with an at-
tempted envelopment from the rear (Spain) and what might be
described as a temporary holding operation in France and the
lesser European states.
In the Middle East, the pressure is felt throughout, in Afghani-
stan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, down into Palestine and the lesser Arab
states, and for that matter on into Egypt and North Africa generally.
From the point of view of the thinking of traditionally naval
powers, like Britain and the United States, this constitutes a "threat
to the Empire lifeline," and is linked with the drive on Trieste and
toward Italy. However, as understood from the point of view of
land power and of fundamental geopolitical relationships, it is per-
haps more fundamentally a drive across the land bridge to the
southern adjunct of the Heartland, in Africa.
In the Far East, the pressure is directed toward all of China. In
India, which is outside the Heartland and of secondary importance
from a geopolitical point of view, the direct force from the Heart-
land is not yet being exerted. The pressure is felt from within,
through the influence of the Indian Communists, the N.K.V.D.
and military agents, and as an effect of the general pro-Moslem
orientation.
We may picture the perspective through the geometrical analogy
of a set of concentric rings around an inner circle (see the following
page).
98
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
THE FIELD STRUCTURE OF THE
COMMUNIST POWER
^^p:X\Ofi & DEM0/?4^,^
"^J-.
'o.
pOMlNAT/o>y,
/latin M'i
f LESSER i: »T^
: I WEST- R fsTATE'
COMMON I ^ |i Wm
•[WEALTH \ m ^^^J
^ %>OLAND^„
SOVIET UNION
AUGUST 1939
^^iuKRM N eS f SmOLDAVIA^
^'^^^^^1^^^^'^M I DOLE *'
iSOUTU^sa
ImongoumchuriaJ ^1
P^-^-P^JM iCENTRALi
frURKIsffl ^ AND 5
|P|5^!| JSOUTHERN
Mp^^^,„„,..4 china J
^_-r^.5#!" NORTH -^
..RABIA^CHINA
UNITED]
STATES ^
I AND, ;
DEPEND*.
CNCIESJ
w
(This figure is not meant to be either complete or in every respect
exact. Its purpose is to represent not a static state of affairs, but the
general character of a dynamic historical process.)
THE GOAL OF SOVIET POLICY 99
The inner, magnetic core of the system is the estabHshed Soviet
Union itself, within the boundaries temporarily crystaUized, after
the Civil War and until August, 1939. In preparation for the Second
World War, this was the communist fortress. It now becomes, in
preparation for the Third, the inner defensive ring of the greater
Eurasian fortress.
The consolidation of the Eurasian fortress as a whole requires,
for the inner core, a series of measures which are already well
started. Economically, the new Five Year Plans are designed to
expand at all costs the basic war industries, and to make a supreme
effort to overtake the United States in the production of atomic
weapons. New contingents of millions of slave laborers, drawn from
the Russian people and from the conquered regions, provide a flex-
ible mass labor force that can be concentrated at the will of the
leadership on the economic tasks. The army, navy and air forces
are being tightened and quahtatively developed, with the educational
system revised to produce a maximum of disciplined, trained soldiers
and officers. Politically, the new purges, the familiar N.K.V.D. ter-
ror methods, and suitable propaganda are re-establishing firm con-
trol over the people, which was somewhat loosened by the aftermath
of the War, and are steeling them for the coming struggle.
The first ring, surrounding the inner circle, represents those ter-
ritories already absorbed, or scheduled soon to be absorbed, directly
within the structure of the Soviet Union proper. This step was pre-
pared for, as we have seen, by the federalist revision of the Soviet
Constitution.
Circle II represents those nations which the communists, in the
first instance, aim to dominate (rather than absorb directly into the
Soviet Union) through one or another type of puppet government.
Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria,
Albania, Northern Iran, Northern Korea, Eastern Germany, East-
tern Austria, are already well inside this circle. To suppose that they
will ever, voluntarily or by merely diplomatic maneuvers, be per-
100 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
mitted to escape, is political idiocy. The communist design is, o£
course, exactly the opposite: to draw them futher inward, toward
and finally into Circle I of Absorption; and to bring within Circle II
of Domination other nations now balancing uneasily on its edge.
Finland, the rest of Iran and Austria, Manchuria and North China
(if the United States graciously ditches Chiang Kai-shek), Iraq,
Turkey, and all of Scandinavia have even today one foot over the
brink.
Germany, however, is the top prize of this circle. The leaders of
the democratic nations, who do not have an over-all political line,
and who are always distracted by side issues, have yet to understand
the meaning of the kind of concentrated Bolshevik campaign which
is being directed toward the domination of Germany. Domination
of Germany will in turn guarantee effective domination of the en-
tire European continent, and will complete in the West the structure
of Fortress Eurasia.
The importance assigned to Germany dates back to Lenin, and
before him to Napoleonic days, when Prussian officers and divisions
helped in the defeat of Napoleon. Lenin many times declared that
German technology plus Russian manpower and resources would
clinch the victory of the world revolution. From 191 8 to 1924 the
communists tried repeatedly to carry through a German communist
revolution. Thereafter they continued intimate relations with Ger-
many. They brought in German machines and technicians, and
permitted German officers of the army outlawed by the Versailles
Treaty to gain experience training the Red Army. The Stalin-Hitler
Pact was by no means so unprecedented a reversal as the world
found it.
Hitler's decision to launch the war against Russia did not end
this more ancient perspective. As early as October, 1941, the com-
munist veteran Walter Ulbricht was directing the formation of a
communist-controlled league among the German war prisoners. In
a speech delivered to the Moscow Soviet on November 6, 1942,
Stalin assured all Germans: "It is not our aim to destroy Germany,
for it is impossible to destroy Germany ... It is not our aim to
destroy all military force in Germany, for every literate person will
understand that this is not only impossible in regard to Germany . . .
THE GOAL OF SOVIET POLICY loi
but It is also inadvisable from the point of view of the future." On
July 12-13, ^943' ^^ Free Germany National Committee w^as formed
in Moscovi^, under the nominal chairmanship of Junker General
Walther von Seydlitz, captured at Stalingrad, and the real direction
of Wilhelm Pieck, leading German communist and former Secre-
tary of the Communist International.*
The Free Germany Committee opened up offices under commu-
nist direction all over the world. It drew into its membership
abroad the bulk of the German-speaking residents and refugees:
fellow-travelers, socialists, liberals, and ordinary patriotic but anti-
Hitler Germans. Within the Soviet Union, the Committee and its
affiliates undertook the job of indoctrinating the German war pris-
oners, the transformation of German Nazis into German commu-
nists, and the training of special agents and of the battalions of a
future "Free Germany" army. By August, 1944, when Friedrich
von Paulus, the German commander at Stalingrad, announced his
adherence, nearly a hundred captured Gerrfian general officers had
joined the Committee.
So alarming to England and the United States did the prospect
of the Free Germany Committee become, that at Yalta they obtained
Stalin's signature to a paragraph renouncing any plan to install the
Committee as a new German government. As always, for the com-
munists, such a renunciation was purely of form, not of substance.
The Free Germany Committee is the expression of the communist
plan for Germany. Its program is a trap, bated for Germans with
what seems to be the offer of a kind of junior partnership in the
Soviet Eurasian, and future World, Empire. In reality, it aims at
the incorporation of Germany under the monolithic communist
control. This program stands unchanged by the Yalta Declaration,
just as the Free Germany activities, under a variety of names, con-
tinue unabated.
The terms of the German capitulation gave eastern Germany to
the communists. From eastern Germany as a base, they eye Germany
as a whole. Already, by mid-1946, the progress in eastern Germany
* I do not have space here to discuss in detail this extremely important committee.
Cf. my article, Stalin and the ]un\ers, in the Sept. 15, 1944 issue of The Common-
weal.
102 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
was sufficient to permit the preliminary moves toward the rest of
Germany. The communists had swallowed the socialists by forcing
them into the "Socialist Unity Party." The Free Germany Com-
mittee members, communist-trained abroad, were brought back
from Mexico, New York, Latin America, London, Stockholm, Mos-
cow. For the first time since the War, in Paris during June, 1946,
Molotov came out against federalism and dismemberment, and for
a "united Germany." By then he believed that the outcome was
assured, that a united Germany would be a communist Germany.
The policy followed in the preliminary organization of eastern
Germany is, in its fundamentals, the same as that throughout the
area of "domination." There need not be any set formula under
which the domination is to be achieved. Great flexibility, and many
diverse forms of political movement, of social structure and of gov-
ernment, are possible. The one constant, as always, is the eHmination
of all power except communist power. Temporary concessions,
favoritism, conversion, economic pressures, shuffling and re-shuffling
of parties and governments, deception, and — essential and continu-
ous prop to all the rest — the terror, threats, torture, killing, exile,
forced labor, all of these, in mixed and varying dosages, gradually
weed out all opposition, past, present, future, or imaginable. Coali-
tions, elections, treaties, mergers, these are shadows. The substance
is the communist drive toward all power.
The boundary in the system of concentric rings between Circle II
(Domination) and Circle III (Orienting Influence) is not always
precise. Circle III represents those nations which the Soviet Union
does not at the given moment feel in a position to absorb or reduce
to outright puppet status, but within which it seeks enough influence
to guarantee a pro-Soviet foreign policy, or at least to neutralize any
tendency toward an anti-Soviet foreign policy. In Europe this in-
cludes the effort to hinder the formation of the so-called Western
Bloc. In Latin America it means pressure to cut the nations loose
from subordination to the United States.
The modes of influence in Circle III vary from direct pressure
exerted by the Soviet state or the internal communist parties, to vari-
THE GOAL OF SOVIET POLICY 103
ous forms o£ concession and conciliation. As examples of the latter,
it may be noted that the Soviet government was the first to grant
partial recognition to the De Gaulle Committee, and the first to
grant full recognition to the Badoglio government in Italy and to
Peron in Argentina. During 1946 it shipped grain to France. It
offered, and in some cases put through, generous economic deals
with various Latin American nations. Within all the nations of
Circle III, the communist parties call for unity and collaboration
in national fronts. They combine this call for unity with threats and
strikes or other hostile actions to enforce abandonment of anti-
communist or anti-Soviet tendencies. Within France and Italy and
throughout most of Latin America, the communists have secured
control of the greater part of the organized labor movement. There,
and in China, they are ready to enter into coalition governments,
where their veto p^ower can be exercised in the cabinets.
In the nations of Circle III (including those, like the Scandinavian
nations, which, though still in Circle III, are already drawn toward
Circle II), the communists' poUcy is to strive for socio-political con-
ditions that permit the communist movement to function effectively.
That is why they advocate, for the present, a measure of democracy
within them: communists abandon the forms of democracy when,
but not until, communist domination is assured. That explains, also,
their readiness to dissolve or merge national Communist Party or-
ganizations, and their acceptance of posts in multi-party cabinets.
At the same time, they work to absorb or destroy any non- or anti-
communist revolutionary elements that tend to arise from the Left.
It is to be observed that the relations within this whole system of
concentric rings are dynamic. As long as the Soviet Union retains
the political initiative, the center acts as an attractive force, pulling
the outer rings toward itself. As the first ring is absorbed into the
body of the central circle, the second ring (Domination) tends to
fuse, in part at least, with the first. Additional territories or nations
tend to become candidates for outright absorption rather than for
mere domination. We may rightly expect that, before so very long,
appHcations for admission to the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
will be filed by some nations now within Circle II. Similarly, the
third ring (Orienting Influence) tends, as the process develops, to
104 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
fuse into the second; and the nations o£ the third ring thus tend
toward the Domination group. The whole set of relations within
the system of rings is summarily epitomized by the 1939-40 history
of the Baltic states.
* * *
We have dealt, in this section, with the nature of Circles I, II, and
III. The discussion, except for its inclusion of Latin America, has con-
cerned the first part of the task of preparation for the Third World
War : the attempt to consolidate effective domination of the Eurasian
continent. Circle IV carries us altogether outside of Eurasia, and
relates only to the second part of the general task: the simultaneous
attempt to weaken and undermine all governments and nations not
under communist control.
The principal occupants of Circle IV are the United States, Eng-
land, and the British Commonwealth. Though the ultimate com-
munist goal with respect to these is identical with that for every
other part of the earth, the specific policy for the present period of
preparation for the Third World War is, in many respects, radically
different from the Eurasian policies analyzed in the preceding
section. Within this period, the communists do not expect to be able
either to absorb or to dominate the nations of Circle IV. They do
not believe that in the United States they can even attain a decisive
orienting influence, though they may have a small reserve hope of
swinging England into line.
Their policy toward the United States is, on the contrary, based
upon the conviction that the United States is the only serious rival
center of power to their own, and that the United States is their
determining opponent in the developing Third World War. They
believe that, in all probability, England and what is left of the Com-
monwealth and Empire will continue the de facto alliance with the
United States on into the open stage of the War. The policy toward
England is therefore subsidiary to the policy toward the United
States, and I shall confine the following analysis to the United States.
THE GOAL OF SOVIET POLICY 105
The communist objectives in relation to the United States may
be summed up as follows:
First, to try to prevent interference by the United States with the
communist plans for the consolidation of Fortress Eurasia, and even
to gain United States assistance in fulfilling those plans.
Second, to weaken, undermine and demoralize the United States
to the maximum extent possible prior to the open war struggle.
Third, to become imbedded within the social fabric of United
States life in order to be ready for direct action — espionage, sabotage,
stimulation of riots and revolts, etc. — when the open war begins.
These objectives are furthered, of course, by communist activities
and propaganda throughout the world. Within the United States
and its dependencies they are promoted by a powerful and complex
network. Many Americans, understanding nothing of totalitarian
politics, dismiss the communists as "a negHgible force in American
life," because the Communist Party gets few votes in elections. For
communists, elections — particularly the vote one gets in elections —
are among the most minor of political exertions. It might be recalled
that in 1917, at the beginning of the Russian Revolution, the Russian
Bolshevik faction, which became the Communist Party, numbered
only about 25,000 members. In general it is a law of politics that a
small minority, tightly organized and disciplined, knowing in ad-
vance what it wants and planning consciously how to get it, has far
greater weight than loose, amorphous majorities.
The communist apparatus in the United States, even quantita-
tively considered, is, as a matter of fact, very extensive. It is built
out of a series of layers, which surround the inner steel, and merge
at the outer edges into the general population. At the center, check-
ing and supervising every activity, are thousands of N.K.V.D.
agents. There are then thousands of other agents, of the military
intelligence, and of the various special commissions, committees and
bureaus of the Soviet State and the international party. All Soviet
employees in this country, in whatever apparent capacity, are of
course part of the machine. All foreign communist parties have their
organized sections within all refugee and foreign-language groups
in this country. Then there is the United States Party itself, with its
own many layers; and the many communists who are instructed not
io6 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
to join any party. Then, in widening circles, there are the fellow-
travelers, the sympathizers, the dupes, the simpletons; and the mil-
lions of honest citizens who, without knowing its source or its
direction, drink up the propaganda because it seems to correspond
with some sentiment of their own.
In order to carry out its triple objective, the communist network
tries to infiltrate every level of American life. ("We must," Lenin
commands in What Is to Be Done? , ''^^o among all classes of the
people as theoreticians, as propagandists, as agitators, and as organ-
izers.") From the smallest sports clubs to the highest departments
of government, from great trade unions to neighborhood debating
societies, from the established political parties to minute farm co-
operatives, from the army to organizations of pacifists, from The
Atlantic Monthly to The Protestant, from Hollywood parties to
strike riots, everywhere communist influence is actively penetrating.
Where an organization is already established, they wedge from the
outside; where there is none, they create it. As their grease for in-
filtration, they use everywhere the formula of the united front,
which we have already studied.
The infiltration is in part opportunistic: that is, the communists
seize any chance that may appear to entrench themselves in any kind
of organization whatsoever. However, in accordance with their
specific objectives, they have in the United States certain concen-
tration areas to which they devote the greater part of their deliber-
ate and planned efforts. The chief of these are the following:
I. The public opinion industry. Enormous energies and funds
are spent on winning over or influencing writers, publishers, jour-
nalists, editors, lecturers, radio speakers, government propagandists,
theater and movie producers, directors and actors, teachers, ministers,
and so on. Dozens of special united fronts have been created for
them; hundreds of communist-controlled magazines, newspapers,
confidential newsletters are put out. The Party plugs the sale of
sympathetic books, and tries by every sort of pressure to suppress
or hinder anti-communist books, plays, movies, or radio programs.
Movie sequences are adroitly slanted by its Hollywood sympathizers.
Lucrative Soviet contracts are carefully manipulated. Communists
THE GOAL OF SOVIET POLICY 107
and fellow-travelers pour hundreds of books and articles into the
American market, when necessary through their own organizations
(such as International Publishers), but more frequently and desir-
ably with the help of sympathetic or deceived sponsors among the
established publishers. Hundreds of innocent radio speakers, maga-
zine writers and newspaper journalists are happily unaware that
the "inside information" with which they jazz up their programs
and articles, and sometimes raise their own salaries, have been fed
to them through a very long tube that traces back to the Agit-Prop
section in Moscow.
In accord with the public opinion concentration, it is not surpris-
ing that during the war communists and fellow-travelers were so
conspicuous and so successful in the Office of War Information, in
"psychological warfare" work generally, and on the staffs of the
army newspapers.
2. Maritime and Communications. Already a large percentage of
United States seamen and waterfront employees are in unions under
communist control. The Party has also been notably successful
among certain of the communication workers, including the ship-
board radio operators and the employees of the crucial New York
(Western Union) headquarters of international communications.
Communist efforts among railroad workers and truck drivers have
been stepped up, and, after earlier years of failure, are now making
progress. The importance of this concentration from the point of
view of war preparation is obvious enough.
3. Intelligence Services. The communists are trying by every
means to infiltrate the various intelligence services, military and
governmental. The measure of their success is indicated by the war-
time penetration of their ideas into some branches of the Office of
Strategic Services, as well as into Military Intelligence and the State
Department. Their work in this field is facilitated by their active in-
terest in the United Public Workers of America, the union which
is making considerable headway in the organization of government
employees. Of course all communists, wherever they are located, are
in effect intelligence agents for the world communist movement.
I08 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
4. Science, especially nuclear science and technology. Several years
ago the communists began large-scale work in the sciences. From
the time of its formation, they have vigorously supported the Inter-
national Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists and Tech-
nicians. With the approach and arrival of atomic weapons, this
concentration has been intensified. Communists and fellow-travelers
are active in most of the committees, unions and other organizations
of nuclear scientists and technologists that are now being formed.
The names of several of the leading nuclear scientists have, in fact,
figured in united fronts. We may take it as certain that nearly all
supposed secrets of atomic energy come into communist hands very
shortly after discovery.
From these and their other organizational vantage points the
communists in the first place manipulate American public opinion
in such a way as to permit the development of the communist Eura-
sian policy. Communism has by far the greatest propaganda machine
that has ever existed, and its achievements in this country during
recent years are notable. United States opinion was led, for example,
to accept the turning over of Yugoslavia to the communist Tito;
and of Poland to the communist-controlled Bierut government.
Communists, with detailed advance preparation, acted as a catalyst
for the "Bring the Boys Home" movement following V-J Day,
which demoralized the armed forces, and weakened the world dip-
lomatic position of the United States. Many Americans now believe,
or half-believe, that totalitarianism is a new kind of higher democ-
racy. They are persuaded that there should be "non-interference" in
China: that is, that China should be turned over to the Soviet-
supported and -supplied Chinese communists. They will soon be led
to think that all American troops should be brought home from
Eurasia. They believe, or many of them believe, that Americans
abroad nurse fascists and counter-revolutionists. They are told hor-
rifying stories about Greek monarchists and Turkish tyrants and
Iranians and Iraqians subsidized by British and American big busi-
ness. Whatever the immediate issue, the propaganda always finds a
reason, a whole set of reasons, why the United States should do
THE GOAL OF SOVIET POLICY 109
nothing to interfere with the communist organization of the con-
centric ring system, should, on the contrary, help in that organiza-
tion with political friendship, food, supplies and industrial
equipment.
And tirelessly the propaganda hammers in the Soviet myth, the
fairy story of the happy, prosperous land of socialism, where for-
ward-moving humanity marches ahead with one mind and one voice
to new and braver worlds.
On another, related front, the communist propaganda and activi-
ties stimulate and provoke all latent conflicts between the United
States and other non-communist states. In the Philippines, the Huk-
balahaps, the guerilla force exploiting the discontent of poor peas-
ants, directs its arms and agitation against the American-sponsored
new government. In Puerto Rico, the communists join the separatist
movement. Throughout Latin America, the communists and their
allies denounce Yankee imperialism. Especially is every occasion
seized upon to stir dislike and distrust of Great Britain.
Within the United States, the communists arouse and exploit
every divisive possibility. Labor against capital, big business against
little business, C.LO. against A.F. of L., farmers against business-
men, Negroes against Whites, Christians against Jews, Protestants
against Catholics, landlords against tenants, foreign born against
native born. South against North, unemployed against employed:
wherever there is a potential rift in the national life, the communist
tactic is to deepen and tear that rift.
To refuse ... to maneuver, to utilize the conflict of interests
(even though temporary) among one's enemies; to refuse to tem-
porize and compromise with possible (even though transient, un-
stable, vacillating, and conditional) allies — is this not ridiculous in
the extreme? . . . The old forms have burst. . . . We now have
from the standpoint of the development of international commu-
nism such a lasting, strong and powerful content of work . . . that
it can and must manifest itself in any form, both new and old;
that it can and must regenerate, conquer, and subjugate all forms,
not only the new but the old — ^not for the purpose of reconciling
itself with the old, but to be able to convert all and sundry forms,
new and old, into a weapon for the complete, final, decisive and
no THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
inevitable victory of communism. [Lenin, quoted by Stalin in
Problems of Leninism.^
It is of course true that many of these rifts, or potential rifts, exist,
independently of communism, within the fabric of our society.
There vi^ould be a Negro problem, a labor problem, a religious prob-
lem, a Jevi'ish problem, if there were no communist movement. It
is further true that many good citizens, non-communists and anti-
communists, concern themselves with these problems. Their con-
cern, however, is to try to solve them. What they do not grasp is
that the concern of the communists — with whom they so often join
their activities, frequently without themselves knowing of the united
front into which they enter — is not to solve them but to make them
insoluble. They do not understand that the communists do not want
to mend the nation, but to smash it beyond repair. The good citizen
is glad to find communist allies when he seeks, say, a fair trial for
a Negro; he does not know that the communist will use him for the
precise purpose, not of helping the Negro, but of embittering and
poisoning race relationships. The good citizen joins a committee to
support, perhaps, the families of strikers; he does not know that the
communists in the committee have as their objective not the well-
being of labor but the hopeless exaggeration of class conflicts, and
the undermining of the American economy. Or the good citizen,
as a humanitarian, joins some committee "for Soviet-American
friendship," equally unaware that the function of the committee is
to protect and defend not the peoples of Russia and the United
States, but the communist dictatorship today crushing the Russian
people and tomorrow aiming for the people of America.
So, if all goes according to plan, the full war will open with the
United States so isolated, and so internally weakened, divided, de-
moralized, that it will be unable even to make a good showing in
the struggle. Meanwhile, in the war itself, with public communist
activities limited or abolished, the infiltrated divisions will be in a
position to take direct action to break down the industrial and mili-
tary machine, and the morale of the nation.
The downfall of the United States will remove the last great ob-
stacle. The Communist World Empire will begin.
THE GOAL OF SOVIET POLICY iii
It is not excluded that the present leftist Seventh Period will be
followed by a temporary Eighth Period, rightist in outward form.
If this happened, the Communist Party of the United States would
drop some of the more extreme class struggle slogans and tactics,
and would, as in the Teheran Period, profess to be more friendly
toward the United States government. Earl Browder might resume
his interrupted post as party leader.
There are two possible occasions for such a shift. The United
States might adopt such a strong policy toward the Soviet Union
and communism that the communist leaders might feel that they
had to run to temporary cover under a veil of friendliness. Or the
mild approach might be thought a suitable bribe for the United
States in return for United States economic assistance, and complete
acquiescence by the United States in the communist Eurasian plans.
There is some reason to believe that a. faction within the Soviet
Union favors such a right turn, and that Stalin himself belongs to
that faction.
If such a turn occurs, it will, like the previous right turns, be
hailed by public opinion in this country as proof that the Soviet
Union has given up world revolution, and that permanent friendly
co-operation between the Soviet Union and the United States has
been established.
It must be insisted once more that these political turns of the com-
munists are purely tactical in significance. The fundamental strategy
of the communists is irrevocably set. Nothing whatever of the analy-
sis of this chapter would be altered by a shift to a rightist Eighth
Period. The basic line would still be: preparation for the Third
World War, by consolidation of the Eurasian base, and the weaken-
ing of the rest of the world. The specific objectives within the United
States would still be to prevent political interference in Eurasia, to
demoralize the country, and to infiltrate every stratum of its social
structure. The surface would alter: the slogans would seek to lull to
sleep rather than to knock sharply on the head. But the knife would
still be ready for the heart.
112 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
Note. The evidence demonstrating the deterioration of the standard of
living under the communist regime has been assembled and analyzed
by a number of scholars. Among the relevant books that may be con-
sulted in this connection, the following are representative: Wor\ers Be-
fore and After Lenin, by Manya Gordon; Soviet Labour and Industry,
by Leonard E. Hubbard; Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace,
by A. Yugow; The Real Soviet Russia, by David J. Dallin. All of these
books contain extensive bibliographies of first-hand sources.
Under the conditions of Soviet life, with no legal, public mechanism
through which opposition can be expressed, it is naturally impossible to
get extensive direct evidence about the attitude of the people toward the
regime. The ritualistic statements of loyalty to Stalin and communism
made by Soviet citizens to foreign journalists show only what the citi-
zens feel they must say in order not to risk trouble from the N.K.V.D.
These statements are in direct contradiction to the reports of the former
subjects who have renounced Soviet citizenship and have been able to
speak or write in countries where freedom of expression is permitted
{cf. Victor Serge, Walter Krivitsky, Victor Kravchenko, Alexander
Barmine, etc.).
The lack of adequate direct evidence, however, is more than com-
pensated by what, can be indirecdy inferred from characteristic features
of the Soviet system. Let us consider only three of the most striking that
have a bearing on this problem: (i) the internal secret police; (2) the
periodic mass purges; (3) the prohibition of any travel beyond the Soviet
border, except on official missions, by any Soviet citizen (a prohibition
enforced by severe statutory penalties which apply not only to an in-
dividual who tries to leave the country but to the members of his im-
mediate family and to anyone who has knowledge of his intended act).
Let us ask: why are the secret police, the purges, and the prohibition
of foreign travel considered necessary by the regime, and not merely
admitted publicly in the controlled press, but constantly and spectacu-
larly emphasized, especially in internal propaganda? The only possible
explanation is that the regime recognizes the existence of profound mass
discontent, however inarticulate and unorganized. If everyone, or nearly
everyone, liked the regime, why would it be necessary to have the enor-
mous secret police apparatus operating in every social, cultural, economic
and political institution.? Why would it be necessary to institute the
periodic purges which, by the official accounts, involve hundreds of thou-
sands, even millions, of persons, and often sweep away the entire staffs
of magazines, theaters, movie trusts, factories, farms, party committees.
THE GOAL OF SOVIET POLICY 113
commissariats, and so on, which in many cases have been praised a few
months before as the best defenders of the Revolution? If the masses of
the people believe Stalin to be the Messiah that is described by our own
fellow-travelers (exercising their decadent right of free speech from their
vantage point on another continent), why, we may wonder, does Stalin
need to make the attempt to get away from him a criminal offense?
The regime confronts here an insoluble dilemma. In order to propa-
gate the communist myth in the non-communist world, it must swamp
the ether, the newsstands and the bookstalls of all countries with the
story of the happy, contented land of socialism. In order to terrorize its
own unhappy subjects into submission, it must fill the columns of
Pravda, Izvestia, and Red Star with denunciations of wrecking, sabotage,
graft, "diversions," plots and deviations, on a scale so huge that it would
seem to indicate a belief by the regime that nine-tenths of the popula-
tion must be criminals and traitors. Both versions are lies, but the sec-
ond, in its own indirect way, informs us very plainly about the true
relation between the regime and the people.
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8.- The Weakness aitd Strength of the Soviet Union
I PROPOSE NOW to judge the equipment with which the communists are making their bid for World Empire.
It is not my intention to cite quantitative statistics. Much of the statistical material is
inexact, often deliberately falsified. Besides, because of the peculiar-
ities of communist social organization, it is usually misleading, even
when accurate. I shall attempt, rather, what might be called a quaU-
tative estimate; and I shall have in mind, as the background of com-
parison, the imperial rival: the United States.
I. Geographical position. The communists, in control of the
extended Soviet Union and its puppet territories, enjoy an incom-
parable geographical position. This adjective is meant literally: there
is no geographical position on earth which can in any way be com-
pared with that of their main base. For the first time in human his-
tory, as we have already remarked, the Eurasian Heartland, the
central area of the earth's great land mass, has both a considerable
population and a high degree of political organization. In this re-
spect the communists are the heirs of the Russian Empire and of the
predecessor Duchy of Muscovy which, in the i6th century, began
the organization of the forests and steppes that for millennia had
been the home of hunters and fishermen, isolated river-cities, and
the scattered nomads who periodically descended upon the civiliza-
tions of the periphery.
Geographically, the Heartland, with its vast distances and its huge
land barriers, is the most defensible of all regions of the earth. Sea
power cannot touch it. Conquerors are swallowed up within its enor-
mous confines. On the other hand, from the base within the Heart-
land raids in force can issue East, West, Southwest, and South.
Potentially, the Heartland controls the Eurasian land mass as a
114
SOVIET WEAKNESS AND STRENGTH 115
whole, and, for that matter, the secondary African Continent, with
the southern section of the Heartland in its interior. From the point
of view of Eurasia, with its African appendage, there remain on the
earth only lesser islands. Geographically, strategically, Eurasia en-
circles America, overwhelms it.
Before the coming of airborne and atomic weapons, it was an
axiom of geopolitics, and of common sense, that if any one power
succeeded in organizing the Heartland and its outer barriers, that
powefwould be certain to control the world. Sea power depends in
the last analysis upon the control of its bases. But sea power cannot
touch the Heartland. Land power, resting on its ultimate base in
the Heartland, would, therefore, in the end, be sure to overcome sea
power on its island bases.
Air power and atomic weapons have upset the certainty of this
former axiom. The Heartland is no longer inviolable. Nevertheless,
they have not altogether done away with the facts of geography.
Geographically, the Soviet position is still the strongest possible
position on earth; and that remains a very great strength. If the
communists succeed in extending their full direct control to the At-
lantic, and in maintaining or extending their position on the Pacific,
the odds on their victory would advance close to certainty.
2. Manpower. The communists are very strong in manpower. Al-
ready within the official Soviet borders there are about two hundred
million human beings; within the already dominated territories
there are over two hundred million more. Several tens of millions
are in the communist-controlled movements of the rest of the world.
The communists rightly consider that many of the colonial peoples
constitute "strategic reserves of the revolution." Most of this com-
munist-controlled population, moreover, arc great breeders, with
birth rates far higher than that of the advanced nations of Western
Civilization.
The commynists use their manpower to make up for other de-
ficiencies. This is especially striking In the two crucial fields of in-
dustry and warfare. In both, lack of training, machines, efficiency
and quality is made up for by millions of human beings. Millions
of Russian lives stopped the qualitatively superior Nazi war ma-
Il6 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
chine; tens of millions overcome industrial defects. The most ex-
pressive sympton of this method in the economy is the increasing
reliance on slave labor, which is hurled by the millions upon mil-
lions into the gigantic tasks of "socialist reconstruction."
3. Natural resources. The Soviet Union has, as is well known,
an abundance of almost all natural resources needed for modern
industrial society.
From one point of view, however, the amplitude of Soviet re-
sources is perhaps over-stated. A "natural resource," like a mineral
or lumber or water-power, is of economic and social significance
only when it can actually be put to social use. If it is inaccessible, or
accessible only at prohibitive cost, then the "natural resource" is a
merely physical fact and not, we might say, a "social resource." A
considerable part of the Soviet resources seem to be in this situation.
For example, much of the great timberlands of Siberia are in ter-
ritory where the rivers flow into the frozen Arctic: but great forests
without rivers on which the logs can be floated to processing and
shipping points are much reduced in social value. For a great deal
of the mineral resources of Siberia, there are also extreme transpor-
tation difficulties. Some of these difficulties can no doubt be over-
come by increased railroad facilities, and by the use of airplanes.
Some are met by the lavish use of manpower already mentioned. A
technologically adequate solution, however, lies in a future beyond
the time during which the world struggle will be decided.*
4. Economic plant. The growth of the Soviet economy under com-
munist control, though considerable, has been greatly exaggerated
in communist propaganda. From a quantitative standpoint, the rate
of growth has been no more rapid — in many important lines less
rapid — than that of United States economy in the period following
the Civil War. The quantitative output of most Soviet industries
was, prior to the war, far below that of the corresponding United
States industries, and has been heavily set back by the war's damage.
The weaknesses of the Soviet economy in factors other than the
* I am indebted to Professor Willard E. Atkins, of New York University, for an
illuminating personal discussion of the point made in this paragraph.
SOVIET WEAKNESS AND STRENGTH 117
purely quantitative are even more striking. The economy^^sjrwhole
is <jualitatively_^n a very low level, inefficient, and out o£ balance.
The inadequacies o£ the transportation system, for example, both
railroad and highway, constitute a persistent bottleneck. (Lend-lease
trucks were probably as decisive as any other single element in the
defeat of the Nazis.) The qualitative inferiority is not merely a hard-
ship on consumers — a question of little concern to the communist
rulers — but results in a maximum of spoilage and breakdown
throughout the productive process. Combined with inadequate pro-
visions for repair and upkeep, it leads to the g^tiick physical deteri-
oration of buildings, machines, and factories. The administrative
overheaH in both industry and agriculture, which must include the
cost of the multitude of N.K.V.D. agents, and the elaborate check-
ing, cross-checking and constant interventions of dozens of special
Party and governmental bureaus, is fantastically high. A Soviet mine
or factory always has two or three times the number of persons in
its administrative personnel as a mine or factory with comparable
oiitput in the United States. Stakhanovite stunts staged for propa-
gandaTpTirposesvattempts by individual plants to make a spectacular
showing on the Kremlin score sheets, and the inroads of purges in-
terfere chronically with the smooth integration of production. The
politically motivated passion for quick production figures leads to
the operation of new factories before their buildings are finished,
and before there are at hand proper storage facilities, supplies, tools,
spare parts, and so on. Decent housing, transportation and food for
the workers are never provided, deficiencies which contribute their
share to the low man-hour output.
