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Susan's attempt to understand the "Brussels Summit Communiqué"
... issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels Belgium June 14, 2021
[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Atlantic_Council ]
"... The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the principal political decision-making body of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), consisting of Permanent Representatives from its member countries.[1] It was established by Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty and it is the only body in NATO that derives its authority explicitly from the Treaty.
... https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm ...
... At present, NATO has 30 members. In 1949, there were 12 founding members of the Alliance: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. The other member countries are: Greece and Turkey (1952), Germany (1955), Spain (1982), the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (1999), Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (2004), Albania and Croatia (2009), Montenegro (2017) and North Macedonia (2020)...."
Press Release - 14 June 2021 ( PR (2021) 086 )
Brussels Summit Communiqué
Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021,
1[of 79]. We, the Heads of State and Government of the 30 NATO Allies, have gathered in Brussels to reaffirm our unity, solidarity, and cohesion, and to open a new chapter in transatlantic relations, at a time when the security environment we face is increasingly complex. [The North Atlantic Treaty Organization] (NATO) remains the foundation of our collective defence and the essential forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies. NATO is a defensive Alliance and will continue to strive for peace, security, and stability in the whole of the Euro-Atlantic area. We remain firmly committed to NATO’s founding Washington Treaty, including that an attack against one Ally shall be considered an attack against us all, as enshrined in Article 5. We will continue to pursue a 360-degree approach to protect and defend our indivisible security and to fulfil NATO’s three core tasks of [1]collective defence, [2]crisis management, and [3]cooperative security.
2. NATO is the strongest and most successful Alliance in history. It guarantees the security of our territory and our one billion citizens, our freedom, and the values we share, including individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.
We are bound together by our common values, enshrined in the "Washington Treaty", the bedrock of our unity, solidarity, and cohesion.
We commit to fulfiling our responsibilities as Allies accordingly. We reaffirm our adherence to the purposes and principles of the United Nations (UN) Charter.
We are committed to the rules-based international order.
We commit to reinforce consultations when the security or stability of an Ally is threatened or when our fundamental values and principles are at risk.
3. We face multifaceted threats, systemic competition from assertive and authoritarian powers, as well as growing security challenges to our countries and our citizens from all strategic directions. Russia’s aggressive actions constitute a threat to Euro-Atlantic security; terrorism in all its forms and manifestations remains a persistent threat to us all. State and non-state actors challenge the rules-based international order and seek to undermine democracy across the globe. Instability beyond our borders is also contributing to irregular migration and human trafficking. China’s growing influence and international policies can present challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance. We will engage China with a view to defending the security interests of the Alliance.
We are increasingly confronted by cyber, hybrid, and other asymmetric threats, including disinformation campaigns, and by the malicious use of ever-more sophisticated emerging and disruptive technologies. Rapid advances in the space domain are affecting our security. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the erosion of the arms control architecture also undermine our collective security. Climate change is a threat multiplier that impacts Alliance security.
The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territories and our populations against attack, and we will address all threats and challenges which affect Euro-Atlantic security. [ search Ukraine, 70 occurances ]
4. We gather at a time when the COVID-19 pandemic continues to test our nations and our resilience. NATO and Allied militaries have supported the civilian response to the pandemic, while ensuring our collective defense and the effectiveness of our operations. We have also provided critical assistance to a number of partners through the delivery of vital medical supplies. We pay tribute to all those who combat this pandemic in our countries and around the world.
5. At our December 2019 meeting in London, we asked the Secretary General to carry out a forward-looking reflection process to further strengthen NATO’s political dimension, including consultations. [ December 4, 2019 Press Conference ]
We recognise the important contribution of the independent group appointed by the Secretary General to support NATO 2030. < 67 page PDF Discusses Ukraine
As a result, today we agree NATO 2030 – a transatlantic agenda for the future. Throughout its history, NATO has continuously adapted to a changing security environment. The NATO 2030 agenda complements and builds on our ongoing political and military adaptation, strengthens our ability to deliver on the three core tasks and contributes to making our strong Alliance even stronger and ready for the future.
6. To that end we agree to:
Reaffirm that NATO is the unique, essential and indispensable transatlantic forum for consultations and joint action on all matters related to our individual and collective security.
We pledge to strengthen and broaden our consultations and to ensure that NATO remains flexible and effective to conduct military operations in support of our common security.
We reaffirm the Alliance’s shared democratic principles as well as our commitment to the spirit and the letter of the North Atlantic Treaty. We commit to reinforcing consultations when the security or stability of an Ally is threatened or when our fundamental values and principles are at risk.
Strengthen NATO as the organising framework for the collective defence of the Euro-Atlantic area, against all threats, from all directions.
We reiterate our commitment to maintaining an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities for deterrence and defence, and to the 2014 Defence Investment Pledge, in its entirety. [link]
We commit to the full and speedy implementation of ongoing work to further strengthen our deterrence and defence posture, and we pledge to continue to improve the readiness of our forces and to strengthen and modernise the NATO Force Structure to meet current and future defence needs.
Enhance our resilience. Noting that resilience remains a national responsibility, we will adopt a more integrated and better coordinated approach, consistent with our collective commitment under Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, to reduce vulnerabilities and ensure our militaries can effectively operate in peace, crisis and conflict.
Allies will develop a proposal to establish, assess, review and monitor resilience objectives to guide nationally-developed resilience goals and implementation plans. It will be up to each individual Ally to determine how to establish and meet national resilience goals and implementation plans, allowing them to do so in a manner that is compatible with respective national competences, structures, processes and obligations, and where applicable those of the EU.
Foster technological cooperation among Allies in NATO, promote interoperability and encourage the development and adoption of technological solutions to address our military needs. For this purpose we will launch a civil-military Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic. We also agree to establish a NATO Innovation Fund, where Allies who so wish can support start-ups working on dual-use emerging and disruptive technologies in areas key to Allied security.
Enhance NATO’s ability to contribute to preserve and shape the rules-based international order in areas that are important to Allied security. We will increase our dialogue and practical cooperation with existing partners, including with the European Union, aspirant countries and our partners in the Asia Pacific, and strengthen our engagement with key global actors and other new interlocutors beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, including from Africa, Asia and Latin America.
Substantially strengthen NATO’s ability to provide training and capacity building support to partners, recognizing that conflict, other security developments and pervasive instability in NATO’s neighbourhood directly impact Allied security.
Aim for NATO to become the leading international organization when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security. We agree to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions from military activities and installations without impairing personnel safety, operational effectiveness and our deterrence and defence posture. We invite the Secretary General to formulate a realistic, ambitious and concrete target for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by the NATO political and military structures and facilities and assess the feasibility of reaching net zero emissions by 2050. We will also initiate a regular high-level climate and security dialogue to exchange views and coordinate further action.
Invite the Secretary General to lead the process to develop the next Strategic Concept. The Concept will be negotiated and agreed by the Council in Permanent Session and endorsed by NATO Leaders at the next Summit.
7. The NATO 2030 agenda sets a higher level of ambition for NATO. It provides clear guidelines for further adaptation to address existing, new and future threats and challenges, building on the ongoing political and military adaptation of the Alliance. Delivering on the NATO 2030 agenda, the three core tasks and the next Strategic Concept requires adequate resourcing through national defense expenditure and common funding. Based on requirements, we agree to increase such resourcing, including as necessary NATO common funding starting in 2023, taking into account sustainability, affordability and accountability. When we meet in 2022, we will agree, alongside the "Strategic Concept", the specific requirements for additional funding up to 2030 and the resource implications across the NATO Military Budget, the NATO Security Investment Programme and the Civil Budget, as well as identify potential efficiency measures.
8. NATO’s fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. The evolving security environment increasingly requires us to address threats and challenges through the use of military and non-military tools in a deliberate, coherent, and sustained manner. NATO will take a tailored and structured approach. NATO uses a variety of non-military tools which support the Alliance’s three core tasks. It also serves as a platform for enhancing the coherent use of these tools by Allies, under their own authority and control, and alongside other international actors. We will continue to strengthen effective, clear, and convincing strategic communication as an essential element to support all three of NATO’s core tasks.
9. For more than twenty-five years, NATO has worked to build a partnership with Russia, including through the NATO-Russia Council (NRC).
While NATO stands by its international commitments, Russia continues to breach the values, principles, trust, and commitments outlined in agreed documents that underpin the NATO-Russia relationship. We reaffirm our decisions towards Russia agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit and all our subsequent NATO meetings.
We have suspended all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia, while remaining open to political dialogue. Until Russia demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities, there can be no return to “business as usual”. We will continue to respond to the deteriorating security environment by enhancing our deterrence and defence posture, including by a forward presence in the eastern part of the Alliance. NATO does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia. Decisions we have taken are fully consistent with our international commitments, and therefore cannot be regarded by anyone as contradicting the NATO-Russia Founding Act.
10. We call on Russia to rescind the designation of the Czech Republic and the United States as “unfriendly countries” and to refrain from taking any other steps inconsistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
11. Russia’s growing multi-domain military build-up, more assertive posture, novel military capabilities, and provocative activities, including near NATO borders, as well as its large-scale no-notice and snap exercises, the continued military build-up in Crimea, the deployment of modern dual-capable missiles in Kaliningrad, military integration with Belarus, and repeated violations of NATO Allied airspace, increasingly threaten the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and contribute to instability along NATO borders and beyond.
12. In addition to its military activities, Russia has also intensified its hybrid actions against NATO Allies and partners, including through proxies. This includes attempted interference in Allied elections and democratic processes; political and economic pressure and intimidation; widespread disinformation campaigns; malicious cyber activities; and turning a blind eye to cyber criminals operating from its territory, including those who target and disrupt critical infrastructure in NATO countries. It also includes illegal and destructive activities by Russian Intelligence Services on Allied territory, some of which have claimed lives of citizens and caused widespread material damage. We stand in full solidarity with the Czech Republic and other Allies that have been affected in this way.
13. Russia has continued to diversify its nuclear arsenal, including by deploying a suite of short- and intermediate-range missile systems that are intended to coerce NATO. Russia has recapitaliZed roughly 80 percent of its strategic nuclear forces, and it is expanding its nuclear capabilities by pursuing novel and destabilising weapons and a diverse array of dual-capable systems. Russia continues to use aggressive and irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and has increased its ongoing emphasis on destabilising conventional exercises that include dual-capable systems. Russia’s nuclear strategy and comprehensive nuclear weapon systems modernisation, diversification, and expansion, including the qualitative and quantitative increase of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons, increasingly support a more aggressive posture of strategic intimidation. We will continue to work closely together to address all the threats and challenges posed by Russia.
14. We reiterate our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova within their internationally recognised borders.
In accordance with its international commitments, we call on Russia to withdraw the forces it has stationed in all three countries without their consent. We strongly condemn and will not recognise Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea, and denounce its temporary occupation. The human rights abuses and violations against the Crimean Tatars and members of other local communities must end. Russia’s recent massive military build-up and destabiliZing activities in and around Ukraine have further escalated tensions and undermined security.
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We call on Russia to reverse its military build-up and stop restricting navigation in parts of the Black Sea. We also call on Russia to stop impeding access to the Sea of Azov and Ukrainian ports. We commend Ukraine’s posture of restraint and diplomatic approach in this context. We seek to contribute to de-escalation. We are also stepping up our support to Ukraine. We call for the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements by all sides, and support the efforts of the Normandy format and the Trilateral Contact Group. Russia, as a signatory of the Minsk Agreements, bears significant responsibility in this regard. We call on Russia to stop fuelling the conflict by providing financial and military support to the armed formations it backs in eastern Ukraine. We reiterate our full support to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. We stress the importance of ensuring its safety and full and unhindered access throughout the entire territory of Ukraine, including Crimea and the Russia-Ukraine border, in accordance with its mandate. We further call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia as independent states; to implement the EU-mediated 2008 ceasefire agreement; to end its militarisation of these regions and attempts to forcibly separate them from the rest of Georgia through the continued construction of border-like obstacles; and to cease the human rights violations, arbitrary detentions, and harassments of Georgian citizens. We reiterate our firm support to the Geneva International Discussions. We also call on Russia to engage constructively in the Transnistria Settlement Process. We are committed to supporting the Republic of Moldova’s democratic reforms and providing assistance through our Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative.
15. We remain open to a periodic, focused, and meaningful dialogue with a Russia willing to engage on the basis of reciprocity in the NRC, with a view to avoiding misunderstanding, miscalculation, and unintended escalation, and to increase transparency and predictability. NRC meetings have helped us communicate clearly our positions, and we are ready for the next meeting of the NRC. We will continue to focus our dialogue with Russia on the critical issues we face. The conflict in and around Ukraine is, in current circumstances, the first topic on our agenda. NATO remains committed to making good use of the existing military lines of communication between both sides to promote predictability and transparency, and to reduce risks, and calls on Russia to do so as well. We continue to aspire to a constructive relationship with Russia when its actions make that possible.
16. Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, continues to pose a direct threat to the security of our populations, and to international stability and prosperity. We categorically reject and condemn terrorism in the strongest possible terms. Allies will continue to fight this threat with determination, resolve, and in solidarity. While nations retain the primary responsibility for their domestic security and their own resilience, the fight against terrorism demands a coherent, long-term effort by the international community as a whole, involving a wide range of instruments and actors. NATO’s role in the fight against terrorism contributes to all three core tasks of the Alliance, and is an integral part of the Alliance’s 360-degree approach to deterrence and defence. Cooperation in NATO adds value to Allies’ national efforts and capacity to prevent, mitigate, respond to, and be resilient against acts of terrorism. We condemn all financial support of terrorism. We also recognise the need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. Our approach to terrorism, and its causes, is in accordance with international law and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and upholds all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) on the fight against terrorism.
17. We remain fully committed to NATO’s enhanced role in the international community’s fight against terrorism, including through awareness and analysis, preparedness and responsiveness, capabilities, capacity building and partnerships, and operations. We continue to implement our 2019 Action Plan and will update it by the end of this year, to take account of the evolving terrorist threats. We are determined to meet our commitments under UNSCR 2396, including through NATO’s new Battlefield Evidence Policy, supported by improved information and data collection, preservation, sharing, and analysis, within NATO’s mandate. We will continue our work to defend against improvised explosive devices and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats. We are developing capabilities to protect our forces against terrorist misuse of technology, while capitalising on emerging technologies to help us in the fight against terrorism. We are also stepping up support to partner countries to fight terrorism themselves and deny terrorists safe haven, which in turn strengthens NATO’s own security. NATO will also continue to engage, as appropriate, with partner countries and other international actors to ensure added value and complementarity. NATO continues to play its part in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS/Da’esh, including through our Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) surveillance flights and staff-to-staff support.
18. After almost 20 years, NATO's military operations in Afghanistan are coming to an end. We have denied terrorists a safe haven from which to plot attacks against us, helped Afghanistan to build its security institutions, and trained, advised, and assisted the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces; they are now taking on full responsibility for security in their country. We pay tribute to those who have lost their lives or have been wounded, and express our deep appreciation to all the men and women who have served under the NATO flag, and to their families.
19. Withdrawing our troops does not mean ending our relationship with Afghanistan. We will now open a new chapter. We affirm our commitment to continue to stand with Afghanistan, its people, and its institutions in promoting security and upholding the
hard-won gains of the last 20 years. Recalling our previous commitments, NATO will continue to provide training and financial support to the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces, including through the Afghan National Army Trust Fund. NATO will retain a Senior Civilian Representative's Office in Kabul to continue diplomatic engagement and enhance our partnership with Afghanistan. Recognising its importance to an enduring diplomatic and international presence, as well as to Afghanistan's connectivity with the world, NATO will provide transitional funding to ensure continued functioning of Hamid Karzai International Airport. We will also step up dialogue on Afghanistan with relevant international and regional partners. We continue to support the ongoing Afghan-owned and Afghan-led peace process, and call on all stakeholders to help Afghanistan foster a lasting inclusive political settlement that puts an end to violence; safeguards the human rights of Afghans, particularly women, children, and minorities; upholds the rule of law; and ensures that Afghanistan never again serves as a safe haven for terrorists.
20. NATO remains a leading and active contributor to international security through operations, missions, and activities. We are grateful to our partners for their substantial contributions to these efforts. NATO and Allies support Iraq in its fight against ISIS/Da’esh and terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. We commend the Government of Iraq and the Iraqi Security Forces for their continued efforts to combat ISIS/Da’esh. Based on a request from the Iraqi Government, we will strengthen our support to Iraq through our NATO Mission Iraq. We will broaden our non-combat advisory, training, and capacity building mission to support Iraq in building more effective, sustainable, accountable, and inclusive security institutions and forces. This expansion of NATO Mission Iraq, including additional support to the Iraqi security institutions, will be demand-driven, incremental, scalable, and based on conditions on the ground. It will be carried out with the full consent of the Iraqi authorities, in full respect of Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and in close coordination with relevant partners and international actors, including the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS/Da’esh, the United Nations, and the European Union.
21. Deterrence and defence are at the heart of the Alliance, underpinned by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and an enduring transatlantic bond. We are united and resolute in our ability and commitment to defend one another. We will maintain and further develop the full range of ready forces and capabilities necessary to ensure credible deterrence and defence and provide the Alliance with a wide range of options to tailor our response to specific circumstances and to respond to any threats, from state and non-state actors, from wherever they arise, and potentially from multiple directions in more than one region simultaneously. While reaffirming our commitment to the three core tasks, we have placed a renewed emphasis on collective defence, and have also ensured that NATO retains the ability to project stability and fight against terrorism.
22. We welcome the significant progress already made to implement our previous decisions to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence posture and reaffirm our commitment to their full and speedy implementation. We have accelerated our military adaptation with increased defence spending, modern capabilities, enhanced political and military responsiveness, and higher readiness of our forces. NATO is taking forward a new military strategy through the implementation of two significant military concepts that will further strengthen our ability to deter and defend against any potential adversary and to maintain and develop our military advantage now and in the future. The deterrence and defence concept provides a single, coherent framework to contest and deter and defend against the Alliance’s main threats in a multi-domain environment, and will strengthen our preparedness to address challenges, particularly pervasive instability and strategic shocks. The warfighting concept provides a long-term vision for maintaining and developing NATO’s decisive military edge. The implementation of the deterrence and defence concept will guide enhanced advance planning to respond to potential crisis and conflict, as well as further improve the use and organisation of Allied forces and capabilities in all operational domains and ensure more effective command and control. We are developing strategic, domain-specific and regional military plans to improve our ability to respond to any contingencies and ensure timely reinforcement. We will emphasise persistent activities in peacetime to support deterrence, including through the presence and dynamic posture of our military forces and exercises, based on enhanced coordination amongst Allies and NATO. Through the implementation of the warfighting concept, we will ensure that the Alliance continuously develops its military and technological advantage, as the character of conflict evolves. We commit to the full implementation of these new concepts, and to taking the necessary steps to enhance the coherence between relevant national and NATO activities and plans and the concepts.
23. We commit to further strengthening and modernising the NATO Force Structure to meet current and future deterrence and defence needs. We will ensure a flexible, agile, and resilient multi-domain force architecture with the right forces in the right place at the right time. We will strengthen modern command and control tailored to support our 360-degree posture, dynamic force management, improved response system, and plans. In doing so, we will place increased emphasis on the interdependence of geography, domains, and readiness. As part of these overall efforts, we are committed to continue increasing the readiness of our forces and the Alliance’s rapid response capability, including through the ongoing implementation of the NATO Readiness Initiative, which is designed to strengthen the culture of readiness and help to provide forces at 30 days readiness or less. We have sourced all the combat forces of the NATO Readiness Initiative with 30 major naval combatants, 30 heavy or medium manoeuvre battalions, and 30 kinetic air squadrons. They are being organised and trained as larger combat formations for reinforcement and high-intensity warfighting, or for rapid military crisis intervention.
24. We will ensure that the NATO Command Structure is robust, resilient, and able to undertake all elements of effective command and control for simultaneous challenges across all domains and the full spectrum of missions, including large-scale operations for collective defence. Our two new commands, Joint Force Command Norfolk headquarters and Joint Support and Enabling Command, as well as the Cyberspace Operations Centre, have achieved Initial Operational Capability. Allied contributions to command and control through the NATO Force Structure and national headquarters as well as their strengthened relationship with the NATO Command Structure, including by providing host nation support, remain essential to improve the Alliance’s regional understanding, vigilance, and ability to rapidly respond to any threat from any direction.
25. We will not be constrained by any potential adversary as regards the freedom of movement of Allied forces by land, air, or sea to and within any part of Alliance territory. Our deterrence and defence posture is underpinned by credible forces, both in-place and ready for reinforcement within Europe and from across the Atlantic. We will continue to strengthen and regularly exercise the Alliance’s ability to rapidly reinforce any Ally that comes under threat. We will continue to give high priority, both nationally and in the Alliance, to ensuring enablement of SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility to improve our ability to support the deployment and sustainment of Allied forces into, across, and from the entire Alliance territory. These efforts include taking forward our work on fuel supply distribution arrangements. We reiterate that NATO’s efforts to ensure a coherent approach and synergies with the EU in the area of military mobility should be pursued, including with regard to military mobility related procedures that should apply to all Allies equally. We continue to reinforce our maritime posture and to protect our sea lines of communication. We welcome the establishment of the NATO Maritime Security Centre of Excellence in Turkey. We will maintain awareness of any potential threats to our critical undersea infrastructure and will continue to address them nationally and, where needed, collectively. We welcome the Full Operational Capability of NATO’s Rapid Air Mobility which was activated and utilised by Allies for relief flights carrying critical supplies to Allies and partners in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
26. We reaffirm our commitment to respond in a measured, balanced, coordinated, and timely way to Russia’s growing and evolving array of conventional and nuclear-capable missiles, which is increasing in scale and complexity and which poses significant risks from all strategic directions to security and stability across the Euro-Atlantic area. We will continue to implement a coherent and balanced package of political and military measures to achieve Alliance objectives, including strengthened integrated air and missile defence; advanced defensive and offensive conventional capabilities; steps to keep NATO’s nuclear deterrent safe, secure, and effective; efforts to support and strengthen arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation; intelligence; and exercises. We have no intention to deploy land-based nuclear missiles in Europe.
27. NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) is an essential and continuous mission in peacetime, crisis, and times of conflict, which contributes to deterrence and defence and the indivisible security and freedom of action of the Alliance, including NATO's capability to reinforce, and to provide a strategic response. NATO IAMD incorporates all measures to contribute to deter any air and missile threat or to nullify or reduce their effectiveness. This mission is conducted in a 360-degree approach and tailored to address all air and missile threats emanating from all strategic directions.
28. NATO has enhanced its IAMD mission and we have taken steps to improve our IAMD forces’ readiness and responsiveness in peacetime, crisis, and times of conflict, strengthening our ability to ensure that all necessary measures are implemented for the security of the Alliance. We are taking into account the increasingly diverse and challenging air and missile threats from state and non-state actors ranging from simple Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to sophisticated hypersonic missiles.
29. Allies will continue to work on NATO IAMD to ensure that it remains flexible and adaptive. Allies will also continue to effectively train and exercise their IAMD forces. Allies have committed to improving NATO IAMD capabilities, including sensors, interceptors, and command and control, in particular through the NATO Defence Planning Process. We welcome the establishment of NATO’s new IAMD Centre of Excellence in Greece.
30. Resilience is essential for credible deterrence and defence and the effective fulfilment of the Alliance’s core tasks. It is a national responsibility and a collective commitment, anchored in Article 3 of the Washington Treaty. Recognising the significant progress achieved since our Resilience Commitment at the 2016 Warsaw Summit, we have agreed today a Strengthened Resilience Commitment that sets out further steps we intend to take in the coming years. We will continue to take a whole-of-government approach to enhancing the resilience of our societies, and achieving the seven NATO Baseline Requirements for national resilience, through enhanced civil-military cooperation and civil preparedness; closer engagement with our populations, the private sector, and non-governmental actors; and the centres of expertise on resilience established by Allies. We welcome the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Centre for Resilience in Romania. NATO and Allies, within their respective authority, will maintain and enhance the security of our critical infrastructure, key industries, supply chains, and communication information networks, including 5G. NATO will further strengthen its own resilience, ensuring our ability to consult, decide, and act together. We will continue to work closely with our partners and other international organisations engaged in similar efforts in order to make the Euro-Atlantic area and our broader neighbourhood more secure.
31. Our nations continue to face threats and challenges from both state and non-state actors who use hybrid activities to target our political institutions, our public opinion, and the security of our citizens. While the primary responsibility for responding to hybrid threats rests with the targeted nation, NATO is ready, upon Council decision, to assist an Ally at any stage of a hybrid campaign being conducted against it, including by deploying a Counter Hybrid Support Team. In cases of hybrid warfare, the Council could decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as in the case of an armed attack. NATO and Allies will continue to prepare for, deter, and defend against hybrid threats. Individual Allies may consider, when appropriate, attributing hybrid activities and responding in a coordinated manner, recognising attribution is a sovereign national prerogative. We are enhancing our situational awareness and expanding the tools at our disposal to counter hybrid threats, including disinformation campaigns, by developing comprehensive preventive and response options. We will also continue to support our partners as they strengthen their resilience in the face of hybrid challenges.
32. Cyber threats to the security of the Alliance are complex, destructive, coercive, and becoming ever more frequent. This has been recently illustrated by ransomware incidents and other malicious cyber activity targeting our critical infrastructure and democratic institutions, which might have systemic effects and cause significant harm. To face this evolving challenge, we have today endorsed NATO’s Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy, which will support NATO’s three core tasks and overall deterrence and defence posture, and further enhance our resilience. Reaffirming NATO’s defensive mandate, the Alliance is determined to employ the full range of capabilities at all times to actively deter, defend against, and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats, including those conducted as part of hybrid campaigns, in accordance with international law. We reaffirm that a decision as to when a cyber attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis. Allies recognise that the impact of significant malicious cumulative cyber activities might, in certain circumstances, be considered as amounting to an armed attack. We remain committed to act in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law as applicable. We will promote a free, open, peaceful, and secure cyberspace, and further pursue efforts to enhance stability and reduce the risk of conflict by supporting international law and voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. We will make greater use of NATO as a platform for political consultation among Allies, sharing concerns about malicious cyber activities, and exchanging national approaches and responses, as well as considering possible collective responses. If necessary, we will impose costs on those who harm us. Our response need not be restricted to the cyber domain. We will enhance our situational awareness to support NATO’s decision-making. Resilience and the ability to detect, prevent, mitigate, and respond to vulnerabilities and intrusions is critical, as demonstrated by malicious cyber actors’ exploitation of the COVID-19 pandemic. NATO as an organisation will therefore continue to adapt and improve its cyber defences. Five years since the adoption of our Cyber Defence Pledge, we remain committed to uphold strong national cyber defences as a matter of priority. We continue to implement cyberspace as a domain of operations. We will enhance the effective integration of sovereign cyber effects, provided voluntarily by Allies, into collective defence and Alliance operations and missions, in the framework of strong political oversight. We will further seek to develop mutually beneficial and effective partnerships as appropriate, including with partner countries, international organisations, industry, and academia, furthering our efforts to enhance international stability in cyberspace. We welcome the recent opening of the NATO Communications and Information Academy in Portugal.
33. We recognise the growing importance of space for the security and prosperity of our nations and for NATO’s deterrence and defence. Secure access to space services, products, and capabilities is essential for the conduct of the Alliance’s operations, missions and activities. We will accelerate our work to deepen and expand our use of space as an operational domain, including through the NATO Space Centre in Germany and the upcoming establishment of the Space Centre of Excellence in France, which we welcome. We will strengthen NATO’s space domain awareness and better integrate space in our activities, including training and exercises, resilience, and innovation efforts. Consistent with the Overarching Space Policy, NATO's approach to space will remain fully in line with international law. We support the international efforts to promote responsible behaviour in space. We consider that attacks to, from, or within space present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance, the impact of which could threaten national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability, and could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack. Such attacks could lead to the invocation of Article 5. A decision as to when such attacks would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.
34. We continue to stand and act together in response to the challenging security environment. As it continues to evolve, the Alliance will continue to respond and adapt as necessary. Since the Warsaw Summit, we have established a forward presence in the eastern part of the Alliance. We continue to improve our enhanced Forward Presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland through alignment with plans and by ensuring the ability of the four combat-ready battlegroups to operate with national home defence forces in an integrated manner. We have increased our contributions to our tailored Forward Presence on land, at sea, and in the air in the Black Sea region, and we remain committed to its full implementation. Our assurance measures, including exercises and various other air, land, and maritime activities, remain in place and continue to provide the fundamental baseline requirement for assurance and deterrence. We have increased our contributions to our tailored assurance measures for Turkey, and we remain committed to their full implementation. We have a range of forces, including the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, which are ready to deploy on short notice to respond to any contingencies and reinforce Allies. The full implementation of NATO’s Framework for the South, as an enduring component of NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, is ongoing. Building on the progress achieved since 2016, including the establishment of the Hub for the South, we will continue to strengthen our capacity to deal with the threats and challenges emanating from the South, including in the Mediterranean Sea region and its approaches, by enhancing our strategic awareness, our plans, and the readiness of our forces. In the High North, we will continue to undertake necessary, calibrated, and coordinated activities in support of the Alliance’s security interests. We will seek to strengthen cooperation with relevant and like-minded partners in the interests of NATO’s agreed deterrence and defence objectives, in line with NATO’s decisions, policies and procedures, as appropriate, and with consideration of political implications.
35. We reaffirm our unwavering commitment to all aspects of the Defence Investment Pledge agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit. Fair burden sharing underpins the Alliance’s cohesion, solidarity, credibility, and ability to fulfil our fundamental Article 3 and Article 5 commitments. We are, individually and collectively, committed to further improving the balance of sharing the costs and responsibilities of Alliance membership. We have made considerable progress since the Wales Summit with seven consecutive years of real growth in non-US defence expenditure, which reinforces our shared responsibility to provide capabilities to the Alliance. All Allies have increased the amount they spend on defence in real terms and this trend is set to continue. Since 2014, European Allies and Canada will have added 260 billion US dollars by the end of this year. Furthermore, ten Allies are expected to spend 2% or more of GDP on defence this year. About two-thirds of Allies plan to reach or exceed the 2% guideline by 2024. Additionally, 24 Allies are spending more than 20% of their defence expenditures on major equipment, including related research and development, and, according to their national plans, 27 Allies will meet the 20% guideline by 2024. Our overall security and defence depend both on how much we spend and how we spend it. Allies continue to make valuable force and capability contributions that benefit the security of the Euro-Atlantic area through NATO’s operations, missions, and other activities, as well as through the operations and missions conducted under national authority and the authority of other organisations. Allies invest considerable resources in preparing their forces, capabilities, and infrastructure for Alliance activities and Allies’ operations. In the years ahead, in line with the Defence Investment Pledge and building on the good progress to date, we affirm our commitment to continue our efforts as a matter of priority across the three pillars of cash, capabilities, and contributions. We must and will do more.
36. We are investing in our military capabilities in order to meet new and enduring challenges across all operational domains. We continue to deliver an array of robust and sophisticated capabilities across all domains, including heavier, more high-end, technologically advanced, better-supported forces and capabilities at the required readiness. We will continue to improve and adapt the sustainability, deployability, and interoperability of our capabilities for a demanding strategic environment, as well as high-end operations. Our national capability development plans will support the full and timely implementation of the capabilities, in particular those required by the Alliance in line with the NATO Defence Planning Process. In light of the pace, breadth, and scale of technological developments, as we further develop our forces and capabilities, we recognise the vital importance of research and development and innovation to exploit the opportunities and to address the challenges posed by emerging and disruptive technologies. This will help to ensure, individually and collectively, our technological edge now and in the future. We continue working to address, as appropriate, existing dependencies on Russian-sourced legacy military equipment through national efforts and multinational cooperation. We welcome the modernisation of the NATO AWACS fleet and the progress of the Alliance Future Surveillance and Control programme, as well as the initial operations of the new Alliance Ground Surveillance Force. Through NATO-supported multinational cooperation projects, Allies are committed to working together to develop or acquire new capabilities in key areas such as air-to-air refuelling, training, precision strike, munitions, air defence, CBRN defence, autonomous systems, and next-generation rotorcraft capability.
37. The speed of technological change has never been higher, creating both new opportunities and risks in the security environment and to the way NATO operates. We are determined to preserve our technological edge, and ensure Alliance interoperability, in order to maintain the credibility of our deterrence and defence posture. We have recently taken important steps to that end, building on the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDTs) Roadmap we agreed in 2019, and have now adopted our strategy to foster and protect EDTs. This strategy outlines a clear approach for identifying, developing, and adopting EDTs at the speed of relevance, guided by principles of responsible use, in accordance with international law, and taking into account discussions in relevant international fora. Moreover, this strategy seeks to preserve our interoperability; safeguard our sensitive technologies; and actively address the threats and challenges posed by technological developments by others, both now and in the future. Drawing on the extensive innovation expertise of all 30 Allies, we will further leverage our partnerships, including with the private sector and academia, to maintain our technological edge.
38. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. No one should doubt NATO's resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened. Faced with a highly diverse, complex, and demanding international security environment, NATO is determined to maintain the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations, wherever it should arise.
39. Credible deterrence and defence is essential as a means to prevent conflict and war and will continue to be based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities. A robust deterrence and defence posture strengthens Alliance cohesion and provides an essential political and military transatlantic link, through an equitable and sustainable distribution of roles, responsibilities, and burdens. We acknowledge the increasingly challenging security environment with risks arising from changes in the posture, doctrine, and behaviour of potential adversaries and their significant investments to develop, modernise, and expand capabilities. NATO continues to adapt and remains steadfast in its resolve to take all necessary steps to ensure that its deterrence and defence posture remains credible, coherent, resilient, and adaptable to the security environment.
40. Allies’ goal is to continue to bolster deterrence as a core element of our collective defence and to contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. In response to the more challenging security environment, NATO has taken steps to ensure its nuclear deterrent capabilities remain safe, secure, and effective. The strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of Allies. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance. These Allies’ separate centres of decision-making contribute to deterrence by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries. NATO's nuclear deterrence posture also relies on United States' nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and the capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies concerned. National contributions of dual-capable aircraft to NATO's nuclear deterrence mission remain central to this effort. The Alliance reaffirms the imperative to ensure the broadest possible participation by Allies concerned in the agreed nuclear burden-sharing arrangements to demonstrate Alliance unity and resolve. Allies concerned will continue to drive forward progress on sustaining leadership focus and institutional excellence for the nuclear deterrence mission. Allies will also continue to ensure greater coherence between conventional and nuclear components of NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, strengthen effective strategic communications and enhance the effectiveness of NATO exercises to maintain and demonstrate a credible deterrence and reduce strategic risk. NATO supports efforts towards strategic risk reduction which constitute important contributions to regional and international security. In particular, transparency and dialogue can help avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation.
41. The fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. Given the deteriorating security environment in Europe, a credible and united nuclear Alliance is essential. Nuclear weapons are unique. The circumstances in which NATO might have to use nuclear weapons are extremely remote. NATO reiterates that any employment of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict. If the fundamental security of any of its members were to be threatened, however, NATO has the capabilities and resolve to impose costs on an adversary that would be unacceptable and far outweigh the benefits that any adversary could hope to achieve.
42. Missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute them. We reaffirm our commitment to continue to deliver a NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability, to pursue the Alliance's core task of collective defence and to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory, and forces against the increasing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. NATO BMD is purely defensive. The aim and political principles of NATO BMD remain unchanged from the 2010 Lisbon Summit. These principles are the indivisibility of Allies’ security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens as well as reasonable challenge, taking into account the level of threat, affordability, and technical feasibility, and in accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance. Should international efforts reduce the threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation, NATO missile defence can and will adapt accordingly.
43. NATO BMD is based on voluntary national contributions, including the US European Phased Adaptive Approach assets in Romania, Turkey, Spain, and Poland, as well as the NATO BMD command and control, the only component eligible for common funding. Additional voluntary national contributions will provide robustness. We are committed to completing additional essential components of NATO BMD command and control, which is necessary for achieving the next major milestone before reaching the Full Operational Capability. Full Allied political control and oversight are essential, and full implementation will be ensured and monitored. We will continue to engage with third states on a case-by-case basis to enhance transparency, build mutual confidence, and increase ballistic missile defence effectiveness.
44. NATO BMD is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia's strategic deterrence. NATO BMD is intended to defend against potential threats emanating from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. We have explained to Russia many times that the BMD system is not capable against Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent and there is no intention to redesign this system to have such a capability in the future. Hence, Russian statements threatening to target Allies because of NATO BMD are unacceptable and counterproductive. Should Russia be ready to discuss BMD with NATO, and subject to Alliance agreement, NATO remains open to the discussion.
45. Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation have made and should continue to make an essential contribution to achieving the Alliance’s security objectives and for ensuring strategic stability and our collective security. NATO has a long track record of doing its part on disarmament and non-proliferation. After the end of the Cold War, NATO dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and its reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We regret that the conditions for achieving disarmament have not been realised since the 2018 Brussels NATO Summit. Allies remain collectively determined to uphold and support existing disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation agreements and commitments. We will further strengthen arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security, taking into account the prevailing security environment. We welcome and fully support the agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation to extend the New START Treaty for five years. NATO Allies believe the New START Treaty contributes to international stability, and Allies again express their strong support for its continued implementation and for early and active dialogue on ways to improve strategic stability. Allies will welcome new strategic talks between the United States and Russia on future arms control measures, taking into account all Allies’ security. Allies will support further arms control negotiations, with the aim of improving the security of the Alliance, taking into account the prevailing international security environment.
46. NATO remains clear-eyed about the challenges Russia poses, including the qualitative and quantitative increase of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons. The Alliance will be guided by experience, not least Russia’s material breach of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which ultimately led to the termination of that agreement. NATO will continue to respond in a measured and responsible way to the significant risks posed by the Russian 9M729 missile, and other short- and intermediate-range missiles, to Allied security. We have agreed a balanced, coordinated, and defensive package of measures to ensure NATO's deterrence and defence posture remains credible and effective, including through potential arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation contributions. Russia’s proposal for a moratorium on the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe is inconsistent with Russia’s unilateral and ongoing deployment of such systems on the continent and would not prevent Russia from building up such missiles outside of its European territory; this proposal is therefore not credible and not acceptable. At the same time, NATO Allies remain open to meaningful arms control discussions and dialogue on reciprocal transparency and confidence-building measures that would take into account security interests of all Allies and increase security across the Alliance.
47. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the essential bulwark against the spread of nuclear weapons, the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, and the framework for international cooperation in sharing the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science, and technology. Allies remain strongly committed to the full implementation of the NPT in all its aspects, as an irreplaceable platform, and the strengthening of the NPT across its mutually reinforcing three pillars. We are committed to working towards a meaningful outcome at the upcoming Tenth Review Conference, which presents a major opportunity to contribute to the preservation, universalisation, and full implementation of the NPT. The Alliance reaffirms its resolve to seek a safer world for all and to take further practical steps and effective measures to create the conditions for further nuclear disarmament negotiations. NATO Allies support the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons in full accordance with all provisions of the NPT, including Article VI, in an ever more effective and verifiable way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all. NATO's nuclear arrangements have always been fully consistent with the NPT, which remains the only credible path to nuclear disarmament. The enduring success of the NPT cannot be taken for granted and requires sustained effort to further its achievements. In this spirit, we call on all NPT States Parties to work together towards a successful Tenth Review Conference. We reiterate our opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) which is inconsistent with the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence policy, is at odds with the existing non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, risks undermining the NPT, and does not take into account the current security environment. The TPNW does not change the legal obligations on our countries with respect to nuclear weapons. We do not accept any argument that the TPNW reflects or in any way contributes to the development of customary international law. We call on our partners and all other countries to reflect realistically on the ban treaty’s impact on international peace and security, including on the NPT, and join us in working to improve collective security through tangible and verifiable measures that can reduce strategic risks and enable lasting progress on nuclear disarmament.
48. While NATO is not itself party to any arms control agreement, Allies will make best use of NATO as an important platform for in-depth discussion and close consultations on arms control efforts that will support Alliance unity, political cohesion, and solidarity. We continue actively to address the collapse of the INF Treaty due to Russian actions, and we are committed to maintain appropriate consultations among Allies on these issues.
49. We remain deeply concerned by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as their means of delivery and related materials, by states and non-state actors, which represents a growing threat to our populations, territory, and forces. We condemn in the strongest possible terms the repeated use of chemical weapons in Syria, as well as use in Iraq, Russia, Malaysia, and, for the first time since NATO’s foundation on Allied territory, the United Kingdom. The use of chemical weapons anywhere, at any time, by anyone, for any reason is unacceptable. There can be no impunity for those who use chemical weapons. We therefore welcome, as an important step towards accountability, the decision by the April 2021 Conference of the State Parties of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to suspend Syria’s rights and privileges under the CWC. We are determined to uphold the CWC and the global norm against the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and to hold those who use chemical weapons accountable for their actions, including through our joint commitment within the International Partnership Against the Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons. We support the full implementation of the CWC and the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in addressing WMD threats and condemn those who seek to impede its work. NATO remains committed to ensuring that Allies can protect their populations, forces, and territories against CBRN threats, including through reviewing NATO’s Comprehensive, Strategic Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Defending against CBRN Threats. We are united in our resolve to promote the goals and objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We underline the need to bring the treaty into force and we support the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission, including the International Data Centre and International Monitoring System. We call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices in accordance with Conference on Disarmament report CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. In the meantime, the Alliance calls on all states to declare and maintain voluntary moratoria on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
50. We remain committed to conventional arms control as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security. We are determined to preserve, strengthen, and modernise conventional arms control in Europe, based on key principles and commitments, including reciprocity, transparency, and host nation consent. Russia’s continuing aggressive military posture, its refusal to fully comply with its obligations under the Treaty on Open Skies, its ongoing selective implementation of the Vienna Document, and its long-standing failure to implement the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, continue to undermine security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Allies call on Russia to return to full implementation of, and compliance with the letter and spirit of all of its international obligations and commitments, which is essential to rebuilding trust and confidence, military transparency and increasing predictability in the Euro-Atlantic region. We specifically call on Russia to be open and transparent about its no-notice snap exercises, large-scale exercises and large-scale troop movements, in accordance with its Vienna Document commitments, particularly in light of its recent unprovoked and unjustified military build-up in and around Ukraine. Allies underscore the importance of modernising the Vienna Document, and welcome the broad support for its comprehensive modernisation package. We look forward to intensified discussions in the Forum for Security Cooperation leading to consensus on an updated Vienna Document at the 2021 OSCE Ministerial. To maintain the contributions of the Treaty on Open Skies to the security of all State Parties, it is essential that all State Parties fully implement its provisions. We will continue to actively support ongoing discussions at the OSCE, including the Structured Dialogue. We call on Russia to engage constructively on all these efforts.
51. We reiterate the Alliance’s full support to the goal of the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearisation of North Korea, in accordance with relevant UNSCRs. We call on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to engage in meaningful negotiations with the United States towards achieving this goal. We urge the DPRK to fully implement its international obligations; to eliminate its nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare capabilities and ballistic missiles; to return to the NPT and its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and to abandon all related programmes. We call on nations to fully implement existing UN sanctions.
52. We are committed to ensuring that Iran will never develop a nuclear weapon. We welcome the substantive discussions between Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) participants, and separately with the United States, to accomplish a mutual return to compliance with the JCPoA by the United States and Iran. We support the goal of restoring the non-proliferation benefits of the JCPoA and of ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. It is vital that Iran preserves the space for these discussions by avoiding any further escalation. We strongly support the IAEA in its crucial monitoring and verification work to help ensure Iran’s compliance with the NPT-related safeguards obligations, as well as its other commitments. A restored and fully implemented JCPoA could also pave the way to further address regional and security concerns, including in support of the non-proliferation regime. We condemn Iran’s support to proxy forces and non-state armed actors, including through financing, training, and the proliferation of missile technology and weapons. We call on Iran to stop all ballistic missile activities inconsistent with UNSCR 2231, refrain from destabilising actions, and play a constructive role in fostering regional stability and peace.
Syria retains an inventory of short-range ballistic missiles whose range covers parts of NATO’s territory and some of our partners’ territories. Syria has used these missiles extensively against its own population. We remain vigilant over missile launches from Syria which could again hit or target Turkey. We continue to monitor and assess the ballistic missile threat from Syria.