There are, however, certain compensating factors in the economy.
In general, it is incorrect to judge production costs in a totalitarian
economy by exactly the same standards that apply within capitalist
economy. A production cost that would mean bankruptcy for a
capitalist enterprise might be justified from a political or strategic
standpoint. I have already mentioned the use of the vast reserves
of manpower as a substitute for economic quality. The communists,
moreover, are making up for some of their own earlier lacks by
exploiting the industries and labor force of the newly absorbed or
dominated territories in Eastern Europe and Manchuria.
Il8 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
More important, for strategic purposes, is the economic concen-
tration which absolute poHtical control makes possible. This is of
great significance in connection with the production of atomic weap-
ons. Deficient as they are in almost all branches of economy, the
communists can concentrate the most and the best of what they have
both of human and physical equipment on a task which they decide
to be dominant. It would, therefore, be a mistake to judge their
atomic performance by their general industrial level.
"'5. Cultural level. Though the communist regime has made con-
siderable advances toward a general primitive literacy,* the cultural
level within the Soviet Union remains low. The percentage of skilled
workers is small. The number of technicians, engineers, scientists,
doctors, teachers, and other professionals is inadequate. Their train-
ing, for which skill in communist ideology and practice is consid-
ered more fundamental than calculus or biology, is defective or
distorted. Schools, hospitals, libraries, and so on, except for the show-
places designed for the ruling class and visiting journalists, are in-
ferior in numbers and quality. The rigid censorship and propaganda
block genuine historical and sociological knowledge, though at the
same time they make easier the problem of political manipulation.
6. Armed forces. Technologically, the weaknesses in the Soviet
economy and culture are reflected in the armed forces. With some
exceptions, the quality of weapons and equipment is relatively low,
andjn many lines there are major shortages. Soviet strategical ideas,
however, take this difficulty into account. Manpower and concen-
tration substitute for quality. The entire economy, the entire society,
is concentrated on the preparation for the war. There is no argu-
ment, in the Soviet Union, over conscription. The quotas for the
mass production of soldiers are fulfilled. Strenuous efforts are being
made to improve discipline, and to turn out a more thoroughly
trained officer corps.
*The "colossal" Soviet achievements in education are a favorite item in the com-
munist myth, achieved by a juggling of statistics. The rate of progress toward literacy
has been no higher than that under the last decades of Tsarism. Cf. Manya Gordon,
Wor/(^ers Before and After Lenin, Part XI.
SOVIET WEAKNESS AND STRENGTH 119
The theory and practice of multi-nationahsm also aids in the ex-
pansion of the communist divisions. The armies of the dominated
nations are fitted readily into the over-all structure of the communist
military machine. It should also be kept in mind that the com-
munists within the non-communist nations are a direct military sup-
plement.
¥7. Ideology. The communist myth, or complex of myths, is a
special source of great strength for the communist movement. The
general myth has traditional roots that push backv^^ard more than
twenty-five hundred years. It expre?ses7Tn secular form, the great
dream of a Kingdom of Heaven on Earth. As a compensation for
th(35e~who are weary and careworn, or an ideal for those who are
aspiring, it permits that seductive leap from a reality which is not,
and can never "fee, to oiir taste, into the vision of a Utopian society
where all men are free and equal and good, where exploitation and
war and hunger and wretchedness have vanished, and all mankind
is linked together in a universal brotherhood. According to the man-
ner of all hallucinations, this dream is mistaken for objective reality:
the dream is taken to be the guiding law of the very process of his-
tory, necessary, inevitable, destiny. The dreamer thereby gains that
feeling of moral security which springs from the sense that we are
at one with the Universe. Even the catastrophic, apocalyptic elements
of the myth — the conviction that the goal will be reached only after
great suffering and gnashing of teeth, in travail and blood and tor-
ment, amid the thunder and crash of the institutions of the world
— adds, as the experience of all religious faith testifies, to the hold
which the myth acquires over the emotions of the believers.
To the general myth, there has been deliberately added, during
the past generation, the, Soviet variation. Tens of millions of persons
throughout the world quiet their doubts and fears with that extraor-
dinary fantasy of a purposeful, co-operative community where there
are no landlords and absentee owners, where the workers and farm-
ers own and rule, where there is security for all and no unemploy-
ment, where the masses, despite all obstacles, are surging ever
forward toward a new and happyTIfe: this vision substituting for
120 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
the reality o£ a police-state founded on terror and slave labor, of in-
comparable wretchedness and tyranny.
From the myth, as from a magic elixir, a strength flows into the
veins of the communist movement that enables it to soar beyond
more grossly material limits. It is a comfort in adversity, as it is a
crowning glory of happy days.
Nevertheless, the present power of the communist myth would
seem to be in most part negative. Social man cannot live without
great myths. It is the deterioration of our religious myths as well as
of the liberal and democratic myths of post-Renaissance civihzation
that gives, by default, such a special enchantment to the communist
myth. Bewildered by the awful problems of this prolonged crisis of
a civilization, uncertain and afraid, disillusioned with the ideals of
liberal democracy in action, skeptical or half-hearted in genuine reli-
gious belief, men grasp at the communist myth so that their spirits
may not altogether drown.
There is, moreover, a seeming paradox that may prove of some
practical importance. The communist myth is believed more ardently
outside of communist-controlled territories than within them.
Within the Soviet domain, there are, it is true, especially among the
youth, some millions of total believers, whose minds and souls are
shaped absolutely by the communist myth. But there is every reason
to think that this is not true of the majority of the people. The out-
side world may be led to beHeve that workers rule in Russia; but the
Russian workers know by life that they are serfs and slaves. Com-
fortable American journalists can beHeve that Stalin liquidated
counter-revolutionary Kulaks as a class; but Russian peasants know
that he tortured and killed and robbed their families and starved
neighbors. English and American preachers and diplomats can ac-
cept the confessions at the Moscow Trials and complacently explain
them as expressions of the peculiarities of the Russian soul; but
Russians who knew and worked with the defendants understand
that the confessions are fables of the N.K.V.D. French poets can
rejoice at the unanimity of will shown by a Soviet election; but
Russians know how that unanimity is obtained.
In 1939 the people of Eastern Poland hailed the Red Army as the
liberator. But we know from much evidence that within a few
SOVIET WEAKNESS AND STRENGTH 121
months or weeks the welcome had faded. So in the other dominated
territories of eastern Europe. After the first flush, it was not the
myth, but the terror and fears, and hopes for a berth in the very
unmythical apparatus, that kept the people, or most of them, under
the communist whip. The communist reality blights the communist
myth. The myth is powerful, but with the power of a compeUing
mirage, not that of the substantial mountains.
8. The International. Unique, and very high among the power-
assets of communism, is the international organization. No nation
has at its disposal any force remotely comparable. The international
sections are an incomparable intelligence bureau; they are the great-
est propaganda body ever known or conceived; they are a permanent
pressure group; and, when necessary, they can act, from within, as
a military auxiliary. They function, in addition, to forestall, either
by diverting or capturing or crushing them, independent, non-
communist mass movements.
9. Political leadership. Perhaps the greatest single element of the
strength of communism is the quality of its political leadership.
World communism is headed by a large stratum of men whose en-
tire lives are trained and dedicated to the pursuit of power. They
study the problems of power with a concentration in which the
objectivity of a research scientist is combined with the passion of a
fanatic. Never before has an entire group of men been so conscious
and deliberate about power. With the exception of a comparatively
few individuals, the political leaders of the past, and the non-
communist leaders of the present, have watered their political inter-
ests with other human concerns. The cross currents of family
affection, or aesthetic sense, or friendship, of moral conscience or
religious belief, of an idea moving freely under its own impulse,
divert at least occasionally the tide of their political motivation.
But the communist leader is all political, all of the time. Neither
wife nor child nor friend, neither beauty nor love nor pleasure nor
knowledge cherished for its own sake, is allowed to deflect by even
the smallest fraction of a degree the fixed direction of the com-"
munist will to power.
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9. -Is a Communist World Empire Desirable?
IT IS HARD for ordinary citizens to realize that there are in the
United States, as in every other nation, thousands, even hundreds
of thousands, of persons who beHeve that a communist World Em-
pire is not merely possible but good. Some of them work actively
for that Empire; others would welcome it; many more are prepared
to accept it, if it comes. They believe that it would be what they
would call "the solution."
On one point they are undoubtedly wiser than the rest. They see
that the question of communist world rule is an issue which must
be faced, about which a moral being ought to make a deliberate and
plain decision. The communist World Empire is a part, the culmi-
nating part, not of the myth of communism, but of its blunt reality.
It is not the vague possibility of a remotely future century, but a
quite probable outcome for the present generation. What, then, is
our moral ballot: For or Against.? Is a communist World Empire
desirable ?
Such a question is always more complex than it appears. When
we ask whether something is desirable, we must always presuppose
certain assumptions in order that the question should be meaning-
ful: desirable for whom, in relation to what standards, and in com-
parison to what possible alternatives ? Even the Anopheles mosquito
is desirable, if our standard is the ability to spread malaria.
Naturally, a communist victory is thought to be desirable by the
communist leadership which would share in and benefit by that
victory. Our reference must be to the majority of men, which is not
communist.
This book has made its point of departure the problem of atomic
weapons, taken in the historical context of the present stage in the
development of civilizations. A basic conclusion was reached that
only a monopoly of atomic weapons, which could be exercised only
by what would be in eflect a World Empire, could save Western
IS A COMMUNIST WORLD DESIRABLE? 123
Civiliz ation, and perhaps all organized human society, from destruc-
tion. Only a World Empire could, in that sense, "solve" the prob-
le|n_pj atomic weapons.
It must, therefore, be recognized that the victory of a communist
World Empire would solve this special problem from which we
began. Though the communist Empire would not eliminate social
violence, it would, by ending independent nations, end international
wars. The communist rulers would hold the monopoly of atomic
weapons. They would therefore no longer have as a motive for the
general use of these weapons the fear that similar weapons would
be used against them. Under those circumstances, there is reason to
believe that the communist rulers would not consider it expedient
to use the atomic weapons, or would at most use them on a limited
scale.
These gains, even if rather negative, are mighty enough to be
taken very seriously. If death is the immediate alternative we do not
usually dispute with the surgeon when he tells us that an arm and
a leg must go, to save life. We do not dispute even if we know that
we will have to live on a plain, dull diet forever after, and that his
fee will be our entire fortune.
What else, then, would a communist victory mean? And what
are the costs that must be balanced against the gain? These we can
estimate only by an appeal to experience: the historical experience
of the communist movement, where it has been in full power, where
it is now in the process of establishing full power, and where it has
operated, on a narrower scale, within nations themselves not com-
munist dominated.
The evidence does not seem to inform us conclusively about what
material economic values would be realized through a communist
world victory. Within Russia, a generation of communist rule has^
meant a definite lowering in the average real standard of living, at
the same time that heavy industry has been considerably expanded.
At the beginning of that generation, however, Russia was relatively
backward industrially. The communists have, besides, had to operate
within a hostile world political environment. We are not yet, I
think, entitled to judge finally the economic possibilities of collec-
tivized industry, — —
124 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
There seem, nevertheless, to be two special features of the specifi-
cally communist form of collectivization, both necessarily following
from the nature of communism, that would always prevent a com-
munist economy from raising the average standard of living: which
would, that is to say, make it probable that a world communist econ-
omy would not increase the material well-being of the majority of
mankind.
The central objective of communism is the conquest and mainte-
nance of a monopoly of all power. From this there follows a
complete subordination of economics to politics. The "natural" re-
quirements of the economy — in terms of division of labor, organiza-
tion of the productive process, balancing and integration of the
various sections of industry and agriculture, some reference to de
facto relations of supply and demand, and so on — are always handled
with primary reference to strictly political ends. Building a new
factory, locating a railroad, setting a production record in one de-
partment of a particular plant, installing or firing an engineer, plan-
ning new housing, allocating supplies, giving purges and decorations
to economic villains or heroes, adjusting levels of wages and salaries
and bonuses: these are all decided by their probable effect on the
political monopoly. No doubt the classical economists have much
overstated the naturalness of the natural economic laws. Hut it is"^
fact that technological and economic processes impose certain objec-
tive limiting conditions that must be accepted if the economy is to
have any chance of functioning reasonably well. In a large enter-
prise, for example, you cannot attain maximum long-term output
by staging, in one section of one department, a Stakhanovite stunt,
which for a few days achieves a record output for that section at the
expense of the equilibrium of the enterprise as a whole. When
planning factories, you cannot disregard the location of coal mines
or rivers or transport or housing or utilities or replacement facili-
ties without raising real costs and thereby reducing potential out-
put.
From the primary communist objective there follows, second, the
necessity of complete economic centralization. Complete centraliza-
tion is not inherent in modified forms of collectivization: many sec-
tions of the United States economy (such as, for example, the
IS A COMMUNIST WORLD DESIRABLE? 125
T.V.A.) are collectivized without being integrated into a totally
centralized economy. But centralization must be a feature of a com-
munist_collectiyism, becaiBe^ceiitralization would create potential
economic bases of decentralized political power. Complete economic
centralization means the attempt to direct the entire economy from a
single authority (through Five Year Plans and similar devices). But
it is humanly impossible that this should be done efficiently, not only
for the world as a whole, but even within a single large nation. The
attempt to do so results continually in economic distortions.
The probability that a world communist economy would not
mean an increase in the average world standard of living — would
mean quite possibly a decrease — is not, however, a fact of identical
significance to all human beings. For the inhabitants of the more
prosperous nations, such as, above all, the United States, it would
almost certainly involve a radical decrease in living standards. On
the other hand, more than half of the world's inhabitants, in India,
China, Indonesia, Africa, central Brazil, are already at or below the
minimum possible standard of life. Their material condition could
hardly be further lowered, might even be somewhat improved.
For the greater part of the presently privileged classes in the non-
communist world, a world communist economy would, of course,
mean a drastically lowered standard where it did Mot bring, as it
would in most cases, slavery or death. The new communized privi-
leged classes — the managerial class of officials, bureaucrats, factory
managers, functionaries of mass organizations, police and army
leaders — would, in contrast, improve their relative material
standards.
It is, thus, difficult to generalize about the desirability of a com-
munist World Empire from the point of view of standard of living.
Material standard of living is not, however, the only economic value.
There are also the values of economic security and of various eco-
nomic freedoms.
Communist propaganda claims that communist economy, by
abolishing unemployment, gives everyone economic security. To the
extent that this is true (and it is not strictly true), it has been cor-
rectly pointed out that the security is analogous to that existing
witKm a prison. Much of the employment is in forced-labor camps
126 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
and slave gangs. All labor is tied serf-like to its assigned job. But the
fact that everyone not only may but must work to live does not at
all by itself mean "job-security." Not only all workers under com-
munism, but all subjects of a communist state — even the members
of the privileged strata — have in reality a maximum of insecurity in
their jobs, because of the fact that political intervention may at any
moment snatch them away to another job, or to purging, exile, or
death.
At the same time, directly contrary to the propaganda myths, the
communist economy eliminates every significant economic freedom.
Deficient and often empty as economic freedoms have been under
capitalism, they have at least included some measure of the rights to
select or reject a given job, to quit, to start on one's own initiative
a new line of work or new enterprise, the not inconsiderable right
to fail without its being a penal offense, to criticize, organize, dem-
onstrate and strike, to show numerous kinds of economic initiative.
Besides these and other similar rights, there is the large and little
recognized element of economic democracy which springs from the
exercise of selective consumer preference : that is, by deciding, in the
mass, what they wish to buy and not to buy, the general population,
functioning as consumers, can direct, within limits but not incon-
siderably, the course of economic enterprise.
Under communist economy, all of these rights and freedoms are
done away with, and must be, for the same reason that compels total
centralization. These freedoms interfere with deliberate centralized
control. In the organizational forms which embody them, they pro-
vide foundations for potential political opposition. Under com-
munism, there can be no independent organization of labor or of
technical and administrative personnel. Each man in industry must
be assigned to his job, and must change only with political permis-
sion. No one can, of his own volition, initiate any enterprise.
Ostensible unions and technical associations must be agencies of the
communist control, not of their members. No strikes or other inde-
pendent labor demonstrations can be tolerated. The central direction,
not consumer preference, must decide what will be produced. The"
relation of labor as a whole to the communist state becomes analo-
gous to that of serfs to their feudal lord, without the mitigating
IS A COMMUNIST WORLD DESIRABLE? 127
effect o£ feudal social and religious custom or the reciprocal obliga-
tions assumed by the lord toward his serfs.
If material standards are not the whole of economic values, still
less are economic values the whole of human values. The evidence
from experience is that the world victory of communism would
mean the destruction of all those values which have been most dis-
tinctively cherished in the tradition of Western Civilization, as well
as of a number of still more general values which Western Civiliza-
tion shares, in aspiration, with such other civilizations as the Chinese
and Indian. I want to be sure that I am here understood to be mak-
ing an objective prediction, not in any degree a flourish of rhetoric.
I am stating a fact, not expressing an attitude.
I do not at all mean that Western Civilization, or any civilization,
has ever adequately realized these values. I recognize, even, that
their moral worth might be challenged, and that they might be
judged better destroyed. Nevertheless, it is true that certain clusters
of values have throughout the history of our culture functioned as
at least partially operative ideals, and have thereby conditioned at
least to some degree the forms of our social and individual life, and
have defined our conceptions of the meaning and goal of humanity.
Chief among these ideals are those which assert the absolute value_
of the single human person, of the individual. In the tradition of
CKrTstiarrity, this is expressed through the doctrines of individual
moral responsibility, guilt, conscience, and personal immortality,
with "the consequent conviction that personal salvation is the su-
preme goal of each^ human being. In the secular mode, similar'
attitudes are expressed in the doctrines of traditional democracy and
liberalism. Applying these ideals, we derive, as guides and tests for
the good life and the good society, the further values of personal
freedoms and personal dignity.
Communist ideology and communist practice alike entail the de-
struction of these ideals of the supreme worth of the human person,
of personal freedom and dignity. The subordination of the person
to the collectivity, the state, the Party, the Revolution, the historic
128 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
process becomes not merely an occasional necessity but a highest
duty and a permanent norm; and not merely the subordination but
the degradation of the individual. It is not carelessness but settled
policy and integral ideal that toss away millions of lives to achieve
quick agricultural collectivization, or rapid industrialization, that in
a purge sweep ten million individuals into slave labor, that fight a
war with oceans of blood substituted for machines and strategy, that
uproot millions — from the Baltic States or Poland or the Volga or
the Sudetenland or the Ukraine — from their homes and families,
that pass laws holding families responsible for individual crimes,
that in the interests of immediate political tactic turn the workers
of Germany or Austria over to Nazism without struggle, that sacri-
fice the people of Spain or China or of a thousand trade unions to
the insistence on a communist monopoly of all power. The Moscow
Show Trials revealed what has always been true of the communist
morality : that it is not merely the material possessions or the life of
the individual which must be subordinated, but his reputation, his
conscience, his honor, his dignity. He must lie and grovel, cheat and
inform and betray, for communism, as well as die. There is no
restraint, no limit. The slave must not merely obey but praise his
master; and the master is himself crushed in his own chains.
Our culture has, again, always held in one or another mode the
ideal of an objective truth as the guide and goal, beyond the limits
of our passions and interests, of our inquiries. In Christian theology
this standard of truth appears as the archetypical ideas in the Divine
Mind, the eternal laws of the universe decreed by the Omnipotent
God. Throughout the secular tradition of post-Renaissance science,
an analogous standard of truth is implicit in the humility before
independent factual evidence that pervades scientific method. For
communist doctrine and communist practice, truth, as merely an-
other weapon in the class struggle, becomes a political tool. The
Party can (as it has) declare the theory of relativity or the Men-
delian laws of heredity false, because "counter-revolutionary," as
readily as it doctors statistics or re-writes history or invents a new
childhood for Stalin. What communists call "mechanical logic" —
that is, the rules of objective inference and proof, the rules jJiat per-
mit us to test for truth and falsity — is replaced by "dialectical loglcT*^"
IS A COMMUNIST WORLD DESIRABLE? 129
The law o£_dialectical logic is. simply that whatever serves the inter-
ests o£ communist power is true.
Though, in our history and in all histories, might has no doubt in
practice ordinarily determined what the laws decree to be right, we
have always rebelled against the belief that might is in truth right,
and have asserted in action as well as in thought the claims of a
superior right against existing might. Antigone, appealing to the
laws written in the stars against the might of Creon, is a heroine for
us as well as for the Hellenes. But for communist ideology, as well
as its action, the distinction itself is obliterated. The final proof of-
fered that communist power is right, and all the means used to
advance that power, is the proclaimed inevitability of communist
triumph.
These, then, are among the costs that must be assessed against
those gains which would result from the victory of a communist
World Empire. If to some, and I think there are some, it will.appear
bettgLjhat mankind should altogether perish than that communism
should thus conquer, there will, I believe, be many, increasingly
many persons in the United States and everywhere who will feel
that these costs are not too high.
< go to Contents>
lo. - The Main Line of World Politics
THE GREAT CAPTAINS of military history, varied as they have
been in every other respect, have all been noted for their grasp of
what military w^riters call "the key to the situadon." At each level
of military struggle, from a brief skirmish to the grand strategy of
a war or series of wars, they have understood that there is one
crucial element which is this key to the situation. The key may be
almost anything: a ford across a river, or a hill Hke Cemetery Ridge
at Gettysburg; a swift blow at the enemy reserve, or the smashing
of the enemy fleet as at Trafalgar or Salamis; stiflE discipline on the
flanks as at Cannse, or a slow strangling blockade for an entire war;
a long defensive delay to train an army or win an ally, or a surprise
attack on a capital; control of the seas, the destruction of supplies,
or the capture of a hero.
The great captain concentrates on the key to the situation. He
simplifies, even over-simplifies, knowing that, though the key alone
is not enough, without it he will never open the door. He may, if
that is his temperament, concern himself also with a thousand de-
tails. He never allows details to distract his attention, to divert him
from the key. Often he turns the details, which in quantitative bulk
total much larger than the key, over to his subordinates. That is why
the genius of the great captain is often not apparent to others. He
may seem a mere figurehead, indolent, lethargic, letting the real
work be done by those around him. They fail to comprehend that
the secret of his genius is to know the key, to have it always in
mind, and to reserve his supreme exertion for the key, for what
decides the issue.
The principles of political struggle are identical with those of
military struggle. Success in both political knowledge and political
practice depends finally, as in military affairs, upon the grasp of the
key to the situation. The exact moment for the insurrection, the one
issue upon which the election will in reality revolve, the most vul-
130
THE MAIN LINE OF WORLD POLITICS 131
nerable figure in the opposition's leadership, the deeply felt complaint
that will rouse the masses, the particular concession that will clinch
a coalition, the guarded silence that will permit an exposure to be
forgotten, the exact bribe that will open up a new Middle Eastern
sphere of influence, the precise hour for a great speech : at each stage
and level of the political process there is just one element, or at most
a very small number of elements, which determines, which decides.
The great political leader (who is often also a great captain) —
Pericles or the elder Cato or Mohammed or Csesar or Henry of
Navarre or Bismarck or Hamilton or Lenin or Innocent III or the
younger Pitt — focuses on the key. He feels whether it is a time for
expansion or recovery, whether the opposition will be dismayed or
stimulated by a vigorous attack, whether internal problems or ex-
ternal affairs are taking political precedence. He knows, in each
political phase, what is the central challenge.
During the late 12th and for most of the 13th centuries, the
Papacy struggled with the Hohenstaufen Empire, and concluded by
destroying the Hohenstaufen. For all of Italy that struggle was in
those times the key to the general political situation, no matter how
it appeared to those whose political sense was distracted by tempo-
rary and episodic details. For the first generation of the 5th cen-
tury B.C., the political key in the Aegean was the attempt of Persia
to conquer the Hellenic world. All of the contests among the Greek
states, and all their internal city squabbles, were in reality subordi-
nate to the relation with Persia. For a generation in America, until
it was decided by the Civil War, the key was the struggle for a
united nation. Everything else in politics, foreign or domestic, was
secondary. For Western Civilization as a whole at the turn of the
19th century, the key was the contest between England and France.
England won, perhaps, because her governing class concentrated on
the key, whereas Napoleon, only vaguely glimpsing the key with its
shaft of sea power, dissipated his energies.
For a given nation, the political key is located sometimes among
internaTPsometiines among foreign affairs. For the United States,
the key during most of its independent history has been internal:
union or slavery or the opening of the West or industrialization or
monopoly. For England, quite naturally, it has been more ordinarily,
132 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
though by no means always, an external relation. It may be the
church or the army or the peasant problem, or, for a brief period, a
spectacular scandal like the Dreyfus affair or the South Sea Bubble
or Teapot Dome.
We have entered a period of history in which world politics take
precedence over national and internal politics, and in which world
politics literally involve the entire world. During this" period, nOw
and until this period ends with the settlement, one way or another,
of the problems which determine the nature of the period, all of
world politics, and all of what is most important in the internal
politics of each nation, are oriented around the struggle for world
power between Soviet-based communism and the United States.
This is now the key to the political situation. Everything else is sec-
ondary, subordinate.
The key is, much of the time, hidden. The determining struggle is
not apparent in the form of individual political issues, as they arise
week by week. The deceptive surface is the cause of the political
disorientation and futility of so many of the observers and actors,
which so particularly infect the citizens and leaders of the United
States. They base their ideas and actions on the temporary form of
political events, not on the controlling reality.
Yugoslavia disputes with Italy over Trieste. Chiang Kai-shek
fights with Chou En-lai over North China. Armenians begin to
clamor for an independent Armenia. The new Philippine govern-
ment confronts a revolt of the Hukbalahaps. Poland argues with
Mexico in the Security Council. The French Cabinet calls for an
immediate break with Franco. Harry Lundberg and the communists
fight for control of the United States waterfront. The American
Labor Party and the Liberal Party jockey for position in New York
State. The British Communists apply for admission to the Labour
Party. The World Federation of Trade Unions demands an official
voice in the United Nations. The International Harvester Company
objects to sending tractors to the Balkans. Japanese printers' unions
refuse to set up editorials they don't like. Sweden signs a commercial
agreement with Moscow. The United States asks for bases in Iceland
or the Azores. Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania arm and succor
Macedonian partisans. Joseph Clark Baldwin, ousted by the New
THE MAIN LINE OF WORLD POLITICS 133
York Republicans, is endorsed by Vito Marcantonio. Australia ob-
jects to the veto power.
The eyes of the public become entangled in the many-colored sur-
face. The exact ethnic complexion of Venezia Giulia is debated with
ponderous statistics. Owen Lattimore proves at length that Chiang
is not quite democratic and that many peasants support Yenan.
Arthur Upham Pope explains that there are reactionary landlords in
Iran. Henry Wallace describes the geography of Siberia. The Nation
catalogues the villainies of Franco. PM sturdily denounces the
crimes of Greek Royalists. The New Republic gives the history of
agricultural oppression in the Philippines. The innocent bystanders
send in their dollars, join committees, and sign open letters.
The statistics and records and swarms of historical facts are
admirable enough to have at hand. But by themselves they are
shadows, ashes. If we do not look through them to the living body,
the focal fire, we know nothing. If we do not grasp that Trieste and
Thrace, and Armenia and Iran and North China and Sweden
and Greece are the border marches between the communist power
and the American power, and that all the statistics and records are
filigree work on the historical structure, then we know nothing. We
know less than nothing, and we fall into the trap which those who
do know deliberately bait with all the statistics and records. It is
their purpose to deceive us with the shadows and to prevent us
from seeing the body. If we do not know that the American Labor
Party has nothing to do with America or with Labor or with any of
the issues stated in its program and speeches, but is simply a dis-
guised colony of the communist power planted within the enemy
territory, then, politically, we know nothing. If we do not under-
stand that the World Federation of Trade Unions is merely a device
manipulated by the N.K.V.D. to further the communist objective
of infiltrating and demoralizing the opponents in the Third World
War, then we have not begun to realize what is at issue in the
world. The central point is not whether Chiang is a democrat —
though that too is an important point — but that he is, in his own
fashion, a shield of the United States against the thrust of com-
munist power out of the Heartland. The debates in the Security
Council are not really over the absurd procedural ritual that appears
134 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
on the surface of the minutes. The ritual is like a stylized formal
dance reflecting in art the battle of the Titans.
Walter Lippmann, after a tour of Europe in the Spring of 1946,
told us in a widely publicized series of articles that the main issue of
world politics was the contest between England and the Soviet
Union, which was coming to a head in the struggle over Germany.
The United States he found to be in the comfortable position of an
impartial umpire who could generously intervene to mediate and
settle the dispute. Mr. Lippmann was right in insisting on the cru-
cial present role of the fight for Germany. But one look at the
political map of Europe, with a side-glance at the state of India and
the British colonies, should be enough to demonstrate that England
could not possibly stand up as principal in a challenge to the com-
munist power. England in Germany, whatever her intentions, func-
tions as a detachment of the greater power which is the only existing
rival in the championship class. If it were really England, and if the
pressure of the United States were withdrawn from the European
arena, the decision over Germany would long since have been
announced.
C^ The determining facts are merely these : Western Civilization has
reached tHe stage in it"s development that calls for the creation of its
Universal Empire. The technological and institutional character of
Western Civilization is such that a Universal Empire of Western
Civilization would necessarily at the same time be a World Empire.
In the world there are only two power centers adequate to make a
serious attempt to meet this challenge. The simultaneous existence
of these two centers, and only these two, introduces into world po-
litical relationships an intolerable disequilibrium. The whole prob-
lem is made incomparably sharper and more immediate by the
discovery of atomic weapons, and by the race between the two
power centers for atomic supremacy, which, independently of all
other historical considerations, could likewise be secured only
through World Empire.
One of the two power centers is itself a child, a border area, of
Western Civilization. For this reason, the United States, crude, awk-
ward, semi-barbarian, nevertheless enters this irreconcilable conflict
as the representative of Western culture. The other center, though it
THE MAIN LINE OF WORLD POLITICS 135
has already subdued great areas and populations o£ the West, and
though it has adapted for its own use many technological and or-
ganizational devices of the West, is alien to the West in origin and
fundamental nature. Its victory would, therefore, signify the reduc-
tion of all Western society to the status of a subject colony. Once
again, the settled peoples of the. Plains would bow to the yoke of the
erupting Nomads of the Steppes. This time the Nomads have
taken care to equip themselves from the arsenal of the intended
slaves. The horses and dogs have been transformed into tanks and
bombs. And this time the Plains are the entire Earth.
Between the two great antagonists there is this other difference,
that may decide. The communist power moves toward the climax
self-consciously, deliberately. Its leaders understand what is at stake.
They have made their choice. All their energies, their resources, their
determination, are fixed on the goal. But the Western power gropes
and lurches. Few of its leaders even want to understand. Like an
adolescent plunged into his first great moral problem, it wishes,
above all, to avoid the responsibility for choice. Genuine moral prob-
lems are, however, inescapable, and the refusal to make a choice is
also a moral decision. If a child is drowning at our feet, to turn
away is to decide, as fully as to save him or to push him under. It
is not our individual minds or desires, but the condition of world
society, that today poses for the Soviet Union, as representative of
coffifnumsrn, and for the United States, as representative of Western
Civiliza'tToh, tTie issue of world leadership. No wish or thought of
ours can charm this issue away.
This issue will be decided, and in our day. In the course of the
decision, both of the present antagonists may, it is true, be destroyed.
But one of them must be.
< go to Contents>
Part II WHAT OUGHT TO BE DONE
11. The Renunciation of Power < go to Contents>
IF OUR SUPREME AIM were in truth to solve finally the prob-
lems of atomic weapons, of war and politics, to bring into the world
a universal and permanent peace, then the way through which that
aim might be fulfilled would not be obscure. The way, the only
way, has been known for a long time. It has been repeatedly told to
us in all the thousands of variations on the winged words that we
link to the names of Christ and Buddha and Confucius and St.
Francis and Lao-tse.
We may have peace, permanent peace, when, and only when, we
are ready to renounce power, to renounce it totally, absolutely. This
is the way, and there is no other way.
With the renunciation of power, the problems of politics, politics
itself and war which is part of politics, cease even to exist, since
politicsis. nothing but the struggle for power. But this can be only
when the renunciation is total. So long as there is any impurity in
cur aim,'s6 long as there is anything other than peace itself that we
will not sacrifice, then the time will come when our wants will clash
with the wants of others. We will be step by step driven to a judg-
ment by force.
If I seek for nothing, I cannot lose in my search. If in my own
sour there is no sense of material possession, then who can rob me?
If liberty and family and life itself are as nothing to me beside the
absolute sin of power, then who can enslave or oppress me?
Through the renunciation of power, I become immune to power.
Through absolute renunciation, I become absolutely free, because my
freedom is of another kingdom, not of this world.
136
THE RENUNCIATION OF POWER 137
The renunciation o£ power has this peculiar distinction: that it is
a revolution within the individual soul. It is thus a revolution that
each individual human being can carry through for himself, to the
end. I do not have to compromise and delay, to calculate probabili-
ties, study social forces, educate and organize, wait for the world
and thereby surrender to the world. I can act alone, because the
source and end of the action, because the Kingdom of God, is
within us.
There is, I think, a remarkable symptomatic significance in the
revival of interest in mystical forms of religion which has become
apparent in Western society during recent years. Religion which is
organized into churches descends through the fact of social organi-
zation from the City of God into the City of the World, It is thereby
enmeshed, necessarily, in the struggle for power. Mysticism, derived
through the individual's inmost experience, alone with the Alone,
joins naturally anH invariably with the renunciation of power.
We find this movement toward mysticism expressed, to begin
with, in those most sensitive of all historical barometers, the ad-
vanced intellectuals. Gerald Heard, Aldous Huxley, Ignazio Silone,
Evelyn Waugh, are only better known names that represent a much
wider stratum among the younger , intellectuals of most of the
Western nations. Within the ranks of the organized churches, both
Catholic and Protestant, the same phenomenon is found, often
rather disturbing to the established hierarchies. Part of the impulse
in the rise of movements like the French Existentialism and Dolor-
ism, the neo-Protestant turn toward Kierkegaard, the swing among
some Catholic theologians away from Thomism toward (as a first
stop) Augustine and Platonism, is not unrelated. The impulse filters
down and is commercialized by middlebrow writers who turn out
books with a "mystical angle" that are chosen by the book societies
and reach the top of the best seller lists.
Like everything else among us, mysticism becomes a racket. Few
even of the best of the individuals who turn toward it win through
to the end of the way; there is usually a Hollywood contract or a
profitable anthology that pushes up in the mystic desert. These dregs
of the City of the World should not, however, obscure for us the
reahty of this fresh flow of mysticism out of that spiritual well
138 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
which repeatedly, in periods analogous to ours, has sent its waters
to the surface. Confronted with a social crisis which seems over-
whelming in its proportions, which seems insurmountable by any
means drawn from empirical analysis and practical calculation, men,
or some men, seek to vault beyond the crisis through the way o£
mysticism and its total renunciation of power.
The mystic revolution, for the individual who makes it, does solve,
and solve permanently, the problems of politics and war and atomic
weapons, as it solves every material problem. The world of matter,
the social world, become Maya — illusion. The soul, drawn into the
timeless reality of the mystic Nirvana, need no longer be troubled
by the grotesque fantasies of Maya. Against this solution of him who
has taken the mystic way, there can be no relevant argument.
Nevertheless, Maya, even if illusion, remains, for others, after its
own fashion. The mystic is exempt from argument only while he
stays within the mystic world of his own soul. When he speaks,
or we still ask, about that other world of mountains and valleys and
cities, of machines and nations and classes, we must still apply the
severe and relentlessly non-mystical criteria of natural reason, if we
want reliable answers to our questions.
These will readily enough indicate to us that the program of the
renunciation of power, unassailable for the self-isolated individual,
would solve the social and historical problems of politics and war
only if everyone everywhere made the renunciation. For me, my
own renunciation of power may be enough. But if my still worldly
neighbor has not joined me in my renunciation, then robbery, cheat-
ing, exploitation, murder will still exist in the historical world if not
in mine : his acts, namely against me. If all the people of the Argen-
tine renounced power there would still, after all, be the Uruguayans,
who would then think their neighbors only the easier picking.
The universal, total renunciation of power by human beings is
not, perhaps, logically inconceivable. I do not think, however, that I
heed give detailed proof that it is so wildly improbable that its
realization would be a miracle beyond all bounds even of imagina-
THE RENUNCIATION OF POWER 139
tive speculation. It would mean, as Arnold Toynbee notes, the trans-
formation o£ human society to an entirely new level, at least as far
removed from our type of civilization as this is removed from
primitive culture. Perhaps, as Toynbee thinks, this transformation,
foreshadowed by the teachings of the great reHgions and the lives
of some of their saints, is the goal of human history. If so, it is a
goal with which we have at present no contact, not even by the most
delicate spiritual radar. We cannot, therefore, rely on its aid for our
navigation.
Let us suppose that the persons not of the whole world but of a
single nation renounced power absolutely. They would no longer,
of course, be a nation, because a nation is itself a form of organized
coercion and power. For them, we know in advance, it would mean
a total enslavement. We should not, with historical experience be-
fore us, fool ourselves with the illusion that, because of the passivity
of the slaves, this slavery would be less than the most harsh. Perhaps
it would be better, morally better, to be thus enslaved, beaten, tor-
tured, starved, than to take for defense to the sword — in particular
to this horrible new sword which the nuclear physicists have fash-
ioned for us. Perhaps we may even grant that if the people of a
single great nation should freely make that sacrifice they would
through their example, in time, in a very long time, draw behind
them the other peoples of the world.
Nevertheless, the probable fact, so highly probable that it is a his-
torical certainty, remains that this people does not exist. For the citi-
zens of a single great nation to make the ultimate renunciation
would be a miracle as much beyond any rational speculation as the
miracle of universal renunciation. We can pray for miracles, but the
wish for their occurrence cannot guide rational social thought or ra-
tional social practice. Miracles are what even theologians call Acts
of Gratuitous Grace, whicE~we"neTther deserve nor have the right
to~expect.
Tf,'"therefore, we wish to base our reasoning upon experience and
the facts of the real world, ^i/e must give up the hope for a "perma-
nent solution" of the problems of war arid politics, in general and in
the newly acute form these now take through the advent of atomic
weapons. We know what the only possible permanent solution is.
140 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
We know that men are not going to accept that solution. When we
nevertheless continue to adhere to the idea of a permanent solution,
and when we construct a program in the light of that idea, we not
only delude ourselves, but we fail to advance in the humbler task
which is possible: the discovery of temporary and partial solutions.
A man with a small business would be evidently foolish if he held
out for non-existent million dollar propositions, and meanwhile went
bankrupt through rejecting thousand dollar customers.
Nothing we can do will guarantee permanent peace. Nothing will
nTake~i"t"certaih that atomic weapons will not some day wipe out
civilization and mankind. We can, however, take steps that will
either postpone war, or make it less totally destructive, or give the
— > best chance for a favorable outcome. If we cannot make certain that
atomic weapons will not destroy us, we can at least take steps to
make it less certain that they will. Moreover, i n spite of widespread
/^romantic notions to the contrary, it has always seemed to me that
J smaller, shorter and easier wars are, as a rule, better than bigger,
"^ \ longer and more difficult wars. And, if by "winning a war" we mean
C the outcome most favorable to what we believe in, it seems better to
win a war than to lose it.
What is called "public opinion" is a set of changing ideas and
feelings that are incompatible with each other. The ideas include
truths, half-truths, and errors; the feelings mix good with vicious
impulses. There are few individuals capable of the mystic way, with
its renunciation of power, which is reserved, after all, for saints.
Watered versions of the attitude which has led to the mystic search
are, however, reflected today in the complex of "public opinion."
We constantly hear and read condemnation of "power politics."
j^We are constantly told that the goal of national and international
'' policy is, or ought to be, "peace." These two beliefs are at present
accepted almost as axioms. They are always good for an editorial, a
column, a speech, or a book on world affairs. They represent, how-
ever, a profound confusion, an insurmountable barrier to clarity in
political analysis or adequacy in pohtical proposals.
"Power politics" is the only kind of politics there is. The idea of
THE RENUNCIATION OF POWER 141
some sort of "politics" that would not be "power politics" is empty,
self-contradictory. When someone condemns "power politics," it is
a sign either that he doesn't know what poUtics is about, or that he
is objecting to someone else's power politics while simultaneously
camouflaging his own.
Equally mistaken is the idea that "peace" can be the controlling
objectrve"of"'political policy. Peace can be, as we have seen, the
supreme objective of afTlndividual person's moral life. It cannot be
the dominant goal of an organized social group, such as a nation,
because that would be the equivalent of a decision by the group to
dissolve, to commit suicide. The group (a nation, for example)
exists as an organized structure of institutionalized interests which
bind together and define the members of the group. These interests
are under continuous attack from corrosive influences within the
group itself and from the external pressure of other groups. Some of
these interests are secondary, and can be thwarted without major
damage to the group as a distinct social entity. But if the major
interests, and the institutions which embody them, are negated, then
the group simply does not exist any longer. The nation, if a nation
is in question, is absorbed into another nation, or its people are dis-
persed into the social wilderness. The individual human beings who
previously constituted the nation may still exist; but the nation has
disappeared.
To mak e peace the sup reme objective of national policy would
mean in effect to decide that the major interests and institutions —
that isj^the elements which make the nation a nation, which give it
historical existence— will not be defended. Since the circumstances
of social life make it certain that the pressures, both internal and ex-
ternal, against these interests and institutions will continue to op-
erate, this decision would mark the cessation of the nation's "will to
exist." At the first crisis, which would not be long delayed, such a
nation would be obliterated. There have been a number of examples
of nations which reached this point, and from there went on to
oblivion. Modern France was perilously close to it in 1939-40, as was
indicated by the half-cynical but widely mentioned French slogan
of those days : "It is better to lose a war than to fight one."
Because peace cannot be the supreme objective of policy, it does
142 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
not follow, as some fascist theoreticians have argued, that war must
be. Peace cannot be. War may be, and in the case of some nations,
has been. What more strictly follows is merely that a nation (or any
comparable social group) must be willing to fight. It must be willing
to fight whenever those m~af6r~ihterests and institutions, which
define it as a distinct group and without which it would not exist
as a nation, are seriously threatened. It may consider peace, among
other things, as on the whole preferable, and therefore seek to pre-
vent the occurrence of such a situation. But such situations will
nevertheless occur. The nation must then be willing to fight, if
necessary must in fact fight. Peace can never be more than the by-
product of a policy which has, for the time being, succeeded in de-
fending the major interests by means other than war.
It is a popular view that those persons who exhaust their rhetoric
in denunciations of power politics and war, in pledges of allegiance
to "understanding" and peace, are "moral," "idealistic," and "good";
whereas the unregenerate few who insist on analyzing politics in
terms precisely of the struggle for power, who are less concerned
with praising permanent peace than with securing a temporary
truce or charting the course of an approaching war, are "cynical"
and "bad." If we judge only in terms of subjective motivation, there
may be something to be said for this view. It is perhaps a tribute to
man's moral nature that he so often allows his conscience to blind
him to reality. However, if our concern is with consequences rather
than with motives, there is a case for the cynics. Unfortunately, we
do not get rid of cancer by calling it indigestion.
It is advisable to observe, so far as consequences go, that the rhet-
oricians of peace are not the best servants of their own avowed
cause. You do not eliminate the conflicts between nations and
classes by denying their existence. You merely make it that much
harder to discover actions that might eliminate or lessen, if they can
be eliminated or lessened, those conflicts. You do not stop an ap-
proaching war by closing your eyes to it. You merely make it more
likely that you will miss any chance there may be of averting it;
and, if it does still come, that you will lose it. In practice, the tran-
scendental ideals of the mystic renunciation of power, mixed into
the vague impure medley of pubUc opinion, result in self-deception
THE RENUNCIATION OF POWER 143
and irresponsibility. An impossible program is always irresponsible,
because it cannot function in practice as a guide to real action. It
ends up as an excuse for doing nothing, or as a cloak for doing some-
thing quite different from what the program advertises.
We have entered a period of history during which the attempt is
to be made to organize world dominion, a^World Empire. There
are, however, only two power-groupings capable oFlnaKing the
attempt seriously: one led by communism with its Soviet base, and
the other potentially under United States leadership. In these cir-
cumstances, there are only three general alternatives from which the
choice of each person must be madeTEven if he does not choose
consciously and deliberately at all, or thinks in his own mind that he
is choosing some fourth alternative, his actions in their practical
consequences will favor one or another of just these three.
/ He may renounce pov/er, and thus political life. If he does this
genuinely and^ITthe way, then the catastrophes of politics and war
will be for him like the merely material catastrophes of avalanche
or earthquake or tidal wave, without moral significance. They may,
quite probably will, overwhelm his physical being, but he will be
morally outside of them.
O' He m ay believe that a communist World Empire is the best solu-
tion. If he does and is morally consistent, then he should act to make
the triumph of the communist Empire as quick and as painless as
may be.
y If he rejects the communist Empire, and is not prepared for ulti-
mate renunciation, then there is nothing left for him — and this will
happen, whether or not he wills it — but to join the attempt to block
the communist Empire by the only means which historical circum-
stance has placed at our disposal.
< go to Contents>
Part III WHAT COULD BE DONE
12. Political Aims and Social Facts 144 13. The Break with the Past 150 14. The Supreme Object of United States Policy: Defensive 161 15. The Supreme Object of United States Policy: Offensive 181 16. The Internal Implementation of Foreign Policy 200 17. World Empire and the Balance of Power 211 18. Is War Inevitable? 222 |
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H |
< go to Contents>
12. Political Aims and Social Facts
IT MAY BE that the course of history, of social and political life, is
determined.
It may be, in other words, that the laws of historical
development are independent of any influence from human reason
or voluntary human choice.
The growth and decline of peoples, the
rise and fall of civilizations, the spread and dissolution of churches,
all may occur in some sequence that has no causal reference to our
own rational nature.
Many philosophers have thought so, and have
traced the causal root of history to
- the Will of an Absolute God
- or to rainfall,
- to Destiny
- or Race
- or the accidental meetings of atoms.
If so, then all political debate and all discussion of social reform,
all our arguments and supposed decisions about elections and wars
and statutes and revolutions, are neurotic illusions, meaningless
scrawls on a blank facade.
All, then, that we could intelligibly do
about history would be to contemplate it with a detached aesthetic
interest.
This may be so, but we must, and we do, assume that it is not so.
We believe, and we cannot help believing, that what we think and
decide makes some difference to the course of history.
The question then arises: how much difference?
We must beware of this assumption of ours.
If we assume, and are perhaps justified
in assuming, that our thoughts and decisions make some difference
to history, it does not follow that they make very much difference.
It is, indeed, fairly easy to demonstrate that they make, at most,
very little difference.
If we have any freedom in relation to the
course of history, to political and social affairs, it is a narrowly
restricted freedom.
Each of us, and each generation of us, comes into a world that is
not our handiwork.
From one point of view it is merely there, given
as the scene and condition of our existence.
We are not responsible
for the stars or the oceans or the atoms, or for the density of the
elements, the energy of nuclei, or the modes of operation of our
own organism.
Nor are we responsible for the houses that we find
already built, the cities and factories and temples, the veins of ore
that others have opened, the land that others have cleared, the tools
and the machines that are the products of their ingenuity.
No more
are we responsible for the courts and armies and jails already func-
tioning, the boundaries our fathers have drawn, the whole vast
frame of thought and feeling, of science and myth and philosophy
that reaches us out of the long past where we were not.
The ponderous but moving weight of the world, the social as well as the
material world, is, for us, a brute and alien fact.
It is a snowball, not
rolled by us, grown already monstrous when we come upon it,
moving now under the compulsion of its own inertia.
The most, surely, that we can propose to ourselves is to alter by a degree or
two, with the lever of the mind, the direction or rate of its advance.
[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Prince ]
I think it was Machiavelli who first compared history to a river
the main course of which we cannot hope to divert, which, when it
is in violent flood, we cannot in the least resist.
Our aim must be more humble, using a time when our river is more calm,
so that- by bank's, and fences, and other provisions [we may perhaps]
correct it in such manner [that] when it swells again, it may be carried
off by some canal,
or the violence thereof rendered less licentious and destructive.
These general considerations have a relevance, which is often
forgotten, to the problem of formulating a deliberate political pro-
gram.
They explain the sense in which most "political programs" are
"Utopian."
They are Utopian because they try to reverse the course of the river.
[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utopia ]
Instead of accepting the inherited set of social facts,
and studying how these may be given a new impetus, a partial redirection,
the programs counter-charge head-on into the social facts.
In that "direct assault" the programs are sure to be crushed, and the
brute facts to conquer.
Noble political longings for a past "Golden Age" turn into the
soured disillusion of the reactionary;
abstract revolutionary idealism is transformed into tyranny.
Today in this country we are told by a growing number of per-
sons who are identified by such names as "democratic agrarians" or
"personalists". that "industrial civilization" has been a mistake, that
we ought to do away with large cities, and return to a rural culture
based upon unmechanized family-size farms.
This program has, in the imagination of the distracted city-dweller,
a nostalgic emotional appeal.
It is similar, it may be noted, to the program of the Epicurean movement
which flourished in a troubled period of Hellenic
history analogous to the period in which we live.
The sufficient comment on any such program is that it is impossible.
Our cities and machines are not isolated accidents.
They are integral phases of our entire social scheme and process.
There is no magic in a noble moral impulse that enables us to wish away our past.
The good agrarians do not, for instance, stop to reflect that ...
their plan would mean the destruction of four-fifths of the population,
in the (impossible) event that it should be put into effect.
What happens - in practice - is what
happened also with Epicureanism.
The "agrarian primitivism" - for the
common man - becomes the transfer of a few thousand sophisticated
New Yorkers into the old farms of Pennsylvania and Connecticut,
where they raise a few vegetables perhaps, and are supported by
interest or dividends - and by writings paid for by the city publishers.
Able and persuasive economists - have - of late been proving for us
the dangers of economic collectivism.
Their positive proposals are left vague;
but the essential meaning is always a return to a genuine market economy
and free enterprise.
Again we must observe that their program is impossible.
The "free enterprise" which they have in
mind never did, as a matter of fact, exist anywhere.
The actual economic relations of a century ago have vanished forever,
together with the general social conditions which supported them.
"Collectivism" need not, as I have argued, be identified with totalitarianism;
but
a large dose of some form of "economic collectivism" there is
from now on certain to be.
The specific subject-matter of this book is the present situation in
world poHtics.
In Part I the character and tendencies
o£ the present historical period have been analyzed.
The general problem has been stated.
The communist program — that is, the communist solution to
the general problem — has been given. ( ... in Part I )
The communist program is neither empty nor Utopian.
It is a genuine "program""
because its political aims are in sufficient conformity with the social facts.
The communists are wrong in believing [that]
the victory of their aims is "inevitable,"
but - nothing in the social facts makes it impossible.
Their program, moreover, does provide a solution to the general problem
^n the only sense that
politicafpr^lHrns are ever solved fa temporary and partial but still
workable solution.
Any counter^rogram to the communists, if it is to be a genuine
program, a guide to action, must meet the test of these same criteria.
It must be in sufficient conformity to the social facts. It must actually
solve, in a measure that would at least be workable, the general
problem. We have seen, it should be remembered, that any solution
of the present world political problem, which includes the problem
of atomic weapons, must be such that it can be realized compara-
tively quickly.
We have been compelled, because it did not fulfill these criteria,
t o rule oii tjyolimtary World Government as a solution.
We have
had also to rule out~ahy program the realization of which would
have to wait for a future several generations or more distant.
These
last would include all programs which place their reliance upon the
gradual spread of proper education, enlightenment, and moral im-
provement, since, from present indications, that spread is going to
be very gradual; and all programs whose hopes rest on "social forces"
that are now inconsiderable, since the development of these to a
point where they can decisively influence history takes a long time.
To rule these programs out as solutions for the present world
political problem does not, of course, mean to abandon them en-
tirely. They may be adhered to for the long term.
Meanwhile there is a short-term crisis'
that must be met if there is to be any long term.
You can't re-educate a wicked crew i£ it is going down, to-
night, on the sinking ship.
The international programs of Americans usually have a good
deal to say about the freedom and equality of all nations, large and
small, the sanctity of treaties and international law, the rights of
self-determination, and so on.
All programs based on such conceptions are also hopeless in the present situation.
They are hopeless
because they, too, are completely at variance with social facts.
History shows that treaties have never lasted, and have never done
much more than symbolize temporarily existing power relationships.
During this century they have all become nondescript scraps of
paper.
In serious matters, there cannot be "international law" when
there is no world state to enforce it.
For us, "international law" can
only be what it was at Nuremberg (and what it would have been
at Moscow and Washington if the other side had conquered) : a
cover for the will of the more powerful.
We cannot make all nations equal by calling them equal,
or writing their equality into the provisions of a Charter.
They simply are not equal, and that setdes
the question.
The so-called "revolts of small nations" at various international gatherings during the past few years are deceptions.
The net effect is never anything but
-- an expression of the alignments of small nations in relation to the great powers.
All the fuss over the
"veto power" in the United Nations is energy wasted.
Whatever the Charter said,
the Soviet Union and the United States would always
have a de facto veto power, because either of them [USSR & US] is alone immeas-
urably stronger than the United Nations.
What an absurdity to think for a moment that Ecuador is equal to the United States,
or Sweden equal to the Soviet Union!
And what a preposterous absurdity to imagine -
[that] the crisis of world politics
could ever be solved with the help of such juridical nonsense!
For whom can "a counter-program" to the communist program be
intended? A program must be addressed to some audience.
The policies it proposes would have to be implemented by some social agency.
There is, however, only one suitable agency in the world,
and no time for the creation of a new agency. A world policy for
Ethiopia or Belgium or Siam, abstractly unassailable in all respects,
would be meaningless, because nothing that Ethiopia and Belgium
and Siam can do will materially influence the world political crisis.
Tlieonly_^ ... The only
possible policy will have to be implemented primarily
through the United States government; because - that government - is
the only agency which might in the next period o£ history channel a
counter-power adequate to meet the challenge o£ the communist power.
This does not mean that the program need be directed toward
the United States government alone.
A world program presumably
seeks to recommend itself as widely as possible to the peoples of the
world — including in this instance, very prominently, the Russian
people, who must on all occasions be so carefully distinguished
from the Soviet regime :
They [the Russian people ] are the primary victims of that regime,
as they may prove to be the chief immediate instrument of its downfall.
Such a program will profit also
by the acceptance of governments other than the government of the United States.
But its fate [ the "program's" fate ]
will be decided by the action of the United States.
This is so
- because the fate of the world in this epoch will be decided by the United
States.
The United States alone is capable of drawing together and
leading the forces- that could prohibit the victory of world communism.
The aim of the present section of this book is, then, to answer the
problem stated in Part I.
Without reference to the question whether
it ought to be done, or will be done, I shall describe: what could be done.
That is, I shall formulate, within the limits of the general
criteria for any genuine "political program", a specific program that
is both possible to carry out, and adequate to answer — not by any
means for all time, but for "this historical period"
— the threat of atomic weapons and the need for world political organization.
This program is thus in direct opposition to the communist program,
which is also both possible and adequate.
( It will therefore presuppose a rejection of the communist program.)
Because of the world political position of the United States, such
a program can only be, first and primarily, a proposal of policy,
in particular though not exclusively "foreign policy", for the United States.
It is therefore
- terms of the United States that the program, will be, for the most part, presented.
13. - The Break with the Past
UNITED STATES foreign policy, from the points of view both of
national interest and of the world crisis, has for a number of years
been mistaken in conception, in method, and in content. The first
requisite for a viable policy is, therefore, a sharp break with the past.
In the first place, the United States, most of the time, has not
really had a foreign policy. What it means to have a policy is not
clearly understood by many of the governmental leaders, or by the
general public.
I observed, recently, a typical example of this confusion. I was
asked to speak professionally, one night, at a meeting of a Republican
committee. During my remarks, I mentioned that the Republican
Party did not have a policy, and that it was mistaken in supposing
that, without a policy, it could count on winning sustained mass
support by organizational measures and the errors of its opponents.
In the discussion that followed, several members of the audience not
only agreed heartily that it was a fine thing to have a policy, but
told me that the whole matter of policy would soon be taken care
of. A dozen or two committees had been appointed, they said, and
were busily gathering statistics on agriculture, foreign trade, labor,
industry, banking, consumers, and what not. Before long they would
have their reports in; these would be summarized and put together;
and there would be the program and policy of the Republican
Party.
It is admirable, granted, for political leaders to be acquainted with
a maximum of factual information about all relevant subjects. These
earnest committees, however, could dig away for the facts from
now until eternity, and they would still not come to the surface
with a poHcy. A policy is not a set of facts. It is a proposal to do
something about facts. If the proposal is intelHgent, it will naturally
take the facts — enough of them, which is much less than all — ^into
account; but if it is limited to the facts, then it is not a policy.
A national policy on agriculture does not mean all the detailed
mass of data about farms and farming and farmers in this country
and in the world. It means a general directive, or small group of
inter-related directives, which points to a goal, and which can serve
as a guide to political action. The objective might be, for instance:
to improve (or worsen) the economic position of farmers relative
to the rest of the population; to increase (or decrease) total agricul-
tural production; to shift from small-scale to large-scale farming, or
from private to collective farming; to make some major change in
the kind of crops grown, and so on; or it might be a combination of
several such general objectives, so long as they are consistent with
each other. Presumably a policy of this kind ought not to be adopted
without a sufficient knowledge of agricultural conditions, and with-
out relating agricultural policy to the national interests as a whole.
Nevertheless, the facts by^ themselves cannot decide the policy* In-;^
deed, we do notknow what facts are relevant, what facts to look
for, unless we are thinking in terms of policy.
On the other hand, poHcy should not be confused with the specific
means that are used to carry out the policy. If our agricultural policy
were to improve the relative economic position of the farmers, we
might try to do so by manipulating prices, changing tariffs, giving
subsidies and bounties, promoting more efficient methods of pro-
duction, lightening farm taxes and increasing city taxes, opening
new export markets, squeezing processors and middle men, and so
on, or by some combination of these. Any one of these particular
means, however, is "policy" only in a secondary sense. To make
sense, it has to be related to an over-all policy, consistent and fairly
simple in conception. Otherwise, the various means will very likely
have opposite effects, cancel each other out, and lead nowhere but
to confusion. This, it may be added, is a result by no means infre-
quent in this country's conduct of its affairs.
What I have been saying applies directly to the problem of foreign
policy. It is imagined that the nation can have a "sound foreign
policy" by setting up, in the State Department, a "Yugoslavian desk"
152 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
and an "Argentine desk" and a "Siamese" and forty other "desks";
and then grouping these desks together according to elegant and
comphcated charts until, at the top of the page, you have presumably
The World, presided over by the Secretary of State, as deputy for
the President.
Linked to each desk, at home and in the field, will be specialists,
experts and research assistants, w^ho will have at their fingertips
all the facts about their respective provinces. Then, by consult-
ing the appropriate file or the appropriate specialist, you will auto-
matically have the answer to any political question that arises
anywhere.
Under the guidance of no-policy, you will treat each separate prob-
lem "on its own merits." Canada wants too high a price for copper,
scTyoli will switch to South Africa. The communist Polish govern-
ment promises democratic elections, so you will throw the London
Poles out of the window. Peron is rude to Braden, so you denounce
Argentina in an official Blue Book. England must export to live, so
you make them haggle over interest rates on a government loan-
Jewish votes may decide the next election in the key States, so you
indulge your demagogic talents on Zionism. The Russians threaten
to get cross, so you reject your own man and take Lie as Secretary
General of the United Nations. Chiang Kai-shek is not as demo-
cratic as he might be, so you tell him he must take communists into
his government. The communists want to kill all their political
opponents, so you obligingly turn over to them all who they claim
are "Soviet citizens" and all whom they accuse — accuse only — of
"anti-Soviet acts." Franco is a bad man, so one day you condemn
him in terms that ought to mean immediate war, and the next you
prevent any serious action being taken against him. One day you
think Japan should be rebuilt as a buffer against Soviet expansion,
and the next that Japan should never again have a soldier or a sailor
or an acre of heavy industry. You won't recognize a friendly French
government because it was never officially elected; but you will
recognize a government installed by Red Army bayonets because
it is a "democratic coalition" — that is, it contains, besides avowed
communists, disguised communists or communist-captives using the
labels of three or four parties. You won't ask the Spanish govern-
THE BREAK WITH THE PAST 153
ment to join the United Nations because it is undemocratic; and
you hand over half the world to the most undemocratic government
that has ever existed.
It all adds up to approximately nothing at all. Without a policy,
the most p'erfectlydesigne^d and functioning apparatus in the world
is as useless as tubes, canvas, easel and brushes without an artist. To
have a foreign policy would mean for the nation to know what it
wants in the world, where it intends to go. Without a policy, the
desks and bureaus and divisions and specialists and consuls and
diplomats are like the limbs and joints of a puppet, pulled and
twisted by a thousand unrelated and conflicting strings. A policy is a
central nervous system, and living blood, pumped from a living
heart through every artery and vein, integrating into a vital whole
a purposive organism.
From the point of view of a genuine foreign policy, you cannot
isolate each separate problem, and treat it on its own merits, because
you understand that the merits of each problem can be judged only
in their relation to the whole. Without policy, separate decisions are
at cross purposes and get nowhere, or perhaps lead insensibly in a
direction opposite to our desires. Informed and organized by a
coherent policy, each decision counts, and moves a step forward in
a general advance.
In former times diere was no world polity. That is, active polit-
ical relationships for most or even all nations did not entangle them
with all the world, but only with their neighbors or special regions
where they had special interests. Today every considerable nation
is in continuous political relationship with every other nation and
region; every political event of any significance has its effects spread
everywhere. Foreign policy today, therefore, cannot be divided into
"policy toward Portugal," "policy toward Peru," "policy toward
Italy." There must be as a directing conception a world policy. What
is the aim and the objective, not in relation to this or that problem
or this or that individual nation, but in and for the world as whole ?
This is the first and last quesdon that foreign policy today must
answer.
We should further note that a foreign policy does not mean some
special jewel locked in a top-secret box of the State Department. The
154 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
State Department, plainly, has the principal direct concern with
foreign policy. But an adequate foreign policy must be the policy
of the entire government, of all its agencies, and for that matter of
the entire nation. There must be one and the same policy directing
all relevant activities of the Departments of War and the Navy and
Agriculture and Commerce, of the Treasury and the Export-Import
Bank and the Civil Aeronautics Board and the other great agencies
and bureaus. In addition, the people, especially the organized groups
of citizens, must be won to an understanding and acceptance of the
policy. If not, then there is only the mixed discord of dozens of
sub-poHcies whose sum is no-policy.
Moreover, since today foreign policy takes precedence over in-
ternal policy, since the world political problem is the key to the
situation, is what decides, it follows that it is impossible to have a
coherent and effective internal policy without having a coherent and
effective foreign policy. All major domestic questions — synthetic rub-
ber or labor or inflation "of anti-Semitism or civil Hberties or food
production — are today dependent upon world political questions!
To have a domestic policy we must have a foreign policy. To
have any poUcy, we must begin by knowing what a policy is.
A foreign policy, and an altogether correct policy, would still be
of no use if it were not properly implemented. To put policy into
practice, there must be men, with sufficient means.
It is not my intention to discuss the deficiencies, in personnel,
training and facilities, of what might be called — since it includes
more than the State Department — the "political department" of the
government. These are due in part to historical and social charac-
teristics of the country as a whole. We have not developed a large
class of persons trained in the required fields of knowledge and
skills, from which class the government might draw. Nor does Con-
gress, public opinion, or the State Department itself yet realize that
the world political tasks, in intelligence, information, propaganda,
negotiation, scientific research, and the rest, make ridiculously small
the resources in men, money and physical facilities now devoted to
THE BREAK WITH THE PAST 155
them. It is true that better could be done with what is at hand. It
is not necessary to accept the abundant self-confidence o£ a Wis-
consin lawyer or even the experience o£ a reasonably successful
military administrator as perfect qualifications for dealing with the
shrewdest politicians in history.
I wish, again, merely to note the fact that the carrying out of any
given foreign policy demands certain correlated measures in con-
nection with the armed forces and industry. Granted the policy, the
determination of just what these measures should be is a technical
problem. Difficult as it is in this country to get such measures put
into effect, no special political question is involved.
I should, however, like to direct particular attention to one factor
in the implementation of policy which itself has a reciprocal influ-
ence on the nature of the policy.
A policy has to be administered and put into effect by human
beings. In order that the policy should be in practice the operating
principle of the government, the human beings who administer it
must act in accordance with it. They must be, that is, loyal to the
policy.
To guarantee such loyalty, reliance cannot be put upon mere
verbal^ pledges, or even upon honest intentions. Human beings too
easily deceive themselves. If the whole pattern of a man's life and
thiiiking runs counter to the policy, he cannot, objectively, be relied
on to implement it effectively.
Let me illustrate. If United States foreign policy included the
perspective of achieving union with Great Britain, it would not be
well advised to appoint Colonel Robert McCormick as Ambassador
to the Court of St. James's; nor would Senator Bilbo be the best
choice as Minister to Liberia. If these examples seem absurd, they
are no more so than the frequent practice of recent years. There was
no reason to expect objective information on the situation in Yugo-
slavia when Communist Party members were planted along the
chain of intelligence, and sat in an office which funneled secret news.
Henry Wallace does not seem the most adequate of reporters on
Soviet Siberia. Can Owen Lattimore, whose writings have in recent
years proved his adherence to views on China that are often hardly
distinguishable from those of the communists, be a suitable instru-
156 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
ment for a policy of supporting Chiang? Is there any point in set-
ting up a Russian desk in an inteUigence unit, or a magazine to
present the American point of view in Moscow, and then running
them under the influence of communist fellow-travelers ? What kind
of propaganda will an O.W.L put out, what kind of information
on European undergrounds will an O.S.S. receive, when key spots
throughout their organization are accessible to Communist Party
members, fellow-travelers, sympathizers, and dupes? Why should
Negrin, leader of a Spanish faction controlled by the communists,
be received at the State Department, but the leaders of the Spanish
anti-communist refugee parties and organizations be refused admit-
tance? Lombard© Toledano, spearheading communist penetration
of Latin America, has for years been courted and aided by officials
of the United States government, as part, presumably, of the policy
of Continental solidarity. In Germany, the selection of men for both
civilian and military jobs of the occupation has often disregarded
prior and deep-seated ideological commitments, so that the policies,
confused enough to begin with, have repeatedly been reversed in
practice.
The point here is so obvious, that the question cannot help aris-
ing: why does this happen? We accept the principle that our very
postmasters — whose technically important function is after all not
very crucial for the political destiny of the nation — should be not
merely undividedly American in outlook but members of the Party
in power. Yet we so often entrust the implementation of our for-
eign policy, upon which our fate and that of the world directly
depend, to those who, if they do not deliberately sabotage, are
hindered by ingrained mental habit from properly carrying out the
poUcy.