The increasing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles in the vicinity of the south-eastern border of the Alliance has been, and remains a driver in NATO’s development and deployment of a ballistic missile defence system, which is configured to counter threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area.
53. The conflict in Syria has entered its eleventh year and continues to have significant consequences on the stability of the region and the security of NATO’s south-eastern border. We remain concerned and vigilant over its ramifications. We reiterate our determination to defend NATO territory and borders against any threats and to address challenges emanating from Syria. The presidential elections held on 26 May 2021 by the Syrian regime cannot be considered as free and fair and do not contribute to the efforts to achieve a political solution. We underline that stability and security cannot be reinstated in Syria without a genuine political process in line with UNSCR 2254. We call for a nationwide ceasefire and the reauthorisation and expansion of the UN cross-border humanitarian assistance for a period of at least 12 months in order to meet the needs of the Syrian people. We reiterate our appreciation to our Ally Turkey for hosting millions of Syrian refugees.
54. Allies remain deeply concerned about developments in Belarus since August 2020. The policies and actions of Belarus have implications for regional stability and have violated the principles which underpin our partnership. NATO will remain vigilant of and monitor the implications for the security of the Alliance. The unacceptable diversion of a civilian aircraft in May 2021 and the subsequent arrest of a journalist and his partner travelling on board endangered the safety of civilians and was a grave affront to political dissent and freedom of the press. We support the independent investigations, including by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). We support measures taken by Allies individually and collectively in response to this incident. We call on Belarus to abide by international law, respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, and immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners, including those belonging to the Union of Poles in Belarus. A democratic, sovereign, and stable Belarus is in all of our interests. Allies stand ready for a mutually beneficial NATO-Belarus partnership, taking into account political and security conditions. We will follow the scale, scope, and aftermath of the Zapad-2021 exercise, and continue to call on Russia and Belarus to act in a predictable, transparent way in compliance with their international obligations and OSCE commitments.
55. China's stated ambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security. We are concerned by those coercive policies which stand in contrast to the fundamental values enshrined in the Washington Treaty. China is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal with more warheads and a larger number of sophisticated delivery systems to establish a nuclear triad. It is opaque in implementing its military modernisation and its publicly declared military-civil fusion strategy. It is also cooperating militarily with Russia, including through participation in Russian exercises in the Euro-Atlantic area. We remain concerned with China’s frequent lack of transparency and use of disinformation. We call on China to uphold its international commitments and to act responsibly in the international system, including in the space, cyber, and maritime domains, in keeping with its role as a major power.
56. NATO maintains a constructive dialogue with China where possible. Based on our interests, we welcome opportunities to engage with China on areas of relevance to the Alliance and on common challenges such as climate change. There is value in information exchange on respective policies and activities, to enhance awareness and discuss potential disagreements. Allies urge China to engage meaningfully in dialogue, confidence-building, and transparency measures regarding its nuclear capabilities and doctrine. Reciprocal transparency and understanding would benefit both NATO and China.
57. We are working together as an Alliance and with like-minded partners, in particular with the European Union, to protect critical infrastructure, strengthen resilience, maintain our technological edge, and address these challenges to the rules-based international order.
58. Climate change is one of the defining challenges of our times. It is a threat multiplier that impacts Allied security, both in the Euro-Atlantic area and in the Alliance’s broader neighbourhood. Climate change puts our resilience and civil preparedness to the test, affects our planning and the resilience of our military installations and critical infrastructure, and may create harsher conditions for our operations. Today we have endorsed an Action Plan to implement our NATO Agenda on Climate Change and Security, which increases our awareness, adaptation, mitigation, and outreach efforts, while ensuring a credible deterrence and defence posture and upholding the priorities of the safety of military personnel and operational and cost effectiveness. To increase awareness, NATO will conduct annual assessments of the impact of climate change on its strategic environment as well as on missions and operations. To adapt to climate change, NATO will incorporate climate change considerations into its full spectrum of work, ranging from defence planning and capability development to civil preparedness and exercises. To contribute to the mitigation of climate change, drawing on best practices of Allies, and taking into account their different national circumstances, NATO will develop a mapping methodology to help Allies measure greenhouse gas emissions from military activities and installations, which could contribute to formulating voluntary goals to reduce such emissions. NATO will also strengthen exchanges with partner countries as well as with international and regional organisations that are active on climate change and security issues.
59. Energy security plays an important role in our common security. A stable and reliable energy supply, the diversification of routes, suppliers, and energy resources, including the integration of sustainable energy sources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks, are all of critical importance and increase our resilience against political and economic pressure. It is essential to ensure that the members of the Alliance are not vulnerable to political or coercive manipulation of energy, which constitutes a potential threat. Allies will therefore continue to seek further diversification of their energy supplies, in line with their needs and conditions. While these issues are primarily the responsibility of national authorities, energy developments can have significant political and security implications for Allies and also affect our partners. Consequently, we will continue to enhance our strategic awareness, including through regular Allied consultations and intelligence sharing, and will strengthen our links with relevant international organisations. We will further develop NATO’s capacity to support national authorities in protecting critical infrastructure, including against malicious hybrid and cyber activity. We will ensure reliable energy supplies to our military forces.
60. NATO has long recognised the importance of Human Security, which focuses on risks and threats to populations in conflict or crisis areas and how to mitigate and respond to them. Taking a Human Security approach is a reflection of our values and makes us more operationally effective. We are committed to ensuring that all efforts are made to avoid, minimise, and mitigate any potential negative effects on civilians arising from our missions or activities, as underscored in our Policy for the Protection of Civilians. Today, we endorse NATO’s new Policy on Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, a landmark demonstration of our commitment to addressing such violence, which inflicts long-term stigma and trauma on individuals and families, contributes to their marginalisation, destroys the social fabric of communities, triggers displacement, fuels armed actors’ activities, fosters prolonged conflict and instability, and is an impediment to sustainable peace and reconciliation. We are updating our policy on combating trafficking in human beings. Our ongoing work on Human Security also includes Children and Armed Conflict and Cultural Property Protection. NATO will continue to work with its partners, international organisations, and civil society to further our Human Security agenda, which includes robust policies and clear operational guidelines, in support of lasting peace and security and our populations’ common defence.
61. Recognising the critical importance of women’s full, equal, and meaningful participation in all aspects of peace and stability, as well as the disproportionate impact that conflict has on women and girls, including conflict-related sexual violence, we are committed to fully implementing the Women, Peace and Security agenda set out by the UN Security Council. NATO’s Policy and Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security better prepare the Alliance to address the challenges of today and tomorrow. NATO’s Policy on Preventing and Responding to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, agreed in 2019, reinforces our commitment to hold ourselves to the highest standards of behaviour, in keeping with our values. Working together with partners, international organisations, and civil society, we will consistently continue to implement our policy on Women, Peace and Security, and, in this context, we will advance gender equality and integrate gender perspectives and foster the principles of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in all that we do, including in NATO operations, missions, and activities.
62. We remain committed to NATO’s Building Integrity Policy and Programme. Corruption and poor governance undermine democracy, the rule of law, and economic development, thus constituting challenges to our security. Implementing measures to improve integrity building, to fight against corruption, and to foster good governance is of continued importance for NATO, Allies, and partners alike.
63. NATO’s partnerships are, and will continue to be, essential to the way NATO works. The success of NATO’s partnerships is demonstrated by their strategic contribution to Alliance and international security. They play an important role in supporting NATO’s three core tasks and our 360-degree security approach. They are central to advancing NATO’s cooperative security agenda, helping to shape our security environment, and contributing to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, and to the pursuit of NATO’s political and military objectives. We remain committed to the principles underpinning our relations with our partners, and have taken steps to make our partnerships more strategic, more coherent, and more effective. The Alliance’s partner relationships are also based on reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect. We will strengthen political dialogue and practical cooperation with our partners. We are grateful to our partners for their significant contributions to NATO’s situational awareness, operations, missions, and activities, including Trust Fund projects. We recognise their sacrifices for Euro-Atlantic and international security over the years. We will continue to improve interoperability, in particular with our Enhanced Opportunities Partners. Recognising that conflict and instability in NATO’s neighbourhood directly undermine Allied security, we will continue to intensify NATO’s assistance and capacity building support to our partners. We reaffirm our commitment to expand political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nation that shares the Alliance’s values and interest in international peace and security and will further develop our partnerships so that they continue to meet the interests of both Allies and partners. In line with our Comprehensive Approach Action Plan, we will continue to pursue coherence within NATO's own tools and strands of work, concerted approaches with partner nations and organisations such as the UN, the EU, and the OSCE, as well as further dialogue with non-governmental organisations.
64. The European Union remains a unique and essential partner for NATO. The NATO-EU strategic partnership is essential for the security and prosperity of our nations and of the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO recognises the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence. The development of coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities, avoiding unnecessary duplication, is key in our joint efforts to make the Euro-Atlantic area safer. Such efforts, including recent developments, will lead to a stronger NATO, help enhance our common security, contribute to transatlantic burden sharing, help deliver needed capabilities, and support an overall increase in defence spending. Non-EU Allies continue to make significant contributions to the EU's efforts to strengthen its capacities to address common security challenges. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU Allies’ fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. We look forward to mutual steps, representing tangible progress, in this area to support a strengthened strategic partnership. We reaffirm in their entirety all the decisions, principles, and commitments with regard to NATO and EU cooperation. We will continue to further strengthen our strategic partnership in a spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity, and respect for the organisations’ different mandates, decision-making autonomy and institutional integrity, and as agreed by the two organisations.
65. NATO-EU cooperation has reached unprecedented levels, with tangible results in countering hybrid and cyber threats, strategic communication, operational cooperation including maritime issues, military mobility, defence capabilities, defence industry and research, exercises, counter-terrorism, and defence and security capacity building. Political dialogue between NATO and the EU remains essential to advance this cooperation. We will continue to develop and deepen our cooperation by fully implementing the common set of 74 proposals, which contribute to the coherence and complementarity of our efforts. The current strategic environment and the COVID pandemic underscore the importance of NATO-EU cooperation in the face of current and evolving security challenges, in particular in addressing resilience issues, emerging and disruptive technologies, the security implications of climate change, disinformation, and the growing geostrategic competition. The ongoing distinct strategic processes within NATO and the EU offer a unique opportunity to intensify further our consultations and cooperation to enhance the security of our citizens and promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond, while reaffirming that NATO remains the transatlantic framework for strong collective defence and the essential forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies. We value the Secretary General’s continued close cooperation with the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the High Representative, on all aspects of the NATO-EU strategic partnership.
66. We reaffirm our commitment to NATO’s Open Door Policy under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, which has been a historic success. North Macedonia’s accession last year is yet another tangible demonstration of this commitment. Successive rounds of enlargement have strengthened Euro-Atlantic security by helping to spread and consolidate the rule of law and democratic institutions and practices across the European continent, and have respected the right of all states to seek their own security arrangements, as enshrined in the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe. NATO’s door remains open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, which are in a position to further the principles of the Treaty, and whose inclusion can contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. Decisions on enlargement are for NATO itself; no third party has a say in that process. We remain committed to the integration of those countries that aspire to join the Alliance, judging each on its own merits. We encourage them to continue to implement the necessary reforms and decisions to prepare for membership. We will continue to offer support to their efforts and look to them to take the steps necessary to advance their aspirations.
67. Allies strongly support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a stable and secure Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other relevant international agreements, encourage domestic reconciliation, and urge political leaders to avoid divisive rhetoric. We commend Bosnia and Herzegovina, an aspirant country, for its contributions to NATO-led operations. We are committed to maintaining strong political dialogue with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and offer our continued support to the implementation of all reform efforts, including through NATO HQ Sarajevo. We encourage the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take full advantage of the breadth of NATO cooperative security and partnership tools. Allies welcome the work of the Commission for Cooperation with NATO. Allies urge political leaders to work constructively and to demonstrate political will for the benefit of all in Bosnia and Herzegovina in advancing Euro-Atlantic aspirations by implementing the much-needed political, electoral, rule of law, economic, and defence reforms, including through the country’s Reform Programme with NATO, without prejudice to a final decision on NATO membership.
68. We reiterate the decision made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Georgia will become a member of the Alliance with the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as an integral part of the process; we reaffirm all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions, including that each partner will be judged on its own merits. We stand firm in our support for Georgia’s right to decide its own future and foreign policy course free from outside interference. As an Enhanced Opportunities Partner, Georgia is cooperating closely with the Alliance across a wide range of issues. We highly appreciate Georgia’s substantial contributions to NATO operations, which demonstrate its commitment and capability to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security. We welcome the recent political agreement on the Way Ahead for Georgia and encourage its full implementation by all sides. This agreement paves the way for the important reforms which will help Georgia, an aspirant country, progress in its preparations towards membership. We remain committed to making full use of the NATO-Georgia Commission and the Annual National Programme in deepening political dialogue and cooperation. We commend the significant progress on reforms which Georgia has made and must continue to make, and which have helped Georgia strengthen its defence capabilities and interoperability with the Alliance. Georgia’s relationship with the Alliance contains all the practical tools to prepare for eventual membership. We are working closely with Georgia on security in the Black Sea region, in response to Russia’s increasingly destabilising activities, and welcome the steps taken to implement the refreshed Substantial NATO-Georgia Package. We stand ready to enhance our support to Georgia, including in building resilience against hybrid threats, in training and exercises, and in secure communications. We look forward to the next NATO-Georgia exercise in 2022.
69. We reiterate the decision made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Ukraine will become a member of the Alliance with the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as an integral part of the process; we reaffirm all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions, including that each partner will be judged on its own merits. We stand firm in our support for Ukraine’s right to decide its own future and foreign policy course free from outside interference. The Annual National Programmes under the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) remain the mechanism by which Ukraine takes forward the reforms pertaining to its aspiration for NATO membership. Ukraine should make full use of all instruments available under the NUC to reach its objective of implementing NATO principles and standards. The success of wide-ranging, sustainable, and irreversible reforms, including combating corruption, promoting an inclusive political process, and decentralisation reform, based on democratic values, respect for human rights, minorities, and the rule of law, will be crucial in laying the groundwork for a prosperous and peaceful Ukraine. Further reforms in the security sector, including the reform of the Security Services of Ukraine, are particularly important. We welcome significant reforms already made by Ukraine and strongly encourage further progress in line with Ukraine’s international obligations and commitments. We will continue to provide practical support to reform in the security and defence sector, including through the Comprehensive Assistance Package. We will also continue to support Ukraine’s efforts to strengthen its resilience against hybrid threats, including through intensifying activities under the NATO-Ukraine Platform on Countering Hybrid Warfare. We welcome the cooperation between NATO and Ukraine with regard to security in the Black Sea region. The Enhanced Opportunities Partner status granted last year provides further impetus to our already ambitious cooperation and will promote greater interoperability, with the option of more joint exercises, training, and enhanced situational awareness. Military cooperation and capacity building initiatives between Allies and Ukraine, including the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Brigade, further reinforce this effort. We highly value Ukraine’s significant contributions to Allied operations, the NATO Response Force, and NATO exercises.
70. The Western Balkans is a region of strategic importance for NATO, as highlighted by our long history of cooperation and operations. NATO remains strongly committed to the security and stability of the Western Balkans and to supporting the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the countries in the region. We will intensify our efforts in the region and enhance our political dialogue and practical cooperation in order to support reform efforts, promote regional peace and security, and counter the malign influence of outside actors. Democratic values, the rule of law, domestic reforms, and good neighbourly relations are vital for regional cooperation and Euro-Atlantic integration, and we look to continued progress in this regard. We value the NATO-Serbia partnership. Strengthening NATO-Serbia relations would be of benefit to the Alliance, to Serbia, and to the whole region. We support the EU-facilitated Dialogue and other efforts aimed at the normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina, and urge the sides to seize the moment and engage in good faith towards reaching a lasting political solution.
71. We remain committed to NATO’s continued engagement in Kosovo, including through the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) which contributes to a safe and secure environment and to wider stability in the Western Balkans, and through ongoing capacity building efforts with the Kosovo security organisations. Any changes to our force posture in KFOR remain conditions-based and not calendar-driven.
72. The Alliance’s close and mutually beneficial security cooperation with our Enhanced Opportunities Partners Finland and Sweden, which share our values and contribute to NATO-led operations and missions, has grown across a wide range of areas. We will continue to strengthen our ability to respond rapidly and effectively to any common challenges and to work together on enhancing our resilience and civil preparedness. We will bolster our regular and open political dialogue and cooperation in support of our common security, including by crisis management preparation, exercises, and exchanging information and analysis, notably on the security situation in the Baltic Sea region.
73. We will work more closely with all our Western European partners to share expertise, address emerging security challenges, and continue our cooperation on operations, missions, and other initiatives. We will also seek to further develop relations with our partners across the globe. We are enhancing political dialogue and practical cooperation with our long-standing Asia-Pacific partners – Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea – to promote cooperative security and support the rules-based international order. We will discuss common approaches to global security challenges where NATO’s interests are affected, share perspectives through deeper political engagement, and seek concrete areas for cooperation to address shared concerns. We are intensifying our interaction with Colombia, NATO’s partner in Latin America, on good governance, military training, interoperability, demining, and maritime security. We remain open to deepening our political dialogue and intensifying our practical cooperation with our partners in Central Asia, taking into account the regional situation. We welcome the interest of other global actors to work with NATO in addressing our shared security concerns and stand ready to explore further engagement on a case-by-case basis.
74. We are committed to enhancing our long-standing engagement in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. We will strengthen our political dialogue and practical cooperation with our Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) partners. This will build stronger security and defence institutions and capacities, promote interoperability, and help to counter terrorism. We have upgraded our defence capacity building assistance to Jordan, our Enhanced Opportunities Partner, to include additional counter-terrorism support, and have contributed to the establishment of the new Military Women’s Training Centre. We will continue our engagement with Tunisia on defence capacity building. We will leverage the NATO-ICI Regional Centre in Kuwait as an important hub for education, training, and public diplomacy activities, and we remain open to the potential establishment of other education and training centres with interested MENA countries. Our Regional Hub for the South, in Naples, is making tangible progress in implementing its four functions and contributing to our situational awareness and understanding. We will continue to engage with the African Union and further develop our relations with the League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council in order to enhance our ability to better address mutual security concerns.
75. The deteriorating situation in the Sahel region matters to NATO’s collective security. This region is a theatre of complex and interconnected challenges. NATO’s approach to the Sahel is currently focused on our long-standing partnership with Mauritania, and we are looking into providing additional advice and training support. We will also continue to engage in dialogue with relevant NATO partners, representatives from the Sahel region, international and regional organisations and entities such as the African Union, the G5 Sahel structures, the UN, and the EU, as well as with the Coalition for the Sahel. NATO will enhance its engagement with the G5 Sahel structures and remains open, upon request, to consider further engagements in the region.
76. The crisis in Libya has direct implications for regional stability and the security of all Allies. We welcome the progress achieved in Libya, including the recent endorsement of the interim Government of National Unity (GNU) and Presidency Council. We commend the UN efforts in support of a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process, aimed at promoting national reconciliation as well as unifying and strengthening state institutions. We call on all the relevant Libyan authorities and institutions, including the GNU and the House of Representatives, to take actions set out in the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum roadmap and to make the necessary preparations for free, fair, and inclusive national Presidential and Parliamentary elections on 24 December 2021. We fully support the implementation of UNSCRs 2570 and 2571 and the 23 October 2020 ceasefire agreement. In accordance with our Summit decisions, we remain committed to providing advice to Libya, upon its request, in the area of defence and security institution building, taking into account political and security conditions.
77. NATO is an Alliance that constantly modernises and adapts to new threats and challenges. NATO is also adapting as an institution. To enhance our political-military coherence and situational awareness, we have restructured the activities of the NATO Headquarters, and established a Chief Information Officer function. We welcome and will continue progress towards an optimised NATO intelligence enterprise, better postured to provide timely and relevant support to Alliance operations and decision-making on contemporary and future challenges. We will also further strengthen the security of our cyber and communications systems and continue to protect the Alliance against espionage attempts. We will continuously pursue greater coherence, improved effectiveness, and new efficiencies, in support of the flexibility and responsiveness we need as an Alliance.
78. We express our deep appreciation for the generous hospitality extended to NATO by the Government and the people of Belgium for over five decades, and to us today on the occasion of our Summit meeting at NATO Headquarters. We pay tribute to all the men and women in uniform who continue to work daily for our collective security. And we extend a special word of thanks to all those who made it possible for us to have a safe and productive Summit meeting despite the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, including the NATO medical personnel and the Polish Medical Emergency Detachment.
79. With our decisions today, we have opened a new chapter in the transatlantic relationship and set the direction for the Alliance’s continued adaptation towards 2030 and beyond. We look forward to meeting again in Spain in 2022, followed by our next meeting in Lithuania.
Communiqué du sommet de Bruxelles
publié par les chefs d’État et de gouvernement participant à la réunion du Conseil de l’Atlantique Nord tenue à Bruxelles
le 14 juin 2021
1. Nous, chefs d'État et de gouvernement des 30 pays de l’Alliance, nous sommes réunis à Bruxelles pour réaffirmer notre unité, notre solidarité et notre cohésion, et pour ouvrir un nouveau chapitre des relations transatlantiques, à un moment où l’environnement de sécurité auquel nous sommes confrontés se fait de plus en plus complexe. L'OTAN reste le fondement de notre défense collective et le forum essentiel pour les consultations et la prise de décision en matière de sécurité entre Alliés. L’OTAN est une alliance défensive et elle continuera d'œuvrer en faveur de la paix, de la sécurité et de la stabilité dans l'ensemble de la zone euro-atlantique. Nous restons fermement attachés au traité de Washington, document fondateur de l’OTAN, y compris au principe, inscrit dans l’article 5, selon lequel une attaque contre un Allié est considérée comme une attaque contre nous tous. Nous continuerons de suivre une approche à 360 degrés pour protéger et défendre notre sécurité, indivisible, et pour mener à bien les trois tâches fondamentales de l’OTAN, à savoir la défense collective, la gestion de crise et la sécurité coopérative.