The explanation is, I think, threefold. This happens, in the first
place, as a result of ignorance. The appointing officials do not know,
and do not take pains to discover, the habitual commitments of their
subordinates. This can, of course, occur in connection with any
policy at any time. There is a more profound ignorance, however,
that affects operations in the present period. The appointing officials
do not understand what it means for a person to have, or to be
strongly influenced by, a totalitarian ideology. Their own political
THE BREAK WITH THE PAST 157
ideas occupy a special compartment of their minds. They are con-
vinced, patriotic Americans, and are ready to change their ideas if
they feel the national interest requires change. They assume that
other citizens, in spite of differences in detail, think and believe and
feel pretty much as they do. They know that they themselves will loy-
ally carry out the policy decided upon, even if they do not altogether
agree with it. And they suppose that other citizens will behave as
they do. They cannot comprehend that a totalitarian ideology is a
Weltanschauung — a world view and a life view, affecting the inner
core of one's intellectual and moral being. It cannot be tossed in the
basket, as one discards a soiled shirt. It is the fixed lens through
which the believer sees the world, the lever by which he hopes to
change it. As long as he remains even partially under the ideological
spell, the beUever will necessarily, even in spite of his own subjective
wish, act in accordance with the dictates of the ideology, and will
press into its frame any policy whatsoever.
Second, the communists and their friends are wonderfully skill-
ful. Under the cover of their myriad disguises, they can edge through
even the best guarded gates. They can hide quietly, like a dormant
germ in the unnoticed marrow, and the organic repercussions of
their activities can spread so far before discovery that a cure is
neither quick nor easy.
A third cause of this tendency to defeat policy by putting its exe-
cution into the hands of men who cannot be counted on is, perhaps,
a confusion about the application of democratic procedures. Many
Americans, including many of our political leaders, feel that a clear,
firm policy is anti-democratic because, if it is clear and firm, there
will always be persons who sharply disagree with it. They feel that
it is dictatorial to dismiss a man from a post because of a disagree-
ment over policy — though they will not hesitate to appoint or dis-
miss if the result can be counted in votes. It is true, of course, that
a democratic nation must permit, in the nation as a whole, the ex-
pression of opposition policy, and must, periodically, ascertain the
will of the people with respect to leadership and policy. It does not
in the least follow that there is any democratic rule against the
vigorous execution of what is, for the time being, the national policy.
If an opposition doesn't like it, and has a different policy, that is
158 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
just the bad luck of being an opposition. It will have to wait its
turn to take over.
An ordinary business corporation would certainly not permit
officers, salesmen and supervisory employees to decide, each man for
himself, whether he will carry out the general plan of operations
that the corporation has adopted. Anyone who failed to do so would
be fired. If there were reason to think, on the basis of past experi-
ence, that someone was incapable of going along with a new plan,
he would be fired in advance. No one, not even the victims, would
find that surprising.
It is not a question of being democratic, but of being effective. If
democracy cannot be made reasonably effective, it might as well
quit now.
Of course, however, it is the content of the policy that most of all
matters. In content also, the first condition for a United States
foreign policy that could work is a sharp break with the past.
During the middle of the '30's, first publicly indicated by Roose-
velt's Chicago speech in October, 1937, the policy of the government,
iso far a"S it had any policy at all, came to be based upon the follow-
ing central ideas: Nazi Germany was the main danger to the na-
tional interest and to the kind of world political organization that
the United States wanted. Japan, though secondary in the world as
a whole, was the main threat to the preferred organization of the
Pacific. Therefore Germany and Japan had to be stopped.
I do not propose to examine these ideas of a decade ago. I believe
that, though they were not altogether false, they were understood
in so vague and confused a manner that they became disorienting.
In any case, the United States acted in accordance with them. The
result should apparently have been the occasion for one hundred
percent rejoicing. Not only was the immediate danger removed.
Germany and Japan have been so crushed that neither can ever
again, in all probability, play a major independent role in world
politics. The foreign policy adopted in the '30's has, thus, triumph-
antly succeeded.
It is unnecessary to stress how bitter is the flavor of this success.
THE BREAK WITH THE PAST 159
World communism is today in an immensely stronger position than
Germany or Japan ever was, and is a far more direct and powerful
threat to the interests of the United States. The world political situa-
tion as a whole is immeasura^ply worse than that of a decade ago.
Something plainly went wrong.
Insofar as deliberate policy had anything to do with this unhappy
consequence, it is obvious enough what went wrong. The mistake
lay primarily in a completely false estimate of communism and
therefore also of the communist dominated Soviet Union.
It was thought that communism's revolutionary ideology had de-
generated into a pious verbal racket used to help Russia's new rulers
stay in power. It was believed that the Soviet Union could be not
merely a helpful but a loyal ally in the war, that it would be grate-
ful for assistance received, and that it would honor its pledges-
Viewed through the spectacles of this false estimate, Russia was
found to be growing more democratic and more normal. She was
going "to resume her rightful place in the family of nations." With
Germany and Japan out of the way, the world could be reorganized
for lasting peace and prosperity under the harmonious joint leader-
ship of the United States and the Soviet Union, with Great Britain
a junior stockholder, France and China granted prestige posts on
the Board of Directors, and the little nations given a forum where
they could harmlessly blow off steam.
As the blots on this pretty blueprint began to spread, the policy
did not alter. The Russians were "suspicious," sometimes a bit rude,
and not always duly appreciative of the favors with which they were
showered. It became fashionable to say that the main problem of
postwar world politics was "how to get along with Russia." As soon
as the United States and the Soviet Union learned how to get along
together, and they certainly would do so soon, one way or another,
then everything would be solved. If we gave enough proofs of our
own good intentions, the Soviet leaders' suspicions would evaporate,
and the troubles would be over.
In the Spring of 1946, United States policy seemed to many to
have somewhat shifted. Undiluted appeasement was mixed with a
dash of what many believed to be, and called, "getting tough with
Russia." This shift, however, is of trivial importance. Primarily it is
i6o THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
a shift in political rhetoric, not in political reality. No law of foreign
policy is better founded than this: that there is no use talking tough
unless you are ready to act tough. Nobody is fooled. For that matter,
there is no use talking tough in any case. So far, the tough talk does
not seem to have proved much of a hindrance to the communist
plans. Even if a little real toughness w^ere added, this would still not
mark any change in the fundamental estimate and perspective. It
would be merely a minor change in tactics, after discouragement
with the results of the tactic of total appeasement.
What is wrong is not this or that tactic, but the basic idea. This
idea is that, by some means or combination of means, you must and
will solve the problems of world politics by "getting along with
Russia," and this is interpreted to mean getting along not with the
Russian people — who could be friendly enough — but with the com-
munist regime which now dominates Russia. But the truth, which
we have analyzed with some care in Part I, is that yoti "can get along
with communism in only one way: by capitulating to it.
< go to Contents>
14. - The Supreme Object of United States Policy: Defensive
WE SEEK, THEN, to formulate a policy which the United States
could follow, and which would be adequate to the demands of the
present world political crisis. Though it might be phrased in a
variety of ways, there is only one such policy. I shall restrict the
present chapter to a statement of the negative or defensive phase of
the policy, and reserve the positive or offensive phase for the next
chapter. This separation is somewhat arbitrary. Defensive and offen-
sive measures are, after all, only differing tactical applications of a
single general strategy. However, the distinction is useful for analy-
sis and exposition.
The nature of a defensive policy is not an independent problem.
A proper defense is derivative from the policy of the opponent, and
is designed to block the fulfillment of that policy. If, therefore, we
have discovered the opponent's policy, we have thereby indirectly
learned also the objective of defense. Carrying out the defense may
be difficult in practice, or even impossible, but we will at least have
the great advantage of knowing what we are trying to do. If our
vegetables are under attack from woodchucks, a fence around the
garden will be a suitable protection. If the attack is from insects or
birds, however, the fence will be irrelevant.
For the United States, we know that the opponent is world com-
munism. We know that the ultimate communist aim is a communist
World Empire. Therefore, the general defensive goal of United
States policy must be to prevent the fulfillment of that aim. In
Chapter 7, we saw that this communist policy, in this present period
which they interpret as the period of preparation for the open stage
of the Third World War, reduces to two specific tasks: consolida-
tion of effective domination of Eurasia, and the infiltration and
161
i62 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
weakening of all countries which cannot be brought under com-
munist control.
The specific defensive goals of United States foreign policy in the
same period can, therefore, only be : to block communist domination
of Eurasia, and to combat the infiltration.
The communist drive out of the Heartland toward Eurasian domi-
nance proceeds, by v/ay of the natural exits, in three general direc-
tions. It plunges Westward into the European peninsula, across the
plains of Poland and Eastern Germany, with flanking movements
on the North via Scandinavia, and to the Southwest through the
Hungarian gap and up the Danube valley. It presses South, down
by way of the Iranian plateau. Southwest toward the Dardanelles,
the Aegean and the Adriatic, Southeast into Afghanistan — waiting
for disintegration of the Indian political situation for bigger moves
toward India. Eastward, it marches on the Northern flanks of the
Eastern Coastland of Eurasia, through the exits into Manchuria,
Sinkiang and Mongolia, with all of China below.
The Coastlands of the Eurasian World Island (to continue with
Mackinder's phraseology), though gravely threatened through the
breaches already opened, are not yet in communist hands. The first
part of the Eurasian defensive task is then to secure ahd hold these
Coastlands. United States policy must aim to prevent the European
peninsula, Greece, the Middle East, China, India from being incor-
porated within the communist Eurasian fortress, and must recognize
Japan as an American outpost off the shores of the World Island.
Communist control, though powerful, is not yet totally established
in most areas outside of the 1940 Soviet boundaries. Defensive policy,
here merging with offensive, must therefore strive to undermine
communist power in East Europe, northern Iran, Afghanistan, Man-
churia, northern Korea and China. The further, and implicitly offen-
sive object of the defensive policy would thus be to reverse the
direction of the thrust from the Heartland, turning the expansive
advance into a demoralizing retreat.
I shall, in this chapter, make only occasional reference to the sec-
ond defensive task of combating communist infiltration in those
parts of the world neither dominated nor immediately threatened
at the present time by outright communist control. What this second
OBJECT OF U. S. POLICY: DEFENSIVE 163
task means, and the ways in which it could be accomplished if it
were taken seriously, are for that matter fairly obvious. It may be
added that one of the most fruitful of these ways of lessening com-
munist influence everywhere in the world — including very promi-
nently Russia itself — would be by a notable success in the first (Eura-
sian) defensive task. Communism in disorderly retreat in Eurasia
would prove much less appealing than communism in bold advance.
Two comments might be made on the defensive policy which has
just been summarized.
In the first place, the policy might seem so obvious that it should
be taken for granted without even the bother of stating it. Now I
confess that, judged in terms of the interests of the United States
and of a workable solution for the world political crisis, it does seem
to me almost too obvious to need discussion. Nevertheless, the evi-
dence proves that during recent years and at present it has not been
and is not United States policy.
During many of these years United States policy has been exactly
the opposite: it has not hindered but furthered communist expan-
sion on Eurasia; it has not combated but aided communist infiltra-
tion all over the world, beginning with the United States itself.
Furthermore, though this defensive task has occasionally or in the
minds of some leaders been part of United States policy, it has never
been accepted as the defensive phase of the supreme policy objective.
This latter qualification is essential. Where the policy has been ac-
cepted at all, it has always been as only one job among others of
approximately equal rank. Along with it there goes the need, it is
figured, of beating out England in the race for markets, of prevent-
ing a third resurgence of Germany or a second of Japan, of captur-
ing the bulk of the world merchant marine and air business, of
overthrowing Franco, of indulging one's emotions about India or
the East Indies, and so on. Success in the great defensive task, how-
ever, would require that all such other matters be considered sec-
ondary, that what is done about them be subordinated to the
interests of the chief aim. The main present danger is not England
or Franco or German resurgence; these are not even remote dangers.
164 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
The main goal is not a few extra millions of profit in oil or trans-
port. These today are trivialities, and should be so treated.
Moreover, we must keep in mind that the whole isolationist tra-
dition, still very influential, denies that the United States should
have any Eurasian policy at all. The isolationists have branched out
a bit, and are willing to include all of the Americas and much of
the Pacific in the home garden. But, they tell us, not a step outside.
For honest American farmers, there is nothing but trouble ahead in
those barbarian Eurasian jungles. What does it matter, anyway, who
runs things over there ? Let them go to the devil their own way.
So, apparently, the policy is not obvious.
A second and more gloomy comment would be made by many
who would grant the desirability of such a defensive policy, but who
would argue that it is already too late. There is nothing that the
United States can do about the communist strategy. If it fails, it will
be by a miracle, a stroke of luck.
I shall amplify the meaning of the defensive policy and evaluate
these comments by examining a few selected but typical errors of
the recent past, and certain possibilities of the near future.
In Yugoslavia, the United States, along with England, had a
choice between Mikhailovitch and Tito. As political choices go, this
one was unusually free. They chose Tito.
It is hard to imagine a more utter political mistake than this choice
of Tito. Mikhailovitch was a well-known Yugoslavian patriot, sup-
ported by the overwhelming majority of the population. Tito was a
communist agent from the outside, who had collaborated with the
Nazis during the period of the German-Soviet Pact, and who had,
when the Soviet war began, only a handful of followers, most of
them Communist Party members. Mikhailovitch, with support and
direction, could be relied on to fight the Nazis (as he did even with-
out support and direction), and, equally, to resist communist domi-
nation of his country and the rest of the Balkans. Naturally the
Soviet Union pressed hard for Tito. But at the time the choice was
made, there was not the slightest need for a concession. The Red
OBJECT OF U. S. POLICY: DEFENSIVE 165
Army was fighting for its life thousands of miles away. Russia could
not have quit the war then, over the issue of Tito.
But Tito was chosen and Mikhailovitch was abandoned, betrayed
and permitted to be degraded and shot through the mechanism of
a standard communist show trial.
The choice of Tito was equivalent to handing over the Balkans to
the communists. The Balkans might have been lost anyway — and
they may still some day be regained — ^but if support had gone to
Mikhailovitch, the odds would have been far more favorable.
The political consequences of such an act, however, are much
wider than the direct losses or gains in territory. Men everywhere,
caught in the storm of the world struggle, note, and draw con-
clusions. The communists back their friends and allies, to the limit.
The United States has trouble telling friend from enemy, and can-
not be relied upon.
There is evidence that part of the cause of the choice of Tito was
direct sabotage by communists and fellow-travelers in the American
and British Balkans intelligence services. Misinformation about the
Yugoslavian situation and the nature of Tito's government was suc-
cessfully palmed oil on the Anglo-American military and political
leadership. This sabotage is even being offered by some supporters
of Churchill and Roosevelt as an excuse for the error. It is a poor
excuse, since it is an additional error of the leadership that there
were communists in the intelligence services, and a glaring error
whenever reports that have filtered through communists or their
sympathizers are believed without independent confirmation. How-
ever, the misinformation was not the chief cause. This is to be traced
to false policy, the false estimate of communism and its aims, the
false analysis of world political realities.
The Paris Conference, in the summer of 1946, proved unable to
settle the Trieste issue. It will not be settled, even if the attempt is
made to carry out a nominal compromise agreement, signed by the
representatives of the Big Four.
What is at stake in Trieste? Trieste is the great outlet to the
Mediterranean and the South from the Danube valley. Supported
i66 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
by the Dalmatian and the Albanian coasts, it controls the Adriatic,
outflanks Italy from the East, Greece from the North and West,
and potentially opens into the central Mediterranean. The commu-
nist power seeks this key point, either outright as demanded through
Tito, or more gradually and indirectly through a phony inter-
nationalization.
Could anything have been done — could anything still be done —
about Trieste ? The answer is so plain and simple that it must make
many an honest general weep. The Anglo-American armies control
Italy; their fleets control the Mediterranean; their air forces control,
or could control, the skies of Europe. All that would have been
needed would have been an Anglo-American decision that Trieste
and its surrounding zone were to remain Italian, together with an
open readiness to enforce that decision. Who would have challenged
it? Who would challenge it? In the remote chance that it would be
challenged, what challenge could be easier and cheaper to meet ?
The Trieste issue is related, of course, to the Italian problem as a
whole. The major troubles over the Italian Treaty (in which a
Trieste ruling is supposed to be included) are all of them absurd.
It is not a lack of ability that has made impossible a settlement of
the Italian question that would be in accord with American (and
also English) interests. It is a lack of policy, adherence to the false
policy of "getting along with Russia." All the months of negotia-
tions, always ending with concession to the communists of the sub-
stance of issues in return for their concession of a few empty words,
could have been avoided by a brief United States declaration that it
was ready to write and sign its own treaty with Italy regardless of
whether anyone else signed. If the Soviet Union had chosen to keep
its pen sheathed, all the better. The United States could then have
proceeded unhampered to promote the integration of a non-commu-
nist Italy into the still non-communist half of Europe.
Roosevelt and other United States negotiators, through secret
agreements not yet fully disclosed, ceded to the communists in the
Far East the Kuriles, southern Sakhalin, control over the very im-
portant warm water ports of Dairen and Port Arthur, the occupa-
OBJECT OF U. S. POLICY: DEFENSIVE 167
tion of Manchuria and the fuller occupation of northern Korea.
What gave them the right to make these cessions is not entirely
clear. Perhaps they reasoned it was the Atlantic Charter. That, how-
ever, is, from the point of view of politics, a lesser question than:
why did they make the cessions? and what results from them?
We are told that they were made as part of the price for getting
the Soviet Union to promise to come into the Japanese War after
the end of fighting in Europe. The promise, as we know, was kept.
The additional question arises: why did they want the Soviet Union
to come into the Japanese war?
By the time these agreements were entered into, it must have been
clear to the United States General Staff that the war with Japan
could be won without any help from the Soviet Union, which, after
the Soviet losses in the West, was not going to amount to much in
any case. It was clear by then to most of the Japanese leadership.
The objective of United States policy should have been to keep the
communists out of that war, not to ask them in. Once again, the
United States was actively furthering the advance of the communist
power out of the Heartland toward Eurasian domination. With
these new Eastern positions, added to what it already had and what
it is strengthening with their help, communism flanks China, the
American outpost of Japan, and for that matter America itself. This
was indeed a remarkable piece of political bargaining, to pay some-
one a stiff price to hit you a stiff blow.
In reality, Roosevelt was led to this deal not by objective military
considerations, but by his policy. It was part of the process of col-
laborating with Russia — politically, not merely militarily, which lat-
ter was dictated by the immediate facts of war — and of easing her
re-entry into the family of nations. Having all been through the
same wars together, it will be that much easier to have peace to-
gether. China is a country with a great future, so we want our friend
Russia to co-operate with us and the Chinese themselves in develop-
ing it.
* * *
It is known that the United States and Great Britain considered
at length and with "care the advisability of directing the major in-
l68 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
vasion of Europe through the Balkans. It would be rash for a lay-
man to pass judgment on the strictly military merits of that plan
compared with those plans that were actually adopted. Nevertheless,
it is reported, and nowhere denied, that many leading officers both
of the British and American commands favored, or were ready to
accept, the strategy of a Balkan invasion. If we take into account the
preparation for European invasion by the grinding of the German
army in the East, the bombing of the Continent, and the overwhelm-
ing weight of the invasion forces that were assembled, there seems
good reason to believe that the Balkan invasion would have been
successful, though it is impossible to be sure whether it would have
been more or less expensive.
It is understood that the final decision against the Balkan plan
was made by Roosevelt, as the United States political leader. All the
evidence thus indicates that the primary motivation for the decision
was once again not mihtary but political. The pattern is the same
that appears so often. The Soviet Union did not want Anglo-
American armies in the Balkans, because she had her own plans for
the Balkans. She brought her pressure to bear, not only in the secret
meetings, but through the world-wide propaganda drive for a "sec-
ond front," by which, she made clear, she meant only a new front
in France. Acting in consistent accord with the policy of getting
along with Russia, of building a new world through Soviet-
American friendship, the United States made the same political
choice that she had made when she abandoned Mikhailovitch for
Tito. The communist expansion into Europe was not merely per-
mitted, not resisted, but it was actively promoted by United States
policy.
Even without a major Balkan invasion, there is reason to believe
that the Red Army could have been kept out. The German Balkan
armies were, apparently, ready to surrender before they did, on the
condition that the surrender would be to the Anglo-American, not
the communist forces. Eighty milHon human beings, and the inter-
ests of the world, were — with perfect consistency — tossed into the
hungry mouth of the false policy.
Let it be reflected that, if Anglo-American armies had taken over
the Balkans, the iron curtain would now be drawn along the East,
OBJECT OF U. S. POLICY: DEFENSIVE 169
not along the West, of the Danube valley. The diflerence to the
map is not unimpressive.
If it is argued that the errors so far cited belong to the past and
that what's done cannot be undone — an incorrect argument, since
none of these four situations can yet be marked as finished business
— let us turn to a brief examination of two crucial problems which
are still far from crystallized.
The recognized government of China is the Kuomintang regime,
headed by Chiang Kai-shek. China is not, however, a unified nation.
In particular, the authority of the Kuomintang regime is challenged
by a communist regime (the so-called Yenan government), which
asserts authority over considerable territory and population in north-
ern, northwest, and parts of central China. This communist regime
functions as an independent government, with its own armies,
police, concentration camps, taxes, and officials. It has for many years
waged civil war against the recognized government. It is, of course,
the Chinese branch of the world communist power.
The policy of the United States has been to try to force a unifica-
tion of China by getting a "democratic coalition government" which
would include both the Kuomintang and the Communists, as well
as certain lesser groups. Applying this policy, the United States has
compelled Chiang to sign various treaties, agreements, and promises
envisaging such a governmental coalition.
The motivation for this policy is threefold. In part it follows from
certain abstract ideas about "democracy." Chiang Kai-shek's govern-
ment is not, as communists and their spokesmen declare, totalitarian :
China is insufficiently organized to have totalitarianism. But it is
also not democratic, and is, besides, ridden with even more graft
and corruption than is customary in governments. Equality of po-
litical opportunities for all parties, instead of a virtual Kuomintang
monopoly (or, as is often forgotten, a communist totalitarian monop-
oly where the communists are in control), and an all-party gov-
ernment, which means in practice a Kuomintang-Communist
government, therefore seem to doctrinaires the road to democracy
in China.
170 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
A few Americans, fancying themselves shrewd manipulators, ap-
proach the question differently. They imagine that the United States
can play the Kuomintang and the communists off against each other,
and can thereby harvest richer Chinese pickings.
The primary motivation, however, is as usual the more funda-
mental general policy of getting along with Russia, which, also as
usual, means in the minds of the American leaders, getting along
with communism. A Kuomintang-Communist coalition is the kind
of Chinese regime that most exactly corresponds with the whole
picture of a world running happily along through the friendly com-
bination of the United States and the Soviet Union.
In the case of China, life is proving quickly and openly enough
the absurdity of the United States policy. There can never be a genu-
ine coalition between the Kuomintang and the communists. The
objective of the communists is not to make China a unified demo-
cratic nation, but to turn it into a communist totalitarian province.
They would, under circumstances to their liking, be glad to enter a
nominally coalition government, as they enter into any united front:
in order the better to destroy, from within, their political opponents.
Meanwhile, they will never relinquish voluntarily the positions of
real power — of control over people and money and territory and
arms — that they have already won. They feel a good deal of confi-
dence, with their rear in the West and North firmly under com-
munist rule, and their world propaganda so brilliantly successful.
United States representatives and commentators lament over civil
war in China, and scold both Chinese houses. They do not realize
that it is their policy which has not merely promoted Chinese civil
war, but prolongs and deepens it. It does so because United States
policy prevents the basic issue from being settled. So long as it is
not settled there can never be, in China, better than a short, uneasy
truce.
It is quite false to believe that, in politics, all issues can be com-
promised. Many can; and, if they can, as a rule they no doubt should
be. But basic issues, above all the basic issue of sovereignty — of who
shall be master in the house — cannot be compromised. They must
be settled. That means that on basic issues one side must win and
the other must lose. Compromise in such cases can do no more than
OBJECT OF U. S. POLICY: DEFENSIVE 171
postpone the showdown, with the usual result of an increase in the
cost of final settlement. The issue in China is of this kind.
From an adequate world policy, it would have been easy for the
United States to deduce a workable application in China. With the
end of the Japanese war, the problem was to block communist domi-
nation of China, which is the Eastern Coastland of Eurasia. The
communists had taken advantage of the long Sino-Japanese war to
set up an insurgent government, and to gain substantial power. It
was necessary, therefore, to aid Chiang in extending the sovereignty
of the Central Government over all of China, which could be done
only by destroying the sovereignty of the rebel government and
liquidating its attributes of independent power — armies, police, po-
litical administration, finance system. This meant, for the United
States, all material aid necessary to Chiang, and nothing whatsoever
for the communists. With the tremendous weight of United States
power in the Far East, a firm, open policy of this sort would, it
seems probable, have settled the basic issue within a very short time
and at a minimum cost.
At the same time, this was, and is, the only road toward what
democracy is possible in China. China will never become democratic
by giving the communists a part in her life. They want a little
democracy now only to be in a position, when their time comes, to
destroy all Chinese democracy forever. Support of Chiang, as against
the communists, does not involve support of Chiang in all things
and against everybody. Quite the contrary. Such measures as are
here outlined would put the United States in the best possible posi-
tion to force reforms on the Kuomintang, to get freedom for non-
totalitarian political parties and movements, and at the same time
to guarantee an orientation of Chinese foreign policy favorable to
United States world policy.
The original United States policy was one more example where
the United States, far from hindering the communist drive out of
the Heartland base, used its influence, against its own potential
friends, to help that drive penetrate into new territories. Months of
weary failure have gradually brought half-hearted, confused re-
visions in the original policy, but clarity is still not in sight.
172 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
In the early Spring of 1945, the United States army on the conti-
nent of Europe, with EngHsh, Canadian and French armies as in
eflect auxiharies, was the most powerful functioning armed force
that had ever operated in history. Its forward sweep was irresistible.
From a military point of view, it was then in a position to occupy
all of Austria, some of Yugoslavia, much of Czechoslovakia and of
Eastern Germany, and in particular Berlin, in advance of the Red
Army. It did not do so. The army was held back. In several sections
it was withdrawn from the forward positions it had reached.
Everyone knows that this reticence was "required" by the agree-
ment that had been entered into with Moscow. It is a poor excuse,
showing how drastically wrong that agreement was. But the agree-
ment in any case should not have been honored. It was part of more
general agreements which had already been violated a dozen times
by the communist party to them. Therefore, even if it is considered
proper to treat these agreements juridically, they should have been
judged null and void.
The communists were given Eastern Germany, the main German
agricultural areas, the largest share of Berlin, and the very important
symbolic triumph of the first entry into Berlin. From their German
base, with Berlin as its apex, they now proceed with their plan for
establishing control over all of Germany. How much more diffi-
cult their present task would be if an American army had taken
over Berlin, later admitting at most a token communist force, and
if the American divisions had established and held their lines at the
eastern limit of feasible advance!
Having thus freely donated to the communists the most advan-
tageous position they could have hoped for, the United States has
ever since continued to make smooth the communist path in Ger-
many. Western Germany is stripped of factories, machines, and
tools for the benefit of the communist zone, but no food comes from
there westward. Democratic parties in the East are suppressed or
absorbed by the communists, but communists are permitted to func-
tion freely in the West. Communist literature circulates in the West,
but no democratic literature in the East. Anyone in the West of
any nationality — Russian or Baltic or German or Pole — whom the
communists do not like is obligingly shipped off East for death or
OBJECT OF U. S. POLICY: DEFENSIVE 173
concentration camp, while in the East the "Free German" divisions
and the communist led Poles and Baits are trained for their place in
the war against the West. Under the lingering, politically insane
influence of the ideas of the Morgenthau Plan, no future hope or
perspective is given by the United States to the German people,
while from the East the Germans are offered the illusory but entic-
ing prospect of a unified Vol\ admitted as a partner in the Soviet
Empire.
In Germany as elsewhere, experience is gradually forcing a partial
revision of the earlier policy, but a revision so slow and confused and
half-hearted that it has small chance of success. Even France, under
the pressure of her huge communist Fifth Column, is permitted to
sabotage a reorientation. France, freed from internal communists,
could be a great friend and bulwark of the United States and
Western Civilization in the struggle for the world. But a friend, too,
must be corrected. The United States, supported by England, is
easily able to compel France to fall into line, on the German ques-
tion. The United States, by bold and firm action, would not weaken
but solidify relations with France.
Ideas of vengeance have no place in intelligent politics. Intelligent
politics must learn from the past, but point always toward the fu-
ture. The German people must be given a chance to Hve again, as
honored members of a European order that is part of a workable
world political system. This chance must be made to appear better to
them if they accept United States rather than communist leadership.
American liberals are attacked by paralysis of the conscience when
they are told that there is now a race between the Soviet Union and
the United States for the enlistment of the Germans as auxiliaries
in the Third World War. There is much truth in this view of the
German problem, though it is not the whole truth. Even if it were,
where is the occasion for feelings of guilt? Will it make liberal con-
sciences easier if the Germans turn up in the communist camp ?
As I write, the communist pressure on Turkey, with intervals of
deceptive relaxation,- gradually mounts. From Russia and from the
174 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
Balkans it points at the Dardanelles. The call has gone out long
since for Kars and Ardahan and other Turkish land to the east. A
faked-up campaign for a new Armenian republic, carved mostly out
of Turkey, is growing on a world scale. Agents, trained within the
Soviet Union, are swarming into Turkey. Soviet professors and
journalists are working overtime to prove that Turks are the root
of all evil.
Could anything be done? A correct policy would have litde diffi-
culty providing answers more compelling than legalistic notes about
the Montreux Convention. It might discover an appropriate mo-
ment, for example, for Turkey to purchase from the United States,
on easy credit, five hundred or a thousand first-class airplanes,
completely equipped. Several thousand young United States officers
might well go with the planes, to give instruction in their use to
Turkish soldiers. The Turkish government might be induced to
invite lengthy maneuvers of United States warships in the vicinity
of the Straits. Perhaps a volunteer squadron of American aviators
might wish training experience in the Near East; and might arrive
with planes and equipment; perhaps, even, with planes fitted for
atomic bombs and with a range at least as far as the Caucasus oil
fields. The bargaining for prices on Turkish export products might
be very generously conducted.
But if Turkey feels from one side, and from within, the hot
reality of communist power, and from the other only the faint
moralistic breath of diplomatic speeches, who can doubt what will
happen? With her resistance sapped, she will be sucked into the
communist system of concentric circles. She will begin the fatal
journey from orienting influence through domination to absorption.
Iran, defended by the West only in irrelevant speeches on points
of procedure at the Security Council, is already within the outer
circle of orienting influence, its northern province indeed already a
puppet state. The Tudeh, front for the Iranian communists, has
penetrated the government. Only a still stronger counter-pole will
negate the attraction of the magnetic core of the concentric circles.
Greece is in the same position as Turkey, under the same com-
munist pressures and the same lack of sufficient counter-pressure.
Meanwhile United States public opinion is more disturbed over the
OBJECT OF U. S. POLICY: DEFENSIVE 175
minor problem o£ the Greek monarchy than over the communist
drive for Macedonia, which is the immediate Greek expression of
the main v^^orld problem.
For Spain, perplexed by marvelously co-ordinated communist
propaganda, the United States now does its share in the move to
replace the trivial, powerless clerical-fascist. Franco, with a totaU-
tarian communist regime planted well out in the Atlantic, and
threatening non-communist Europe from the rear.
Toward India, with the communists poised for full descent into
the chaos that would result from an abrupt move for full and imme-
diate independence, the United States washes its hands, and sits
back listening piously to denunciations of British imperialism.
The communists have begun major operations to subordinate the
economies of the non-communist small nations of Europe to the
Soviet economy. This is designed as a first stage in the process of
dragging these nations within the concentric rings. A Soviet-Swiss
company is formed, for example, to distribute Rumanian oil, with a
potential monopoly of the Swiss market. The oil itself is the legal
property of British and American corporations, but under commu-
nist control, and used for communist ends. Could anything be
done? Switzerland, too, is a potential friend; but in politics the small
man must try to be the friend of the stronger. The strong must
make plain in action their claim to strength. Perhaps, for the mo-
ment, the Rumanian oil fields and refineries are inaccessible. Switz-
erland, and the route to Switzerland, are not. The Anglo-American
armies lie across that route, in Austria and Bavaria. Why should
Switzerland be allowed to succumb to this maneuver engineered by
the communists and certain of her own profiteers? Juridically, the
United States and England can void the contracts, since the oil is
British and American. Physically, they can simply block delivery.
Sweden finds it necessary to yield to the communists, and to
make contracts with the Soviet Union that will tend to throw
Swedish economy into dependence on Soviet economy. She yields
because she feels the communist pressure to be too great. Why
should there not be a more than counter-balancing pressure from
the West, a pressure which would make clear to Sweden both the
positive advantages she would gain from choosing the West, the
176 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
concessions that would be granted, but equally the danger, the very
great danger, she runs if in the end she turns up on the wrong side.
So too with Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and, very notably, with
France. We may sympathize deeply with France at the same time
that we believe she should not be permitted much longer the coy
balancing o£ her present tight-rope course. A firm pull from the
West must be hastened, or she will before long topple to the East.
We are told by the anxious hberals in their sermons on relief that
"you must not play politics with human lives," and by profit-blinded
conservatives that "politics should not interfere with business." Un-
fortunately for the liberals, human lives are just what politics always
plays with; and to the confusion of the conservatives, politics and
business are now part of an identical enterprise. Listening to them,
the United States turns over millions of tons of food for distribution
by communists, not to those who most need it, but as bribes and
rewards for those who accept the communist domination. The
staunchest friends of the West are the ones who do not get the
food; the food of the United States is turned into a communist
weapon. American industry makes American political friends suffer
for the sake of a minor foreign market, or hurries the construction
of turbines and machines that will supply the atomic bomb plants of
the Soviet Union. Is there any reason, in the nature of things, if
American food is to be distributed, why Arriericans should not do
the distributing, in accordance with American interests and values
instead of communist interests and values? or why, if American
machinery is to be sent to other lands, there should not be sufficient
real guarantee that it will not be used for the destruction of
America ?
This sketch of various situations from the recent past, the present,
and the near future, has been introduced in order to develop the
meaning of the supreme defensive policy formulated in the first sec-
tion of this chapter. I do not wish to insist on the specific interpre-
tation of any single incident or problem. Complete agreement on
policy does not prevent occasional disagreement on how the policy
is to be applied. Agreement assures in each application, however, a
OBJECT OF U. S. POLICY: DEFENSIVE 177
common standard o£ judgment. Because we know the goal, we have
a chance to measure, and even to predict ahead of time, whether a
given step puts us closer or pushes us further away. Enough exam-
ples have been assembled, I think, to show what it would mean to
adopt as the primary defensive policy the aim of blocking commu-
nist domination of Eurasia. These same examples serve also to
prove that this has not been the functioning policy of the United
States.