2. L'OTAN est l'alliance la plus solide et la plus réussie de l'histoire. Elle garantit la sécurité du territoire de nos pays et celle de leurs citoyens, au nombre d’un milliard, ainsi que notre liberté et les valeurs que nous partageons, parmi lesquelles la liberté individuelle, les droits de la personne, la démocratie et l’état de droit. Nous sommes unis par nos valeurs communes, inscrites dans le traité de Washington, socle de notre unité, de notre solidarité et de notre cohésion. Nous nous engageons à assumer en conséquence nos responsabilités en tant qu’Alliés. Nous réaffirmons notre attachement aux buts et aux principes de la Charte des Nations Unies. Nous sommes attachés à l'ordre international fondé sur des règles. Nous nous engageons à renforcer les consultations lorsque la sécurité ou la stabilité d'un Allié sont menacées ou lorsque nos valeurs et nos principes fondamentaux sont en péril.
3. Nous nous trouvons face à des menaces multiformes, à une compétition systémique de la part de puissances autoritaires qui cherchent à s’affirmer, ainsi qu’à des défis croissants pour la sécurité de nos pays et de nos concitoyens, depuis toutes les directions stratégiques. Les actions agressives de la Russie constituent une menace pour la sécurité euro-atlantique ; le terrorisme sous toutes ses formes et dans toutes ses manifestations demeure une menace persistante pour nous tous. Des acteurs étatiques et non étatiques mettent à mal l’ordre international fondé sur des règles et cherchent à fragiliser la démocratie dans le monde. L’instabilité observée au-delà de nos frontières favorise aussi la migration irrégulière et la traite des êtres humains. L’influence croissante et les politiques internationales de la Chine peuvent présenter des défis, auxquels nous devons répondre ensemble, en tant qu’Alliance. Nous interagirons avec la Chine en vue de défendre les intérêts de l’Alliance en matière de sécurité. Nous sommes de plus en plus souvent confrontés à des menaces cyber et hybrides, et à d’autres menaces asymétriques, parmi lesquelles des campagnes de désinformation, ainsi qu’à l’utilisation malveillante de technologies émergentes et de technologies de rupture toujours plus perfectionnées. Les avancées rapides dans le domaine spatial ont une incidence sur notre sécurité. La prolifération des armes de destruction massive et l’érosion de l'architecture de maîtrise des armements portent également atteinte à notre sécurité collective. Le changement climatique est un multiplicateur de menaces qui a des incidences sur la sécurité de l’Alliance. La responsabilité première de l’Alliance est de protéger et de défendre le territoire et la population de ses pays membres contre une attaque, et nous répondrons à l’ensemble des défis et des menaces qui pèsent sur la sécurité euro-atlantique.
4. Nous nous réunissons alors que la pandémie de COVID-19 continue de mettre à l’épreuve nos pays et notre résilience. L’OTAN et les forces armées des pays de l’Alliance ont soutenu la réponse civile à la pandémie tout en assurant notre défense collective et en garantissant l’efficacité de nos opérations. Nous avons en outre apporté une aide cruciale à un certain nombre de partenaires en leur faisant parvenir des fournitures médicales essentielles. Nous rendons hommage à toutes celles et tous ceux qui luttent contre la pandémie dans nos pays et partout dans le monde.
5. À notre réunion de décembre 2019, à Londres, nous avons demandé au secrétaire général de mener un processus de réflexion prospective en vue de renforcer encore la dimension politique de l’OTAN, y compris les consultations. Nous prenons acte de l'importante contribution apportée par le groupe indépendant que le secrétaire général a constitué à l’appui de l'initiative OTAN 2030. En conséquence, nous approuvons aujourd'hui, dans le cadre d'OTAN 2030, un agenda transatlantique pour l'avenir. Tout au long de son histoire, l'OTAN s'est en permanence adaptée à un environnement de sécurité en évolution. L'agenda OTAN 2030 complète et prolonge l'adaptation politique et militaire en cours, renforce notre aptitude à mener à bien les trois tâches fondamentales et contribue à ce que notre Alliance soit encore plus forte et prête pour l'avenir.
6. À cette fin, nous décidons :
de réaffirmer que l'OTAN est l’unique forum transatlantique, essentiel et indispensable, pour les consultations et l'action commune sur toutes les questions touchant à notre sécurité individuelle et collective. Nous nous engageons à renforcer et à élargir nos consultations et à faire en sorte que l'OTAN demeure souple et efficace pour la conduite d'opérations militaires au service de notre sécurité commune. Nous réaffirmons les principes démocratiques communs de l'Alliance ainsi que notre attachement à l'esprit et à la lettre du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord. Nous nous engageons à renforcer les consultations lorsque la sécurité ou la stabilité d'un Allié sont menacées ou lorsque nos valeurs et nos principes fondamentaux sont en péril ;
de renforcer l'OTAN en tant que cadre d'organisation de la défense collective de la zone euro-atlantique, face à toutes les menaces, d'où qu'elles viennent. Nous réaffirmons notre détermination à maintenir une combinaison appropriée de capacités nucléaires, conventionnelles et de défense antimissile pour la dissuasion et la défense, et nous réitérons notre attachement à l'engagement en matière d'investissements de défense de 2014, dans son intégralité. Nous nous engageons en faveur de l'exécution complète et rapide des travaux menés pour renforcer encore notre posture de dissuasion et de défense, et nous nous engageons à faire en sorte que l’amélioration de la disponibilité opérationnelle de nos forces et le renforcement et la modernisation de la structure de forces de l'OTAN se poursuivent de manière à répondre aux besoins actuels et futurs en matière de défense ;
d'améliorer notre résilience. Sachant que la résilience reste une responsabilité nationale, nous adopterons une approche plus intégrée et mieux coordonnée, dans le droit fil de notre engagement collectif au titre de l'article 3 du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, pour atténuer les vulnérabilités et faire en sorte que nos forces armées puissent opérer efficacement en temps de paix, de crise ou de conflit. Les Alliés élaboreront une proposition en vue d'établir, d'évaluer et de revoir des objectifs de résilience, et d'en assurer le suivi, pour guider l'élaboration, au niveau national, des buts et des plans de mise en œuvre en matière de résilience. Il appartiendra à chaque Allié individuellement de déterminer comment établir et réaliser ses buts et ses plans de mise en œuvre nationaux en la matière, ce qui lui permettra de procéder d'une manière qui soit compatible avec ses propres compétences, structures, procédures et obligations, et aussi, le cas échéant, avec celles de l'UE ;
de favoriser la coopération entre Alliés au sein de l'OTAN dans le domaine des technologies, de promouvoir l'interopérabilité et d'encourager la mise au point et l'adoption de solutions technologiques pour répondre à nos besoins militaires. À cet effet, nous mettrons en place un accélérateur civilo-militaire d'innovation en matière de défense pour l'Atlantique Nord. Nous décidons en outre de mettre en place un fonds OTAN pour l'innovation au travers duquel les pays de l’Alliance qui le souhaitent pourront financer des start-up travaillant sur des technologies émergentes et des technologies de rupture à double usage dans des domaines clés pour la sécurité des Alliés ;
de renforcer la capacité de l'OTAN de contribuer à préserver et à façonner l'ordre international fondé sur des règles dans les secteurs importants pour la sécurité des Alliés. Nous intensifierons le dialogue et la coopération pratique que nous menons avec les partenaires actuels, y compris avec l'UE, les pays aspirant à l'adhésion et nos partenaires de la région Asie-Pacifique, et nous renforcerons nos interactions avec des acteurs mondiaux clés et avec d'autres nouveaux interlocuteurs au‑delà de la zone euro-atlantique, notamment d'Afrique, d'Asie et d'Amérique latine ;
de développer sensiblement l'aptitude de l'OTAN à apporter un soutien aux partenaires dans le domaine de la formation et du renforcement des capacités, sachant que les conflits, d'autres développements en matière de sécurité et l'instabilité généralisée dans le voisinage de l'OTAN ont des conséquences directes pour la sécurité des Alliés ;
de nous fixer pour but que l'OTAN devienne l'organisation internationale de référence s'agissant de comprendre les incidences du changement climatique sur la sécurité et de s'y adapter. Nous décidons de réduire sensiblement les émissions de gaz à effet de serre provenant des activités et des installations militaires, sans nuire à la sécurité du personnel, à l'efficacité opérationnelle et à notre posture de dissuasion et de défense. Nous invitons le secrétaire général à définir un objectif réaliste, ambitieux et concret pour la réduction des émissions de gaz à effet de serre provenant des structures et des installations politiques et militaires de l'OTAN, et à évaluer s'il serait possible d'atteindre l'objectif de zéro émission nette d'ici à 2050. Nous organiserons aussi à intervalles réguliers un dialogue de haut niveau sur le climat et la sécurité afin d'échanger des points de vue et de coordonner des mesures complémentaires ;
d’inviter le secrétaire général à diriger le processus d'élaboration du prochain concept stratégique ; ce concept sera négocié et approuvé par le Conseil en session permanente puis entériné par les dirigeants des pays de l'OTAN au prochain sommet.
7. L'agenda OTAN 2030 définit pour l'Organisation un niveau d'ambition plus élevé. Il contient des lignes directrices claires devant permettre à l'Alliance de poursuivre son adaptation afin de pouvoir faire face aux menaces et défis actuels, nouveaux et futurs, dans le prolongement de l'adaptation politique et militaire en cours. L'exécution de l'agenda OTAN 2030, l'accomplissement des trois tâches fondamentales et la concrétisation du prochain concept stratégique nécessitent l'affectation de ressources adéquates au travers des dépenses de défense nationales et du financement commun. Compte tenu des besoins, nous décidons d'accroître ces ressources, y compris si nécessaire le financement commun de l'OTAN à partir de 2023, en prenant en considération la soutenabilité, l'abordabilité et la redevabilité. À notre réunion de 2022, parallèlement à l'adoption du concept stratégique, nous approuverons les besoins spécifiques de financement supplémentaire jusqu'en 2030 ainsi que les incidences en termes de ressources pour le budget militaire de l'OTAN, le programme OTAN d'investissement au service de la sécurité et le budget civil, et nous définirons d'éventuelles mesures d'efficience.
8. L’objectif fondamental et immuable de l'OTAN consiste à sauvegarder la liberté et la sécurité de tous ses membres par des moyens politiques et militaires. L’environnement de sécurité, en évolution constante, nous amène de plus en plus à faire face aux menaces et aux défis en recourant à des instruments militaires et non militaires suivant une démarche délibérée, cohérente et pérenne. L’OTAN adoptera une approche adaptée et structurée. L’Organisation utilise divers instruments non militaires à l'appui des trois tâches fondamentales de l’Alliance. Elle sert également de plateforme pour rendre plus cohérent le recours à ces instruments par les Alliés, sous leur autorité et leur contrôle, et aux côtés d’autres acteurs internationaux. Nous continuerons de renforcer nos efforts en faveur d’une communication stratégique efficace, claire et convaincante, élément essentiel à l'appui des trois tâches fondamentales de l’OTAN.
9. Depuis plus de vingt-cinq ans, l’OTAN s’emploie à bâtir un partenariat avec la Russie, notamment au travers du Conseil OTAN-Russie (COR). Alors que l'OTAN respecte ses engagements internationaux, la Russie continue de porter atteinte aux valeurs, aux principes, à la confiance et aux engagements qui font la substance des documents agréés sur lesquels repose la relation OTAN-Russie. Nous réaffirmons les décisions que nous avons prises concernant la Russie au sommet du pays de Galles, en 2014, et lors de toutes nos réunions suivantes dans le cadre de l’OTAN. Nous avons suspendu toute coopération pratique, tant civile que militaire, avec la Russie, tout en restant ouverts au dialogue politique. Tant que la Russie ne montre pas qu’elle respecte le droit international et qu’elle honore ses obligations et responsabilités internationales, il ne peut y avoir de retour à la normale. Nous continuerons de répondre à la détérioration de l'environnement de sécurité en renforçant notre posture de dissuasion et de défense, y compris par une présence avancée dans la partie orientale de l'Alliance. L’OTAN ne cherche pas la confrontation et ne représente aucune menace pour la Russie. Les décisions que nous avons prises sont pleinement compatibles avec nos engagements internationaux, et elles ne sauraient en conséquence être considérées par quiconque comme étant en contradiction avec l'Acte fondateur OTANRussie.
10. Nous appelons la Russie à révoquer la désignation de la République tchèque et des États-Unis comme « pays inamicaux » et à s’abstenir de toute autre mesure contraire à la Convention de Vienne sur les relations diplomatiques.
11. Le renforcement multidomaine, par la Russie, de son dispositif militaire, sa posture plus affirmée, ses capacités militaires innovantes, et ses activités provocatrices, notamment à proximité des frontières de l'OTAN, ainsi que ses exercices d'alerte de grande envergure organisés sans préavis, la poursuite du renforcement de son dispositif militaire en Crimée, le déploiement à Kaliningrad de missiles modernes à double capacité, l’intégration militaire avec le Bélarus, et les violations répétées de l’espace aérien de pays membres de l’OTAN constituent une menace grandissante pour la sécurité de la zone euro-atlantique et contribuent à l’instabilité le long des frontières de l’OTAN et au-delà.
12. Outre ses activités militaires, la Russie a par ailleurs intensifié ses activités hybrides visant des pays membres ou partenaires de l’OTAN, y compris par l’intermédiaire d’acteurs agissant pour son compte. Il s’agit notamment de tentatives d’ingérence dans les élections et les processus démocratiques de pays de l’Alliance, de pressions et de pratiques d’intimidation sur les plans politique et économique, de vastes campagnes de désinformation, d’actes de cybermalveillance, et de sa complaisance à l’égard des cybercriminels qui sévissent depuis son territoire, y compris ceux qui prennent pour cible des infrastructures critiques, et en perturbent le fonctionnement, dans des pays de l’OTAN. Il s’agit également d’activités illégales et destructrices menées par les services de renseignement russes sur le territoire de pays de l’Alliance, dont certaines ont causé la mort de concitoyens et engendré d’importants dégâts matériels. Nous sommes pleinement solidaires de la République tchèque et des autres Alliés qui ont été ainsi touchés.
13. La Russie a continué de diversifier son arsenal nucléaire, y compris par le déploiement d’une panoplie de systèmes de missiles à courte portée et à portée intermédiaire censés exercer une action coercitive sur l’OTAN. Elle a recapitalisé environ 80 % de ses forces nucléaires stratégiques, et elle développe ses capacités nucléaires en cherchant à se doter d’armes innovantes et déstabilisatrices ainsi que de toute une gamme de systèmes à double capacité. La Russie continue de tenir un discours nucléaire agressif et irresponsable, et elle a accru l’importance qu’elle accordait déjà aux exercices conventionnels déstabilisateurs mettant en jeu des systèmes à double capacité. La stratégie nucléaire de la Russie ainsi que son programme complet de modernisation, de diversification et d’expansion de ses systèmes d’armes nucléaires – y compris l’augmentation du nombre de ses armes nucléaires non stratégiques et leur perfectionnement – contribuent toujours davantage à une posture d’intimidation stratégique se faisant plus agressive. Nous continuerons de collaborer étroitement pour faire face à l’ensemble des menaces et des défis que présente la Russie.
14. Nous réitérons notre soutien à l’intégrité territoriale et à la souveraineté de l'Ukraine, de la Géorgie et de la République de Moldova à l’intérieur de leurs frontières internationalement reconnues. Nous appelons la Russie à retirer, conformément aux engagements qu’elle a pris au niveau international, les forces qu’elle a stationnées dans ces trois pays sans leur consentement. Nous condamnons fermement, et ne reconnaîtrons pas, l’annexion, illégale et illégitime, de la Crimée par la Russie, et nous dénonçons son occupation temporaire. Les violations des droits de la personne dont sont victimes les Tatars de Crimée et les membres d’autres communautés locales doivent cesser. Le renforcement massif de son dispositif militaire et les activités déstabilisatrices auxquels la Russie s’est récemment livrée en Ukraine et alentour ont davantage encore exacerbé les tensions et porté atteinte à la sécurité. Nous appelons la Russie à mettre fin au renforcement de son dispositif militaire, ainsi qu’à cesser d’imposer des restrictions à la navigation dans certaines parties de la mer Noire. Nous appelons également la Russie à cesser d’entraver l’accès à la mer d’Azov et aux ports ukrainiens. Nous saluons la retenue et l’approche diplomatique de l’Ukraine dans ce contexte. Nous nous efforçons de contribuer à la désescalade. Nous intensifions par ailleurs notre soutien à l'Ukraine. Nous appelons à la pleine application des accords de Minsk par toutes les parties, et nous soutenons les efforts entrepris dans le cadre du format Normandie et du Groupe de contact trilatéral. En tant que signataire des accords de Minsk, la Russie porte une responsabilité importante à cet égard. Nous appelons la Russie à cesser d’attiser le conflit en apportant comme elle le fait un soutien financier et militaire aux formations armées qu’elle appuie dans l’est de l’Ukraine. Nous réitérons notre plein soutien à la mission spéciale d’observation de l’Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (OSCE) en Ukraine. Nous soulignons qu’il importe que soient assurés la sécurité et l’accès total et sans entrave de cette mission sur l’ensemble du territoire de l’Ukraine, y compris la Crimée et la frontière russo-ukrainienne, comme le prévoit son mandat. Nous appelons en outre la Russie à revenir sur sa décision de reconnaître les régions géorgiennes d’Abkhazie et d’Ossétie du Sud en tant qu’États indépendants, à appliquer l’accord de cessez-le-feu conclu en 2008 par l’entremise de l’UE, à mettre fin à la militarisation de ces régions, ainsi qu’aux tentatives de séparation forcée de celles-ci du reste de la Géorgie par la construction, qui se poursuit, d’obstacles s’apparentant à des frontières, et à mettre un terme aux violations des droits de la personne, aux détentions arbitraires et au harcèlement de citoyens géorgiens. Nous réitérons notre ferme soutien en faveur des discussions internationales de Genève. Nous appelons également la Russie à prendre part de manière constructive au processus de règlement de la question de la Transnistrie. Nous sommes déterminés à soutenir les réformes démocratiques de la République de Moldova et à lui fournir une aide dans le cadre de notre initiative de renforcement des capacités de défense et des capacités de sécurité se rapportant à la défense.
15. Nous restons ouverts à un dialogue périodique, ciblé et substantiel avec une Russie qui soit disposée à mener des échanges au sein du COR sur la base de la réciprocité, en vue d'éviter les malentendus, les erreurs d'appréciation ou les escalades involontaires, et à accroître la transparence et la prévisibilité. Les réunions du COR nous ont aidés à communiquer clairement nos positions, et nous nous tenons prêts pour sa prochaine réunion. Nous continuerons d’axer notre dialogue avec la Russie sur les questions d'importance critique auxquelles nous sommes confrontés. Le conflit en Ukraine et alentour est pour nous, dans les circonstances actuelles, le premier point à l'ordre du jour. L’OTAN reste déterminée à faire bon usage des lignes de communication militaires existant entre elle et la Russie afin de favoriser la prévisibilité et la transparence et de réduire les risques, et elle appelle la Russie à faire de même. Nous continuons d'aspirer à établir une relation constructive avec la Russie, lorsque ses actions le permettront.
16. Le terrorisme, sous toutes ses formes et dans toutes ses manifestations, continue de représenter une menace directe pour la sécurité de nos populations ainsi que pour la stabilité et la prospérité internationales. Nous rejetons catégoriquement le terrorisme et le condamnons avec la plus grande fermeté. Les Alliés continueront de lutter contre cette menace avec détermination et résolution, dans un esprit de solidarité. Bien que les pays restent responsables au premier chef de leur sécurité intérieure et de leur propre résilience, la lutte contre le terrorisme exige un effort cohérent et durable de la part de la communauté internationale dans son ensemble, faisant intervenir un large éventail d'instruments et d'acteurs. Le rôle de l'OTAN dans la lutte contre le terrorisme contribue aux trois tâches fondamentales de l’Alliance et fait partie intégrante de l’approche à 360 degrés de celle-ci concernant la dissuasion et la défense. La coopération au sein de l’OTAN vient renforcer la capacité des Alliés de prévenir les actes de terrorisme, d’en atténuer les conséquences, d’y répondre et d’y résister, et elle apporte une valeur ajoutée aux efforts que les Alliés déploient en la matière au niveau national. Nous condamnons tout soutien financier au terrorisme. Par ailleurs, nous sommes conscients de la nécessité d'agir sur les conditions qui favorisent la propagation du terrorisme. Notre approche du terrorisme, et de ses causes, est conforme au droit international et aux buts et aux principes de la Charte des Nations Unies, et elle s’inscrit dans le respect de toutes les résolutions pertinentes du Conseil de sécurité de l’Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU) relatives à la lutte contre le terrorisme.
17. Nous demeurons pleinement attachés au rôle accru que joue l'OTAN dans la lutte de la communauté internationale contre le terrorisme, notamment par la sensibilisation et l’analyse, la préparation et la réactivité, les capacités, le renforcement des capacités et les partenariats, et les opérations. Nous continuons de mettre en œuvre notre plan d’action de 2019, et nous l’actualiserons d’ici à la fin de cette année pour qu’il reflète l’évolution des menaces terroristes. Nous sommes déterminés à honorer les engagements qui sont les nôtres au titre de la résolution 2396 du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, au travers notamment de la politique nouvellement établie de l’OTAN sur les éléments de preuve recueillis sur le champ de bataille, en nous appuyant sur une collecte, une conservation, un partage et une analyse améliorés des informations et des données, dans les limites du mandat de l’OTAN. Nous poursuivrons notre travail en matière de défense contre les engins explosifs improvisés et contre les menaces chimiques, biologiques, radiologiques et nucléaires (CBRN). Nous développons des capacités visant à protéger nos forces contre le détournement de technologies à des fins terroristes, tout en mettant les technologies émergentes au service de notre lutte contre le terrorisme. Par ailleurs, nous intensifions notre soutien aux pays partenaires afin de les aider à lutter eux-mêmes contre le terrorisme et à priver les terroristes de sanctuaires, ce qui, par voie de conséquence, renforce la propre sécurité de l'OTAN. L’Organisation poursuivra aussi ses contacts, comme il conviendra, avec les pays partenaires et d'autres acteurs internationaux pour apporter valeur ajoutée et complémentarité. Elle continue de contribuer à la coalition mondiale contre l'EIIL/Daech, notamment par les vols de surveillance qu’effectuent ses avions AWACS (système aéroporté de détection et de contrôle) et par la collaboration entre services.
18. Près de vingt ans après leur lancement, les opérations militaires de l’OTAN en Afghanistan vont prendre fin. Nous avons privé les terroristes d’un sanctuaire qui leur permettait de planifier des attaques contre nos pays, aidé l’Afghanistan à développer ses institutions de sécurité, et prodigué formation, conseil et assistance aux forces de défense et de sécurité nationales afghanes ; celles-ci assument désormais l’entière responsabilité de la sécurité dans leur pays. Nous rendons hommage à celles et ceux qui ont perdu la vie ou ont été blessés, et nous exprimons notre profonde gratitude à l’ensemble des hommes et des femmes qui ont servi sous la bannière de l’OTAN, ainsi qu’à leurs familles.
19. Le retrait de nos troupes ne signifie pas la fin de notre relation avec l’Afghanistan. Nous allons maintenant entamer un nouveau chapitre. Nous confirmons notre engagement à continuer de soutenir l’Afghanistan, sa population et ses institutions s’agissant de promouvoir la sécurité et de préserver les avancées durement acquises ces vingt dernières années. Gardant à l’esprit les engagements que nous avons pris précédemment, l’OTAN continuera d’assurer formation et soutien financier aux forces de défense et de sécurité nationales afghanes, notamment dans le cadre du fonds d’affectation spéciale pour l’armée nationale afghane. L’OTAN conservera un bureau à Kaboul pour son haut représentant civil afin de poursuivre l'action diplomatique et de renforcer notre partenariat avec l’Afghanistan. Consciente que l’aéroport international Hamid Karzaï est important pour qu’une présence diplomatique et internationale soit maintenue et pour que l’Afghanistan soit relié au reste du monde, l’OTAN fournira un financement transitoire de manière à assurer la continuité des activités de cet aéroport. Nous développerons par ailleurs le dialogue sur l’Afghanistan avec les partenaires internationaux et régionaux concernés. Nous continuons d’appuyer le processus de paix en cours, dirigé et pris en charge par les Afghans, et nous appelons toutes les parties prenantes à aider l’Afghanistan à promouvoir un règlement politique inclusif et durable, qui permette de mettre fin aux violences, de protéger les droits de la personne au sein de la société afghane, en particulier s’agissant des femmes, des enfants et des minorités, de faire respecter l’état de droit et de faire en sorte que l’Afghanistan ne redevienne jamais un sanctuaire pour les terroristes.
20. L’OTAN continue de jouer un rôle actif et de premier plan en faveur de la sécurité internationale au travers de ses opérations, missions et activités. Nous exprimons notre gratitude à nos partenaires pour leurs contributions substantielles à ces efforts. L’OTAN et les Alliés aident l’Iraq à lutter contre l’EIIL/Daech et contre le terrorisme sous toutes ses formes et dans toutes ses manifestations. Nous félicitons le gouvernement iraquien et les forces de sécurité iraquiennes pour les efforts qu'ils continuent de déployer afin de combattre l’EIIL/Daech. Suite à une demande du gouvernement iraquien, nous allons renforcer notre soutien à ce pays au travers de la mission OTAN en Iraq. Nous élargirons notre mission non combattante de conseil, de formation et de renforcement des capacités pour aider le pays à mettre en place des institutions et forces de sécurité qui soient plus efficaces, plus pérennes, plus à même de rendre des comptes et plus inclusives. Cet élargissement de la mission OTAN en Iraq, y compris le soutien supplémentaire aux institutions de sécurité iraquiennes, aura lieu de manière progressive et modulable, en fonction de la demande et des conditions sur le terrain. Il se fera avec le plein accord des autorités iraquiennes, dans le plein respect de la souveraineté et de l’intégrité territoriale de l’Iraq, et en étroite coordination avec les partenaires et acteurs internationaux concernés, parmi lesquels la coalition mondiale contre l'EIIL/Daech, l’ONU et l’Union européenne.
21. La dissuasion et la défense sont au cœur de l’Alliance, et elles s’appuient sur l’article 5 du traité de Washington et sur un lien transatlantique immuable. Nous sommes unis et résolus dans notre aptitude et notre engagement à nous défendre mutuellement. Nous maintiendrons et développerons plus avant toute la gamme des forces et des capacités nécessaires, au niveau de disponibilité opérationnelle requis, pour assurer une dissuasion et une défense crédibles et offrir à l'Alliance un large éventail d'options permettant d'adapter notre réponse aux circonstances et de faire face à toutes les menaces émanant d’acteurs étatiques ou non étatiques, d'où qu'elles viennent, potentiellement de différentes directions dans plus d'une région à la fois. Tout en réaffirmant notre attachement aux trois tâches fondamentales, nous avons accordé une attention renouvelée à la défense collective, et nous avons aussi fait en sorte que l'OTAN conserve son aptitude à projeter la stabilité et à lutter contre le terrorisme.
22. Nous nous félicitons des progrès significatifs déjà réalisés dans la mise en œuvre de nos précédentes décisions visant à renforcer la posture de dissuasion et de défense de l'OTAN, et nous réaffirmons notre attachement à la mise en œuvre complète et rapide de ces décisions. Nous avons accéléré notre adaptation militaire en augmentant les dépenses de défense, en nous dotant de capacités modernes, en renforçant la réactivité politique et militaire et en accroissant la disponibilité opérationnelle de nos forces.L’OTAN travaille actuellement à établir une nouvelle stratégie militaire en mettant en œuvre deux concepts militaires importants, qui renforceront encore notre capacité à assurer la dissuasion et la défense face à tout adversaire potentiel et à préserver et développer notre avantage militaire, aujourd'hui comme demain. Le concept de dissuasion et de défense offre un cadre cohérent unique, qui permet de faire face aux principales menaces pesant sur l’Alliance et d'assurer la dissuasion et la défense face à ces menaces dans un environnement multimilieu ; ce concept nous permettra d’être mieux préparés pour affronter les défis, en particulier l’instabilité généralisée et les chocs stratégiques. Le concept sur la capacité à combattre offre une vision à long terme permettant de préserver et de développer l’avantage militaire décisif de l’OTAN. La mise en œuvre du concept de dissuasion et de défense servira de guide pour la planification préétablie renforcée en vue de réagir à une crise ou un conflit potentiel, et elle permettra d’améliorer encore l'utilisation et l’organisation des forces et des capacités des Alliés dans tous les milieux d'opérations et d'assurer un commandement et un contrôle plus efficaces. Nous élaborons des plans militaires stratégiques, des plans militaires par milieu et des plans militaires régionaux afin d’améliorer notre capacité à faire face à toute éventualité et de garantir un renforcement en temps voulu. Nous mettrons l’accent sur les activités menées en permanence en temps de paix à l’appui de la dissuasion, y compris au travers de la présence et de la posture dynamique de nos forces militaires ainsi que d’exercices, sur la base d’une coordination renforcée entre les Alliés et l’OTAN. Grâce à la mise en œuvre du concept sur la capacité à combattre, nous garantirons que l’Alliance développera continuellement son avantage militaire et technologique, suivant l'évolution de la nature du conflit. Nous nous engageons à mettre pleinement en œuvre ces nouveaux concepts et à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour renforcer la cohérence entre ceux-ci et les activités et plans pertinents des pays et de l’OTAN.
23. Nous nous engageons à poursuivre le renforcement et la modernisation de la structure de forces de l'OTAN de manière à répondre aux besoins actuels et futurs en matière de dissuasion et de défense. Nous veillerons à la mise en place d’une architecture de forces multimilieu flexible, agile et résiliente, dotée des forces adéquates, au bon endroit et au bon moment. Nous renforcerons nos moyens modernes de commandement et de contrôle, en les adaptant aux besoins de notre posture à 360 degrés, de la gestion dynamique des forces, du système de réponse amélioré et des plans. Ce faisant, nous mettrons davantage l’accent sur l’interdépendance des aspects liés à la géographie, aux milieux et à la disponibilité opérationnelle. Dans le cadre de ces efforts d’ensemble, nous sommes déterminés à continuer d’accroître la disponibilité opérationnelle de nos forces et d'améliorer la capacité de réaction rapide de l’Alliance, y compris au travers de la mise en œuvre, en cours, de l’initiative pour la disponibilité opérationnelle de l’OTAN, qui vise à renforcer la culture de la disponibilité opérationnelle et à contribuer à la mise à disposition de forces dans un délai de 30 jours ou moins. Nous avons réuni toutes les forces de combat requises dans le cadre de l’initiative pour la disponibilité opérationnelle de l’OTAN, qui prévoit 30 bâtiments de premier rang, 30 bataillons de manœuvre moyens ou lourds et 30 escadrons de chasse. Il est actuellement procédé à l’organisation et à l’entraînement de ces forces en formations de combat de plus grande taille pour le renforcement et pour les combats de haute intensité, ou pour des interventions militaires rapides en cas de crise.
24. Nous veillerons à ce que la structure de commandement de l'OTAN soit robuste, résiliente et apte à prendre en charge tous les éléments d'un commandement et d'un contrôle efficaces face à des défis simultanés dans tous les milieux d’opérations et dans tout le spectre des missions, y compris les opérations de grande envergure menées à des fins de défense collective. Nos deux nouveaux commandements, le Commandement de forces interarmées de Norfolk et le Commandement interarmées du soutien et de la facilitation, ainsi que le Centre des cyberopérations, ont atteint leur capacité opérationnelle initiale. Les contributions des Alliés au commandement et au contrôle par l’intermédiaire des quartiers généraux de la structure de forces de l'OTAN et des quartiers généraux nationaux, ainsi que le lien renforcé entre ces éléments et la structure de commandement de l'OTAN, y compris le soutien fourni en tant que pays hôte, restent essentiels pour améliorer la compréhension qu’a l’Alliance de la situation régionale, pour accroître sa vigilance et pour développer son aptitude à réagir rapidement à toute menace, d’où qu’elle vienne.
25. Nous ne nous laisserons pas imposer de contraintes par un quelconque adversaire potentiel s'agissant de la liberté de mouvement des forces alliées dans les milieux terrestre, aérien ou maritime, vers et dans n'importe quelle partie du territoire de l'Alliance. Notre posture de dissuasion et de défense s’appuie sur des forces crédibles, à la fois en place et prêtes pour un renforcement au sein de l’Europe et depuis l’autre rive de l’Atlantique. Nous continuerons de consolider et d’exercer régulièrement l’aptitude de l’Alliance à renforcer rapidement tout Allié visé par une menace. Nous continuerons d'accorder une priorité élevée, au plan national comme au sein de l’Alliance, à la facilitation dans la zone de responsabilité du SACEUR pour améliorer notre aptitude à soutenir le déploiement et le maintien en puissance des forces alliées à destination, en provenance et au sein de tout le territoire de l’Alliance. Ces efforts incluent la progression des travaux sur les modalités relatives à l’acheminement du carburant. Nous réaffirmons que l’OTAN doit poursuivre ses efforts afin de garantir une approche cohérente et des synergies avec l’UE en matière de mobilité militaire, notamment pour ce qui est des procédures dans ce domaine, qui devraient s’appliquer de la même manière à tous les Alliés. Nous continuons de renforcer notre posture maritime et d’assurer la protection de nos voies de communication maritimes. Nous saluons la création, en Turquie, du Centre d'excellence de l’OTAN pour la sûreté maritime. Nous nous tiendrons en permanence informés des menaces susceptibles de peser sur nos infrastructures sous-marines critiques et continuerons de faire face à ces menaces à titre national, et, s’il y a lieu, à titre collectif. Nous nous félicitons que le mécanisme OTAN de mise en œuvre de la mobilité aérienne pour intervention rapide ait atteint sa capacité opérationnelle totale ; il a été activé et utilisé par les Alliés pour des vols de secours transportant des fournitures essentielles au profit d’Alliés et de partenaires en réponse à la pandémie de COVID-19.
26. Nous réaffirmons notre engagement à apporter une réponse mesurée, équilibrée, coordonnée et rapide face à la panoplie croissante et en évolution des missiles russes conventionnels et à capacité nucléaire, qui gagne en ampleur et en complexité et qui fait peser sur la sécurité et la stabilité à l’échelle de la zone euro-atlantique des risques importants émanant de toutes les directions stratégiques. Nous continuerons de mettre en œuvre un ensemble cohérent et équilibré de mesures politiques et militaires pour réaliser les objectifs de l’Alliance, lesquelles portent notamment sur la défense aérienne et antimissile intégrée renforcée, sur les capacités conventionnelles défensives et offensives modernes, sur les initiatives visant à faire en sorte que la dissuasion nucléaire de l’OTAN reste sûre, sécurisée et efficace, sur les efforts déployés pour soutenir et renforcer la maîtrise des armements, le désarmement et la non-prolifération, ainsi que sur le renseignement et sur les exercices. Nous n’avons aucune intention de déployer des missiles nucléaires à lanceur terrestre en Europe.
27. NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) is an essential and permanent mission, in times of peace as well as in times of crisis or conflict, which contributes to deterrence and defense, as well as to security, indivisible, and freedom of action of the Alliance, including NATO's capacity for strengthening and strategic response. NATO's IAMD encompasses all measures aimed at helping to deter, neutralize or reduce any air and missile threats. This mission, conducted using a 360-degree approach, is designed to deal with all air and missile threats emanating from all strategic directions.
28. NATO has developed its IAMD mission and we have taken steps to improve the readiness and responsiveness of IAMD forces, in peacetime as well as in times of crisis or conflict, thereby strengthening our ability to ensure that all necessary measures are implemented in the service of the security of the Alliance. We take into account the increasingly diverse and complex air and missile threats emanating from state and non-state actors, ranging from simple unmanned aerial vehicles to advanced hypersonic missiles.
29. Allies will continue to work in NATO's IAMD to maintain its flexibility and adaptability. They will also continue to ensure the effectiveness of the training and exercises of their IAMD forces. Allies are committed to enhancing NATO's IAMD capabilities, including sensors, interceptors and command and control assets, including through the NATO defense planning process. We welcome the establishment in Greece of the NATO Center of Excellence for IAMD.
30. Resilience is essential for credible deterrence and defense as well as for the successful execution of the Alliance's core tasks. This is a national responsibility and a collective commitment, as set out in Article 3 of the Washington Treaty. Building on the significant progress made since the commitment to better resilience, which we made in 2016 at the Warsaw summit, today we approved a reinforced commitment to better resilience, which outlines the new measures that we plan to take in the years to come. We will continue to pursue a public sector-wide approach to improving the resilience of our societies and meeting NATO's seven basic requirements for national resilience, through enhanced civil-military cooperation and better preparedness of the civilian sector, closer dialogue with our populations, the private sector and non-governmental actors, and centers of expertise for resilience set up by the Allies. We welcome the establishment in Romania of the Euro-Atlantic Center for Resilience. NATO and the Allies, within the limits of their respective competences, will maintain and strengthen the security of their critical infrastructures, their key industries, their supply chains. supply and their information and communication networks, including 5G. NATO will further strengthen its own resilience, to preserve our ability to consult, make decisions and act together. We will continue to work closely with our partners and other international organizations engaged in similar initiatives to increase the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and our neighborhood.
31. Our countries continue to face threats and challenges from both state and non-state actors who resort to hybrid activities directed against our political institutions, our public opinions and the security of our fellow citizens. Although the response to hybrid threats rests primarily with the target country, NATO is prepared, by decision of the Council, to assist an Ally at any stage of a hybrid campaign against it, in particular by deploying a support team to combat hybrid practices. In Hybrid War cases, the Council could decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as for an armed attack. NATO and the Allies will continue to ensure preparedness, deterrence and defense against hybrid threats. On an individual basis, Allies may consider attributing hybrid activities and responding in a coordinated manner, where appropriate, with the understanding that attribution is a prerogative of national sovereignty. We are improving our situational awareness and expanding the toolkit at our disposal to combat hybrid threats, including disinformation campaigns, by developing a comprehensive set of prevention and response options. We will also continue to support our partners in building their resilience to hybrid threats. assign hybrid activities and respond in a coordinated manner, it being understood that attribution is a prerogative under national sovereignty. We are improving our situational awareness and expanding the toolkit at our disposal to combat hybrid threats, including disinformation campaigns, by developing a comprehensive set of prevention and response options. We will also continue to support our partners in building their resilience to hybrid threats. assign hybrid activities and respond in a coordinated manner, it being understood that attribution is a prerogative under national sovereignty. We are improving our situational awareness and expanding the toolkit at our disposal to combat hybrid threats, including disinformation campaigns, by developing a comprehensive set of prevention and response options. We will also continue to support our partners in building their resilience to hybrid threats. including disinformation campaigns, by developing a comprehensive set of prevention and response options. We will also continue to support our partners in building their resilience to hybrid threats. including disinformation campaigns, by developing a comprehensive set of prevention and response options. We will also continue to support our partners in building their resilience to hybrid threats.
32. Cyber threats to the security of the Alliance are complex, destructive, coercive and increasingly frequent, as recently shown by incidents of ransomware and other cyber attacks directed against our infrastructure. critics and our democratic institutions, which can have systemic effects and cause great damage. To meet this evolving challenge, today we endorsed NATO's Comprehensive Cyber Defense Policy, which will contribute to the Organization's three core tasks and its overall deterrence and defense posture, and which will further strengthen our resilience. While reaffirming NATO's defensive mandate, The Alliance is determined to be able to employ the full range of capabilities at all times to actively deter, defend and respond to the full spectrum of cyber threats, including those exercised in hybrid campaigns, in the respect for international law. We reiterate that it would be for the North Atlantic Council to decide, on a case-by-case basis, the circumstances of an invocation of Article 5 following a cyberattack. The Allies are aware that, in certain circumstances, the incidences of major cyber-attacks with cumulative effects are such that these acts may be considered to be tantamount to an armed attack. We remain determined to act in accordance with applicable international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, international humanitarian law and international human rights law. We will work to promote a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace, and we will continue efforts to enhance stability and reduce the risk of conflict by supporting the application of international law and voluntary standards for responsible behavior of people. States in cyberspace. We will use NATO more as a platform for political consultation among Allies, where we can share concerns about cyber-attacks, share national approaches and responses, and reflect on possible collective responses. When necessary, we will ensure that those who harm us pay the price. Our response does not necessarily have to be confined to the cyber world. We will improve our situational awareness in support of decision-making in NATO. Resilience and the ability to detect, prevent, mitigate and respond to vulnerabilities and intrusions are of critical importance, as the malicious exploitation of the COVID pandemic has shown -19 by cyberactors. NATO as an organization will therefore continue to adapt and improve its cyber defense capabilities. Five years after adopting our Cyber Defense Commitment, we remain committed to supporting, as a priority, the goal of strong national cyber defense capabilities. We are continuing the implementation process resulting from the designation of cyberspace as the operating environment. We will enhance the effectiveness of integrating sovereign cyber effects, provided on a voluntary basis by Allies, into collective defense and Alliance operations and missions, under strong political oversight. We will continue to seek to develop, as appropriate, effective and mutually beneficial partnerships, including with partner countries, other international organizations, industry and academia, with a view to continuing our efforts to improve international stability. in cyberspace. We welcome the recent opening of the NATO Academy of Information and Communication Technologies,
33. Nous reconnaissons l’importance croissante de l’espace pour la sécurité et la prospérité de nos pays et pour la dissuasion et la défense assurées par l'OTAN. Un accès sécurisé aux capacités, services et produits spatiaux est essentiel pour la conduite des opérations, missions et activités de l’Alliance. Nous accélérerons les travaux visant à approfondir et à élargir notre utilisation de l’espace en tant que milieu d’opérations, notamment au travers du Centre spatial OTAN, en Allemagne, et grâce à la création prochaine, en France, du Centre d’excellence pour l’espace, dont nous nous félicitons. Nous renforcerons la connaissance qu’a l’OTAN du milieu spatial et ferons en sorte de mieux intégrer ce milieu dans nos activités, y compris l’entraînement et les exercices ainsi que l’action en matière de résilience et d’innovation. Comme le prévoit la politique spatiale globale de l’OTAN, l’approche de l’Organisation concernant l’espace restera pleinement conforme au droit international. Nous soutenons les efforts menés au niveau international pour promouvoir un comportement responsable dans l’espace. Nous considérons que les attaques en direction de l’espace, en provenance de l’espace, ou dans l’espace représentent un réel défi pour la sécurité de l'Alliance, dont l’impact pourrait menacer la prospérité, la sécurité et la stabilité des pays et de la zone euro-atlantique, et qu’elles pourraient avoir sur les sociétés modernes un effet tout aussi dommageable que celui d'une attaque conventionnelle. De telles attaques pourraient conduire à l'invocation de l’article 5. Il reviendrait au Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord de décider, au cas par cas, des circonstances d'une invocation de l’article 5 à la suite de telles attaques.
34. Nous restons unis et continuons d'agir ensemble face à un environnement de sécurité exigeant. À mesure que celui-ci continuera d’évoluer, l'Alliance continuera d'y faire face et de s’y adapter en tant que de besoin. Depuis le sommet de Varsovie, nous avons établi une présence avancée dans la partie orientale du territoire de l’Alliance. Nous continuons d'améliorer notre présence avancée rehaussée en Estonie, en Lettonie, en Lituanie et en Pologne en mettant en cohérence les plans et en veillant à ce que les quatre groupements tactiques prêts au combat soient en mesure d’opérer avec les forces nationales de défense du territoire de manière intégrée. Nous avons augmenté nos contributions à notre présence avancée adaptée sur terre, en mer et dans les airs, dans la région de la mer Noire, et nous restons attachés à sa pleine mise en œuvre. Nos mesures d’assurance, y compris les exercices et diverses autres activités aériennes, terrestres et maritimes, restent en place et continuent de répondre au besoin fondamental essentiel d'assurance et de dissuasion. Nous avons augmenté nos contributions à nos mesures d'assurance adaptées pour la Turquie, et nous restons attachés à leur pleine mise en œuvre. Nous disposons d’un éventail de forces, dont la force opérationnelle interarmées à très haut niveau de préparation, qui sont prêtes à se déployer sur court préavis pour faire face à toute éventualité et renforcer les Alliés. Les travaux se poursuivent en vue de la pleine mise en œuvre du cadre OTAN pour le sud en tant que composante durable de la posture de dissuasion et de défense de l’Alliance. Forts des progrès accomplis depuis 2016, y compris la mise en place du pôle pour le sud, nous continuerons de renforcer notre capacité à faire face aux menaces et aux défis émanant du sud, notamment dans la région de la mer Méditerranée et ses abords, en améliorant notre connaissance de la situation stratégique, nos plans, et la disponibilité opérationnelle de nos forces. Dans le Grand Nord, nous continuerons de mener les activités requises, de manière calibrée et coordonnée, à l’appui des intérêts de sécurité de l’Alliance. Nous nous emploierons à renforcer la coopération avec les partenaires concernés qui partagent les mêmes conceptions, au service des objectifs de dissuasion et de défense agréés de l'OTAN, conformément aux décisions, politiques et procédures de l’OTAN, comme il conviendra, et eu égard aux incidences politiques.