We have also been examining the question whether, granted the
political desirability of the policy, there is anything that can be done
about it, whether the policy is practically possible as well as desir-
able. We have found, in every instance, that there is something,
usually several things, that could be done. The policy is not, there-
fore, uselessly abstract, but designed for action. It is true that for
the United States to put such a policy into practice would mean the
abandonment of many ideas and habits of the past. I shall conclude
this chapter by summarizing certain rules of political outlook and
behavior which would have to be accepted if the defensive policy
were to be adopted and put into practice.
1. It would have to be recognized that peace is not and cannot be
the objective of foreign policy.
2. What tag ends still remain of the doctrine of "the equality of
nations" would have to be discarded. The United States would have
to be prepared to make an open bid for world political leadership.
3. Similarly, the doctrine of "non-intervention in the internal af-
fairs of other nations" — already little more than a verbal shell —
would have to be discarded altogether. So far as concerns matters
affecting world poKtical relations, the procedure would have to be
quick, firm, sufficient intervention, not non-intervention. The more
clearly this is everywhere understood, the more eflective will the
intervention be.
4. The United States would have to accept the need for world-
wide propaganda as an arm of policy that cannot be dispensed with
in the modern world. In our time the peoples of the world have
become the active political audience. Policy today must break
through whatever barriers are erected, and find the ear of the
178 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
masses. The meaning and goal of policy must become publicly intel-
ligible and convincing.
The United States, as against the communists, has a peculiar po-
tential advantage in mass propaganda. It would be an experiment of
unusual fascination if this advantage were utilized. The communist
propaganda, as we have seen, is and must be false on all important
points. United States propaganda could be, and v/ould benefit by
being, for the most part true, or close to the truth. What is chiefly
needed is merely to call things by their right names. It is time to
stop calling the Soviet Union one of the "peace-loving democracies,"
to stop the pretense that a communist ruled Poland or Yugoslavia
or Mongolia is "an independent state," or a communist led union an
ordinary workers' organization, or a communist journalist "a noted
liberal." It could be useful to end nonsensical arguments over "east-
ern and western definitions of 'democracy' and 'freedom of the
press' " and to explain that the real dispute is not over words but
over totalitarian slavery. The secret intelligence reports on com-
munist activities in Poland, East Germany, China, the Balkans, the
United States, would do much better published than hidden in the
archives. The past practices of the United States leaders have not a
little to do with the fact that the peoples of the world have absorbed
so much of the communist myth: the spokesmen of the United
States, from a mistaken notion of expediency and from ignorance,
have done their part in spreading the myth.
The propaganda should aim very deliberately to penetrate the
Soviet borders, to let the subjects of the communist dictatorship
know that the United States is aware of their misery and is their
ally against their tyrants. The present automatic identification of
"Russia" with the communist regime permits the regime to solidify
its hold on the Russian people and to persuade them that they must
stand together against the "bourgeois world." The people must be
allowed to know that it is not they but their oppressors whom the
world condemns, and that the world is ready to rejoice with them
when they break their chains.
5. Friends would have to be distinguished from enemies. The rule
would have to become: all aid and comfort — economic, political,
food, machines, money, arms — for friends; no support, nothing and
OBJECT OF U. S. POLICY: DEFENSIVE 179
less than nothing, for enemies. The idea that because a loan or a
tariff reduction or food or locomotives or scholarships or airplanes
have been granted to one nation they must then be allotted to all,
may be appropriate in a society of angels but will prove disastrous
in the struggle for the v^^orld. The United States should let it be un-
equivocally known that there is something to gain by being its
friend, and much for enemies to lose.
6. In particular application of Rule 5, it follows that no favors
would be granted to communists or to the friends of communists,
and that the grounds for the refusal would be openly stated : nothing
for that person or organization or country because he, or it, is com-
munist. It should be made clear to workers that a union led by
communists will not be treated like a union led by non-communists;
that anyone joining a communist front in the supposed interest of
some political or social aim of his own is thereby injuring, not fur-
thering that aim; that a nation admitting communists to its govern-
ment is by that act, in the eyes of the United States, moving not
toward democracy and friendship but toward totalitarianism and
war. For the generous welcome given by the United States to every
communist agent in the guise of journalist, engineer or diplomatic
clerk, there would be substituted the same kind of welcome that a
citizen of a democracy gets in communist territory.
7. There would have to be a practical recognition of non-collabo-
ration with the Soviet Union. The real meaning of the much
debated "Soviet veto" is not to be discovered by parliamentary study
of the provisions of the United Nations Charter or the regulations
of the Council of Foreign Ministers. What the Soviet veto means,
for the United States, is that the United States has been unwilling to
make any political move which might risk the serious disapproval of
the Soviet Union. As long as this attitude persists, the Soviet Union
has a de facto veto over United States policy. In consequence. United
States policy is subordinated to Soviet policy. Soviet policy retains
the all-important political initiative. This we have observed in the
examples cited in this chapter. The only way for the United States
to avoid the Soviet veto and to seize the initiative is to make deci-
sions independently, in the light only of the perspective of United
States policy, without reference to the possible Soviet attitude; and
l8o THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
then to carry these decisions through, whatever the Soviet Union
may say or do.
8. Finally, this policy could be put into practice only if the United
States is, and is known to be, able and ready to use force. The force
may not have to be used, or may have to be used only sparingly.
But it must be there, as the final premise, or the pohtical syllogism
is incomplete.
< go to Contents>
15.-The Supreme Object of United States Policy: Offensive < go to Contents>
DEFENSIVE STRATEGY, because it is negative, is never enough.
The defensive policy stated in the preceding chapter would be able
to halt and even reverse, for a time, the communist Eurasian ad-
vance. It would make more difficult the communists' path toward
their final goal, and would delay their arrival. Communist victory
would, however, still be the end result.
The trouble with a merely defensive policy is that, however suc-
cessfully pursued, it leaves unsolved the problems which generate
the crisis in world politics. The intolerable unbalance of world po-
litical forces would remain. There would be no framework within
which the world polity could function without continuous irritation.
The irrepressible issue between world communism, with its unalter-
able aim of world conquest, and the non-communist world would
not be settled. Civilization would continue to be under the ceaseless
threat of destruction by atomic warfare.
Under these circumstances, any retreat of the communists would
prove temporary. Since they have a plan which, no matter how
costly to human values, would at any rate sufficiently work, men
would in desperation turn toward that plan as the only answer
offered to an unendurable challenge. If there is no alternative, there
can be no doubt about the choice.
The communist plan for the solution of the world crisis is the
World Federation of Socialist Soviet Republics: that is, the commu-
nist World Empire. If the communists are not to win, there must
be presented to the governments and the peoples of the world a posi-
tive alternative to the communist plan, which will meet, at least as
well as the communist plan, the demands of the crisis. Mankind
will not accept, as a substitute for the communist Empire, nothing.
This alternative can only be another, a non-communist World
181
i82 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
Federation — a federation at least of enough of the world to dominate
effectively the major questions of world politics. No world federa-
tion will, we have seen, be attained voluntarily in our time. Besides
the communists, only the United States holds power enough to
force a federation into being. It can be brought about only if the
United States, retaining for itself monopoly control of atomic weap-
ons, assumes responsibility for world leadership.
A federation, however, in which the federated units are not
equal, in which one of them leads all others, to however slight a
degree, and holds the decisive instrument of material power, is in
reality an empire. The word is unacceptable, as distasteful perhaps
to citizens of the United States as to those of most of the rest of the
world; and therefore the word would in practice doubtless never be
employed. Whatever the words, it is well also to know the reality.
The reality is that the only alternative to the communist World
Empire is an American Empire which will be, if not literally world-
wide in formal boundaries, capable of exercising decisive world con-
trol. Nothing less than this can be the positive, or offensive, phase of
a rational United States policy.
In the creation of this Empire there would be necessarily involved
the reduction of communism to impotence. The threat of a com-
munist World Empire would therefore be eHminated. Once func-
tioning, the primary political business of the American Empire
would be the restriction of warfare within limits that would permit
civilization to continue. To accomplish this, the crucial step would
be to safeguard the monopoly of atomic weapons. There would
have to be the continuous assurance against possession of atomic
weapons * or their means of manufacture by two or more rival
centers; there would have always to be one and only one control.
This bare minimum is enough to solve the immediate world po-
litical crisis. It is enough, that is, to permit civilization to continue at
least through the next historical period. It is very far from enough
to solve society's more enduring problems, or to guarantee a world
at all in accord with our wishes. These larger problems are not part
of the subject-matter of this book, which is confined to the political
* As I have explained, I use the term "atomic weapons" to refer not only to these
in the proper sense but to any other weapons comparable in destructive power.
OBJECT OF U. S. POLICY: OFFENSIVE 183
analysis of the present crisis. Beyond the minimum, the questions
are left entirely open, and they are in fact open. To solve the prob-
lem of the present crisis is no more than the pre-condition for the
solution of the larger problems. But without the pre-condition, there
will be no further problems, much less their solution.
What does it mean to say that there must be an "American Em-
pire," and by what possible means could it be brought about ? I wish
to make sure that I am not interpreted to be saying much more than
I intend.
There is already an American Empire, greatly expanded during
these past five years. From the point of view of political reality, the
territories of this Empire, as of any empire, cannot be thought of as
Hmited to those areas which are, like Puerto Rico or the Virgin
Islands, legally and formally listed as some sort of colony or de-
pendency. The Empire extends to wherever the imperial power is
decisive, not for everything or nearly everything, but for the crucial
issues upon which political survival depends.
From this point of view, the American Empire reaches out to the
West to include, at the present time and for the foreseeable future,
Japan. The Philippines did not leave the Empire through a grant of
juridical independence. Their status within the Empire has changed
to one more honorable, but the fate of the new Philippine Republic
is still altogether dependent upon United States power, which could
snuff it out in a moment, and alone protect it from attack.
The many islands of the Atlantic and the Pacific, implicidy domi-
nated by United States military and naval installations, are also part
of the already existing American Empire. For that matter, those
parts of Africa and Europe where United States armed force is
supreme are also, for now at least, in the Empire.
The present Empire includes still more. All of the Americas al-
ready lie within it. Is it conceivable that any one or any combina-
tion of the American nations could make a war against the United
States that would be more than an insane gesture ? Is it conceivable
that the United States would permit the resources of any of these
184 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
nations to fall into the hands of a major world enemy? The im-
perial federation of the Americas is loose, and its members enjoy a
great — perhaps, occasionally, a too great — autonomy. United States
policy is vague and irresolute. It does not lead the Americas as well
as it easily could — and if it led better, the rest of the Americas would
be not more but much less given to complaints about "Yankee im-
perialism." Nevertheless, for the issues that decide, the Empire is
real. If the leadership of the United States were less hypocritical,
more responsible, the nations would have no legitimate grounds for
objection. Without the imperial relation, they could not survive a
decade in the present world. Some time ago, several of the Latin
American countries on the West Coast would have been colonies of
Japan. Not a few would be near today to the far from agreeable role
of satellites of the communist world power.
Canada, juridically, is a Dominion in the British Commonwealth.
But Canada, too, in terms of political reality, must be included
within the American Empire. To prove this, it is only necessary to
reflect on the following hypothetical test. Suppose that United States
policy, continuing its present confusion and vacillation, ends by in-
directly forcing England into the Communist Empire, and that war
begins. On which side will Canada be ? There would no doubt be an
Anglo-communist faction that would have to be suppressed. It is
certain, however, that the resources, and much of the manpower, of
Canada — whether or not the Canadians freely chose so — would be
with the United States. For that matter, maps of United States war
resources have for many years included those of Canada.
An imperial policy is not, therefore, something new for the
United States. It has been, rather, and continues to be forced upon
the United States by the dynamic effects of power relationships. The
relative strength of the United States is too great to permit passivity.
The United States cannot help building an Empire. But United
States opinion has never been willing to face consciously the signifi-
cance of the United States political position and its political behavior.
The realities of the struggle for power are overlaid with a crust of
pseudo-moral platitudes, by which United States citizens and leaders
try to convince themselves that they always act from the most
altruistic of ideal motives. This habit may be a tribute to United
OBJECT OF U. S. POLICY: OFFENSIVE 185
States conscience, but it has a lamentable efifect outside the borders.
The citizens o£ other nations, after their experiences in the late
war and the demonstrations of the atomic bombs, are fully con-
scious of the power of the United States. They regard this power
with mingled fear and hope, fear from what it has already done
when turned toward destruction, and hope that it may be redirected
toward the positive solution of those problems which unaided they
do not feel able to meet. Along with this fear and hope there is also
a growing contempt. To others the moral platitudes appear only as
a combination of hypocrisy and stupidity. Is a European, starving
in a city crushed by American bombs, going to take seriously Ameri-
can condemnations of "power politics"? Is a foreign observer at
Bikini going to pay much attention to American piety about
"peace"? Is the citizen of a small nation, noting American signa-
tures on charters that guarantee control by great powers, going to
listen to American speeches on the "equality of all nations"? Is a
father, whose daughter has been raped and house looted by Ameri-
can soldiers, going to believe that the United States is moral precep-
tor to mankind? Is an Englishman going to relish American
rhetoric against British imperialism in Palestine and India, while the
United States takes no concrete step to help England meet the grave
problems of those unhappy lands ?
The United States has power, greater relative power in the world
total than has ever been possessed by any single nation. The United
States is complacent in the enjoyment of many of the immediate
fruits of that power, in particular the highest living standard there
has even been. The United States is,. however, irresponsible in the
exercise of its power. A positive and adequate policy for the United
States would presuppose first of all that the United States should
face the fact and the responsibility of power. That done, there would
follow at once the realization that the United States must itself,
openly and boldly, bid for political leadership of the world.
It will not be imagined by anyone that such a bid by the United
States would meet with unanimous enthusiasm in the rest of the
world. Nevertheless, there is no reason to suppose that, made in the
proper form, it would meet universal rejection. A not inconsiderable
portion of mankind is aware of the catastrophic depth of the world
i86 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
crisis. It is ready to accept a way out, even at much loss to lesser
needs. This readiness, after all, is the principal source of commu-
nism's attractive power. How much more persuasive would be a per-
spective, as effective as the communists' in offering a solution of the
crisis, yet without the price of totalitarian degradation.
There is much to learn, in this connection, from Hitler's failure.
In the end the Nazi military machine was smashed, but it is prob-
able that the first cause of Hitler's defeat was political rather than
military. I wish to cite one major item from the political record.
Victory in the First World War made France the leading power
in Europe. The Versailles Treaty, tailored in all of its European
measurements to France's order, was designed to perpetuate her po-
sition. Nevertheless, in 1940, France collapsed at the first hard blow.
Every evidence from that period — ^no matter how this may now be
covered up — proves that a large part of the French population had
no stomach for the new war. It was not that they were cowards.
They just didn't think they had anything worth fighting about.
More than this. They did not feel that Europe could go on in the
old way, divided into a score of jealous nations, economically stran-
gling each other, and breaking out in general wars every few dec-
ades. The French were ready for what the situation so pre-eminently
demanded: European federation. They would not have proposed it
— certainly not to Hitler; but they were ready to be pushed into it,
and to accept it. If there was no other way, they were ready to
accept what was for them the worst way : federation under German
leadership.
In 1940 Hitler had his great political chance to win. Instead of
occupying France and handling her as a conquered nation, he could
have made at once a generous treaty with France, and proposed that
she join as a partner — a junior partner, to be sure, but more than
puppet — in the administration of a united Europe. It is hard to
believe that France, already prepared psychologically, could have
refused such an offer, from which she had so much to gain. Agree-
ment between Germany and France would have been enough, by it-
self, to make European union an almost immediate reality. England
would then have faced not a conquered Europe seething internally
with England's friends, but an awakened Europe eager to go for-
OBJECT OF U. S. POLICY: OFFENSIVE 187
ward. Hitler could have demanded, with the voice o£ all Europe,
an end to the war in the West. England's case for continuing the
war would have collapsed. There were probably elements within
Nazism that made it impossible for Hitler to grasp his political
chance, but, looking back, we can see what kind of chance it was,
and what it would have meant if it had been taken.
It must be granted, of course, that the United States cannot,
within the allotted time, win the leadership of a viable world pohti-
cal order merely by appeals to rational conviction. To carry out its
responsibility, the United States would have to proceed primarily
through a combination of pressures and concessions. Both are indis-
pensable. The United States does not have sufficient independent
power to rely solely on pressures. The resistances are too strong for
concessions alone to soften.
The relevant concessions are of three kinds: economic, political,
and what might be called sentimental or moral. The United States,
with its colossal and indeed overbuilt productive machine, is in a
position, if it is prepared for unorthodox methods, to grant enormous
economic concessions in the interests of a supreme political objective.
In some cases, these might require temporary economic self-sacrifice,
but their effect would often be beneficial through the stimulus they
would give to production. Loans, relief, mutually profitable trading
agreements, machines, floods of wanted consumers' goods, easy
financial terms, these all speak a language that is everywhere under-
stood. They could all be made to repeat the lesson that it is a ma-
terially profitable and pleasant thing to be associated with the United
States.
In politics, as in^ marriage, it is always wise to concede everything
excepFwhat is essential. In the relations between a more powerful
and a less powerful nation, constant political interference on small
points is usually much more irritating to the lesser nation than a
sharp, firm intervention confined to those very infrequent points
that really decide. It would be fatally wrong for the United States
to adopt officially the feeling of many of its citizens that all nations
ought to model their political and social institutions after the United
i88 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
States pattern. Others may not like the pattern and may still be
neither barbarians nor menaces to world security.
The United States, in the conduct of its foreign aflFairs, is often
guilty of playing what is sometimes called "prestige politics." This
term refers to political actions which are motivated by the forms
rather than by the substance of politics, which are overly concerned
with political appearances. It is prestige politics when you always
want to be first in the procession, chairman of conferences and com-
mittees, addressed in a respectful tone, listed at the top of the page;
when you hate someone else for making a suggestion first, even
though you agree with it, when you want to sit Number i at a
Peace Conference even though that violates the alphabetical order.
Wise politics is occupied with the realities of power, and is content
to give freely to others the prestige of appearances. Octavius, when
he became emperor and Rome an empire, was careful to be ranked
still just one senator among the others; he did not mind that he
should not be called "king"; he wanted to be king. If the United
States wants to be first among nations, it will not succeed most easily
by insisting that all other nations humble themselves before the Bald
Eagle. On the contrary, it will do best if it demonstrates that other
nations, through friendship with the United States, increase and
guard their political dignity and honor.
The cheapest of all concessions in the relations between nations,
and far from the least important, are those to tnoral sentiment, re-
ligious belief, and social custom. Here too the provincialism and
smugness of the United States do grave injury to its foreign policy.
The American tourist, making crude jokes about "foreigners," is the
counterpart of the American diplomat who doesn't know the lan-
guage of the country to which he is accredited, the exported Ameri-
can film which ridicules an unfamiliar religious sensibility, or
American advertising which boasts at the world's expense. A policy
concentrated on the supreme objective, on the key to the situation,
will dictate the" utmost tact in the approach to the customs, feelings
and beliefs of other peoples.
Concessions alone would not, however, be enough. Concessions
alone, in fact, give others the impression not of generosity but of
weakness. Concessions must be understood as one side of a coin
OBJECT OF U. S. POLICY: OFFENSIVE 189
whose reverse is pressure, force. The reaHzation that it is good to be
a trieiid of the United States must be inseparably tied to the further
reaHzation that it is fearful to be its enemy. At all points bracing the
concessions used for the construction of the world order, there must
be the buttresses of power. Power must be there, with the known
readiness to use it, whether in the indirect form of paralyzing eco-
nomic sanctions, or in the direct explosion of bombs. As the ulti-
mate reserve in the power series, there would be the monopoly
control of atomic weapons.
A non-communist world federation is the only rational objective
for United States foreign policy. This federation can be built, at least
to the necessary extent and level, by the bold use of generous con-
cessions and superior power. These two necessary and sufficient
means are today — though not for long — at the disposal of the United
States, That is why the responsibility for the future of civilization
falls unavoidably, today, upon the United States.
Because I am concerned with the general statement of a supreme
policy, and wish to prevent the diversion of attention from guiding
objectives to side issues, I am anxious not to become too much occu-
pied with details of the application of policy. In order to allow for
unexpected changes in the historical situation, the correct application
cannot in any case be exactly mapped in advance. However, the
meaning of the policy will perhaps remain vague unless there is
some indication of how it might be put into practice.
No fundamental change would be required in United States rela-
tions toward the Americas. What is needed is a more conscious
clarification of the implicit objectives, and both more firmness and
more tact in pursuing them. United States supreme policy, in its
application to the Americas, would be successful if it guaranteed the
following: first, that the major resources of the Americas will be
utilized, during peace, to the mutual benefit of the Americas, the
United States, and the world friends of the United States, and there-
fore counter to the interests of world communism; second, that in
war the use of these resources will be under the direction of the
ipo THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
United States; third, that world communism will not secure any
base in the Americas, but will on the contrary be progressively
weakened.
This minimum, if accepted as primary, is without question attain-
able.
The supreme policy formulated in this chapter would, I believe,
dictate an immediate proposal by the United States to Great Britain
and the British Dominions: common citizenship and full political
union.
This conclusion may seem surprising against the memory of an
adverse popular response, both in the United States and in England,
to Churchill's advocacy of no more than a firm Anglo-American
alliance. The adverse jresponse, however, was more clamorous than
widespread. In the United States, its surface was exaggerated by the
professional England-haters of the Chicago Tribune and the Hearst
press. Both here and in England, it was stoked by the communist
front organizations, not a little of whose energies are now being allo-
cated to the promotion of Anglo-American hate. The whole agita-
tion has a somewhat absurd side, since a de facto Anglo-American
alliance does in any case exist.
Political experience, moreover, would seem to indicate that there
would be more support for, and less opposition to, a proposal for
outright union than for a mere alliance. A larger goal, especially if
it is felt that this could really accomplish something great, has fre-
quently a better chance of popular acceptance than a lesser, partial
goal that would not be a real advance even if attained. The lesser
goal excites the same resentments as the larger but is n~&t capable
of enlisting the same enthusiasm. A formal alliance between Great
Britain and the United States would accomplish nothing. Merely
signing a document would not make more stable the present incom-
plete de facto alliance. Documents can only record, not create, real
political relations. Actual union between the United States and
Great Britain and her Dominions would on the other hand be a
catalyst which would instantaneously transform the whole of world
poHtics.
OBJECT OF U. S. POLICY: OFFENSIVE 191
We may grant that the union could not take place through an
altogether spontaneous birth. The forceps would perhaps have to be
used, or at least kept at hand. However, enough of the historical
premises hold to make union possible. Historical origin, language,
literature, legal principles, form of government are a single heritage.
The circumstances of the world crisis bring the issue to a present
head. The United States, Britain, and her Dominions confront a
common fate. They will, whether they admit it in advance or not,
survive together or be destroyed together. If the communist Empire
captures England, the turn of the United States will not be long
delayed. If England thinks she can go her own way, playing com-
munism off against America, she will be soon and most grievously
undeceived.
Union is possible, and is rationally demanded by the crisis. Sup-
pose that, after a brief period of preparation at official and unofficial
levels on both sides, union were openly offered, not by private indi-
viduals or well-motivated but rather snobbishly organized private
groups, but by the President of the United States ? Proposed not for
a dim and abstract future, but for right now. Why should we be-
lieve that the offer would be, could be, rejected? If the offer were
generous, open — and if there were also in the background some
hint of the black meaning of refusal — an imaginative fire could be
kindled in which the jealous fears of special interests would be
consumed.
Today the only escape which men can see from the ever-tighten-
ing net of isolating nationalism, with all its cords of passports,
boundaries, tariffs, coinage, police, bureaucracy, is into the suffo-
cating totalitarian unity of the communist Empire. The union of
Britain and the United States would present men with the fact and
the prospect of another road on which the barriers could be pulled
down without the necessity for paying the totalitarian forfeit.
Such a union would mean that Britain, her Dominions and the
United States would become partners in the imperial federation. In
the first stages, Britain would be necessarily the junior partner. This
fact, which follows not merely from popular prejudices, but from
the realities of power relations, is the greatest obstacle to the union.
It is harsh to ask so great a nation, which for three hundred years
192 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
led the world, to accept a lower place than the first, especially when
the claim comes from an upstart whose only superior qualification —
unfortunately, the deciding qualification — is the weight of material
might. It would need a superb statesmanship to overcome this ob-
stacle, and a realization among both peoples of the depth of the
crisis.
Foreshortened Europe is today pressed back against the Atlantic
wall. The advanced units of the communist power are flung in every
direction on the Continent, far beyond the iron curtain, piercing
right through to the seas. Behind the curtain, the communist con-
solidation of all power proceeds under the whip of the N.K.V.D.
In front of the curtain, in the still non-communist sections of the
Continent, the remaining nations, starved and weakened, squander
their last reserves of energy in snarling at each other's heels,
pouncing at meatless bones, and refighting the lost battles of yester-
day. It is a dreary, self-defeating spectacle. There is so plainly only
one possible solution.
Under the protection and guidance of Anglo-America, there must
be swiftly built a European Federation, joining all those Continental
countries not now under communist domination, and, as its at-
tractive power grows, drawing to itself the victims now behind the
curtain. That few today dare even to talk of a plan so obvious and
so imperative must be a source of many chuckles for the communist
leaders. How scornfully they must hear the cowardly denials that
answer their shout of "Western bloc"! How pleased they must be
as they watch the nations of the West squabble among themselves
for the sake of prestige and vengeance!
Can anyone believe that Europe will endure even a decade longer
under these conditions ? What answer other than European Federa-
tion can there possibly be ?
For England and the United States not merely to accept, but to
compel the federation of Europe would mean a complete reverse of
policies which have been followed by England for more than three
centuries, and by the United States for two generations. Both nations
have fought their greatest wars with the objective political aim of
OBJECT OF U. S. POLICY: OFFENSIVE 193
preventing the unification of Europe. No such reversal could be
expected unless the situation had so changed that the traditional
policies had become inadmissible.
The situation has, however, so changed. The traditional poHcies
vv^ere based upon the historical fact that until a generation ago the
bulk of world power was located on the European Continent. If,
therefore, that power were unified, it would dominate the entire
world, including of course England and the United States. English
policy, supplemented in this century by United States policy, had
thus to aim to keep the European power divided, "balanced," in
order to ensure their own independence and survival.
Today the bulk of world power is divided between the United
States and the communist controlled areas of Eurasia. The total
power of what remains of Europe is not capable, during the next
few decades, of entering the lists as an independent challenger to
"the two main contenders. It does not follow that what happens to
Europe is unimportant for the outcome of the struggle. What follows
is that Europe's potential energy can now be harnessed only as
auxiliary to the West, or to communism. The European supple-
merif inay well control the equilibrium.
The traditional Anglo-American policy, which in the past pro-
tected Anglo-American security, has today under the new condi-
tions exactly the opposite effect. Permitting Western Europe to
reniain^ divided and quarreling means permitting communism to
conquer Western Europe. Through every rift, the communist power
pours in. Anglo-America can close the entrances only by superin-
tending the consolidation of Europe. The combined tactics of con-
cession and compulsion must bring unity through a process that
simultaneously rids Europe of internal communism.
France, since 1870, has feared European federation because she
has felt that in a united Europe the Germans would be ascendant.
Today there is no longer any reason for that fear. England and the
United States, along with France, are in a position to control the
conditions of federation. They can, if they wish, arrange these so
that the Germans may live honorably and work again within a
united Europe, and still be deprived of any chance to become a
political or military threat. If France argues that in time any initial
194 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
restriction would be loosened, that the Germans might in some
future once more make a drive for dominance, the reply must be:
yes, that might happen. But that chance belongs to the next volume
of v^^orld history. Meanw^hile there is no independent "German prob-
lem." The question today is not whether the Germans will make an-
other try for European and world leadership, but whether there is
any way of preventing the Germans from being drawn into the
communist Empire. Let France, if jhe is v/orrj^dover_ the remote
menace, two generations hence, of a resurgent Germanism, reflect
more carefully on the very real prospect of a united communist Ger-
many, two years hence, at her borders.
The problem of American relations to China, India, Malaysia,
the East Indies, the Arab and other Moslem territories, and the
primitive regions of Africa, grave as it is, has this mitigating dis-
tinction in the present crisis: the societies within these areas are not
a direct part of Western Civilization and do not have large-scale
advanced industry or technology. For this reason, they are not capa-
ble during the next historical period of undertaking on their own
the manufacture of atomic weapons. Since the existence of atomic
weapons is the precipitating factor of the crisis, it follows that policy
toward these parts of the world, though it should doubtless aspire
to much more, can be content with a merely negative, or defensive
success. That is, if policy is able to block communist domination of
these areas and their addition thereby to the communist strategic
base, it will have achieved, if not much, the necessary minimum.
The application of the supreme policy to China has been made in
the preceding chapter. Japan raises no special political problem, since
it is obvious that rational American pohcy would retain Japan as an
"advanced American base off the Eurasian coast, would elimipate
communism from Japanese life, and would try to guide Japanese
development in such a way as to integrate the Japanese people into
the non-communist world political system. In general, the combined
method of concessions and force would be the means for imple-
menting the policy.
OBJECT OF U. S. POLICY: OFFENSIVE 195
Among the concessions, those of a poHtical order have now become
most acute, especially in connection with India and the East Indies.
Let me restrict a brief comment to India.
The majority of articulate Indians (who comprise a very small
proportion of the Indian population) want an independent India.
India does not, however, have the social conditions which would
enable her to operate as a fully independent, sovereign nation. If
Western power (at present primarily British power) were at once
or in the near future totally withdrawn from India, the general
result may be predicted with assurance. India would immediately
plunge into internal chaos. Within this chaos, the only consistent,
positive force would be that of communism, continuously aug-
mented from its base in the Heartland. As the other mixed forces
wore themselves out by fighting each other and by internal disinte-
gration, the relative power of communism would increase cumula-
tively. India would be drawn into the communist Empire.
No one today can advance a convincing argument against this
palpable conclusion, or even tries to. Debate is always diverted into
purely moral channels of "right" and "freedom." But the rights and
freedom of the peoples of India would not be furthered by turn-
ing them over to communism. Freedom and all rights would be
wholly snuffed out. Subjection to the British Raj would seem a
golden past compared to the slave gangs of the N.K.V.D.
If there were no other variant, it would be politically just to con-
clude: better that the Indians should be denied their wish a genera-
tion longer, after so many hundreds, than that communism should
conquer the world. There is, however, another variant which, if not
altogether satisfactory to anyone, is at any rate the least of the avail-
able evils.
"Independence" and "freedom" are after all abstractions. In the
world today, no nation, certainly no nation which is either small
or industrially undeveloped, can be altogether independent and free.
The cause of the most bitter humiliation to a people or a nation (or
even an individual) is not so much the lack of an abstract freedom
which no one, or few, possess, as the feeling that it is singled out for
some special and peculiar discrimination, that it must wear a badge
of unique dishonon India has been not only ruled and oppressed.
196 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
which is the fate of almost all of us. Conscious of the greatness of
her historical past, India has suffered from the moral degradation
of her status as a mere possession of an alien people which has
coupled to its power an intolerable racial arrogance. In material
terms, in spite of exploitation, India has gained from British rule.
Morally her loss has been unrelieved.
The articulate Indians can reasonably demand a position in the
world more nearly that of other men, granted the overriding impera-
tives of the world order as a whole. Toward this, the first step is the
recognition that India is no longer the special problem of Britain,
but of Britain and her friends within the non-communist world po-
litical system: that is, in particular, the United States. Such a recog-
nition at once would change the entire issue for India. What she
regards as an uncompromisable struggle against a foreign tyrant
could be transformed into a mutual effort to create a world system
within which India would find a just and respected place.
• India must not be laid open to the communist advance. India can-
not, for many decades, defend her own independence. Therefore,
whatever the extremists of independence may say or do, the Western
powers must have adequate guarantees for the defense of India, and
for the orientation of her foreign policy. Within those limits, which
should hold today for every nation, it would seem possible, though
far from easy, to work out a status for India not unlike that which
is presumably envisaged for the Philippines. It is not without rele-
vance to point to the enormous objective advantages that would
follow for all peoples from the expansion of a poHtical federation
such as is here under discussion. The collapse of political barriers
would so stimulate free social intercourse, trade and industry, as to
make possible a general economic advance. India's share could be
large enough to reconcile her people, perhaps, to some adjustment
of their ideal hopes.
It may be added that it will be expedient for the United States to
contribute her maximum to the material improvement of the less
developed sections of the world. For this she has motives more
politically compelling than disinterested generosity. Her own pro-
ductive plant has swelled much beyond the potentialities of the
internal market, and can be kept from deflationary collapse only by
OBJECT OF U. S. POLICY: OFFENSIVE 197
increasing the percentage of output sent to the rest of the world. At
the same time, it will be difficult for force alone to keep the Chinese,
the Indians, the Moslems, the East Indians, the Malaysians and the
others in line with United States world policy, unless experience
demonstrates to these peoples the relative material benefits which
accompany acceptance of United States political leadership.
It is sometimes argued that by building up, say, China, industri-
ally and poHtically, the United States would be creating a rival
which in the future, with its vast resources of manpower, would
crush its American sponsor. Here, too, we must reply: yes, this is
quite possible. But this, too, belongs to another historical period, the
problems of which must be met by another generation. Meanwhile
the question is of survival through this present period. For my own
part, I am inclined to doubt these prophecies about China (or
India), in the form they are usually given. It is forgotten that China
■and India belong to entirely different civilizations from that of the
West. Though they may accept, or have forced on them, the me-
chanical surface of the West, with its appliances and some of its
material conveniences, the current of their independent cultural life
is too deep, I think, to be absorbed by the Western tide. If China or
India, in some future, conquers the world, it will not be because
they, having become Western, turn to destroy the West. It will
more probably be because Western Civilization has collapsed from
within. China or India or Islam might then be called to act as
receiver for the Western bankrupt.