35. We reaffirm our unwavering commitment to all aspects of the defense investment commitment made at the Wales Summit in 2014. Fair burden-sharing is the foundation for cohesion, the solidarity and credibility of the Alliance and our ability to fulfill our fundamental commitments under Article 3 and Article 5. We, individually and collectively, are determined to continue to better balance the sharing expenses and responsibilities among Alliance member countries. We have made considerable progress since the Wales summit: Defense spending outside the United States has increased in real terms for seven consecutive years, which supports our shared responsibility to provide capabilities to the Alliance. All Allies have increased their defense spending in real terms, and this trend is set to continue. By the end of the year, European Allies and Canada will have invested an additional US $ 260 billion compared to 2014. In addition, ten Allies are expected to spend at least 2% of their GDP this year on defense. About two-thirds of Allies plan to meet or exceed the 2% target by 2024. In addition, 24 Allies spend more than 20% of their defense spending on major equipment, including research and development. and, according to their national plans, 27 Allies will achieve the 20% target by 2024. Our security and defense, as a whole, depend both on the sums we devote to them and on the way in which we spend them. Allies continue to make valuable contributions of forces and capabilities, which benefit the security of the Euro-Atlantic area in NATO operations, missions and other activities, as well as in operations and missions. carried out under national authority or under the authority of other organizations. Allies invest considerable resources in preparing their forces, capabilities and infrastructure for the activities of the Alliance and the operations they conduct. For the years to come, in line with the defense investment commitment and on the basis of the significant progress made to date, We confirm our determination to continue our efforts as a priority in the three areas of appropriations, capacities and contributions. We must and will do more.
36. We are investing in our military capabilities to meet new and persistent challenges in all operating environments. We continue to build a range of robust and sophisticated capabilities in all settings, including heavier forces and capabilities, more at the high end, using advanced and better supported technologies, at the level of readiness. required. We will continue to improve and adapt the sustainability, deployability and interoperability of our capabilities to face a demanding strategic environment and to conduct high-spectrum operations. Our national capacity development plans will contribute to the establishment of capacities in their entirety and on time, in particular those required by the Alliance as part of the NATO defense planning process. Given the pace, breadth and magnitude of technological change, and as we continue to develop our strengths and capabilities, we recognize the vital importance of research and development and innovation s '' acting to exploit the opportunities and meet the challenges posed by emerging technologies and disruptive technologies. This will make it possible to consolidate, individually and collectively, our technological advance today and tomorrow. We are continuing our work on dealing, as appropriate, with the issue of dependencies that exist with regard to old military equipment of Russian origin, through national initiatives and multinational cooperation. We welcome the modernization of the NATO AWACS fleet and the progress made on the program on the future Alliance Monitoring and Control Capability, as well as the first operations of the NATO Force of the newly established allied land surveillance capability. Allies are determined to work together, through NATO-supported multinational cooperation projects, to develop or acquire new capabilities in key areas, such as air-to-air refueling, training, precision strike, next-generation ammunition, air defense, CBRN defense, autonomous systems and rotorcraft capability. We welcome the modernization of the NATO AWACS fleet and the progress made on the program on the future Alliance Monitoring and Control Capability, as well as the first operations of the NATO Force of the newly established allied land surveillance capability. Allies are determined to work together, through NATO-supported multinational cooperation projects, to develop or acquire new capabilities in key areas, such as air-to-air refueling, training, precision strike, next-generation ammunition, air defense, CBRN defense, autonomous systems and rotorcraft capability. We welcome the modernization of the NATO AWACS fleet and the progress made on the program on the future Alliance Monitoring and Control Capability, as well as the first operations of the NATO Force of the newly established allied land surveillance capability. Allies are determined to work together, through NATO-supported multinational cooperation projects, to develop or acquire new capabilities in key areas, such as air-to-air refueling, training, precision strike, next-generation ammunition, air defense, CBRN defense, autonomous systems and rotorcraft capability.
37. The evolution of technology has never been so rapid, bringing both new opportunities and new risks to the security environment and the way NATO operates. We are determined to maintain our technological lead, and to ensure interoperability within the Alliance, in order to maintain the credibility of our deterrence and defense posture. We have recently taken important steps to this end, building on the Roadmap for Emerging and Disruptive Technologies, which we endorsed in 2019, and we have now adopted a strategy to promote and protect these technologies. This strategy clearly defines the approach to be followed to identify, develop and adopt, with the desired speed, emerging technologies and disruptive technologies based on the principles of responsible use, respecting international law, and taking into account the discussions initiated in other competent international forums. It must also allow us to preserve our interoperability, protect our sensitive technologies and actively face the threats and challenges linked to the development of technologies by others, today and in the future. While leveraging the vast innovation expertise available to all 30 Allies, we will further leverage our partnerships, particularly with the private sector and academia, to maintain our technological lead. and taking into account the discussions initiated in other competent international fora. It must also allow us to preserve our interoperability, protect our sensitive technologies and actively face the threats and challenges linked to the development of technologies by others, today and in the future. While leveraging the vast innovation expertise available to all 30 Allies, we will further leverage our partnerships, particularly with the private sector and academia, to maintain our technological lead. and taking into account the discussions initiated in other competent international fora. It must also allow us to preserve our interoperability, protect our sensitive technologies and actively face the threats and challenges linked to the development of technologies by others, today and in the future. While leveraging the vast innovation expertise available to all 30 Allies, we will further leverage our partnerships, particularly with the private sector and academia, to maintain our technological lead. to protect our sensitive technologies and to actively face the threats and challenges related to the development of technologies by others, now and in the future. While leveraging the vast innovation expertise available to all 30 Allies, we will further leverage our partnerships, particularly with the private sector and academia, to maintain our technological lead. to protect our sensitive technologies and to actively face the threats and challenges related to the development of technologies by others, now and in the future. While leveraging the vast innovation expertise available to all 30 Allies, we will further leverage our partnerships, particularly with the private sector and academia, to maintain our technological lead.
38. The Alliance's primary responsibility is to protect and defend the territory and the people of its member countries against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. No one should doubt NATO's resolve should the security of any of its member states be threatened. Faced with a highly diverse, complex and demanding international security environment, NATO is determined to preserve the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations, and this wherever it comes from.
39. Une dissuasion et une défense crédibles sont essentielles pour prévenir les conflits et les guerres, et elles continueront de reposer sur une combinaison appropriée de capacités nucléaires, de capacités conventionnelles et de capacités de défense antimissile. Une posture de dissuasion et de défense robuste renforce la cohésion de l'Alliance et constitue un lien transatlantique politique et militaire essentiel, et ce grâce à une répartition équitable et viable des rôles, des responsabilités et des charges. Nous sommes conscients de l'environnement de sécurité de plus en plus exigeant, qui présente des risques liés aux changements de posture, de doctrine et de comportement d'adversaires potentiels, et à leurs investissements considérables dans la mise au point de nouvelles capacités ainsi que dans la modernisation et le développement de leurs capacités existantes. L'OTAN continue de s'adapter et demeure fermement déterminée à prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour s’assurer que sa posture de dissuasion et de défense reste crédible, cohérente, résiliente et adaptable à l’environnement de sécurité.
40. The objective of the Allies is to continue to strengthen deterrence as a central element of our collective defense and to contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance. As long as there are nuclear weapons, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. To cope with the more demanding security environment, NATO has taken steps to ensure that its nuclear deterrent capabilities remain safe, secure and effective. The strategic forces of the Alliance, and in particular those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have their own deterrent role and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance. The separate decision-making centers of these Allies contribute to deterrence, by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries. NATO's nuclear deterrence posture also relies on the US nuclear weapons forward deployed in Europe, as well as the capabilities and infrastructure made available by the Allies concerned. National contributions to NATO's nuclear deterrence mission, in the form of dual-capability aircraft, remain a central element of this effort. The Alliance reaffirms the imperative to ensure the widest possible participation of the Allies concerned in agreed nuclear burden-sharing arrangements in order to demonstrate its unity and determination. Relevant Allies will continue to advance their efforts to maintain leadership focus and institutional excellence for the nuclear deterrent mission. Allies will also continue to ensure greater coherence between the conventional and nuclear components of NATO's deterrence and defense posture, enhance the effectiveness of strategic communications and increase the effectiveness of NATO exercises. so as to maintain and demonstrate credible deterrence and reduce strategic risk. NATO supports efforts to reduce strategic risk, which contribute significantly to regional and international security. In particular,
41. The fundamental objective of NATO's nuclear capability is to preserve the peace, prevent coercive action and deter aggression. Given the deteriorating security environment in Europe, a credible and united Nuclear Alliance is essential. Nuclear weapons are very unique. The conditions under which NATO could be led to resort to nuclear weapons are extremely improbable. NATO reaffirms that any use of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict. If, however, the fundamental security of any of its Member States were to be threatened, the
42. Missile defense can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence, but it cannot replace it. We reaffirm our commitment to maintain a NATO Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability to accomplish the Alliance's fundamental collective defense task and ensure full coverage and protection of all populations, territory and forces. forces of European NATO countries against the growing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. NATO's BMD is purely defensive. The objective of NATO's BMD and the political principles which govern it remain the same as those defined at the Lisbon summit in 2010. These principles are those of the indivisibility of the security of the Allies and of solidarity within NATO, the equitable sharing of risks and burdens, as well as reasonable effort, taking into account the level of threat, financial sustainability and technical feasibility, and according to the latest joint threat assessments approved by the Alliance . If international efforts are to reduce the threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, NATO's missile defense can and will be adapted accordingly.
43. NATO BMD relies on voluntary national contributions, including US assets in Romania, Turkey, Spain and Poland as part of the Phased Adaptive Defense Approach anti-missile in Europe, as well as on its command and control system, the only component eligible for common funding. Additional voluntary national contributions will provide robustness. We are committed to putting in place the essential complementary elements of NATO's BMD Command and Control System, a necessary step to achieve the next major milestone before reaching Full Operational Capability. Full control and supervision by the Allies at the political level is essential, and full implementation will be ensured and monitored. We will continue to interact with third States, on a case-by-case basis, in order to enhance transparency and mutual trust and to increase the effectiveness of ballistic missile defense.
44. NATO's BMD is not directed against Russia, and it will not undermine Russian strategic deterrence. NATO's BMD is intended to defend against potential threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. We have explained to Russia on numerous occasions that the BMD system cannot undermine Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent system, and that there is no intention to revise the design of this system to endow it with such ability in the future. Therefore, Russia's statements threatening to target Allies because of NATO's BMD are unacceptable and counterproductive. In the event that Russia is willing to discuss BMD with NATO,
45. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation have made and should continue to make essential contributions to the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives, as well as to strategic stability and our collective security. NATO has a long history of contributing to disarmament and non-proliferation. After the end of the Cold War, NATO drastically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe, as well as its reliance on nuclear weapons in its strategy. We regret that the conditions necessary for disarmament have not been met since the NATO summit in Brussels in 2018. Allies remain collectively committed to upholding and supporting existing disarmament agreements and commitments, arms control and non-proliferation. We will continue to strengthen arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, key elements of Euro-Atlantic security, taking into account the current security environment. We welcome and fully support the agreement that the United States and the Russian Federation have reached to extend the new START treaty for five years. The Allies believe that the new START Treaty contributes to international stability, and they renew their strong support for its continued implementation and for an early and active dialogue on ways to improve strategic stability. They will welcome further strategic talks between the United States and Russia on future arms control measures, taking into account the security of all Allies. They will support further arms control negotiations, with the aim of improving Alliance security, given the current international security environment.
46. NATO remains lucid about the challenges that Russia presents, including the increase in the number of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons and their refinement. The Alliance will build on the lessons of the past, in particular from Russia's material violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which resulted in the termination of that agreement. NATO will continue to respond in a measured and responsible manner to the significant risks that the Russian 9M729 missile and other short-range and intermediate-range missiles pose to the security of Allies. We have adopted a balanced, coordinated and defensive set of measures to ensure that NATO's deterrence and defense posture remains credible and effective, in particular through potential contributions in the fields of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Russia's proposal for a moratorium on the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe is at odds with Russia's current unilateral deployment of such systems on this continent, and would not prevent it. to concentrate such missiles outside the European part of its territory; this proposal is therefore neither credible nor acceptable. At the same time, the Allies remain open to substantial discussions on arms control and a genuine dialogue on measures of transparency and reciprocal confidence,
47. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the main bulwark against the dissemination of nuclear weapons, the cornerstone of the global architecture for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and the framework for international cooperation. for the sharing of the benefits arising from the use of nuclear energy, science and technology for peaceful purposes. Allies remain firmly committed to the full implementation, in all its aspects, of the irreplaceable platform, as well as to the consolidation of each of its three mutually reinforcing pillars. We are determined to work towards a meaningful outcome at the upcoming Tenth Review Conference, and which provides an important opportunity to contribute to the preservation, universalization and full implementation of the NPT. The Alliance reaffirms its determination to strive for a more secure world for all and to take further concrete and effective measures to create the conditions conducive to new negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Allies support the achievement of the ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world, in full compliance with all provisions of the NPT, including Article VI, and in an increasingly effective and verifiable manner that promotes stability international and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all. NATO's nuclear arrangements have always been in full compliance with the NPT, which remains the only credible path to nuclear disarmament. The long-term success of the NPT cannot be taken for granted; it takes a sustained effort to add to the accomplishments that this treaty has made possible. It is in this spirit that we call on all States parties to the NPT to work together for the success of the Tenth Review Conference. We reaffirm our opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TIAN), which is not in line with the Alliance's nuclear deterrence policy, runs counter to the existing architecture of non-proliferation and disarmament, risks weakening the NPT and does not take into account the current security environment. The TIAN does not change the legal obligations of our countries with regard to nuclear weapons. We do not accept any argument that the TIAN reflects or contributes in any way to the development of customary international law. We call on our partners and all other countries to reflect realistically on the implications of this treaty for international peace and security, and in particular on the NPT, and to work with us to improve collective security through concrete measures. and verifiable, which make it possible to reduce strategic risks and make lasting progress on the path to nuclear disarmament.
48. Même si l'OTAN n'est elle-même partie à aucun accord de maîtrise des armements, les Alliés utiliseront au mieux la plateforme importante qu’elle offre pour mener des discussions approfondies et des consultations étroites sur des initiatives de maîtrise des armements propres à soutenir l'unité et la cohésion politique de l’Alliance ainsi que la solidarité en son sein. Nous continuons de faire face activement aux conséquences de l’effondrement du traité sur les forces nucléaires à portée intermédiaire, provoqué par les actions de la Russie, et nous sommes déterminés à maintenir les consultations voulues entre Alliés sur ces questions.
49. Nous restons profondément préoccupés par la prolifération des armes nucléaires et des autres armes de destruction massive, ainsi que de leurs vecteurs et matières connexes, qui est le fait d'acteurs étatiques ou non étatiques et qui représente une menace croissante pour nos populations, nos territoires et nos forces. Nous condamnons avec la plus grande fermeté l’utilisation répétée d’armes chimiques en Syrie ainsi que le recours à de telles armes en Iraq, en Russie, en Malaisie et, pour la première fois depuis la création de l’OTAN, sur le territoire de l’Alliance, au Royaume-Uni. L’emploi d’armes chimiques en tout lieu, à tout moment, par quiconque et pour quelque raison que ce soit est inacceptable. Il ne saurait y avoir d’impunité pour ceux qui utilisent des armes chimiques. Nous nous félicitons dès lors de la décision importante – en ce qu’elle contribue à mettre les auteurs de tels agissements face à leurs responsabilités – qui a été prise en avril 2021, par la Conférence des États parties à la convention sur les armes chimiques (CIAC), de suspendre les droits et privilèges de la Syrie au titre de cette convention. Nous sommes déterminés à respecter la CIAC et le principe international s’opposant à la mise au point, à la fabrication, au stockage et à l’emploi des armes chimiques, ainsi qu’à faire en sorte, notamment au travers de notre engagement commun au sein du Partenariat international contre l’impunité d’utilisation d’armes chimiques, que ceux qui utilisent de telles armes répondent de leurs actes. Nous soutenons la pleine mise en application de la CIAC ainsi que le travail mené par l’Organisation pour l'interdiction des armes chimiques (OIAC) dans le cadre de la lutte contre les menaces liées aux armes de destruction massive, et nous condamnons ceux qui cherchent à entraver les activités de cette organisation. L’OTAN demeure résolue à faire en sorte que les Alliés puissent protéger leurs populations, leurs forces et leurs territoires contre les menaces CBRN ; à cette fin, elle procèdera notamment au réexamen de sa politique globale, au niveau stratégique, pour la prévention de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive et la défense contre les menaces CBRN. Nous sommes unis dans notre détermination à promouvoir les buts et objectifs du Traité d'interdiction complète des essais nucléaires. Nous insistons sur la nécessité de faire entrer en vigueur ce traité et nous soutenons la Commission préparatoire de l’Organisation du Traité d'interdiction complète des essais nucléaires, et notamment le Centre international de données et le système de surveillance international. Nous appelons au lancement immédiat et à la conclusion rapide, au sein de la Conférence du désarmement, de négociations sur un traité interdisant la production de matières fissiles pour la fabrication d’armes nucléaires ou d’autres dispositifs explosifs, conformément au rapport CD/1299 de la Conférence du désarmement et au mandat qu’il contient. Dans l’intervalle, l’Alliance appelle tous les États à déclarer et à maintenir, à titre volontaire, des moratoires sur la production de matières fissiles pour la fabrication d’armes nucléaires ou d'autres dispositifs explosifs nucléaires.
50. Nous restons attachés à la maîtrise des armements conventionnels, élément clé de la sécurité euro-atlantique. Nous sommes résolus à préserver, à renforcer et à moderniser la maîtrise des armements conventionnels en Europe, sur la base de principes et d’engagements clés, y compris en ce qui concerne la réciprocité, la transparence et le consentement du pays hôte. Le maintien par la Russie d'une posture militaire agressive, son refus de respecter pleinement les obligations qui lui incombent en vertu du Traité sur le régime « Ciel ouvert », et le fait qu'elle applique encore de manière sélective le Document de Vienne et n'applique plus depuis longtemps le Traité sur les forces armées conventionnelles en Europe continuent de porter atteinte à la sécurité et à la stabilité de la zone euro-atlantique. Les Alliés appellent la Russie à revenir à la mise en œuvre intégrale et au respect, dans la lettre et l'esprit, de l'ensemble de ses obligations et engagements internationaux, ce qui est indispensable pour restaurer la confiance et la transparence militaire et pour accroître la prévisibilité dans la région euro-atlantique. Nous appelons en particulier la Russie à faire preuve d'ouverture et de transparence, conformément aux engagements auxquels elle a souscrit dans le cadre du Document de Vienne, en ce qui concerne ses exercices d'alerte sans préavis, ses exercices de grande envergure et ses mouvements de troupes à grande échelle, en particulier au vu du récent renforcement, en l’absence de provocation et sans justification, de son dispositif militaire en Ukraine et alentour. Les Alliés soulignent qu'il importe de moderniser le Document de Vienne et se félicitent du large soutien apporté au vaste ensemble de mesures proposé à cet effet. Nous attendons avec intérêt d'intensifier les discussions au sein du Forum pour la coopération en matière de sécurité pour aboutir à un consensus sur un Document de Vienne actualisé à la ministérielle 2021 de l'OSCE. Pour maintenir les contributions qu’apporte le Traité sur le régime « Ciel ouvert » à la sécurité de tous ses États parties, il est essentiel que chacun d'entre eux en respecte pleinement les dispositions. Nous continuerons de soutenir activement les discussions en cours à l'OSCE, notamment le dialogue structuré. Nous appelons la Russie à prendre part de manière constructive à tous ces travaux.
51. Nous réaffirmons le plein soutien de l’Alliance à l’objectif de dénucléarisation complète, vérifiable, et irréversible de la Corée du Nord, conformément aux résolutions pertinentes du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU. Nous appelons la République populaire démocratique de Corée (RPDC) à mener des négociations constructives avec les États-Unis en vue d'atteindre cet objectif. Nous appelons la RPDC à s’acquitter pleinement de ses obligations internationales, à éliminer ses capacités d’armement nucléaire, chimique et biologique, ainsi que ses missiles balistiques, à revenir au TNP et à son accord de garanties généralisées avec l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA), et à abandonner tous les programmes liés à de tels armements. Nous appelons les pays à appliquer pleinement les sanctions imposées par l’ONU.
52. Nous sommes déterminés à faire en sorte que l’Iran ne développe jamais l’arme nucléaire. Nous nous félicitons des discussions substantielles menées entre les participants au Plan d'action global commun (PAGC), et, séparément, avec les États-Unis, pour parvenir à un retour des États-Unis comme de l’Iran à l’application du PAGC. Nous soutenons l'objectif consistant à rétablir les avantages du PAGC en matière de non-prolifération et à garantir la nature exclusivement pacifique du programme nucléaire iranien. Il est essentiel que l’Iran préserve cet espace de discussion en évitant toute nouvelle escalade. Nous apportons notre ferme soutien à l’AIEA dans son travail, crucial, de contrôle et de vérification, qui contribue à garantir le respect par l’Iran de ses obligations en matière de garanties liées au TNP, ainsi que de ses autres engagements. La reprise de la pleine mise en œuvre du PAGC pourrait également ouvrir la voie à des discussions sur les préoccupations régionales et de sécurité, y compris à l’appui du régime de non-prolifération. Nous condamnons le soutien que l’Iran apporte à des forces agissant pour son compte et à des acteurs armés non étatiques, y compris par des financements, par des formations et par la prolifération d’armes et de technologies de missiles. Nous appelons l’Iran à cesser toutes ses activités relatives aux missiles balistiques qui ne sont pas conformes à la résolution 2231 du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU, à s’abstenir de toute action de déstabilisation et à jouer un rôle constructif en faveur de la stabilité et de la paix régionales.