Success in all these policy applications which I have so far listed
would not have solved the world crisis, though even a start at such
applications would revolutionize world power relationships. The
United States would gain the political initiative; world communism
would be put on the defensive. The communist fortress would, how-
ever, remain, and the ultimate division between the communists,
with their fixed aim of an absolute monopoly of power, and the rest
of mankind. The statement of positive policy is not, therefore, com-
plete, unless it is understood to include the task of penetrating the
198 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
communist fortress, and of winning back from communist control
those areas and peoples — including pre-eminently the Russian people
— now subject to the communist monopoly. To this problem, which
I have already touched on, I shall return in another context.
8
Even those who will not be frightened when the policy outlined
in these two chapters is called "imperialist" — and no doubt "fascist"
— may prefer to dismiss it as "unreaHstic." I should like to examine,
for a moment, this adjective.
There are two quite different reasons for which a policy may cor-
rectly be judged "unrealistic." A policy is unrealistic if, in order that
it should be carried out, we must expect men to act in ways utterly
unlike those in which experience teaches us they do act. It is in this
sense that the policy of peace through the renunciation of power,
analyzed in Chapter 11, is unrealistic. So too is any policy, such as
Utopian socialist policies, which assumes that groups of men in
power will voluntarily relinquish their power, or use it only for the
benefit of others. Unrealistic in this sense also, as we have seen, are
the plans for the immediate voluntary establishment of a democratic
World State.
It is less often noticed that a policy is, in another sense, equally
unrealistic if, even granted its full success, it totally fails to solve the
problem with which it is concerned. A policy, in the cure of cancer,
of having all those with the disease take large doses of sulfa-drugs
does not exceed human capacity. But a successful application of this
policy would not in the least cure cancer. A policy, with the aim of
avoiding economic depression, of legalizing free coinage of silver
could readily be put into practice. It would not, however, stop de-
pressions.
It is hardly possible to exaggerate the profundity of the present
world political crisis. The trouble with many of the policies which
are proposed, or even followed, in the attempt to meet the crisis is
that even their most triumphant achievement would not at all lessen
the crisis. Can anyone seriously believe that signing a few treaties
will remove the threat of the atom bomb ? Does anyone continue to
OBJECT OF U. S. POLICY: OFFENSIVE 199
think that debates in the Security Council are going to eliminate
the ^'misunderstandings" between communism and the West? Who,
after what has happened in Eastern Europe, is going to expect com-
munism to keep any pledges except those which it is compelled to
keep ? Are American diplomats going to open up the Danube valley
to freedom of trade by convincing the communist leaders that free
trade is a "better" economic principle than totalitarian monopoly?
How many more treaties on China must be broken before it is
understood that the Chinese communists want not treaties but all
power? UnitedMStatesJfo£eign_pqlicy, during the past several years,
has beenJightiagioii-.Yictories: which are not worth winning.
The policy which I have sketched is certainly grandiose. It is not
unrealistic in either of these two senses. It presupposes that men,
groups of men, jnd jiations, will continue to act politically as they
have always acted: primarily (though not quite exclusively) from
self-interest, with good will and intelligence a£fecting their conduct
to a very slight, though nonetheless potentially important, degree.
This policy, moreover, takes into account the realities of the existing
distribution of world power, and calls for nothing that is not ma-
terially possible in terms of this power distribution. Finally, this
policy, if carried out with success or even a fair percentage of success,
would really solve — in, let me repeat, the temporary and partial
measure that is the most that is ever possible in social life — the chief
present problems which account for the profundity of the present
crisis. Nothing less than this can be "realistic."
< go to Contents>
16. The Internal Implementation of Foreign Policy < go to Contents>
BECAUSE I WISH to limit my primary discussion in this book to
a descriptive analysis of the world political crisis and the alternatives
for its solution, I do not intend to take up questions of what Ameri-
cans call "practical politics" : candidates, nominations, elections, party
organization, platforms, and so on. I do not want to give the impres-
sion that I minimize the importance of these questions. A poHcy
cannot make its own way in the world. The best policy conceivable
for the United States would mean nothing unless it were activized
in the will of political leaders and a political party. I have no criti-
cism of the American stress on "practical politics"; I criticize only
the usual American belief that this is all there is to politics; and I
wish, therefore, in counter-emphasis, to keep attention directed to-
ward the problem of the integrating objective, the guiding program,
toward what I have been calling "policy."
Any policy along such lines as we have been tracing would, how-
ever, have to face within the United States two special problems
which would prove so fundamental as to be inseparable from the
general question of the policy itself. In Chapter 13, as part of the
discussion of the implementation of policy through the State Depart-
ment and other government agencies, both of these special problems,
in narrower form, have been provisionally dealt with. We shall
find that both are linked to decisions about the nature of democratic
government.
The first can be posed as follows. Under a democratic form of
government, what ought policy to be, and how ought it to be related
to the opinions of the body of citizens? Should it be a resultant,
average, or compromise of all the various beliefs held, on the ques-
200
IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN POLICY 201
tion at issue, by the various citizens? Or should it try to reflect, as
accurately as possible, the belief that at each given moment is held
by the majority? Both o£ these views seem, at first glance, demo-
cratic. Or is there, perhaps, some third possibility that is consistent
with democratic government?
Under the assumption that we wish, so far as this is possible, to
retain a democratic form of government in the United States, the
following considerations will show why this rather philosophic en-
quiry is relevant.
I tend to believe, though with admittedly inadequate evidence,
that the policy which has been formulated in this part, if presented
vigorously, in terms suitable for public debate, would be found to
correspond to the sentiments of a majority of the adult citizens of
the United States. I am certain, however, that at least a substantial
minority would be, and would for a long time remain, most sharply
opposed to every aspect of it. If, therefore, democratic policy must
represent the average, or the least common denominator, of the be-
Hefs of the citizens, this policy could not be United States policy so
long as the United States remained a democracy.
Whether or not my belief about the present sentiment of the
majority is factually correct, it is at any rate conceivable that either
now or in the future the majority might believe in this policy. But
to carry out the policy is a long, difficult, and perhaps most terrible
process. During that process, occasions would arise when the policy
would seem to threaten total disaster; on others, a temporary let-
down in world political tension would seem to make the policy un-
necessary. Though a majority might, at one time and another,
believe in the policy, we know from experience that mass opinion
is variable, and can shift with great rapidity. We can be fairly sure
that belief in the poHcy would not be continuously maintained at a
majority level during all of the time necessary for carrying it out.
If, then, democratic policy must reflect at every given moment the
opinion of the majority, it would be impossible for the United States
to remain democratic and at the same time to carry out this policy
with the consistency and firmness which would be plainly indis-
pensable.
We seem, so far, to be led to the conclusion that the policy is ruled
202 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
out for the United States, unless the United States abandons democ-
racy. The United States may abandon democracy in any case, for
other reasons, but it is not forced to do so by these premises and this
poHcy. The truth is that these two ways of defining the proper rela-
tionship between policy and citizens do not exhaust the democratic
alternatives. Indeed, neither of these two is genuinely democratic.
The first is merely a guarantee of having no policy at all, and re-
duces government to the sole task of office-seeking. The second
defines not democracy, but demagogy. It is the theory professed by
the demagogue, who manipulates the crowd by giving it the im-
pression that he is nothing more than the sensitive mouthpiece for
the crowd's own changing thoughts and sentiments.
If democracy, as a form of government, is not compatible with
responsibility and leadership, then it neither will, nor deserves to,
endure. Alexander Hamilton, who was more concerned with real
liberties than with democratic rhetoric, which he left to his op-
ponents, has in the Federalist understood the dilemma, and resolved
it for us:
There are some who would be inclined to regard the servile
pliancy of the Executive to a prevailing current ... as its best
recommendation. But such men entertain very crude notions, as
well of the purposes for which governments are instituted, as of the
true means by which the public happiness may be promoted. The
republican principle demands that the deliberate sense of the com-
munity should govern the conduct of those to whom they intrust
the management of their affairs; but it does not require an unquali-
fied complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion, or to every
transient impulse which the people may receive from the arts of
men, who flatter their prejudices to betray their interests.
In a democracy, leaders, and through them the policies which they
hold, must give a periodic accounting to the enfranchised citizenry.
Their submission to "the will of the people" means, in practice, that
they must be judged at regular intervals by a secret ballot, on which
the voters are free to oppose them. There is, however, nothing in the
nature of democracy which forbids them from leading the nation,
while it is their turn to lead, in accordance with their own best wis-
dom, not in deference to every momentary prejudice and weakness
IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN POLICY 203
of the common man. Nor is there anything to forbid democratic
leaders, if their own behef differs Trom that of rnany ^DrTvenTa. great
majority, from trying to convince even the great majority that it is
wrong. This the demagogue never attempts. The demagogue is
cynical, contemptuous of the masses — contemptuous above all be-
cause they follow him; and he flatters "their prejudices to betray
their interests." But a willingness to be opposed if necessary, openly
opposed to the majority, and to try, openly, to convince the majority
that it is wrong is a sign not of contempt but of deep respect for the
masses. It is an essential part of democratic leadership.
The policy which we here consider could be implemented inter-
nally only with such a conception of democracy, only if a respon-
sible leadership proved ready to pursue boldly and openly a single,
unwavering course, and, through the education of public opinion,
win for that course informed public consent.
The second problem is posed by the fact that the United States
could not carry out this world policy, or any policy remotely likf it,
unless communism within the United States were reduced to im-
potence. To accomplish this, communism would have to be illegal-
ized and suppressed. There is no hope that communism could be
sufficiently reduced, within the allotted time, by mere education and
enlightenment. The implementation of the policy is impossible — the
survival of the United States, I would in fact add, is impossible —
unless the internal communist movement is got rid of. Here, again,
thus, we must ask: is this compatible with the principles of demo-
cratic government?
The usual reply — spoken most loudly of all, we may be sure, by
the communists themselves and their sympathizers — is that illegal-
ization and suppression of the internal communist movement would
be an obvious violation of the fundamental democratic rights of free
speech and assembly, and therefore not consistent with democratic
government. Democracy must grant everyone not only the right to
his beliefs, but the right to express them, to win others to them, and
to organize politically to try to make them the prevailing beliefs of
204 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
the democratic community and the directing behefs of its govern-
ment. The logic of the argument seems complete. It is hard for most
people to see at what point it could be even challenged. There are
those in this country who are ready to suppress internal commu-
nism; but to most others, and even to themselves, it is felt that in
doing so they would be abandoning democracy.
It is never possible, however, to understand poHtical questions by
the purely logical analysis of abstract principles. We must relate the
principles to what they mean in terms of concrete historical experi-
ence. If we do so in this case, we will discover the emptiness of the
usual argument. Let us, for simplicity, approach the evidence from
the point of view of the right of free speech. Similar considerations
would apply in the case of the various related democratic rights.
Democracy in practice has never, and could never, interpret the
right of free speech in an absolute and unrestricted sense. No one,
for example, is allowed to advocate, and organize for, mass murder,
rape, and arson. No one feels that such prohibitions are anti-
democratic. But why not? Why cannot some purist tell us that any
restriction whatsoever is, logically, counter to the absolute demo-
cratic principle of free speech?
The explanation of the logical puzzle is this. The right of free
speech, or any other single right, or all of them together, cannot be
understood in isolation. It must be related to a context, not merely
to the verbal context of a constitution or set of laws, but to a social
and historical context. The right of free speech presupposes the ex-
istence of a democratic government, which is something much more
complex than just free speech; and the existence of a democratic
government presupposes the existence of a functioning social com-
munity. But mass murder, rape, and arson are incompatible not only
with the existence of a democratic government but with the existence
of any kind of functioning social community. Whatever the situa-
tion in pure logic, it is factually impossible for. a,jiy organized society
"HEo enforce rules of conduct which are incompatible with its own
existence. No right guaranteed by any government can, in social
' fact, be interpreted to permit citizens to advocate, and organize for,
mass murder, rape and arson.
We may generalize as follows. The principles of an organized
IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN POLICY 205
society cannot be interpreted in practice in such a way as to make
organized society impossible. The special principles of a special form
of government, in this case democratic government, cannot be in-
terpreted in practice in such a way as to make that form of govern-
ment impossible.
Let us approach the question along somewhat different lines,
through an analogy. Suppose that a football team claimed to be the
best in the' country, and announced that it was ready to prove it by
playing against "any other team," Let us further suppose that an-
other group, calling itself a football team, challenged; but that this
second group did not in fact accept the rules which define the game
of football to be what it is. The second group, let us say, scored
differently, refused to accept penalties, shot runners with pistols in-
stead of tackling them, and so on. If our first claimant to the cham-
pionship refused to take up the challenge, would we then denounce
it for not making good on its offer to play "any other team"? We
would, of course, not. We would say, rather, that the second group
was not really a football team at all. We would say that you can
play football only with those who accept the fundamental rules
which define football, without which there would be no such thing
as football.
Similarly, a' poker player willing to take on "any opponent"
means in practice, and can only mean, a poker player ready to take
on anyone who is going to abide by the rules of poker. Within the
framework of those rules, there can be an infinite variety in players
and their method of play; in a poker tournament all of this variety
should properly be admitted; but without the rules there is simply
no poker.
These analogies will, perhaps, suggest what is the only intelligible
and workable interpretation of the rights and freedoms of demo-
cratic government. Any individual right or freedom is properly
extended only to those who accept the fundamental rules of democ-
racy, only to those whose political activities, however infinitely vari-
ous, are conducted within the general framework of democratic
government, the framework without which the government would
not be democratic. If this is not the interpretation, then democratic
206 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
government is necessarily self-defeating. It cannot defend itself. It
welcomes and fosters, in e£Fect, its own murderer.
We may further note that no sovereign government, democratic
or of any other kind, can, or does, voluntarily permit within the
jurisdiction of its sovereignty the organized activities of the agency
of another and contrary sovereignty. This too could not be other-
wise in practice, because such activities are a negation of the gov-
ernment's sovereignty.
Communism, in democratic nations, makes use of free speech in
order to abolish free speech. More generally, it is an essential part
of the goal of communism to destroy democratic government, and to
replace democratic government by totalitarianism.* Communism,
in other words, does not accept the basic rules of democracy, the
rules which define the very possibility of democracy. This fact is
incontrovertible, demonstrated alike by consistently held commu-
nist doctrine and by communist practice. The rules of democracy
cannot, therefore, be intelligibly interpreted as providing for the free
operation and development of a force specifically designed for their
own destruction. On the contrary, if democratic government is his-
torically workable, its rules must not only permit but enjoin it to
reject, combat, and eliminate any such force. How, once again, could
any society survive which deliberately nursed its own avowed and
irreconcilable assassin, and freely exposed its heart to his knife?
But communism within the United States is no less outside the
limits of democratic rights on the equally demonstrable ground that
it is the agency of an alien sovereign. It rejects, in theory and prac-
tice. United States sovereignty, and accepts that of world com-
munism and its Soviet center.
There is, therefore, nothing in democratic principle which would
forbid the suppression of communism. The act of suppression would
be in no way incompatible with the democratic form of government.
The question, however, does not end with this demonstration. A
principle is, we might say, timeless. The application of a principle
occurs necessarily in time. In connection with the application, we
must always ask when? how? under what circumstances? If, on
principle, I have the right to carry a rifle, it does not follow that it
* This analysis applies, of course, equally well to the fascist form of totalitarianism.
IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN POLICY 207
is always under all circumstances correct for me actually to carry
a rifle. The application is also a matter of expediency.
Experience can show us that, though there is nothing anti-
democratic in principle in suppressing such a movement as com-
munism, there is always a practical danger to democracy from any
and every act of suppression. The reason, as we know, is that those
who have power, those who control the suppressive measures, often
do not stop at what is justified in principle. They find it convenient
to create an amalgam, to lump together with the group that ought
legitimately to be suppressed other opponents of theirs whose activi-
ties are not outside the boundaries and rules of democracy. The
communists today are very skillfully playing up this danger. They
are saying over and over : if communists are suppressed, then where
will the line be drawn ? Will that not prove the first step in a series
which will end with the suppression of all opposition?
This might happen. It would be foolish to deny the reality of the
danger. But in political life, and in all life, there is always danger.
Every choice we make may lead to disaster. Nothing we can do will
make certain our safety. If our object is to preserve democracy, we
must, then, weigh possible dangers against each other. Along which
course — that of permitting communism to continue freely, or that
of suppressing it — does the greater danger to democracy lie ?
To the principle which permits the suppression, we need to add
a rule of expediency which can help us know when to apply the
principle. Negatively, the reasonable rule would seem to be that it
is never expedient to proceed against a group which is so small and
weak as to be a negligible influence in the life of the country. Even
if its program and activities are altogether beyond the permissible
boundaries of democracy, the mere fact of its weakness means that
there is little to gain from suppressing it, and that this little is not
enough to counterbalance the indirect dangers from the act of sup-
pression. Positively, the rule would call for suppression in the case
of groups which constitute a clear, present, and powerful threat. In
such cases, though it is no doubt hard to be sure just when the
equilibrium shifts, the danger to democracy from the existence of
the group outweighs the possible dangers from the suppression.
The Hearst press does a great disservice through its mode of
2o8 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
treating the "Red Menace." There is a Red Menace within the
country, and only those who are liars or ignorant deny it. It is the
menace of the official communist movement and its legions of
auxiliaries and dupes. But the Hearst press applies the terms "red"
and "Bolshevik" and "communist" indiscriminately to official com-
munists, opposition communists, socialists, populists, anarchists, and
several kinds of liberals. Only the official communists, together with
those whose ideas and activities they control, come under the rule
that the threat must be "clear, present, and powerful." It might be
argued that socialism, through the political effects of collectivization,
might in the long run bring about the destruction of democracy.
This argument, however, is not "clear": that is, it is not yet proved
by the historical evidence. Besides, the non-communist socialist
groups are too weak to be either a "present" or "powerful" threat.
The rule cannot justify suppression for what might happen fifty
or a hundred years from now. The influence of the anarchists is
negligible. As for the populist movements, and the individualist
liberals (as distinguished from the pseudo-liberals of the New Re-
public, Nation, PM type, who are professionally sympathetic to com-
munist policies), their suppression naturally cannot be justified in
principle or in practice: their program and activities are eminently
within the boundaries of democracy, far more plainly than those of
the Hearst press, which not infrequently steps beyond those
boundaries.
The threat of the communist movement, of that movement specifi-
cally, comes in all respects under the rule of expediency, which calls
for actual suppression. Its threat to democratic government is abso-
lutely clear, demonstrated. Its threat, above all in the context of the
world political crisis, is very present. And the total internal influence
of its combined forces, supplemented by the pressures from without
of. its world apparatus, is already so powerful as to be a major chal-
lenge to the sovereignty of the government. The danger to democ-
racy in the United States from the continued existence of the
communist movement is so much greater than the possible danger
from the act of suppression, that there are no grounds for demo-
cratic hesitation. The survival of democracy in this country requires
the suppression of communism, now.
IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN POLICY 209
The suppression of communism cannot be accomplished in a day
or two. To begin with, the reasons for the suppression must be ex-
plained clearly and frankly to the people. The communists and their
allies, their activities and their program, must be named and ex-
posed, stripped of all the disguises which they are so adept at wear-
ing. From the point of view of the implementation of foreign policy,
an immediate practical measure imperatively demanded is the oust-
ing of all communists and all ingrained communist sympathizers
from all departments and agencies of the government and the armed
forces. How, possibly, can the world struggle against world com-
munism be successfully conducted, when communists are planted
in key spots throughout the primary instrumentalities of that
struggle ?
After having been motivated by the explanation and the exposure,
the communist party, and all communist activities and propaganda
conducted under whatever name or through whatever fronts, must
then be flatly illegalized. And the prohibition must be rigorously and
thoroughly enforced.
We not infrequently hear that "you cannot suppress communism."
Communism, it is said, arises naturally in our day out of the dis-
content of the masses with bad social conditions. The only possi-
bility of ending communism is by removing all the bad conditions,
and creating a society with universal well-being and happiness.
Those who use this argument are not aware that it has been sup-
plied to them by the communists themselves. They are still less
aware that the communists themselves do not believe it. For com-
munists, the classic refutation of this "theory of spontaneity" is to
be found in Lenin's What h to Be Done?, to which we have else-
where referred. Lenin insists, correctly, that mere social "conditions"
could not bring "Social-Democratic consciousness" to the masses (by
"Social-Democratic" he means what is today called "communist").
"This consciousness," he writes, "could only be brought to them
from without."
The partial truth in the usual argument, which gives it its plausi-
bility, is that bad social conditions are one of the factors that may
produce moods of discontent and even revolt among the masses, and
may lead to actual mass movements against the prevailing order.
210 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
(They do not always do so; often they produce mass passivity.)
They do not of themselves lead to communism. Communism is not
just a loose wave of discontent. It is a specific movement of our
time, highly and intricately organized both in its theories and in its
activities. It does not "arise spontaneously." It is deliberately built,
by trained and disciplined men, by what Lenin calls the professional
revolutionists of the conscious vanguard. Bad social conditions are,
it is true, a kind of manure which helps the professional com-
munists to grow an easier and larger crop. It is thus worth while,
as a defense against communism, if there were not so many better
reasons, to work to improve social conditions. But the specific prob-
lem of communism in our time is independent of the more perma-
nent problem of social conditions. Communism, as a specific move-
ment, is not like an Antaeus, who, crushed to his mother Earth, will
rise again always stronger than before. Communism can be sup-
pressed, to stay suppressed. If democracy is to be saved, it will have
to be.
< go to Contents>
17. -World Empire and the Balance of Power < go to Contents>
A WORLD FEDERATION initiated and led by the United States
would be, we have recognized, a World Empire. In this imperial
federation, the United States, with a monopoly of atomic weapons,
would hold a preponderance of decisive material power over all the
rest of the world. In world politics, that is to say, there would not
be a "balance of power."
To those commentators who feel that they are displaying a badge
of poHtical virtue when they denounce the "balance of power," the
prospect of its elimination ought to seem a prime asset of the poHcy
here under discussion. Those who are not impressed with the rhetor-
ical surface of politics will be less pleased.
At whatever level of social life, from a small community to the
world at large, a balance of power is the only sure protection of
individual or group liberties. Since we cannot get rid of power, the
real pbliticar choice is between a balance of diverse powers and a
monopoly of power. Either one power outweighs all the rest, or
separately located powers check and countercheck each other. If one
power outweighs all the rest, there is no effective guarantee against
the abuse of that power by the group which wields it. It will seem
desirable and necessary to buttress still further the power domi-
nance, to take measures against any future threat to the power
relations, to cut off at the source any trickle of potential opposition.
It will seem right that those with the over-weening power should
also receive material privilege commensurate with their power rank-
ing. Only power can be counted on to check power and to hinder
its abuse. Liberty, always precarious, arises out of the unstable
equilibrium that results from the conflict of competing powers.
As a solution for the present crisis, might it not therefore seem
that there is little objective reason to prefer a world federation under
United States leadership to a communist World Empire ? Of course,
we might, not altogether cynically, reflect that even if our choice is
212 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
only between jailers to preside over our common prison, that is still
not an occasion for indifference. But is anything more at stake?
Would not the United States also, if it became world leader, turn
out in the end to be world tyrant?
We must begin by replying, as we have so often: it might be so.
There can be no certainty against it. We must say even more than
this. There is in American life a strain of callow brutality. This be-
trays itself no less in the lynching and gangsterism at home than in
the arrogance and hooliganism of soldiers or tourists abroad. The
provincialism of the American mind expresses itself in a lack of
sensitivity toward other peoples and other cultures. There is in many
Americans an ignorant contempt for ideas and tradition and history,
a complacency with the trifles of merely material triumph. Who,
listening a few hours to the American radio, could repress a shud-
der if he thought that the price of survival would be the American-
ization of the world?
We have already observed that the idea of "empire" carries with
it a confused set of associations that is only remotely related to his-
torical experience. There have been many empires, of many kinds,
differing in almost every imaginable way in their social and polit-
ical content. The only constant, the factor that leads us to call the
given political aggregate an "empire," is the predominance — perhaps
only to a very small degree — of a part over the whole.
It is by no means true that all empires are tyrannies. The Athe-
nian Empire of the 5th century b.c. was for most of its history little
more than a strengthened federation. Within the imperial state,
Athens itself, there flourished the most vigorous political democracy
of the ancient world, and in some respects of all time. Though
Athens controlled the foreign policy of the federated cities and
islands, in many instances she used her influence to promote demo-
cratic changes of their internal regimes.
The hand of England has been heavy on India, Malaysia, Ceylon,
but she can hardly be accused of destroying there a liberty which
never existed. And in what independent states has there been found
more Hberty than in her loosely dependent Dominions?
THE BALANCE OF POWER 213
The imperial rule of Rome, especially if compared to the pre-
existing regimes of the areas to which it was gradually extended,
was far from an unmixed despotism. For hundreds of years it was
centered in an imperial state which was itself a Republic. Many of
the cities and states which were added by force or maneuver were,
upon affiliation, cemented by the grant not of slavery but of Roman
citizenship. It would be hard to prove that Roman power meant less
liberty for the inhabitants of Egypt or Thrace or Parthia.
Even the Ottoman Empire, which, entering from outside, took
over the rule of the enfeebled Byzantine states in Asia Minor, the
Balkans, and parts of Africa, is hardly responsible for the end of
liberties which had never grown on Byzantine soil. Under the Otto-
man Turks, the Christians, permitted the free practice of their
religion, and eligible through the peculiar device of the slave house-
hold of the capital to the highest military and administrative posi-
tions, were more free than had been heathens or heterodox Chris-
tian sects under the Byzantine power.
I am not, certainly, trying to suggest that building an empire is
the best way to protect freedom. The empires of the Mongols, of
the Egyptians, the Incaic and Aztec and Babylonian and Hittite
empires will scarcely be included among the friends of liberty. It
does, however, seem to be the case that there is no very close causal
relation between empire and liberty. The lack of liberty among the
Andean or Mexican Indians, the Egyptians or Mongolians or Hit-
tites, cannot be blamed on the imperial structures into which their
societies were, at various periods, politically articulated. Within their
cultures, social and political liberties, as we understand them, did
not exist at any time, whether or not they were organized as em-
pires. The degree of liberty which exists within an empire seems to
be relatively independent of the mere fact of the imperial poHtical
superstructure.
The extension of an empire does, by its very nature, mean at least
some reduction in the independence, or sovereignty, of whatever
nations or peoples become part of the empire. This is sometimes felt
as a grievous loss by these nations or peoples, almost always so felt
by the governing class which has previously been their unrestricted
rulers — perhaps their tyrants. But this partial loss of independence
214 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
need not at all mean a loss of concrete liberties for the population,
may even mean their considerable development, and may bring also
a great gain to civilization and world political order. Untrammeled
national independence is a dubious blessing, consistent with com-
plete despotism inside the given nation, and premise of an inter-
national anarchy that derives precisely from separatist independence.
I did not attempt to deduce the totalitarian tyranny of a com-
munist World Empire from the mere fact that it would be an em-
pire. This conclusion was based upon the analysis of the nature of
communism, as revealed in ideology, organization, and historical
practice. Though it must be granted that an imperial world feder-
ation led by the United States might also develop into a tyranny,
the fact of empire does not, in this case either, make the conclusion
necessary.
The development of an industrial economy world-wide in scope,
the breakdown of the international political order, and the existence
of atomic weapons are, we observed at the beginning of our discus-
sion, the elements of the world .crisis as well as the occasion for the
attempt to construct a world imperial federation. This world feder-
ation is made possible by the material and social conditions, is de-
manded by the catastrophic acuteness of the crisis, and at the same
time is a means for solving the crisis. The nature of the federation
cannot be deduced from definition, but must be understood in re-
lation to the historical circumstances out of which it may arise.
From the point of view of the United States, and of the non-
communist world generally, the world federation is required in
order to perform two inter-related tasks, which cannot be performed
without the federation: to control atomic weapons, and to prevent
mass, total, world war. With United States leadership, and only
with its leadership, a federation able to perform these tasks could
be built, and built in time. With the performance of these tasks,
the federation would be accomplishing what might be called its
"historical purpose"; it would be fulfilling the requirements which
prompted its creation. The minimum content of the "American
world empire" would thus be no more than that of a protective
THE BALANCE OF POWER 215
association of nations and peoples in which, for a restricted special
purpose, a special power — the power of atomic weapons — ^would be
guarded in the beginning by one member of the association.
At first there would be, perhaps, little more to the federation than
this minimum content — which, after all, would not be such an un-
mitigated blow to the liberties of mankind. It is not, however, to
be expected that the federation would remain long at this bare level.
It would develop; the content would deepen. How it would develop
is a question not decided in advance. If the direction might be to-
ward a tyrannous despotism, on the part of the initially favored
nation, there is no reason to rule out a development in a quite oppo-
site direction, toward the fuller freedoms and humanity of a genu-
ine world state and world society.
The danger to liberties would be the power predominance of the
United States in the beginning of the federation. Fortunately for
•liberty, there are objective factors of very great weight that would
operate against any attempt by the United States to institute a totali-
tarian world tyranny.
Not unimportant among these factors is the historical tradition
which is the past of the United States social present. I have men-
tioned the brutality, provincialism, and cultural insensitivity which
are not infrequent in United States behavior. These are, however,
characteristics to be expected in a young and "semi-barbarian super-
state of the cultural periphery" (I use, again, Toynbee's phrase).
There is nothing totalitarian about them. Their rather anarchic,
somewhat lawless, disruptive manifestations are on the whole anti-
totalitarian in effect. Americans do, most of them, have a contempt
for ideas; but that very contempt gives them a certain immunity to
mental capture by an integral ideology of the totalitarian kind. It is
less easy for a nation to escape from its past than many optimists,
and pessimists, imagine. The past can be a millstone around the
neck, but it can also be an anchor bringing safety. The United States
may become totalitarian. It seems to me unlikely, however, that this
will come about through a natural internal evolution. Totalitarian-
ism would have to be brought from without, as it would have been
by a world-victorious Nazi Germany, as it will be by the commu-
nists, if they are allowed to continue.
2l6 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
A second factor on the side of liberty is the inadequate power of
the United States. The United States has today very great power,
greater than its own spokesmen reaHze, great enough to build a
world federation, to defeat communism, and to ensure control of
atomic weapons. It does not have enough power to impose a totali-
tarian rule on the rest of the world. Even if the United States could
concentrate enough in the form of purely military power, it lacks
sufficient manpower and sufficient political experience.
What this means is that the United States can lead only by accept-
ing others as partners, only by combining the methods of concilia-
tion and concession with the methods of power, only by guarding
the rights of others as jealously as its own privileges. If the United
States refuses this mode of leadership, if it should try instead to be
world despot, it might still, for a short while, subdue the world
beneath an atomic terror. But the end would be swift and certain.
Mankind would be avenged, and the United States destroyed. The
only question would be whether all civiUzation would be brought
down in the process.
Looked at somewhat differently, this indicates that in the pro-
jected world federation the principle of the balance of power would
not in reality be suspended. At the one, narrowly military level, a
balance would be replaced by United States preponderance. But
military force, especially in the technical sense which is alone at
stake in the control of atomic weapons, is by no means the only
form of social power. In terms of population, material resources,
cultural skills and experience, the United States would not at all
outweigh the other members of the federation. Within the frame-
work of the federation, divided powers would continue to interact.
Through their mutual checks and balancings, they would operate
to prevent any totalitarian crystallization of all power.
A third, ironic protection of liberty is the unwillingness of the
United States to rule the world. No people, pushed by forces they
cannot control, ever entered on the paths of world power with less
taste for the journey, with more nostalgic backward glances. This
distaste, indeed, is so profound that it is primarily significant not
so much as a protection against the abuse of United States power,
THE BALANCE OF POWER 217
but rather as a tragic handicap to the sufficient utiUzation of that
power.
There is a fourth major factor which will challenge any despotic
presumption on the part of the United States. In the world today
there are many millions of men and women who know the meaning
of totalitarian tyranny, often through the frightful lessons of direct
experience, and who are resolved, if any chance is given them, to
fight against it. They are within the United States itself, as within
every other nation, not the least firm among them silent for the
moment under the stranglehold of the communist power. The loss
of liberty teaches best, perhaps, its meaning. Though they are now,
after so many betrayals and vain hopes, close to despair, they are still
ready to act again.
They are ready, since there is no other way, to accept and follow
the leadership of the United States, but only if they are given reason
to believe that United States leadership will bring both power and
justice: power so that there will be a chance to win, and justice so
that the victory will be worth winning. They will follow not as
subjects of the United States, but, in their own minds, as citizens of
the world. For them, all governments and all power are suspect.
They will be — they are — stern judges of the United States; they are
acquainted with the symptoms of tyranny; they will observe and
resist every invasion of liberty. If experience should prove to them
that their hope in the United States is also empty, then they will
abandon the United States.
The United States cannot compete in tyranny with the commu-
nists. The communists have cornered that political market. The
peoples of the world will reason that if it is to be totalitarianism
anyway, then it had might as well be the tried and tested brand.
The United States will not win the peoples to her side — and the
struggle in the end is for them, is not merely miHtary — unless her
leadership is anti-totalitarian, unless she can make herself the in-
strument of the hope, not the fear, of mankind.
2i8 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
In Chapter 3 we reached the conclusion that a genuine world
government was not a possible solution o£ the present world po-
litical crisis. At the same time we found no reason for abandoning
the ideal of a genuine world government or even the far nobler ideal
of a world society in which the coercion and violence which are
always part of any government would be replaced by the free, co-
operative union of all mankind.
Those men who are dedicated to these ideals, who have rid their
hearts forever of the bitter nationalist shell that divides them from
their brothers who are all men, cannot remain satisfied with any
such perspective as we have been examining. With the best of
chances, a world federation led, however generously and discreetly,
by the United States would still retain its gross flaw of imperial in-
equality. Must they, then, these dedicated men, reject and condemn
this perspective?
I think they need not, if their ideal is more than self-indulgence,
if they know that their ideal must be realized within and through
the harsh, real world of history. For them, this is the means; there
is no other way. They cannot want for its own sake a federation of
unequals, led by the United States. But they must want it as the
necessary step toward their own goal of a world society of equals,
in which they will continue to believe, and toward which their
influence will try to direct the future of the federation.
Let us assume that I am correct in maintaining that world or-
ganization under communist leadership and world organization
under United States leadership are the only two real alternatives in
the present world political situation.
Communism, consistent in itself, is not troubled by any seeming
disparities between the various propaganda masks through which
it faces the world. From one mouth, it will tell us that all is well
within the Soviet Union and among communists everywhere, and
that any story of communist villainy is a fascist slander and a
THE BALANCE OF POWER 219
counter-revolutionary lie. If we have learned too much to be in this
way quite lulled, communism will change mouths, and say: of course
communists are now and then guilty of excesses, and there has been
some Soviet trouble, but is this not the way of the world ? How can
the United States, with its own eye so full of beams, object to those
Soviet motes ? If communists are rather bad, well, at any rate Amer-
icans are no better.
This adoit maneuver, playing as it does so skillfully on all the
strings of our own guilt, has a paralyzing effect on the minds and
wills of honest men. Is it not true that we oppress a subject race,
that we grab military bases, that our soldiers rape and rob, that we
have dismal slums, that our propaganda is often false and hypo-
critical, that much of our press serves rich and wicked men, that
we have grafters and absentee landlords and exploiters ? What right
do we have, then, to criticize communism, to set up our own way
against its way ? What choice is there between us ? And, above all,
what right have we to ask the world to choose ?
Because I have not tried to conceal either the present defects in
our society or the threats of future danger, but rather to force these
out into the open, I feel it necessary to comment on the subtle,
pseudo-humility of this attitude.
The truth is this. Our way is not the communist way. There is a
difference, and there is a choice, as profound as any that men have
in history confronted. We do not ever have, in history, a choice be-
tween absolutes, between Good and Evil, God and Satan. Evil, along
with good, pervades the fabric of the City of the World; Satan, if
not enthroned, is always present at the world's assemblies. Our
choice is always between gray mixtures of good and evil; our right
choice can never gain more than the lesser evil. What is always
relevant, therefore, is the exact composition of the mixture, the
degree, the measure.
It is true that we discriminate against the Negro race; but the
most oppressed Negro in the United States has ten times more free-
dom than nine-tenths of the persons subject to the communist power.
It is true that there are some frauds in our elections; but the whole
electoral system of the Soviet Union is nothing but a gigantic fraud
and farce. It is true, and wrong, that our press sometimes distorts
220 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
news for the sake of selfish owners; but the entire communist press
is simply the voice of a total lie. Some of our workers and farmers
live in poverty and slums; but all Soviet workers live, under com-
munist rule, in poverty and slums; all are hounded by a secret police
and tied to the state by labor passports, and fifteen or twenty mil-
lion of them are herded into the slave-gangs of the N.K.V.D. Our
soldiers, occupying a country, are, some of them, brutal; but the
communists, occupying a country, suck it dry, destroy its inde-
pendent life, ship hundreds of thousands of its inhabitants back to
the slave-gangs, and torture and kill every even potential opponent.
Our police occasionally knock a striker over the head, or beat up a
harmless drunk; but the communist police torture and frame and
exile and murder millions of innocent men and women, and by
means of spies and provocateurs reach into every factory and farm
and home. Our employers and authorities sometimes try to break a
strike; under a communist regime the very mention of a strike is
punishable by death. We sometimes punish a poor man who in
desperation steals, say, a jewel from a rich waster; in the Soviet
Union a starving peasant who takes, to feed his children, a bushel
of wheat from the farm he works, can legally be sentenced to exile
or death for what, in the pious cant, is called "the theft of socialist
property." In communist law and practice, it is a crime not to be a
stoolpigeon, and a duty to betray friends and wife and family.
Among us, the poor and weak do not have an equal chance against
the rich and powerful; under the communists the poor and weak
must not only obey, but praise and fawn on their masters.
It is far from my purpose to list these comparisons in order to
suggest any complacency on our part. Our evils are still evil, even
if there are worse. It is no less our duty to reject and overcome them.
Every one of them, every added one, it may be noted, is a weapon
contributed to communism. But it is necessary to guard against a
false and in reality cynical indifference which escapes the responsi-
bility for choice by the plea that all roads are alike, and alike lead
to ruin. It is well to recall that there is something, after all, to
lose\
THE BALANCE OF POWER 221
It will be useful to give a name to the supreme policy which I
have formulated. It is neither "imperial" nor "American" in any
sense that would be ordinarily communicated by these words. The
partial leadership which it allots to the United States follows not
from any nationalist bias but from the nature and possibilities of
existing world power relationships. Because this policy is the only
answer to the communist plan for a universal totalitarianism, be-
cause it is the only chance for preserving the measure of liberty that
is possible for us in our Time of Troubles, and because it proposes
the sole route now open toward a free world society, I shall hence-
forth refer to it as the policy of demoa-atic world order.
< go to Contents>
18. Is War Inevitable? < go to Contents>
IT IS, IN A WAY, rather absurd to ask whether there is going to
be another general war, a Third World War. The Third World
War began, we saw, in the Spring of 1944, and has thus already been
going on for several years. Already, thousands, even tens of thou-
sands, of men have been killed in this war — in China and Iran and
Yugoslavia and Trieste and Germany and elsewhere. Among those
killed have been armed soldiers of the United States.
We know, however, that something different is usually meant by
the question. When we speak of syphilis, we do not have in mind
the passing annoyance of a small sore. When most people ask about
the Third World War, they are thinking, of course, not of small
skirmishes and incidents here and there, or even rather extensive
battles in the less developed nations, but of fighting and destruction
on a mass and general scale. We may note that there is a superficial-
ity in this way of thinking. Between the small sore and the dread
organic degeneration, though they may be widely separated in time
and in idea, the lurking spirochetes provide a most intimate causal
link. Nevertheless, let us re-state the problem, and ask whether there
will be a new war in the more total sense.
No future event is inevitable, and we therefore cannot say that a
new full-scale war is certain to come. It is conceivable, possible, that
it should not. We are compelled to recognize, however, if we wish
to face the evidence, that a new war in the full sense, and in a com-
paratively short time, is very probable. It is on the whole probable,
though not in each case equally so, no matter what deliberate policies
are followed by the United States or by the other nations. The living
germs are present in the blood; and political science has not yet
devised its miracle drugs.
The evidence, a good deal of it, may be found distributed through
the pages of this book. We know in general that civilized men have
always fought many and frequent wars. We know of nothing to
IS WAR INEVITABLE? 223
assure us that their habits o£ millennia can quickly change. In the
past, the most that wise policy has ever achieved has been to lessen
the frequency and devastation of wars, to decrease, by foresight and
a steady navigation, the cost of either victory or defeat. We know
that in today's world the division and unbalance, immeasurably
aggravated by the mere existence of atomic weapons, are so pro-
found that they cannot persist for long under the present tensions
without some major resolution. We know that such a resolution is
ordinarily brought about through war.
It is not really necessary to examine causes to their roots in order
to recognize that a new war is probable. The fact is written in bold-
face on the daily surface of events. Indeed, there is hardly a prece-
dent in history for the failure of a war to begin from political clashes
and incidents much less grave than those of the past few years.
We may say more than this. It is well understood that the im-
mediate occasion which sets off a great war in our complex modern
society is largely accidental. It need be nothing of any particular im-
portance in itself: a mistranslated telegram, a personal assassination,
a border incident among many border incidents. Difficulties much
more serious in themselves will have preceded it, without starting
the war. What happens is that the relations among the belligerents-
to-be reach and maintain a state of explosive instability. In that state,
even a small spark, which before could easily have been damped out,
can begin the massive detonation. The spark is sometimes deliber-
ately struck by one of the protagonists, hoping to gain an advantage
from the choice of timing; sometimes it occurs, as it were, spon-
taneously, the chance result of a clash which no political leader con-
sciously planned. Once the explosive state has been reached, war can
begin at any moment. Conceivably it may be delayed, even for some
years; but, unless by rare luck the explosive combination is dena-
tured, it is a never-absent, immediate threat.
The world has now, in relation to the full and open stage of the
Third World War, entered that explosive state. This means that the
full war is not the possibility of a generation from now, to be
debated on at leisure. It might be delayed four or five years, much
more improbably ten; but it may begin at any moment, today, to-
morrow; it may have begun before these sentences are published.
224 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
An airplane shot down, a port shelled by a warship, an army's
march into a neighboring country, an atom bomb dropped on a
great city or an oil field, an arrest and detention, any of hundreds of
events no more intrinsically important than hundreds which have
already occurred, might be the immediate occasion. Or it could be-
gin from a larger, slower fuse, building up through stages in the
expansion of a civil war or a revolt or a border infiltration.
Under these circumstances, the United States cannot carry out a
serious foreign policy, certainly not the policy of democratic world
order, unless it is at every moment ready for war. I do not refer
so much to the details of military preparedness. Essential as these
are, they are secondary, derivative from the more fundamental poUt-
ical readiness, from the realization that policy must, if necessary,
be backed by force, and backed all the way.
Policy must come first, and I again repeat: peace cannot be the
supreme practical objective of policy. In the present world political
^crisis, there is no chance of bluffing so shrewd and informed an
opponent as the communists. Conflicts involving the concrete aims
of American policy are bound to occur, are daily occurring. Where
these are of any consequence, it will mean that their settlement will
be a definite advance or a definite setback for American world ob-
jectives, and, conversely, a definite setback or advance for commu-
nist objectives: one cannot go forward without the other's retreating.
No tougn speeches, no rude notes, no shocked complaints to the
Security Council will appreciably affect the results unless it is true,
and known to be true, that directly back of the words is force, and
that there is a complete readiness on the part of the American lead-
ers to call on the force to implement the words.
The United States is not going to stop the war by wishing for peace.
It is unlikely that this war can be stopped in any case. The only
chance of stopping it is by carrying through a policy the fulfillment
of which would remove the causes of this war. This can be done
only by a constant readiness for war; and readiness for war, therefore,
far from making war more probable, is the indispensable means for
decreasing its probability to the lowest figure that is, under the cir-
cumstances, possible. If war nevertheless comes quickly, there is less
reason for the United States to fear it in conjunction with a policy
IS WAR INEVITABLE? 225
that is certain to improve the relative position of the United States,
than there is to fear a later war which would begin with atomic
weapons on the other side, and the United States' position sapped
perhaps beyond repair by the results of a false policy.
The communists are at the present time ready, but not anxious,
for war.
There are in their ranks no signs of defeatism or of any unwilling-
ness to fight at once if it seems advisable. Indeed, they have been
fighting right along, sometimes on a considerable scale, in many
parts of the world. There is, however, some reason to believe that
they would, on the whole, prefer a delay of ten or fifteen years in the
outbreak of general warfare.
This wish for delay, which is by no means an insurmountable
preference, has an understandable motivation. The parts of the
world which the communists now control are, relative to the United
States and its potential associates, technically and economically back-
ward. In spite of the communist concentration on war industry to
the exclusion of almost everything else, the backwardness means
deficiencies, both quantitative and qualitative, in the production of
armaments. In particular, they still lack atomic weapons and the
means of producing them.* ^y delay, these deficiencies might be at
•During 1946, rumors began to circulate that the Soviet Union did have atomic
weapons. These rumors may be expected to recur from nov/ on. In most cases they
may be traced to communist sources. Though it is difficult to be sure, I am inclined to
doubt them. Through the activities of their agents in the United States, England and
Canada, combined with the work of their own and their captive German scientists, I
take for granted that the communists possess all the important "secrets" of the
manufacture of atomic weapons. Nevertheless, the history of Soviet industry suggests
that it will have great difficulty in meeting, on the necessary large scale, the ex-
tremely high precision standards which are required. If there is no interruption, it
will be done, by way of the method of concentration which the Soviet scheme per-
mits. But not, I think, for a few years more. The planted rumors seem to be, for
the present, an instrument of psychological warfare, designed to induce doubt, fear,
and demoralization. If war started tomorrow, runaors would be used to spread mass
panic in New York, London, Chicago, Detroit and other great cities, and thereby
to get the socially disintegrating effect of atomic weapons without having the weapons
themselves.
W*^*'"*''"
226 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
least in part overcome. With even five years, they would have atomic
weapons ready for use.
The war with Germany caused great material destruction in the
Soviet Union, much o£ it in just those regions which had been
most highly developed during the first three Five Year Plans. The
stories about the many factories saved by being moved intact to the
Urals are much exaggerated. Besides, you cannot move coal mines,
dams, coke ovens, oil fields. The need to repair this damage also
counsels delay.
The war and its aftermath brought, besides the material destruc-
tion, a considerable socio-political disintegration. The war gave the
first big chance for the expression of the fierce accumulated resent-
ment against the communist regime. This took many forms. The
Russian divisions, for example, which fought powerfully for the
Germans under General A. A. Vlasov were the only large "traitor
army" that any of the belligerents succeeded in organizing. The
regime has, since the war ended, taken note of mass anti-communist
behavior by wiping out a number of so-called "autonomous repub-
lics" (the Chechen-Ingush, Crimean, Kalmyk, Volga -German),
whose existence was supposedly guaranteed by "the most democratic
constitution in the world," and by liquidating the Karachev "au-
tonomous region," As the Red Army spread beyond the Soviet
borders, discipline among the ordinary soldiers often broke down,
and desertions were frequent. Under the war conditions, moreover,
it was hard to hold together the complexly woven threads of the
centralized party apparatus.
The leadership, therefore, needs a little time to reconsolidate its
absolute control of the party ranks, the army, and the masses. This
job is being carried out in the usual way, through the primary
mechanism of the gigantic new purge which began in 1946.
On the other hand, the communists believe, with no residue of
doubt, that "capitalist-imperialism" — that is, the non-communist
world — has entered the stage of its permanent decline, and that it is
subject to irreversible internal disintegration. Within a few years,
they believe, the non-communist world will descend into another
economic depression more catastrophic than that of 1929-33. They
believe also that the internal disintegration of capitalism can be
IS WAR INEVITABLE? 227
speeded by the activitdes o£ their own organizations functioning
within the capitahst nations. Delay thus seems to promise a double
relative improvement in the communist position, both by positive
communist advance, and by capitalist deterioration.
A stress on these considerations is responsible for a current of
opinion which exists among the communists, but which does not
find official recognition in the slogans and conduct of the present,
leftist "Seventh Period." * Those influenced by this current are in
favor of a slower, more cautious policy, and a shift to a new Right
period with the customary Right formulas of collaboration and
united fronts. The puHic form of their views was given by Earl
Browder, in the six articles which he wrote for The New Republic
during the summer of 1946, after his journey for conference with his
headquarters in Moscow.f These articles were a bait held out to
the United States government. They said, in effect: just let us com-
plete our present modest plans in Europe, China, and the Middle
East, and we will promise to be good. The United States and the
communists, in permanent "peaceful collaboration," will together
run the world to their mutual happiness and prosperity.
The difference between this view and that expressed in the current
Seventh Period is, needless to repeat, merely tactical. The only ques-
tion is how, in details and in timing, to prepare best for the war
which all communists regard as inevitable. I have already suggested
that a new turn to the Right is not at all inconceivable. In many
ways it would seem a more intelligent tactic, especially toward the
United States. The United States is almost pathetically anxious to
be lulled to political sleep.
However, a wish for a delay in the start of the war is not a symp-
tom of any lack of communist confidence. This confidence, sustained
by the belief in capitalist disintegration, is increased by the recent
war's fresh demonstration of the strength of the geographical and
* See Chapter 6.
t The same position, stated by Browder from the communist side, was given its
American expression by Henry Wallace. The difference between Browder and Wallace
is that Browder knows what he is doing.
228 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
strategic position which the communists now control. Ideologically,
it has unassailable support in the dogma of the inevitability of com-
munist world triumph.
Of still more immediate bearing on present communist tactics
is the communists' belief in their own political superiority. Nega-
tively, they are convinced that "imperialism" is so degenerate and so
torn with "internal contradictions" that the non-communist world,
in its parts and as a whole, is incapable of projecting and following
any serious policy at all. For this view they have, up to now, much
evidence. Positively, they observe the fact that, during the war and
following it, they have at all times, no matter what their material
difficulties, kept the political initiative. Even when they have bluffed
like a poker player raising the limit on a pair of threes, they have
found that their bluff is never called. In Poland or Argentina or
Iran or Italy or Germany, on Tito or Franco or Boris, they always
move first. The non-communist nations either come trailing after, or
shout feeble protests against the runner who jumps the gun.
Thoughts on matters like these help account for the dynamic,
"fast," Left communist policy which now prevails. Like a gambler
in a winning streak, they reason : let's keep going while the going is
good. Let's snatch every opening, fill every vacuum, pry wider every
crack. Let's, in other words, get as much as possible of the next
war's job done before the war begins in earnest. If we irritate the
imperialists, they are, politically, too broken down to do anything
much about us. Even if they should try to, even if our tactics pro-
voke an earlier war, we will have gained more than enough to make
the chance worth taking.
The lock-bolt of the entire structure of communist plans is politi-
cal. For them, everything depends on their continuing to have
political superiority and to maintain the political initiative. If they
do, they win either way, war or no war, war soon or war delayed.
Whatever happens, their policy, with its fixed goal of world con-
quest, will be steadily advancing.
The structure collapses if the lock-bolt is loosened. If the non-
communist world adopts a bold and adequate policy, and takes the
IS WAR INEVITABLE? 229
initiative in carrying it out, the communists will be thrown back on
the political defensive. Then many even of their apparent advantages
would be turned into obstacles. Their morale, dependent on the
sense of political superiority, would be undermined. The political
vacuums into which they now pour would be filled from the oppo-
site direction. The walls of their strategic Eurasian fortress, so ap-
parently firm now as much because of the absence of pressure
without as from strength within, would begin to crumble. The
internal Soviet difficulties, economic and social, would be fed a
rich medium in which to multiply. The communist sections within
the non-communist nations would wilt; in short order they could
be stunted, and rooted out.
The policy of democratic world order promises rapid and maxi-
mum results. It is designed not as a remote future possibility, but for
immediate action. Its dividend payments would begin on the day
of subscription. Within a week it is capable of transforming the
world political situation.
This policy, while providing firmly against attack, is positive and
purposeful. It provides a solution, the only possible non-communist
solution, for the world political crisis. There would be in it no
element of bluff, because it would be based on material power suffi-
cient for its aims; and it is thereby peculiarly suited to forcing the
communists at once on to the defensive. For that very reason, its
tendency would be not to provoke the communists to war, but to
make them, with good reason, fear the beginning of war, and grant
major concessions to forestall it. They would no longer call the
turn.
If war nevertheless came soon, as it might, the communists, de-
prived of political superiority, would be in very poor shape to fight
it. Delay, however, would only weaken them further. Confronted by
the active working of the policy of democratic world order, they
could no longer count on time to improve their condition. They
would find themselves driven on the horns of a most unpleasant
dilemma. Either, facing the ever rising odds against them, they
would become afraid to fight — in which case we would doubtless be
treated to the ironic spectacle of a totalitarian attempt at the ap-
peasement of democracy; or, in desperation, they would try a fling
230 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD
at a last ditch war which, perhaps without great cost in blood and
destruction, they would be sure to lose.
If it stopped short o£ the end, however, even the successful im-
plementation of the policy of democratic world order would not
remove the threat of a new war capable of destroying civilization.
So long as the explosive ingredients remained assembled, the total
war would still continuously impend.
The danger of this war will not disappear until the present Soviet
regime is overthrown, and world communism as a whole rendered
impotent. It is the presence of a high relative concentration of com-
munism alongside of a world society which is still itself non-com-
munist that renders the world political mixture explosive. The
mixture can be denatured by its becoming all-communist, or by
reducing the communist percentage safely below the critical point.
Besides these two, there is no other method.
In the Soviet Union, and in all other countries, it is preferable,
and we ought to prefer, that the smashing of communism should
be accompHshed from within, rather than by a war from the outside.
Communism, however, has grown beyond the powers of any single
people acting alone and unsupported. The defeat of communism
anywhere must be part of the mutual struggle of non-communists
everywhere. It is, moreover, the peoples of the Soviet sphere who
most need aid. When — and only when — they have rid themselves
of their communist masters, we will find it easy enough to solve
the now unanswerable riddle of "how to get along with Russia."
< go to Contents>
Part IV WHAT WILL BE DONE < go to Contents>
19. The Policy of Vacillation < go to Contents>
FIGURE "Part III". — What Could Be Done
12. Political Aims and Social Facts
13. The Break with the Past
14. The Supreme Object of United States Policy: Defensive
15. The Supreme Object of United States Policy: Offensive
16. The Internal Implementation of Foreign Policy
17. World Empire and the Balance of Power
18. Is War Inevitable?
WE DID NOT, at any point in Part III (Chapter titles shown above), raise the question of what the United States will do, but only of what the United States could do, and would do, if it were to adopt and carry through a policy adequate to meet the demands of the present world political crisis.
GOOGLE > "world political crisis" "1947"
- https://www.jstor.org/stable/2704199
- https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1853&context=cwilj
- https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/declaration/
- https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/present-at-the-re-creation/
What the United States will actually do is a problem of a different kind.
In order to predict what probably will happen, we must [ GET A CRYSTAL BALL ]
... first determine what alternatives there are to the possible course which Part III (figure above) has charted.
Part III dealt with a line of action for the United States particularly, and for the non-communist world more generally,
which would be directed by a deliberately adopted, consciously held "supreme policy".
If our reference is merely to conscious policy, to ideas that men are capable of forming in mind and imagination,
we may say at once that there is an infinite number of alternatives to the policy of democratic world order.
GOOGLE >"democratic world order" ( https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/scowcroft-center-for-strategy-and-security/global-strategy-initiative/democratic-order-initiative/shaping-a-new-democratic-world-order/ )
There are no limits, or almost none, to what men can imagine. [ And, the 1947 "sexist bastard" reveals himself! ]
A lively fancy could, in a single afternoon, pull a hundred possible policies out of its mental hat.
The United States might adopt as its "leading policy" a plan for
the colonization of Antarctica, or the conversion of the world's population to Rosicrucianism.
It [ The United States ] might decide that France was the main enemy,
and direct all efforts toward the annihilation of France and Frenchmen.
It [ The United States ] might hold that the "key problem" of the world
was the political unification of the United States and the Soviet Union,
and that to accomplish this end the United States should
make immediate application for membership in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.
It [ The United States ] might undertake the conquest of Tibet,
or simply say that it would never again have anything to do with
anything in the world beyond its own borders.
In a similar way, a man confronted with a heavy invasion of his
rose garden by Japanese beetles might choose simply to ignore them.
Or, he might set out bowls of rum for them,
so that they would become too drunk to be interested in the flowers;
or sing lullabies to make them sleepy.
He might believe in the principle of putting a
fierce watchdog on guard at the garden's gate, or he might write a
letter of protest to the Department of Agriculture.
Any of these, and any of a thousand more, are possible policies for the gardener.
Meanwhile the historical process, through which the beetles continued eating up his roses until
there was not a whole petal left,
would develop according to its own laws, not at all deterred by any of these policies.
If he wishes to protect his garden, those policies are not so much wrong as they are irrelevant.
[THAT IS]They have no significant effect on what is happening.
We have seen that meaningful political choice is narrowly limited
by the structure of social facts, by the concrete situation within which the choice must be made.
A genuine political policy must be of such a kind that it has some real connection with the situation,
and is capable of affecting, at least to some degree, what is to happen.
Otherwise it is, like the various possible United States policies just
listed, irrelevant, a fantasy of the imagination, not a plan for human action.
The facts in the case are that the world has entered a period of the severest possible political crisis,
and that the only two great power groupings, one led by the communists,
the other by the United States as deputy for "Western Civilization", have begun a
struggle for world leadership. [ "WESTERN" BLOC NATIONS - EASTERN BLOC NATIONS ]
The struggle grows out of the given situation.
It is forced on the "protagonists". ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protagonist )
They cannot avoid it, no matter what they consciously decide.
The conditions of the struggle are such, moreover, that one or the other, or perhaps both,
of the contestants must in the end be defeated.
These are the facts.
Only those policies which are based upon an
understanding of these facts, and which propose operation within
the limits which these facts set, can be taken seriously.
The choice of policy, infinitely wide in imagination, is most strictly bounded in reality.
To the basic perspective underlying the policy presented in
Part III, there is in reality no alternative whatever.
No matter what conscious policy is adopted by the United States, and even i£ it has
no policy, the situation will be what it is, and the struggle will go on.
For the United States, as for the communists, there are significant alternatives.
The alternatives, however, are not with respect to the basic issue.
They are all tactical, about the choice of ways and means,
about the degree of consciousness and firmness with which policy
will be carried out. There are "alternative ways" of conducting the
struggle. There is no alternative to the struggle itself.
And there is the not unimportant alternative of : who will win?
The usual American conception of foreign policy is an uneasy
combination of abstract moral sentiment with short-term selfish
interests, both projected without any reference to world political
facts.
How, under the circumstances of the present, could any policy
so conceived be expected to influence events, to succeed, or to gain
anything worth while if it did succeed?
Debate over such conceptions is an exercise in rhetoric, not in politics.
They (these debates) serve as a means
for expressing feeling, not as an instrument for understanding history, or changing it.
For political clarity, it is essential to distinguish between the ques-
tion. What is the situation? - and the separate question.
What shall
we do about it? — with the understanding, of course, [that] what we
do may - in turn - change the situation.
If the world political situation
is, not in every detail (perhaps) but in the main, more or less as it is
described in this book, then what is to be done ?
All answers will be tactical variations of the three possible judgments.
(1) Either nothing should be done, and the struggle allowed to take its own course.
(2) Or the communist plan for world leadership should be actively fur-
thered.
(3) Or the United States should accept the responsibility of the
struggle, and should, consciously, try to win it.
If the last judgment is accepted, there is still a wide enough scope for debate.
There will still be the problems of means and methods, and there are better
and worse ways of winning.
If the situation is not as here described, then what is wrong with
the description?
What is the evidence that it is false? [HOW DO WE PROVE A NEGATIVE?]
It will not be proved false by being found disagreeable.
Nearly everyone knows by now [that] the whole question of United States foreign policy,
and of world politics, centers in the problem of the relation between the United States and the Soviet Union
(though it is less widely understood that the Soviet Union is primarily significant
- not as an ordinary nation among nations, but as the chief base of world communism). [ LINK ]
The two most vehement and coherent positions taken on this problem by United States public
opinion are those of Appeasement and of a new form of Isolationism.
The unremitting source of the appeasement point of view is the
communist propaganda machine.
Its most publicly conspicuous adherents, however, have been such conspicuous men as Henry Wal-
lace, Claude Pepper, Elliott Roosevelt, and Joseph E. Davies.
Its ostensible thesis is simple.
The Russians (whom the "appeasers" systematically confuse with the communists)
are friendly, co-operative, hard-working, unaggressive people, in fact just like Americans.
Contents [ Russian History ]
- 1Prehistory
- 2Antiquity
- 3Early history
- 4Grand Duchy of Moscow (1283–1547)
- 5Tsardom of Russia (1547–1721)
- 6Russian Empire (1721–1917)
- 6.1Population
- 6.2Peter the Great
- 6.3Catherine the Great
- 6.4Ruling the Empire (1725–1825)
- 6.5Alexander I and victory over Napoleon
- 6.6Nicholas I and the Decembrist Revolt
- 6.7Russian Army
- 6.8Russian society in the first half of 19th century
- 6.9The Crimean War
- 6.10Alexander II and the abolition of serfdom
- 6.11Russian society in the second half of 19th century
- 6.12Autocracy and reaction under Alexander III
- 6.13Nicholas II and new revolutionary movement
- 6.14Revolution of 1905
- 6.15World War I
- 7Russian Civil War (1917–1922)
- 8Soviet Union (1922–1991)
- 8.1Creation of the Soviet Union
- 8.2War Communism and the New Economic Policy
- 8.3Changes to Russian society
- 8.4Industrialization and collectivization
- 8.5Stalinist repression
- 8.6Soviet Union on the international stage
- 8.7World War II
- 8.8Cold War
- 8.9De-Stalinization and the era of stagnation
- 8.10Soviet space program
- 8.11Perestroika and breakup of the Union
- 9Russian Federation (1991–present)
- 10Historiography
- 11See also
- 12References
- 13Further reading
Their leaders (the Russian leaders) have a few absurd ideas, but these are a hangover
from the past, and nothing to worry about.
"They" believe in the "common man", and in real economic and "social democracy".
If they have an approach to "political democracy" not quite like ours, well, every-
one is entitled to his tastes, and, besides, our views and theirs are steadily getting closer together.
They want only peace and prosperity, and a chance to improve their lot for the sake of themselves
and the world.
If they are still a bit touchy and suspicious of us {"Americans"],
that is because we have treated them so badly in the past, and because "war-mongers"-in our midst
- stir up distrust by spreading lies about them.
All that we have to do, then, is to prove that we are fair and
square by giving them what they feel they need for their political
security, shipping to them food and commodities and machines to
build up their country, turning over to them the secrets of atomic
weapons, assuring democracy everywhere by having "communists" in
all governments, stopping "warlike gestures" like building bases and
sending warships on tours, and preventing fascist-minded Americans
from provoking them by telling truths out of season.
Traditional isolationism has evaporated under the hot sun of two world wars.
No one can even dream any longer of a virginal United
States, pure, serene and satisfied behind its ocean ramparts and its
continental boundaries, guarded from the filth of the diseased Old Worlds of Europe and Asia.
But the heart of isolationism was never geographical.
The geographical expression was a temporary
mode, correlated with those stages in United States development
when the primary historical tasks were the conquest of its own
internal frontier and the welding of its own national unity, and
when armament was restricted in effective range.
Below the "isolationist geography" there has always been a historical, a moral idea.
It is the notion, not without its grandeur for all its falsity, that the
United States is not as other nations are.
It is the vision of a New World of new hope and new promise, taken naively, literally.
The "United States", as seen in the images of this vision, grew from fresh
seed in new soil, without roots in the past, unmixed with the weeds
that so choked the crops of other lands.
It The "United States"] must draw its strength
from its own rich, untainted earth; it must be shielded from those
osmotic contacts through which the ancient infections might flow.
Hence, America First and Unique, its own star - not part of any constellation,
its destiny unentangled with common human fate.
The emotions out of which this vision grew remain, and express
themselves through new forms, distorted and degraded by the in-
exorable pressure of a historical reality in which they can have no
natural outlet.
These "new forms" are grossly manifest in the Chicago Tribune or the New York Daily News;
they show more honestly in the failing politics of the LaFollettes or Burton K. Wheeler; and
they become dignified in the refined nostalgia of Charles A. Beard.
The "new isolationism" has expanded its provincial geography to include,
within the boundaries of its idea of the United States, all of the Americas and much of the Pacific.
But it retains intact the sense of the uniqueness of the United States, and the conviction that
the United States must go its own unentangled way.
All international organizations are to be mistrusted and preferably avoided. [ NATO history ]
There must be no alliances, certainly no unions, and no admission to "alien philosophies."
In political effect and practice, the new isolationism is belligerently nationalist.
The United States, it declares, seeks only to go its
own way and to safeguard its own interests.
Let other nations choose their own particular route to damnation — communist, socialist, im-
perialist, fascist.
It is no business of the United States', so long as
they don't interfere with United States affairs.
In the world as it exists, however, the affairs of the United States are everywhere, and
there is always interference.
The "new isolationism" is thus forced to be,
not simply indifferent to the rest of the world, as it would like
to be, but actively anti-foreign.
It [the United States] refuses to admit the interdepend-
ence of all the present world, and the impossibility of the United
States' divorcing itself from the world's political destiny.
It [the United States] refuses to intervene responsibly and positively in the grave international
problems which determine the political health of a world that includes
the United States — the problems of India or the Balkans or commu-
nism or Iran or Western Europe or Palestine. . . .
India "history" - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India#History
or the "Balkans" "history" - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balkans
or "communism" "history" -- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communism :: history
or Iran "history" -- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran#History
or Western Europe "history" -- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Europe
or Palestine "history" -- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_Palestine
But - what is done about the "problems", in spite of the refusal, most intimately affects the United States.
The result is that "isolationism" succeeds in disentangling the United States from the rest of the world
- only in the sense that it [ "isolationism" ] tends to turn all the rest of the world against the United States.
Since it is unwilling to seek or accept more fruitful connections,
it reduces international relations to their bare and sterile minimum, to force alone.
Denouncing all other points of view as leading to war through entanglement,
it [the United States] makes war more probable than ever
- by refusing to admit any method, other than war,
of mediating the "critical issues" which, in spite of isolationism, will continue to arise.
Appeasement and isolationism seem, to American public opinion and to each other,
the ultimate opposites in the debates over United States foreign policy.
-- United States foreign policy: SOURCE: https://www.state.gov/ > Policy Issues:
Policy Issues [ year 2022 ]
Anti-Corruption and Transparency |
Refugee and Humanitarian Assistance Science, Technology, and Innovation |
h | h |
Certainly appeasers and isolationists reserve for each other their fiercest invective.
The Chicago Tribune's contemptuous cartoons of Wallace are equaled only by Wallace's bitter
jibes at the Tribune.
Certainly, if we stick to the verbal surface, no two positions could seem more irreconcilable.
Nevertheless, if we relate words to facts, and examine these apparent opposites in their
historical frame, in terms of political consequences, we discover that the differences melt and blur.
Though each gives a very different account of the political world we live in, both accounts are equally false.
The proposals of both, based on the false descriptions, are equally incapable of fulfillment.
In their political consequences, in their ??eilect?? upon the key problem
of present world politics, they are identical.
Both, in their different ways and from their different motivations, offer a free rein to the communists.
Either, directing United States policy, would permit the "communists" — unhampered by the isolationists, positively aided
by the appeasers — to carry forward their own "communist world policy" ...
[ https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v08/d473 ]
The specific present [ circa 1947] communist policy is the strategic and political preparation
for the open stage of the Third World War, the war in which "communism" will be fighting against the United
States and for control of the world. [ WHICH IS LITERALLY IMPOSSIBLE: "communism" IS A BELIEF - AND THE us IS A "COUNTRY" ]
The practical meaning of both appeasement and isolationism is, therefore, simply:
no interference with the communists.