La Syrie conserve un stock de missiles balistiques à courte portée pouvant atteindre certaines parties du territoire de l'OTAN et le territoire de certains de nos pays partenaires. La Syrie a largement utilisé ces missiles contre sa propre population. Nous restons vigilants face aux tirs de missiles qui pourraient de nouveau frapper ou viser la Turquie depuis la Syrie. Nous continuons de suivre et d'évaluer la menace balistique en provenance de Syrie.
La menace croissante que représente la prolifération des missiles balistiques à proximité de la frontière sud-est de l’Alliance a été et reste un facteur du développement et du déploiement, par l’OTAN, d'un système de défense antimissile balistique conçu pour contrer les menaces émanant de l’extérieur de la zone euroatlantique.
53. Le conflit en Syrie est entré dans sa onzième année et continue d'avoir des conséquences importantes pour la stabilité de la région ainsi que pour la sécurité de la frontière sud-est de l’OTAN. Nous restons préoccupés et vigilants face à ses répercussions. Nous réaffirmons notre détermination à défendre le territoire et les frontières de l'OTAN contre toute menace et à faire face aux défis émanant de la Syrie. L’élection présidentielle tenue par le régime syrien le 26 mai 2021 ne peut être considérée comme libre et régulière et ne contribue pas aux efforts visant à trouver une solution politique. Nous soulignons que la stabilité et la sécurité ne sauraient être rétablies en Syrie sans un véritable processus politique conforme à la résolution 2254 du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU. Nous appelons à un cessez-le-feu national et au renouvellement de l’autorisation d’acheminement transfrontalier de l'aide humanitaire de l’ONU, ainsi qu’à l’accroissement de cette aide, pour une période d'au moins douze mois, afin de pouvoir faire face aux besoins d'assistance de la population syrienne. Nous tenons de nouveau à remercier l’un des membres de notre Alliance, la Turquie, qui accueille des millions de réfugiés syriens.
54. Les Alliés demeurent profondément préoccupés par les développements intervenus au Bélarus depuis août 2020. Les politiques et les actes du Bélarus ont des incidences sur la stabilité régionale, et ils sont contraires aux principes qui fondent notre partenariat. L’OTAN suivra les répercussions pour la sécurité de l’Alliance et demeurera vigilante à cet égard. Le déroutement, inacceptable, d’un avion civil en mai 2021, et l’arrestation ultérieure d’un journaliste et de sa compagne qui se trouvaient à bord, ont porté atteinte à la sécurité de civils et sont un grave affront aux principes de la liberté d’opinion politique et de la liberté de la presse. Nous soutenons les enquêtes indépendantes menées à cet égard, notamment celle de l’Organisation de l’aviation civile internationale (OACI). Nous approuvons les mesures prises par les Alliés, à titre individuel ou collectif, en réaction à cet incident. Nous engageons le Bélarus à se conformer au droit international, à respecter les droits de la personne et les libertés fondamentales, et à libérer immédiatement et sans condition tous les prisonniers politiques, y compris les membres de l’Union des Polonais du Bélarus. Il est dans l’intérêt de tous que le Bélarus soit un pays démocratique, souverain et stable. Les Alliés se tiennent prêts à développer un partenariat mutuellement bénéfique entre l’OTAN et le Bélarus, en fonction de la situation politique et des conditions de sécurité. Nous serons attentifs à l'ampleur, à la portée et aux suites de l’exercice Zapad 2021, et nous continuons d'appeler la Russie et le Bélarus à agir de manière prévisible et transparente, dans le respect de leurs obligations internationales et des engagements qu’ils ont pris dans le cadre de l’OSCE.
55. Les ambitions déclarées de la Chine et son assertivité présentent des défis systémiques pour l’ordre international fondé sur des règles et dans des domaines revêtant de l’importance pour la sécurité de l’Alliance. Nous sommes préoccupés par celles des politiques coercitives qui ne correspondent pas aux valeurs fondamentales inscrites dans le traité de Washington. La Chine accroît rapidement son arsenal nucléaire, se dotant d’un plus grand nombre d’ogives et de vecteurs sophistiqués pour établir une triade nucléaire. Elle fait preuve d’opacité dans la mise en œuvre de la modernisation de son appareil militaire et dans celle de sa stratégie de fusion militaro-civile publiquement déclarée. Elle coopère par ailleurs avec la Russie dans le domaine militaire, notamment en participant à des exercices russes dans la zone euro-atlantique. Nous restons préoccupés par le fait que la Chine manque souvent de transparence et a fréquemment recours à la désinformation. Nous appelons la Chine à respecter ses engagements internationaux et à agir de manière responsable au sein du système international, notamment dans les milieux spatial, cyber et maritime, en conformité avec son rôle de grande puissance.
56. L’OTAN maintient un dialogue constructif avec la Chine lorsque cela est possible. Sur la base des intérêts qui sont les nôtres, nous voyons d’un œil favorable les possibilités d’interagir avec la Chine sur des questions revêtant de l’importance pour l’Alliance et sur des défis communs, tels que le changement climatique. Il est utile d’échanger des informations sur les politiques et les activités de chacun, afin de mieux se connaître et d’aborder les éventuels points de désaccord. Les Alliés exhortent la Chine à s’investir de manière substantielle dans le dialogue, dans le développement de la confiance, et dans des mesures de transparence concernant ses capacités et sa doctrine nucléaires. La transparence et la compréhension mutuelles seraient avantageuses aussi bien pour l’OTAN que pour la Chine.
57. Nous travaillons ensemble, en tant qu’Alliance, ainsi qu’avec des partenaires partageant les mêmes conceptions, en particulier l’Union européenne, en vue de protéger les infrastructures critiques, de renforcer la résilience, de conserver notre avance technologique et de faire face à ces défis pour l’ordre international fondé sur des règles.
58. Le changement climatique est l’un des défis incontournables de notre époque. Il s’agit d’un multiplicateur de menaces, qui a des incidences sur la sécurité des Alliés, tant dans la zone euro-atlantique que dans son voisinage. Le changement climatique met à l’épreuve notre résilience et la préparation du secteur civil, a des effets sur notre planification et la résilience de nos installations militaires et de nos infrastructures critiques, et peut rendre plus difficiles les conditions dans lesquelles sont menées nos opérations. Aujourd'hui, nous avons entériné un plan d’action visant à mettre en œuvre l’agenda de l’OTAN sur le changement climatique et la sécurité, qui vient renforcer notre action de sensibilisation, d’adaptation, d’atténuation des effets et d’ouverture sur l’extérieur, sans compromettre la crédibilité de la posture de dissuasion et de défense ni remettre en question les priorités que sont la sécurité du personnel militaire, l’efficacité opérationnelle et l’efficience financière. Pour accroître la sensibilisation à cette problématique, l’OTAN réalisera chaque année une étude des effets du changement climatique sur son environnement stratégique ainsi que sur ses missions et opérations. Pour s’adapter au changement climatique, l’OTAN intégrera des considérations liées à cette problématique dans tout l’éventail de ses activités, qu’il s’agisse de la planification de défense, du développement capacitaire, de la préparation du secteur civil ou des exercices. Pour aider à atténuer les effets du changement climatique, l’OTAN mettra au point – en s’appuyant sur les bonnes pratiques des Alliés et en tenant compte du fait que ceux-ci ne sont pas tous dans la même situation – une méthode de cartographie visant à aider les Alliés à mesurer les émissions de gaz à effet de serre provenant des activités et des installations militaires, laquelle pourrait contribuer à la définition d’objectifs volontaires de réduction de ces émissions. L’OTAN renforcera par ailleurs les échanges avec les pays partenaires ainsi qu’avec les organisations internationales et régionales qui s’intéressent de près aux questions ayant trait au changement climatique et à la sécurité.
59. La sécurité énergétique joue un rôle important dans notre sécurité commune. La stabilité et la fiabilité des approvisionnements énergétiques, la diversification des itinéraires, des fournisseurs et des ressources énergétiques, y compris l’intégration de sources d’énergie durables, et l’interconnexion des réseaux énergétiques sont autant d’éléments qui revêtent une importance critique et permettent d'accroître notre résilience face aux pressions politiques et économiques. Il est essentiel de veiller à ce que les pays membres de l’Alliance ne soient pas vulnérables à la manipulation des ressources énergétiques à des fins politiques ou de coercition, laquelle constitue une menace potentielle. Les Alliés continueront donc de chercher à diversifier encore leurs approvisionnements énergétiques, en fonction de leurs besoins et des circonstances. Même si ces questions sont avant tout de la compétence des autorités nationales, les développements en matière d'énergie peuvent avoir des incidences importantes sur les plans politique et de la sécurité pour les Alliés, et également toucher nos partenaires. Par conséquent, nous continuerons d'améliorer notre connaissance de la situation stratégique, notamment par des activités de partage du renseignement et des consultations régulières entre Alliés, et nous renforcerons nos liens avec les organisations internationales compétentes. Nous développerons plus avant la capacité de l'OTAN d’aider les autorités nationales à protéger les infrastructures critiques, notamment contre des activités hybrides ou cyber malveillantes. Nous garantirons la fiabilité des approvisionnements énergétiques destinés à nos forces armées.
60. L’OTAN est, depuis longtemps, consciente de l’importance de la sécurité humaine, qui met l’accent sur les risques et les menaces auxquels sont confrontées les populations des zones de conflit ou de crise et sur la manière de les atténuer et d’y répondre. Adopter une approche axée sur la sécurité humaine témoigne des valeurs qui sont les nôtres et permet d’accroître notre efficacité opérationnelle. Nous sommes déterminés à faire en sorte que tout soit mis en œuvre pour éviter, réduire le plus possible et atténuer les effets négatifs potentiels de nos missions ou activités sur les civils, comme le souligne notre politique de protection des civils. Aujourd'hui, nous entérinons la politique nouvellement établie de l’OTAN visant à prévenir et à combattre la violence sexuelle liée aux conflits, un témoignage phare de notre engagement à faire face à ce type de violence, qui inflige un traumatisme à long terme à des individus et à des familles, leur font subir durablement le poids de la stigmatisation et contribue à leur marginalisation, détruit le tissu social des collectivités, provoque des déplacements, alimente les activités des acteurs armés, favorise la prolongation des conflits et de l’instabilité et entrave l’instauration d’une paix et d’une réconciliation durables. Nous actualisons notre politique relative à la lutte contre la traite des êtres humains. Les travaux que nous menons actuellement en matière de sécurité humaine recouvrent également la question des enfants et des conflits armés, et la protection des biens culturels. L’OTAN continuera d’œuvrer avec ses partenaires, avec d’autres organisations internationales ainsi qu'avec la société civile à l’avancement de son programme pour la sécurité humaine, qui comprend des politiques solides et des directives opérationnelles claires, en faveur d’une paix et d’une sécurité durables et de la défense commune de nos populations.
61. Conscients de l’importance cruciale que revêt la participation pleine et véritable des femmes, sur un pied d'égalité, à tous les aspects de l'action en faveur de la paix et de la stabilité, ainsi que des effets disproportionnés des conflits, y compris la violence sexuelle liée aux conflits, sur les femmes et les filles, nous sommes déterminés à mettre pleinement en application le programme pour les femmes, la paix et la sécurité établi par le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU. La politique et le plan d’action de l’OTAN sur les femmes, la paix et la sécurité permettent de mieux préparer l’Alliance à faire face aux défis d’aujourd’hui et de demain. La politique de l’OTAN sur la prévention de l’exploitation et des abus sexuels et sur les moyens d’y réagir, adoptée en 2019, renforce notre engagement à respecter les normes de comportement les plus strictes, conformément aux valeurs que nous portons. En collaboration avec les pays partenaires, d’autres organisations internationales et la société civile, nous continuerons sans relâche de mettre en œuvre notre politique sur les femmes, la paix et la sécurité, et, dans ce contexte, nous ferons progresser la cause de l’égalité des genres et nous intégrerons la dimension de genre et promouvrons les principes du programme pour les femmes, la paix et la sécurité dans tout ce que nous faisons, et notamment dans les opérations, les missions et les activités de l’OTAN.
62. Nous restons attachés à la politique et au programme de l’OTAN pour le développement de l’intégrité. La corruption et la mauvaise gouvernance fragilisent la démocratie, l’état de droit et le développement économique, et elles constituent dès lors des défis pour notre sécurité. La mise en œuvre de mesures visant à améliorer le développement de l’intégrité, à lutter contre la corruption et à promouvoir la bonne gouvernance continue de revêtir de l’importance aussi bien pour l’OTAN que pour les Alliés et les partenaires.
63. Les partenariats de l'OTAN sont, et resteront, essentiels au fonctionnement de l'OTAN. Le succès des partenariats de l'OTAN est démontré par leur contribution stratégique à la sécurité de l'Alliance et à la sécurité internationale. Ils jouent un rôle important à l’appui des trois tâches fondamentales de l’OTAN et de notre approche à 360 degrés en matière de sécurité. Ils sont indispensables à la concrétisation des priorités de l’OTAN dans le domaine de la sécurité coopérative, en ce qu'ils aident à façonner notre environnement de sécurité et contribuent à la stabilité de la zone euro-atlantique, ainsi qu’à la réalisation des objectifs politiques et militaires de l’OTAN. Nous restons attachés aux principes sur lesquels reposent nos relations avec nos partenaires, et nous avons pris des mesures pour rendre nos partenariats plus stratégiques, plus cohérents et plus efficaces. Les relations de l’Alliance avec ses partenaires s’appuient aussi sur la réciprocité, ainsi que sur des avantages et un respect mutuels. Nous renforcerons le dialogue politique et la coopération pratique avec nos partenaires. Nous exprimons notre gratitude à nos partenaires pour les contributions significatives qu’ils apportent à la connaissance de la situation de l’OTAN ainsi qu’à ses opérations, missions et activités, y compris aux projets relevant de fonds d’affectation spéciale. Nous tenons à reconnaître les sacrifices qu’ils ont consentis au fil des ans au bénéfice de la sécurité euro-atlantique et internationale. Nous continuerons d’améliorer l’interopérabilité, en particulier avec nos partenaires bénéficiant du programme « nouvelles opportunités ». Conscients que les conflits et l'instabilité dans le voisinage de l’OTAN nuisent directement à la sécurité des Alliés, nous continuerons d’accroître l’aide que l’OTAN fournit à nos partenaires et le soutien qu’elle apporte au renforcement de leurs capacités. Nous réaffirmons notre détermination à élargir le dialogue politique et la coopération pratique à tout pays qui partage les valeurs de l'Alliance et son intérêt pour la paix et la sécurité au niveau international, et nous développerons plus avant nos partenariats de sorte qu'ils continuent de répondre aux intérêts tant des Alliés que des partenaires. Conformément à notre plan d'action pour l'approche globale, nous continuerons d'œuvrer à la cohérence des outils et des activités de l'OTAN, d’adopter des approches concertées avec les pays partenaires et des organisations telles que l'ONU, l'UE et l'OSCE, ainsi que de dialoguer avec les organisations non gouvernementales.
64. L’Union européenne demeure un partenaire unique et essentiel pour l'OTAN. Le partenariat stratégique OTAN-UE est fondamental pour la sécurité et la prospérité de nos pays et de la zone euro-atlantique. L'OTAN reconnaît l'importance d'une défense européenne plus forte et plus performante. Le développement de capacités de défense cohérentes, complémentaires et interopérables, évitant les doubles emplois inutiles, est essentiel pour nos efforts conjoints visant à rendre la zone euro-atlantique plus sûre. De tels efforts, y compris les développements récents, rendront l'OTAN plus forte, aideront à accroître notre sécurité commune, contribueront au partage des charges entre les deux rives de l’Atlantique, faciliteront la mise à disposition des capacités nécessaires et soutiendront une augmentation globale des dépenses de défense. Les Alliés non membres de l'UE continuent d'apporter des contributions significatives aux efforts que déploie l'UE pour renforcer ses capacités et ainsi faire face aux défis de sécurité communs. Il est essentiel pour le partenariat stratégique entre l’OTAN et l’UE que les Alliés non membres de l’UE soient associés à ces efforts le plus largement possible. Nous attendons avec intérêt des démarches mutuelles dans ce domaine, représentant des progrès tangibles, à l’appui d'un partenariat stratégique renforcé. Nous réaffirmons, dans leur intégralité, l’ensemble des décisions, principes et engagements relatifs à la coopération entre l'OTAN et l'UE. Nous continuerons de renforcer encore notre partenariat stratégique dans un esprit d’ouverture, de transparence et de complémentarité mutuelles totales, de même que dans le respect des différents mandats, de l’autonomie décisionnelle et de l’intégrité institutionnelle de l’OTAN et de l’UE, et comme l’ont décidé les deux organisations.
65. La coopération entre l’OTAN et l’UE a atteint un niveau sans précédent et a débouché sur des résultats concrets dans les domaines de la lutte contre les menaces hybrides et les cybermenaces, de la communication stratégique, de la coopération opérationnelle, y compris sur les questions maritimes, de la mobilité militaire, des capacités de défense, de l’industrie de défense et de la recherche en matière de défense, des exercices, de la lutte contre le terrorisme, et du renforcement des capacités de défense et de sécurité. Le dialogue politique entre l’OTAN et l’UE reste essentiel pour faire avancer cette coopération. Nous continuerons de développer et d’approfondir notre coopération en mettant pleinement en œuvre l’ensemble des 74 propositions communes, qui contribuent à la cohérence et à la complémentarité de nos efforts. L’environnement stratégique actuel et la pandémie de COVID-19 mettent en lumière l’importance que revêt la coopération entre l’OTAN et l’UE face aux défis de sécurité existants et à leur évolution, s’agissant en particulier des questions de résilience, des technologies émergentes et des technologies de rupture, des incidences du changement climatique sur la sécurité, de la désinformation, et de la compétition géostratégique grandissante. Les processus stratégiques distincts engagés au sein de l’OTAN et de l’UE offrent une occasion tout à fait unique d’intensifier encore nos consultations et notre coopération afin d'accroître la sécurité de nos concitoyens et de promouvoir la paix et la stabilité dans la zone euro-atlantique et au-delà, sachant que l’OTAN reste le cadre transatlantique pour une défense collective solide et le forum essentiel pour les consultations et la prise de décision en matière de sécurité entre Alliés. Nous attachons du prix à la poursuite de l’étroite coopération que le secrétaire général entretient avec le président du Conseil européen, la présidente de la Commission européenne et le haut représentant de l’UE sur tous les aspects du partenariat stratégique OTAN-UE.
66. Nous réaffirmons notre attachement à la politique de la porte ouverte de l’OTAN aux termes de l’article 10 du traité de Washington, laquelle est une réussite historique. L’adhésion de la Macédoine du Nord l’an dernier est une nouvelle preuve tangible de cet attachement. Les vagues successives d'élargissement ont permis de renforcer la sécurité euro-atlantique en aidant à développer et à consolider l’état de droit ainsi que les institutions et les pratiques démocratiques sur l’ensemble du continent européen, et elles ont été conduites dans le respect du droit de tous les États de choisir leurs propres arrangements en matière de sécurité, comme énoncé dans la Charte de Paris pour une nouvelle Europe, de 1990. La porte de l'OTAN reste ouverte à toutes les démocraties européennes qui partagent les valeurs de notre Alliance, qui sont désireuses et capables d'assumer les responsabilités et les obligations liées au statut de membre, qui sont susceptibles de favoriser le développement des principes du Traité et dont l'admission peut contribuer à la sécurité de la zone de l’Atlantique Nord. Les décisions concernant l'élargissement sont du seul ressort de l'OTAN ; aucune tierce partie n'a son mot à dire dans ce processus. Nous restons attachés à l'intégration des pays qui aspirent à rejoindre l'Alliance, en jugeant chacun d'eux en fonction de ce qu'il aura accompli. Nous les encourageons à continuer de mettre en œuvre les réformes et les décisions nécessaires pour préparer leur adhésion. Nous continuerons de soutenir leurs efforts et attendons d'eux qu'ils prennent les mesures nécessaires pour concrétiser leurs aspirations.
67. Les Alliés apportent leur ferme soutien à la souveraineté et à l'intégrité territoriale d’une Bosnie-Herzégovine stable et sûre en conformité avec l’Accord-cadre général pour la paix en Bosnie-Herzégovine et les autres accords internationaux pertinents, prônent la réconciliation nationale et exhortent les responsables politiques à éviter les discours clivants. Nous félicitons la Bosnie-Herzégovine, pays aspirant à l’adhésion, pour ses contributions aux opérations dirigées par l'OTAN. Nous sommes déterminés à poursuivre un dialogue politique intense avec la Bosnie-Herzégovine et prêts à continuer d'apporter notre soutien à la mise en œuvre de tous les efforts de réforme, y compris par l'intermédiaire du QG de l’OTAN à Sarajevo. Nous encourageons les dirigeants de la Bosnie-Herzégovine à tirer pleinement parti de l'éventail des outils de sécurité coopérative et de partenariat qu’offre l'OTAN. Les Alliés saluent le travail de la Commission pour la coopération avec l’OTAN. Ils prient instamment les dirigeants politiques d'œuvrer de manière constructive et de faire preuve de volonté politique dans l'intérêt de tous en Bosnie-Herzégovine, en progressant dans la réalisation des aspirations euro-atlantiques du pays au travers de la mise en œuvre des réformes indispensables dans les domaines politique, électoral, de l’état de droit, de l’économie et de la défense, notamment dans le cadre du programme de réforme du pays établi avec l’OTAN, indépendamment de la décision qui sera prise in fine concernant l’adhésion à l’Organisation.