A surer guarantee of war, and of war disastrous for the United States, is hard to imagine.
On the other hand, neither appeasement nor isolationism, even if entirely successful,
offers any positive solution to the world political crisis (1947), or - to the problem of atomic weapons.
[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_1947_crises ]
For all their exchange of insults, they are identical in their sins of omission,
as in their sins of commission.
They fail to propose what is necessary. What they do propose is, and most fatally, wrong.
Early in 1946 there was an apparent shift in United States diplomatic behavior, which was taken by many observers to be a turn
to a policy of "getting tough with Russia."
I have remarked that this turn was chiefly rhetorical.
-- By calling a policy "rhetorical," I mean that its words do not correspond with its actions.
In politics, it is the actions, not the words, that count;
or, rather, the words count only so far as they correctly express a line of action.
The rhetorical nature of at least the earlier stage of the 1946 toughness was plainly shown by the Iranian episode which first
prompted it.
The Soviet Union had directly violated its treaties and agreements with Iran, the Teheran agreement, and the Charter of
the United Nations.
[ SOURCE: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943CairoTehran/d551 ] "... Home Historical Documents Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 Document 551 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, THE CONFERENCES AT CAIRO AND TEHRAN, 1943 "Roosevelt Papers" Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill1 29 January 1944. (Translation) Personal and secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to Presiden[t] Fr[a]nklin D. Roosevelt and Prime-Minister Winston Churchill On January 23 I have received your two joint messages, signed by you, Mr. President, and you, Mr. Prime-Minister, on the question of transference for the use of the Soviet Union of Italian vessels.2 I have to say, that after your joint affirmative reply in Teheran to my question regarding the transference to the Soviet Union of Italian vessels before the end of January, 1944, I considere[d] this question as settled and it did not occur to me that there was a possibility of revision of this accepted and agreed upon, among the three of us, decision. So much the more, as we came to an agreement, that in the course of December and January this question should have been settled with the Italians as well. Now I see that this is not so, and that the Italians have not been approached on that question at all. In order not to delay, however, this matter, which is of vital importance for our common struggle against Germany, the Soviet Government is ready to accept your proposal …3 In your reply, however, is no mention made of the transference to the Soviet Union of eight Italian squadron destroyers and four submarines, regarding the transference of which to the Soviet Union still at the end of January, you Mr. President, and you Mr. Prime-Minister, gave your consent in Teheran. Undoubtedly for the Soviet Union primarily is this question, the question regarding destroyers and submarines, without which the transference of a battleship and [Page 874]a cruiser is of no value. You will understand yourself that cruisers and battleships are powerless without destroyers escorting them. Since you have at your disposal the whole Italian naval fleet, fulfillment of the decision agreed upon in Teheran pertaining to the transference for the use of the Soviet Union of eight destroyers and four submarines from this fleet should not be difficult. I agree, that instead of Italian destroyers and submarines the Soviet Union be given to use the same number of American or English destroyers and submarines. Besides, the question of transference of destroyers and submarines cannot be postponed, but must be solved simultaneously with the transference of the battleship and cruiser, as it was agreed upon, among the three of us, in Teheran.4 1. Roosevelt’s copy was presumably sent via the Soviet Embassy, Washington.↩ 2. The joint message of January 23, 1944, printed in Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. ii, p. 115, conveyed to Stalin (1) the conclusions set forth in the memorandum of the Combined Chiefs of Staff mentioned in Churchill’s telegram of January 16 1944, ante, p. 871, and (2) a proposal, which Churchill had made to Roosevelt in the same telegram, for the temporary transfer to the Soviet Union of certain non-Italian ships instead of the surrendered Italian ships.↩ 3. The omitted passage, which does not refer to the Tehran Conference, is printed in Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. ii, p. 117.↩ 4. Churchill, in a telegram to Roosevelt dated February 1, 1944, repeated the text of this message which he had received from Stalin and added the comment: “What can you expect from a bear but a growl?” (Roosevelt Papers). Further passing references to the Tehran agreement on Italian ships, in correspondence of February 1944 with Stalin, will be found in Stalin’s Correspondence, vol. ii, pp. 118, 122.↩ ..."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran#Qajars
"... Qajars
Main article: Qajar Iran
In 1795, following the disobedience of the Georgian subjects and their alliance with the Russians, the Qajars captured Tbilisi by the Battle of Krtsanisi, and drove the Russians out of the entire Caucasus, reestablishing the Iranian suzerainty over the region.
A map showing the 19th-century northwestern borders of Iran, comprising modern-day eastern Georgia, Dagestan, Armenia, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, before being ceded to the neighboring Russian Empire by the Russo-Iranian wars
The Russo-Iranian wars of 1804–1813 and 1826–1828 resulted in large irrevocable territorial losses for Iran in the Caucasus, comprising all of the South Caucasus and Dagestan, which made part of the very concept of Iran for centuries,[21] and thus substantial gains for the neighboring Russian Empire.
As a result of the 19th-century Russo-Iranian wars, the Russians took over the Caucasus, and Iran irrevocably lost control over its integral territories in the region (comprising modern-day Dagestan, Georgia, Armenia, and Republic of Azerbaijan), which got confirmed per the treaties of Gulistan and Turkmenchay.[22][132] The area to the north of Aras River, among which the contemporary Republic of Azerbaijan, eastern Georgia, Dagestan, and Armenia are located, were Iranian territory until they were occupied by Russia in the course of the 19th century.[22][133][134][135][136][137][138]
As Iran shrank, many South Caucasian and North Caucasian Muslims moved towards Iran,[139][140] especially until the aftermath of the Circassian Genocide,[140] and the decades afterwards, while Iran's Armenians were encouraged to settle in the newly incorporated Russian territories,[141][142][143] causing significant demographic shifts.
Around 1.5 million people—20 to 25% of the population of Iran—died as a result of the Great Famine of 1870–1872.[144]
The first national Iranian Parliament was established in 1906 during the Persian Constitutional Revolution
Between 1872 and 1905, a series of protests took place in response to the sale of concessions to foreigners by Qajar monarchs Naser-ed-Din and Mozaffar-ed-Din, and led to the Constitutional Revolution in 1905. The first Iranian constitution and the first national parliament of Iran were founded in 1906, through the ongoing revolution. The Constitution included the official recognition of Iran's three religious minorities, namely Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians,[145] which has remained a basis in the legislation of Iran since then. The struggle related to the constitutional movement was followed by the Triumph of Tehran in 1909, when Mohammad Ali Shah was defeated and forced to abdicate. On the pretext of restoring order, the Russians occupied northern Iran in 1911 and maintained a military presence in the region for years to come. But this did not put an end to the civil uprisings and was soon followed by Mirza Kuchik Khan's Jungle Movement against both the Qajar monarchy and foreign invaders.
Reza Shah, the first Pahlavi king of Iran, in military uniform
Despite Iran's neutrality during World War I, the Ottoman, Russian and British empires occupied the territory of western Iran and fought the Persian Campaign before fully withdrawing their forces in 1921. At least 2 million Persian civilians died either directly in the fighting, the Ottoman perpetrated anti-Christian genocides or the war-induced famine of 1917-1919. A large number of Iranian Assyrian and Iranian Armenian Christians, as well as those Muslims who tried to protect them, were victims of mass murders committed by the invading Ottoman troops, notably in and around Khoy, Maku, Salmas, and Urmia.[146][147][148][149][150]
Apart from the rule of Agha Mohammad Khan, the Qajar rule is characterized as a century of misrule.[115] The inability of Qajar Iran's government to maintain the country's sovereignty during and immediately after World War I led to the British directed 1921 Persian coup d'état and Reza Shah's establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty. Reza Shah, became the new Prime Minister of Iran and was declared the new monarch in 1925.
Pahlavis
Main article: Pahlavi Iran
See also: Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran
In the midst of World War II, in June 1941, Nazi Germany broke the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and invaded the Soviet Union, Iran's northern neighbor. The Soviets quickly allied themselves with the Allied countries and in July and August, 1941 the British demanded that the Iranian government expel all Germans from Iran. Reza Shah refused to expel the Germans and on 25 August 1941, the British and Soviets launched a surprise invasion and Reza Shah's government quickly surrendered.[151] The invasion's strategic purpose was to secure a supply line to the USSR (later named the Persian Corridor), secure the oil fields and Abadan Refinery (of the UK-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company), prevent a German advance via Turkey or the USSR on Baku's oil fields, and limit German influence in Iran. Following the invasion, on 16 September 1941 Reza Shah abdicated and was replaced by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, his 21-year-old son.[152][153][154]
The Allied "Big Three" at the 1943 Tehran Conference.
During the rest of World War II, Iran became a major conduit for British and American aid to the Soviet Union and an avenue through which over 120,000 Polish refugees and Polish Armed Forces fled the Axis advance.[155] At the 1943 Tehran Conference, the Allied "Big Three"—Joseph Stalin, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill—issued the Tehran Declaration to guarantee the post-war independence and boundaries of Iran. However, at the end of the war, Soviet troops remained in Iran and established two puppet states in north-western Iran, namely the People's Government of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Mahabad. This led to the Iran crisis of 1946, one of the first confrontations of the Cold War, which ended after oil concessions were promised to the USSR and Soviet forces withdrew from Iran proper in May 1946. The two puppet states were soon overthrown and the oil concessions were later revoked.[156][157]
1951–1978: Mosaddegh, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi ..."
It [ The Soviet Union ] had begun the process of drawing Iran into the concentric ring system, by transforming northern Iran into a puppet dependency, and gaining an orienting influence in Iran as a whole. ( see above ) The spokesmen for the United States, at the Security Council and in public declarations, grew very indignant about the Soviet behavior. They ( spokesmen for the United States ) used "tough words" in place of the uniformly gracious phrasing that had made up the appeasement rhetoric of the preceding four and a half years. However, the communists knew that the United States was not taking, and had no intention of taking, any action ... political, economic or military, in connection with the "Iranian affair". This was well known, also, to the Iranian government. There should have been no surprise, therefore, at the result. The "tough rhetoric" bounded off the resilient hide of Gromyko, and was disregarded. The communists went ahead according to plan — their plan. They withdrew the formal units of the Red Army only after they had sufficiently secured their position within Iran. At the same time, the Iranians were given a lesson in how much help they could expect from the United States. The Iranian orbit began to be determined by the communist gravitational field. A much stronger counter-force than would have been enough in January, 1946, will now be required to break it away. The mere rhetoric of toughness does not constitute a special policy. The policy continues to be defined by the substance of action. The rhetorical toughness is only, in fact, a kind of seasoning added to the mush of appeasement. A doting mother, along with her fond plead- ing, occasionally shakes her finger and says, "Naughty," when her spoiled child continues to be rude before company. But her attitude and her objectives do not change — nor, for that matter, does the child. However, it is possible that the rhetorical toughness with Russia will develop into a real toughness. It is important to insist that a mere "tough with Russia" poHcy does not coincide with the policy of democratic world order. Indeed, just as the rhetorical toughness is a variant of the policy of appeasement, so might a real toughness amount to no more than a variant of isolationism. The policy of democratic world order does, it is true, include real toughness — though toughness with communism rather than with Russia. This toughness, however, is only part of a more complex orientation which is internationahst in the widest sense, not nation- alist. A leading function is assigned to the United States, not because of any supposed moral virtues which the United States possesses, but because of the existing power relationships which permit the ful- fillment of the internationalist purpose only through United States leadership. The policy aims not at the defeat of Russia, but at its liberation, at the victory of the Russian people over their totaUtarian rulers. It proposes the defeat of world communism, but only as a negative and lesser phase of a task whose positive objective is the construction of a world political order within which civilization can breathe again. The policy of democratic world order aims not to reinforce the divisions in the world but to bring the world together, and to bind the United States to the rest of the world. Mere toughness, in contrast, would be no more than the end- product of a national isolationism. It would be divisive, not inte- grating. It would mark off the United States from the rest of the world, and found the case of the United States on the sole plea of ungloved power. Its maximum success would prove negative and sterile. Conceivably the Red Army would be crushed in battle, but the conditions of the world political crisis would remain untouched, and therefore the crisis itself would be in no measure solved. The world would be no nearer a workable political order. Policy unsupported by power is empty; but power divorced from correct policy is sterile. This is a law of politics which recent experi- ence should be making well known to the United States. In Ger- many, Austria, Italy, France, there has been no lack of United States power. That power has led to nothing of benefit to the United States, to those nations themselves, or to the. world. It has not because the power has not been controlled by a policy which could put the power to fruitful use. If we are to judge by the evidence up to now at hand, we must believe it unlikely that the United States will adopt any sustained, consistent, long-term world policy. It is not merely unlikely that it will adopt and carry through an adequate policy — the policy, namely, of democratic world order; it seems unHkely that it will even adopt and stick to any single version of incorrect policy. The leaders of the government are under two sets of interacting pressures, one from the outside, from the international arena, the other from within. The habitual practice of American politicians is opportunistic in the most immediate sense: they try to worm their way through the maze of these pressures by yielding, responding, occasionally reacting to them as they arise and vary from day to day. They seldom lift their vision to a level from which they could get knowledge of the pressure system as a whole, in order, with the help of that knowledge, to try to create an independent force which might control and direct the resultant energy of the entire sytem. They are more likely to weigh a shift in foreign policy against a million votes in the next election than against the effect of the shift on the alignment of world political forces — though that effect, if adverse, may before long lose much more than an election. We may, then, expect to find, at any given moment in the govern- ment's conduct of world affairs, an admixture of several mutually incompatible policies — three parts appeasement with one part tough- ness; two parts isolationism with two parts World Government; and so on. Over a period of time, we may expect the successive predomi- nance of first one and then another of the various possible policies. Moods of toughness, appeasement, isolationism, internationalism, and chauvinism will (unless, of course, open war cuts the series) replace and overlap each other. In short, the evidence suggests that the United States in world aflairs will have a policy of vacillation. A policy of vacillation is perhaps the worst of all policies. Even a poor policy, resolutely carried through, will usually produce much better results than a policy of vacillation, as in science a false hy- pothesis is often more useful than no hypothesis at all. Under a policy of vacillation, everything adds up to nothing, because one action in one direction merely cancels out another in a different di- rection. Your own followers are disoriented and demoralized. Your friends, who cannot count on you from one week to the next, are disheartened. Because they know that, whatever your promises, a sudden change may leave them in the lurch, they drop away. Your enemies, if they keep their heads, can go merrily and scornfully forward. A vacillating attitude toward the storm on the horizon — one mo- ment running up all sails to try to fly before it, the next trimming down to head into its teeth, then dropping anchor to ride it out — does not, unfortunately, ensure any vacillation on the storm's part. It will come on at its own rate, and break at its own time. Your ^ indecjsipn wUl have rijeaftt only that, when the squall strikes, you v/iTl be least read|y,.tfi.m^^^^- < go to Contents> 20. The Outcome < go to Contents> I HAVE ALREADY STATED my belief that the policy of democratic world order would prove successful. From the point of view of the United States, success for this policy, or for any policy, would, in the first place, mean the assurance of survival. Negatively, success would mean the defeat of the communist plan for world conquest and the reduction of communist power to insignificance. But, given the existing world political situation, success must mean much more. It must include a method for controlling atomic weapons, which, we have seen, can only be through an absolute monopoly in their production and possession. It must provide for the organization of a world political system which would be workable and through which a general, total war could be prevented. These two requirements, which are of no more special concern to the United States than to the world at large, can also be fulfilled by this policy. In addition, though here we look beyond the present historical period to which alone this policy is directly relevant, the achieve- ment of its specific aims could be used as a "bridge" toward the goal of a genuine world government. All this is not merely logically possible. With the available means, it could actually be done. With a determined leadership in, and by, the United States, it would be done. I do not wish to suggest that it could be done easily, or with small cost. The most optimistic account of the present state of the world will be very black. The most hopeful route out of the crisis will be hard and painful and, most probably, bloody. The determined leadership may arise, in response to the world challenge. What if it does not, what then will be the outcome ? If it does not, the United States will follow what I have described as a policy of vacillation. This policy will in no way check the inten- sification of the crisis, or the progress of the world struggle. The struggle will go, and the flood of war will break at a moment for which, because of the very nature o£ the policy, the United States cannot be prepared. The initiative, the timing will be under the control of the antagonist. We do not need access to secret files in order to know that the military leadership.Qf«tbf,,nilited States. i&;-a-ware of the possibility, even probability, of the war, and is, in a military sense, preparing for it. Military preparation, however, is the instrument of policy; and political unpreparedness condemns even the most perfect mili- tary measures to futility. Under the assumption of a policy of vacillation, let us consider briefly the prospects of the war. Since the enemy, under the assumption, will have at his disposal greater manpower and a better strategic position, the primary reli- ance of the military leadership must be on technical, and to a lesser extent on quantitative, superiority in armament. The strategic plan must be, it would seem, to strike an immediate, paralyzing blow with atomic weapons at the Caucasian oil fields, Moscow, and a dozen or more of the chief Soviet and Soviet-controlled cities and industrial concentrations. There is reason to believe that some among the military leaders think that with this blow the war would be virtually over, and that the Soviet Union, deprived of war potential, ^vould have to quit within a few weeks. In 1946, it is doubtful that there exist the technical means for delivering a simultaneous, mass blow into the depths of the Heart- land. Let us assume, however, that this technical problem will have been solved, as it no doubt soon will be. In any case, even without its full solution, colossal material destruction could be brought about. But if, by then, the Soviet Union also has atomic weapons, the United States will receive as well as launch a mass attack in the first stage. In fact, with a United States policy of "vacillation", and with the totalitarian freedom from public responsibility, it is almost certain that the communist attack will have come first. Presumably, the United States will have prepared its atomic installations so that they at least will survive the attack, and retaliation will be possible (if not, the United States will have lost before beginning) , We have already noted that United States industry, more highly developed, more concentrated, more integrated, is also and because of those very characteristics more vulnerable to atomic attack than Soviet industry. At the same time, the American social structure is more intimately dependent on industry than the Soviet structure. We should therefore expect that the relative damage done by the initial communist atomic attack on the United States will be greater than the damage done by the United States attack on the Soviet Union. However, the attacks would tend, more or less, to cancel each other out. They would not end a short war, but begin a war of incomparable length and magnitude. The huge material damage on both sides, so great that during the course of the war it will never be made up, will have the effect of lessening the importance of the technical factor in the conduct of the war. Manpower, morale, appeals to the peoples of the world, in general the political factors, will become more and more decisive. With the continued assumption of a United States policy of vacillation, this change in the nature of the struggle will throw the advantage more and more heavily to the side of the communists. Their greater direct manpower reserves will be supplemented by the mass populations of the colonies and undeveloped nations, which the lack of positive United States policy will have left open to communist influence. Western Europe will probably have been brought under communist domination before the start of the war. If not, if it is still somehow standing, divided nationally and socially, riddled with communist organizations, it will fall to pieces at the first big communist push. Within the United States itself, and inside all of her allies, the communist parties and agents, permitted by the policy of vacillation to thrive imbedded in all the vital national organs, will erupt into material and psychologi- cal sabotage, before which loyal citizens, politically unprepared, will be comparatively helpless. The end, the defeat of the United States, will be delayed, but almost certain. Let us suppose, on the other hand, that when the war begins the Soviet Union does not yet have atomic weapons. [ SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_atomic_bomb_project ] "... On 29 August 1949, the Soviet Union secretly conducted its first successful weapon test (First Lightning, based on the American "Fat Man" design) at the Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakhstan.[2] ..." Then, of course, there will be no immediate retaliation to the initial mass atomic attack by the United States. This means that the first stage of the war will be a gigantic victory for the United States. If this victory were part of an adequate positive policy, it would, in all probability, be the end of the war. In the eyes of all the peoples of the world, including those of the subjects of the Soviet regime, it would mean much more than a mere display of unprecedented material force. It would be seen in relation to a plan, already in operation, which promised a solution of the world crisis. Everyone, except the com- munist leadership itself, would know that he had something to gain by stopping the war. The pre-war functioning of the policy would have blocked the communists from completing their strategic and political preparations, would have reduced or rooted out the internal communists, and would have shown the people the meaning of the struggle. It would have acted to neutralize the communist penetration of China, India, Islam, the East Indies, Latin America. Instead of the slender human resources of the United States, joined with some others in a precarious ad hoc alliance for the war, the peoples of the non-communist world, and the non-communist peoples of the communist world, would be in the process of coming together not for a war but for the creative task of building a humane world political order. The communists could recover from the physical blow of the initial attack only if they had superior political reserves on which to draw. Deprived of these, they would have little chance, even for a delaying action. The prospect at once darkens -if we keep to the more likely assumption of a policy of vacillation. True enough, the communists could not avoid the terrible defeat in the initial stage. But, with their political arsenal immune to the atomic blast, they would not sur- render. They would abandon their vulnerable great cities and factories, as the Athenians, knowing that they could neither defend nor use it, abandoned their city to the Persian hordes. They would give up the idea of a war fought with all modern conveniences. They would transform the struggle into a political war, a "people's war," fought in every district of the world by irregulars, partisans, guerillas, Fifth Columns, spies, stool pigeons, assassins, fought by sabotage and strikes and lies and terror and diversion and panic and revolt. They would play on every fear and prejudice of the United States population, every feeling of guilt or nobility; they would exploit every racial and social division; they would widen every antagonism between tentative allies; and they would tirelessly wear down the United States will to endure. Though the result would be not quite so certain, perhaps, as if the communists also had atomic weapons, they would in the end, I think, succeed. Because of the lack of a positive United States policy, because it would not have presented to the world even the possibility of a political solution, its dreadful material strength would appear to the peoples as the unrelieved brutality of a murderer. Its failure to distinguish between the communist regime and that regime's subject-victims would weld together the victims and their rulers. Americans (themselves) would be sickened and conscience-ridden by what would seem to them a senseless slaughter, never-ending, lead- ing nowhere. The military leadership would be disoriented by the inability of their plans based on technical superiority to effect a decision. The failure to conceive the struggle "politically" would have given the communists the choice of weapons. From the standpoint of the United States, the entire world would have been turned into an ambush and a desert. In the long night, nerves would finally crack, the sentries would fire their last shots wildly into the darkness, and it would all be over. There can be no illusion about the meaning of defeat in the next total war. We are long past those youthful wars of the springtime of a civilization, which are part of the exuberance of lusty growth. We have left behind the wars that are the professional business of a small social class that doesn't have much else to do, or the polite wars which, after much maneuvering and small fighting, adjust a dynasty or a kink in a border. We are fighting the Punic Wars and the civil wars of the climax of the Time of Troubles, the wars of annihilation. Roosevelt, in the Second World War, impelled by a fatality which he doubtless did not understand, revealed by his ominous slogan the nature of our age. For the first time in the history of the wars of Western Civilization, the objective had become Unconditional Surrender — final defeat, utter, crushing, absolute. Under a continued policy of vacillation, the defeat and annihila- tion of the United States are probable. It is less certain, however, that the defeat of the United States will automatically mean the victory of the Soviet Union and world communism. In the prolonged struggle, especially if it is fought by both sides with atomic weapons, it may be that both contestants will be destroyed, that they will destroy each other. The exhaustion, the human and material de- struction, might well go beyond the point where social recuperation is possible. This has happened before. In the Peloponnesian Wars, victorious Sparta was destroyed no less than defeated Athens, as the battle of Leuctra soon showed; and all Greece was opened to easy conquest, first by Macedon and then by Rome. It happened in the case of Byzantine Civilization, whose internal blood-letting permitted the entry of the Ottoman Turks; and it happened in other civilizations centered in the Near East, and in China.* All of Western Civilization, all, that is, of those parts of the world whose social structure is now dependent upon an advanced level of industry and technology, would be enmeshed in this total defeat. But what then? The intolerable world political crisis, which is fundamentally the crisis of Western Civilization in its necessarily world-wide repercussions, would still exist, in a still more aggravated form. In the premature travail of Napoleon, and by three world wars, the West would have proved that it could not solve its own crisis. In the attempt it would have used up its resources for possible solution. But Western Civilization, we have been careful to observe, is not all of human society. The exhaustion of the West would have affected only the imposed Western veneer of the other existing civilizations. Into the vacuum of the West there might well then flow a tide from China or India or Islam. The political order of a Universal Empire would be imposed from without, and the Western peoples would enter the last stage of their history as the imperial proletariat. * C£. Arnold J. Toynb'ee, op. cit. The United States must choose. When the cry of the drowning man has once been heard, it does no good to stop our ears. There is no way of release from the awful responsibility of choice; Pilate's refusal to choose is also, we know, a choice. Individual men, through the mystery of what our theologians call "God's Grace", if they fail once, are always given another chance, a chance to repent and choose again. This does not seem to be the law of the history of societies. History offers each of its great challenges only once. After only one failure, or one refusal, the offer is withdrawn. Babylon, Athens, Thebes, Alexandria, Madrid, Vienna ??? ink back, and do not rise again. Nor is there any prior bargaining over the terms and the time of the challenge. It may be that the darkness of great tragedy will bring to a quick end the short, bright history of the United States — for there is enough truth in the dream of the New World to make the action tragic. The United States is called before the rehearsals are completed. Its strength and promise have not been matured by the wisdom of time and suffering. And the summons is for nothing less than the leadership of the world, for that or nothing. If it is reasonable to expect failure, that is only a measure of how great the triumph could be. < The END > < go to Contents>
6-10-2022
"Guided democracy" "managed democracy" in "Russia" > "Sovereign democracy" > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_democracy
WOULD a de facto "authoritarian government" - STINK so bad ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authoritarianism )
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_rose_by_any_other_name_would_smell_as_sweet - "A rose by any other name would smell as sweet"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Russia#The_era_of_Putin
SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guided_democracy :: "... Guided democracy, also called managed democracy, is a formally democratic government that functions as a de facto authoritarian government or in some cases, as an autocratic government. Such governments are legitimized by elections that are free and fair, but do not change the state's policies, motives, and goals.
In other words, the government controls elections so that the people can exercise all their rights without truly changing public policy. While they follow basic democratic principles, there can be major deviations towards authoritarianism.
Under "managed democracy", the state's continuous use of propaganda techniques prevents the electorate from having a significant impact on policy.
After World War II, the term was used in Indonesia for the approach to government under the Sukarno administration from 1957 to 1966.
It is today widely employed in Russia, where it was introduced into common practice by Kremlin theorists, in particular Gleb Pavlovsky . [4] ..."
( 4 ) SOURCE: https://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1001/p07s02-woeu.html
"... TITLE > "Kremlin lobs another shot at marketplace of ideas"
The takeover of an independent polling firm is the latest move under 'managed democracy.'
October 1, 2003 -- By Fred Weir Special to The Christian Science Monitor
(MOSCOW)
The proverbial canary in the mineshaft of Russia's ongoing democratic experiment may well be Yury Levada, a pioneering sociologist whose roller-coaster career has tracked the political vicissitudes of the past 50 years here. [ "Levada Center" :: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Levada_Center ]
Fired from his academic job under Leonid Brezhnev, reinstated by reforming Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Mr. Levada has lately been showing signs of distress under the presidency of Vladimir Putin.
In early September, employing a Soviet-era technicality, the Russian government took control of the independent All-Russian Center for Public Opinion and Market Research (VTsIOM), founded and until last month headed by Levada, and replaced its governing board of professional sociologists with officials from the Kremlin and various state ministries.
After VTsIOM's management was forcibly changed, Levada and his entire staff of 100 abandoned the offices and equipment they had used for 15 years and set up a new private polling agency, which they named VTsIOM-A.
"I've always just tried to do my job," says Levada, a jovial, white-haired bear of a man. "Sometimes I notice that someone doesn't like it. Just now, I can see they don't like it."
Critics warn that the attempt to put Levada out of business is part of a larger Putin-era pattern, which Kremlin theorists call "managed democracy."
The idea is to maintain outward democratic forms, while ensuring that those in power are not actually challenged by serious opposition or trenchant criticism. Over the past three years all independent Russian TV networks have been taken over by Kremlin-friendly companies and the rest of the press straitjacketed by tough new laws and a pervasive culture of self-censorship.
"The security sweep that has already cleaned up the media is being extended into sociology," says Andrei Piontkovsky, director of the independent Center for Strategic Studies in Moscow. "It's obvious that the aim of the operation was to get rid of Levada."
Some of the data generated by Levada's VTsIOM may have incurred the wrath of authorities. While other polling agencies were indicating the pro-Kremlin United Russia Party on track to win parliamentary elections slated for December, Levada's surveys over the past summer showed the opposition Communist Party with a strong lead. On the hypersensitive issue of the four-year-old war in Chechnya, Levada's latest study found that only 27 percent of Russians want to continue military action, and 58 percent want to stop the conflict.
The government says that the seizure of VTsIOM, Russia's oldest and best-known public opinion agency, was a routine "reorganization" of a company that was created in 1988 - under Soviet law - as a state-owned body. Though nominally government property, VTsIOM had survived since the collapse of the USSR without public funding.
"We have always had our own contracts with clients, in Russia and abroad, and that was how we fed ourselves," says Levada.
The government appointed Valery Fyodorov, a young sociologist who once campaigned for the pro-Kremlin United Russia party, to manage the new state-controlled VTsIOM in Levada's place. Mr. Fyodorov agrees that "Levada is an outstanding scientist; we have no claims against him on that score."
But he alleges that the "commercialization" of VTsIOM under Levada detracted from serious research. "Social issues stopped being the research priority, and that was wrong," Fyodorov says. Under his leadership, he adds, the agency will focus on social issues like poverty, railroad reorganization, and municipal reforms. "The state has decided to keep VTsIOM as its property, and that means we have to solve important tasks and not the private task of providing employment to the staff," Fyorodov says.
Levada says he can't understand why the Kremlin should fear scientific public opinion research.
But, he agrees, the ups and downs of his own career suggest that it always has. When he graduated from university, in 1952, sociology was banned in the USSR as a "bourgeois science." Levada was allowed to carry out limited surveys during the political thaw initiated by Nikita Khrushchev in the 1960s, but his institute was closed down as the freeze returned under Mr. Brezhnev in 1972.
Three decades later he finds himself in a similar situation. "They are afraid of their own shadows," he says. "They really worry that someone might use these figures against them."
Kremlin methods, however, have changed since Communist times. Under Putin, overt censorship and direct secret police action are rare. In "managed democracy," the state exploits "commercial disputes" and acts through companies it controls - as it did to take over the independent NTV, TV-6 and TVS networks in recent years - or employs legal maneuvers of the sort used last month to dispossess Levada.
Gleb Pavlovsky, the head of the Effective Policy Foundation, a Kremlin-funded think tank, says that "a regime of managed democracy had to be established [after Putin came to power] in 2000, in order to counter real threats from shady groups who had seized power in Moscow and in the regions. That task has been accomplished now. Today, Putin's power is based on the moral authority of a leader of civil society and not upon an authoritarian dictatorship."
Levada sees danger in the Kremlin's approach.
"The real threat today," he says, "is the darkening of our future, this tendency to degrade the democratic freedoms that were gained under Gorbachev."
He adds, however, that he believes that "it's impossible to restore a full dictatorship in Russia today, because it is already a semi-open country."
Fyodorov says the state will continue to pursue Levada through the courts for "stealing" the name of VTsIOM. "They secretly registered a new parallel private organization, VTsIOM-A," he says, "and thereby usurped the brand of a state organization."
Levada says he'll do what he's always done: keep working.
"My entire team came over here with me, and they are all good professionals," he says. "We have good clients, and there is work to be done. These are critical days." ..."
https://www.levada.ru/en/
6-10-2022
https://www.levada.ru/en/
Levada Analytical Center (Levada-Center) is a Russian non-governmental research organization.
"PRESS-RELEASES"
SANCTIONS
10.06.2022
In May, Russians’ concern about Western sanctions against Russia decreased. The first shock of the sanctions has passed. Among the various restrictions, respondents are most concerned about the freezing of Russian assets abroad, although young people are more concerned about restrictions on Visa and Mastercard and the departure of Western brands. Respondents consider the price increase to be the main consequence of sanctions. At the same time, three-quarters of respondents believe that Russia should continue its policy despite the sanctions.
RUSSIA AND NATO
10.06.2022
Most Russians have a negative attitude towards NATO. The prevailing opinion is that new countries joining NATO poses a threat to Russia. About half of the respondents admit that the conflict in Ukraine may escalate into a clash between Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance. A third of respondents admit that in the event of a conflict with the West, Vladimir Putin may give the order to use nuclear weapons first.
RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS
31.05.2022
In March 2022, the Levada Center and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs research organization conducted a joint study of the public opinion of Russians and Americans about Russian-American relations and the most pressing topics on the international agenda. The study showed an increase in negative attitudes towards the United States among Russians, a decrease in willingness to cooperate – and at the same time increased fears associated with a possible conflict.
PARTICIPATION IN SURVEYS AND TRUST IN DATA
31.05.2022
Compared to 2020, the willingness to participate in surveys has not changed at the moment. Respondents are still more willing to take part in a personal interview (rather than a phone survey). The level of confidence in the survey results remained at the same level: about half of the respondents (54%) trust the data.
INTERNET, SOCIAL NETWORKS AND BLOCKING
27.05.2022
Television, social networks and online media are the main sources of information. In the wake of the “special operation”, trust in television has grown, while trust in internet sources has sunk. The banned social networks keep losing users. There is no unambiguous opinion on blocking and restrictions on the Internet in the society: Russians are rather against it, while more than half of respondents aren’t against Internet censorship as such.
THE CONFLICT WITH UKRAINE AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEATHS OF CIVILIANS
18.05.2022
Attention to the “special military operation” is gradually beginning to dull. At the same time, the majority of respondents demonstrate concern about what is happening. Support for the actions of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine remains high, but compared to March it has slightly decreased. The majority of respondents hold NATO countries responsible for the destruction in Ukraine and the death of civilians.
RELIGIOSITY
18.05.2022
The majority of respondents consider themselves to be Orthodox Christians, 15% do not consider themselves to be of any religion. More than half of Russians consider themselves religious. Respondents’ belief in the supernatural (life after death, religious miracles, the evil eye) remains a common phenomenon.