68. Nous réitérons la décision prise en 2008 au sommet de Bucarest concernant la Géorgie, à savoir que ce pays deviendra membre de l'Alliance, le plan d’action pour l’adhésion (MAP) faisant partie intégrante du processus ; nous réaffirmons tous les éléments de cette décision, ainsi que les décisions ultérieures, y compris celle qui prévoit que chaque partenaire sera jugé en fonction de ce qu'il aura accompli. Nous restons déterminés dans notre soutien au droit de la Géorgie de décider librement de son avenir et de l'orientation de sa politique étrangère, sans ingérence extérieure. Partenaire bénéficiant du programme « nouvelles opportunités », la Géorgie coopère étroitement avec l’Alliance sur un large éventail de questions. Nous apprécions vivement les contributions substantielles aux opérations de l’OTAN que la Géorgie apporte, témoignage de son engagement et de sa capacité à contribuer à la sécurité euro-atlantique. Nous saluons l’accord politique conclu récemment sur la voie d’avenir pour la Géorgie et nous appelons de nos vœux sa pleine mise en application par l’ensemble des parties. Cet accord ouvre la voie aux importantes réformes qui aideront la Géorgie, pays aspirant à l’adhésion, à progresser dans sa préparation à celle-ci. Nous restons déterminés à tirer pleinement parti de la Commission OTAN-Géorgie et du programme national annuel afin d’approfondir le dialogue politique et la coopération. Nous félicitons la Géorgie pour les progrès significatifs qu’elle a accomplis en matière de réforme – lesquels doivent se poursuivre – et qui l’ont aidée à renforcer ses capacités de défense et son interopérabilité avec l’Alliance. La relation que la Géorgie entretient avec l'Alliance renferme tous les outils pratiques pour la préparation d'une adhésion à terme. Nous travaillons en étroite collaboration avec la Géorgie sur la question de la sécurité dans la région de la mer Noire, en réponse aux activités de plus en plus déstabilisatrices de la Russie, et nous nous félicitons des mesures prises pour mettre en œuvre la version actualisée du paquet substantiel OTAN-Géorgie. Nous nous tenons prêts à accroître notre soutien à la Géorgie, notamment pour ce qui concerne le renforcement de la résilience contre les menaces hybrides, la formation et les exercices, et les communications sécurisées. Nous attendons avec intérêt le prochain exercice OTAN-Géorgie, en 2022.
69. Nous réitérons la décision prise en 2008 au sommet de Bucarest concernant l’Ukraine, à savoir que ce pays deviendra membre de l'Alliance, le plan d’action pour l’adhésion (MAP) faisant partie intégrante du processus ; nous réaffirmons tous les éléments de cette décision, ainsi que les décisions ultérieures, y compris celle qui prévoit que chaque partenaire sera jugé en fonction de ce qu'il aura accompli. Nous restons déterminés dans notre soutien au droit de l’Ukraine de décider librement de son avenir et de l'orientation de sa politique étrangère, sans ingérence extérieure. Les programmes nationaux annuels établis dans le cadre de la Commission OTAN-Ukraine (COU) demeurent le mécanisme dont le pays se sert pour faire avancer les réformes liées à son aspiration à l’adhésion. L’Ukraine doit tirer pleinement parti de tous les instruments disponibles au sein de la COU pour atteindre son objectif de mise en application des principes et des normes de l’OTAN. L'aboutissement de réformes irréversibles de grande ampleur s'inscrivant dans la durée – s'agissant notamment de la lutte contre la corruption, de la promotion d'un processus politique inclusif et de la réforme sur la décentralisation –, basées sur les valeurs démocratiques et sur le respect des droits de la personne, des minorités et de l’état de droit, est essentiel pour préparer l'avènement de la prospérité et de la paix en Ukraine. Il est particulièrement important que soient menées de nouvelles réformes dans le secteur de la sécurité, y compris celle du Service de sécurité d'Ukraine. Nous nous félicitons des réformes significatives déjà accomplies par l’Ukraine et encourageons vivement ce pays à réaliser de nouveaux progrès dans le respect des obligations et engagements internationaux qui sont les siens. Nous continuerons d’apporter un soutien pratique aux réformes dans le secteur de la sécurité et de la défense, notamment au travers de l’ensemble complet de mesures d’assistance. Nous continuerons aussi de soutenir les efforts de l’Ukraine visant à renforcer sa résilience face aux menaces hybrides, notamment par l’intensification des activités de la plateforme OTANUkraine pour la lutte contre les pratiques de guerre hybride. Nous nous félicitons de la coopération qui s’exerce entre l’OTAN et l’Ukraine concernant la sécurité dans la région de la mer Noire. Le statut de partenaire bénéficiant du programme « nouvelles opportunités », octroyé l’année dernière, donne un nouvel élan à notre coopération, déjà ambitieuse, et favorisera une plus grande interopérabilité, avec la possibilité de développer les exercices conjoints, les formations et la connaissance de la situation. La coopération militaire et les initiatives de renforcement des capacités que mènent les Alliés avec l’Ukraine, notamment dans le cadre de la brigade lituano-polono-ukrainienne, viennent appuyer cette démarche. Nous apprécions vivement les contributions significatives de l’Ukraine aux opérations de l’Alliance, à la Force de réaction de l'OTAN et aux exercices de l'OTAN.
70. Les Balkans occidentaux sont une région d'importance stratégique pour l’OTAN, comme l’attestent la coopération et les opérations que nous y menons de longue date. L’OTAN reste fermement engagée en faveur de la sécurité et de la stabilité des Balkans occidentaux, et fermement déterminée à soutenir les aspirations euro-atlantiques des pays de la région. Nous intensifierons nos efforts dans la région et nous renforcerons notre dialogue politique et notre coopération pratique pour appuyer les efforts de réforme, promouvoir la paix et la sécurité régionales et contrer l’influence néfaste d’acteurs extérieurs. Les valeurs démocratiques, l'état de droit, les réformes internes et les relations de bon voisinage sont essentiels à la coopération régionale et à l’intégration euro-atlantique, et nous comptons sur la poursuite des progrès à cet égard. Nous attachons du prix au partenariat entre l’OTAN et la Serbie. Le renforcement de leurs relations serait bénéfique pour l'Alliance, pour le pays et pour l'ensemble de la région. Nous soutenons le dialogue facilité par l'UE et les autres initiatives visant à normaliser les relations entre Belgrade et Pristina, et nous exhortons les parties à saisir ces opportunités et à dialoguer de bonne foi en vue de trouver une solution politique durable.
71. Nous restons attachés à la poursuite de l’action de l’OTAN au Kosovo, notamment au travers de la Force pour le Kosovo (KFOR), qui, dirigée par l'OTAN, contribue à un environnement sûr et sécurisé et, plus largement, à la stabilité dans les Balkans occidentaux, ainsi qu’au travers des activités de renforcement des capacités menées actuellement avec les organes de sécurité du Kosovo. Toute modification de la posture de forces de la KFOR restera dictée par les conditions et non par le calendrier.
72. La coopération étroite et mutuellement bénéfique qu’entretient l’Alliance, en matière de sécurité, avec la Finlande et la Suède – partenaires bénéficiant du programme « nouvelles opportunités », qui partagent nos valeurs et qui contribuent aux opérations et missions dirigées par l'OTAN – s’est accrue dans un large éventail de domaines. Nous continuerons de renforcer notre capacité de répondre de manière rapide et efficace à tous les défis communs et de travailler ensemble à améliorer notre résilience et la préparation du secteur civil. Nous renforcerons le dialogue politique ouvert que nous menons régulièrement ainsi que notre coopération à l’appui de notre sécurité commune, y compris par la préparation à la gestion de crise, par la conduite d’exercices et par l’échange d’informations et d’analyses, notamment concernant l’état de la sécurité dans la région de la mer Baltique.
73. Nous collaborerons plus étroitement avec l’ensemble de nos partenaires d'Europe occidentale s’agissant de mettre en commun notre expertise, de répondre aux défis de sécurité émergents et de poursuivre notre coopération dans le cadre d'opérations, de missions et d’autres initiatives. Nous chercherons en outre à développer encore nos relations avec nos partenaires dans le monde. Nous renforçons le dialogue politique et la coopération pratique avec nos partenaires de longue date dans la région Asie-Pacifique, à savoir l’Australie, le Japon, la Nouvelle-Zélande et la République de Corée, en vue de promouvoir la sécurité coopérative et de soutenir l’ordre international fondé sur des règles. Nous réfléchirons à des approches communes des défis de sécurité mondiaux là où les intérêts de l’OTAN sont en jeu, échangerons nos points de vue au travers de contacts politiques plus approfondis, et rechercherons des domaines de coopération concrets pour répondre aux préoccupations communes. Nous intensifions nos interactions avec la Colombie, partenaire de l’OTAN en Amérique latine, dans les domaines de la bonne gouvernance, de la formation militaire, de l’interopérabilité, du déminage et de la sûreté maritime. Nous restons ouverts à la possibilité d’approfondir notre dialogue politique et d’intensifier notre coopération pratique avec nos partenaires d’Asie centrale, en fonction de la situation dans la région. Nous nous félicitons que d’autres acteurs dans le monde aient exprimé le souhait de travailler avec l’OTAN pour répondre aux préoccupations de sécurité communes, et nous nous tenons prêts à envisager de nouvelles interactions au cas par cas.
74. Nous sommes déterminés à accroître notre engagement de longue date dans la région du Moyen-Orient et de l’Afrique du Nord (MENA). Nous renforcerons notre dialogue politique et notre coopération pratique avec nos partenaires du Dialogue méditerranéen (DM) et de l'Initiative de coopération d'Istanbul (ICI). Cela permettra de mettre en place des capacités et institutions de sécurité et de défense plus solides, de promouvoir l’interopérabilité et de contribuer à la lutte contre le terrorisme. Nous avons accru l’aide que nous apportons à la Jordanie – partenaire bénéficiant du programme « nouvelles opportunités » – dans le domaine du renforcement des capacités de défense, de manière à y inclure un soutien supplémentaire à la lutte contre le terrorisme, et nous avons contribué à la création du Centre d'entraînement pour le personnel militaire féminin. Nous poursuivrons notre collaboration avec la Tunisie dans le domaine du renforcement des capacités de défense. Nous exploiterons le potentiel qu’offre le Centre régional OTAN-ICI, implanté au Koweït, en tant que pôle important pour les activités de formation, d’entraînement et de diplomatie publique, et nous restons ouverts à la possibilité de mettre en place d’autres centres de formation et d’entraînement avec les pays intéressés de la région MENA. Notre Pôle régional pour le sud, implanté à Naples, accomplit des progrès tangibles dans l’exécution de ses quatre fonctions et contribue à améliorer notre compréhension et notre connaissance de la situation. Nous continuerons de collaborer avec l’Union africaine et de développer plus avant nos relations avec la Ligue des États arabes et avec le Conseil de coopération du Golfe pour renforcer notre capacité de répondre aux préoccupations communes en matière de sécurité.
75. La détérioration de la situation dans la région du Sahel importe pour la sécurité collective de l’OTAN. Cette région est le théâtre de défis complexes et liés entre eux. L’approche de l’OTAN concernant le Sahel est actuellement axée sur le partenariat que nous entretenons de longue date avec la Mauritanie, et nous étudions la possibilité de fournir un soutien supplémentaire en matière de conseil et de formation. Nous continuerons par ailleurs de dialoguer avec les partenaires de l’OTAN concernés, avec les représentants de la région du Sahel, avec des organisations et entités internationales et régionales, comme l’Union africaine, les structures du G5 Sahel, l’ONU et l’UE, ainsi qu’avec la Coalition pour le Sahel. L’OTAN développera son interaction avec les structures du G5 Sahel, et elle reste prête, si demande lui en est faite, à réfléchir à la possibilité d’autres interactions dans la région.
76. La crise en Libye a des incidences directes sur la stabilité régionale et sur la sécurité de tous les pays de l’Alliance. Nous nous félicitons des progrès accomplis en Libye, et notamment de l’approbation récente du gouvernement d'unité nationale (GNU) intérimaire et du Conseil de la présidence. Nous saluons les efforts déployés par l’ONU à l’appui d’un processus politique dirigé et pris en charge par les Libyens, visant à promouvoir la réconciliation nationale ainsi qu’à unifier et à renforcer les institutions étatiques. Nous appelons l’ensemble des autorités et institutions libyennes compétentes, y compris le GNU et la Chambre des représentants, à prendre les mesures prévues dans la feuille de route adoptée par le Forum de dialogue politique interlibyen et à faire le nécessaire pour préparer la tenue à l’échelle nationale, le 24 décembre 2021, d'élections présidentielle et législatives libres, régulières et inclusives. Nous soutenons pleinement l’application des résolutions 2570 et 2571 du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU, ainsi que de l’accord de cessez-le-feu du 23 octobre 2020. Conformément aux décisions que nous avons prises lors de sommets précédents, nous restons déterminés à fournir à la Libye, si celle-ci en fait la demande, des conseils dans le domaine du renforcement des institutions de défense et de sécurité, en tenant compte de la situation politique et des conditions de sécurité.
77. NATO is an alliance that is constantly modernizing and adapting to new threats and challenges. It is also adapting institutionally. To improve our political-military coherence and our situational awareness, we have restructured the activities of NATO Headquarters, and created a position of Director of Information Systems. We welcome the progress made in optimizing the intelligence architecture in NATO so that this architecture is better able to provide timely and relevant support to NATO operations and decision-making. Alliance regarding current and future challenges, and we will continue to move forward in this direction. In addition, we will further strengthen the security of our cyber and communication systems, and we will continue to protect the Alliance from espionage attempts. We will constantly seek to gain consistency, effectiveness and efficiency in support of the flexibility and responsiveness we need as an Alliance.
78. We express our deep gratitude to the Belgian government and people for the generous hospitality they have shown towards NATO for more than 50 years, and which they have shown towards us today in the past. occasion of our summit at the headquarters of the Organization. We pay tribute to all the men and women in uniform who continue to work for our collective security every day. We especially thank all those who, despite the COVID-19 pandemic, allowed us to hold a successful summit in complete safety, and in particular the NATO medical staff and the Emergency Medical Team provided. by Poland.
79. With the decisions we have taken today, we have opened a new chapter in transatlantic relations and set the course for the further adaptation of the Alliance to 2030 and beyond. We look forward to our next meeting, to be held in Spain in 2022, followed by a meeting in Lithuania.
STATEMENT ON THE RESULTS OF THE HIGHER LEVEL MEETING
Unveiled by Heads of State and Government attending the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Brussels on June 14, 2021
1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the 30 NATO member states, have gathered in Brussels to reaffirm our unity, solidarity and cohesion and to open a new chapter in transatlantic relations at a time when the security environment is increasingly challenging. NATO continues to be the backbone of our collective defense and the most important forum for consultation and decision-making on security issues by member states. NATO is a defensive alliance and will continue to strive for peace, security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. We remain firmly committed to the Washington Treaty, NATO's founding document, including the provision that an attack on one ally will count as an attack on all of us, as enshrined in Article 5.
2. NATO is the strongest and most successful alliance in history. He is the guarantor of the security of our territory and our one billion citizens, our freedom, and the values we share, including individual freedom, human rights, democracy and the rule of law. We are bound by our common values, enshrined in the Washington Treaty, on which our unity, solidarity and cohesion are based. We are committed to fulfilling our responsibilities as NATO members in an appropriate manner. We reaffirm our commitment to the purposes and principles set out in the Charter of the United Nations (UN). We are committed to a rules-based international order. We are committed to strengthening consultation,
3. We face multifaceted threats, systemic competition from assertive and authoritarian powers, as well as growing security challenges for our countries and our citizens from all strategic directions. Russia's aggressive actions pose a threat to Euro-Atlantic security; terrorism in all its forms and manifestations remains a constant threat to all of us. State and non-state actors challenge the rules-based international order and seek to undermine democracy around the world. Instability beyond our borders also contributes to illegal migration and human trafficking. China's growing influence and foreign policy may pose challenges that we need to address with the combined efforts of all Allied member countries. We will work with China to protect the security interests of the Alliance. We are increasingly confronted with cyber, hybrid and other asymmetric threats, including disinformation campaigns and the malicious use of increasingly sophisticated emerging and disruptive technologies. Rapid progress in space is affecting our security. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the erosion of the arms control architecture also undermine our collective security. Climate change is multiplying many of the challenges affecting the security of the Alliance. The most important responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend the territory and population of our countries from attacks, we will confront all threats and challenges affecting Euro-Atlantic security We are increasingly confronted with cyber, hybrid and other asymmetric threats, including disinformation campaigns and the malicious use of increasingly sophisticated emerging and disruptive technologies. Rapid progress in space is affecting our security. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the erosion of the arms control architecture also undermine our collective security. Climate change is multiplying many of the challenges affecting the security of the Alliance. The most important responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend the territory and population of our countries from attacks, we will confront all threats and challenges affecting Euro-Atlantic security We are increasingly confronted with cyber, hybrid and other asymmetric threats, including disinformation campaigns and the malicious use of increasingly sophisticated emerging and disruptive technologies. Rapid progress in space is affecting our security. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the erosion of the arms control architecture also undermine our collective security. Climate change is multiplying many of the challenges affecting the security of the Alliance. The most important responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend the territory and population of our countries from attacks, we will confront all threats and challenges affecting Euro-Atlantic security including disinformation campaigns and the malicious use of increasingly sophisticated emerging and disruptive technologies. Rapid progress in space is affecting our security. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the erosion of the arms control architecture also undermine our collective security. Climate change is multiplying many of the challenges affecting the security of the Alliance. The most important responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend the territory and population of our countries from attacks, we will confront all threats and challenges affecting Euro-Atlantic security including disinformation campaigns and the malicious use of increasingly sophisticated emerging and disruptive technologies. Rapid progress in space is affecting our security. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the erosion of the arms control architecture also undermine our collective security. Climate change is multiplying many of the challenges affecting the security of the Alliance. The most important responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend the territory and population of our countries from attacks, we will confront all threats and challenges affecting Euro-Atlantic security The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the erosion of the arms control architecture also undermine our collective security. Climate change is multiplying many of the challenges affecting the security of the Alliance. The most important responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend the territory and population of our countries from attacks, we will confront all threats and challenges affecting Euro-Atlantic security The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the erosion of the arms control architecture also undermine our collective security. Climate change is multiplying many of the challenges affecting the security of the Alliance. The most important responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend the territory and population of our countries from attacks, we will confront all threats and challenges affecting Euro-Atlantic security.
4. We are here as the COVID-19 pandemic continues to challenge our countries and our resilience. The Alliance and Allies' armed forces are supporting civilian efforts to respond to the pandemic, while continuing to ensure our collective defense and the effectiveness of our operations. We also provide critical assistance to a number of partners through the supply of vital medical supplies. We pay tribute to all those who are fighting this pandemic in our countries and around the world.
5. At our meeting in December 2019 in London, we instructed the Secretary General to undertake a forward-looking analysis process to further strengthen NATO's political dimension, including consultations. We recognize the important contribution of the independent group appointed by the Secretary General in support of NATO's 2030 Initiative. As a result, today we are establishing a transatlantic agenda for the future within NATO 2030. Throughout its history, NATO has continuously adapted to the changing security environment. NATO's 2030 Agenda complements and builds on our ongoing political and military adaptation, strengthens our ability to fulfill our three core missions, and contributes to our strong alliance being even stronger and more prepared for the future.
6.To this end, we decide:
reaffirm that NATO is a unique, essential and essential transatlantic forum for consultation and joint action on all issues related to our individual and collective security. We commit to strengthening and broadening our consultations and ensuring that NATO remains flexible and effective in conducting military operations in support of our common security. We reaffirm the Alliance's general democratic principles and our commitment to the spirit and letter of the North Atlantic Treaty. We commit ourselves to strengthening consultation when the security or stability of a NATO member is threatened or when our fundamental values and principles are at risk;
to strengthen NATO as a framework for the collective defense of the Euro-Atlantic region against all threats, no matter where they come from. We reaffirm our commitment to maintain an adequate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defense forces for deterrence and defense, and the 2014 defense investment commitment in full. We commit ourselves to fully and expeditiously implement ongoing work to further strengthen our deterrence and defense capabilities and commit to continue to enhance our force readiness and to strengthen and modernize NATO's force structure to meet current and future defense needs;
increase our resilience. Noting that the responsibility for resilience remains the responsibility of countries, we will adopt a more integrated and better coordinated approach, consistent with our Article 3 Washington Treaty collective defense commitment to reduce vulnerability and ensure that our armed forces can operate effectively in an environment peace, crises and conflicts. Allies will develop a proposal for the establishment, assessment, review and monitoring of sustainability goals that will guide country-level sustainability goals and implementation plans. It will be up to each individual NATO country to determine how it sets and implements national sustainability goals and implementation plans to enable countries to do so in a way that
facilitate technological cooperation among NATO member states, promote interoperability and encourage the development and implementation of technological solutions to meet our military needs. To this end, we will create a civil-military Defense Innovation Catalyst for the North Atlantic. We also decide to establish a NATO Innovation Fund, through which willing countries can support start-up companies working on emerging and disruptive dual-use technologies in areas critical to the security of NATO member states;
to strengthen NATO's ability to contribute to the maintenance and development of a rules-based international order in areas critical to the security of NATO member states. We will deepen dialogue and practical cooperation with existing partners, including the European Union, candidate countries and our partners in the Asia-Pacific region, and strengthen our engagement with key global actors and other new actors outside the Euro-Atlantic region, including from Africa, Asia and Latin America;
substantially strengthen NATO's ability to provide training and capacity-building support to partners, recognizing that conflicts, other security developments and widespread instability in NATO's neighborhood directly affect the security of Allies;
set a goal for NATO to become the leading international organization in understanding and adapting to the security implications of climate change. We resolve to substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions from military installations and activities without compromising personnel safety, the effectiveness of operations and our deterrence and defense capabilities. We invite the Secretary General to formulate a realistic, ambitious and specific goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by NATO's political and military structures and facilities and assess the possibilities of achieving the goal of net zero emissions by 2050. We will also organize regular high-level dialogue on climate and security issues to exchange views and coordinate further actions;
предложить Генеральному секретарю руководить процессом разработки следующей Стратегической концепции. Эта концепция будет обсуждаться и согласовываться Советом на постоянной сессии и будет утверждена главами государств и правительств НАТО на следующей Встрече в верхах.
7. Повестка НАТО 2030 выводит устремления НАТО на более высокий уровень. Она предоставляет четкие руководящие принципы для дальнейшей адаптации для противостояния существующим, новым и будущим угрозам и вызовам, опираясь на текущую политическую и военную адаптацию Североатлантического союза. Осуществление Повестки НАТО 2030, выполнение трех основных задач и работа над следующей Стратегической концепцией требуют выделения адекватных средств посредством расходов на национальную оборону и совместного финансирования. Учитывая эти потребности, мы решаем повысить уровень этих средств, в том числе, при необходимости, общего финансирования НАТО, начиная с 2023 года, принимая во внимание устойчивость, доступность по стоимости и подотчетность. На нашей встрече в 2022 году мы примем параллельно со Стратегической концепцией конкретные требования по дополнительному финансированию до 2030 года и определим воздействие на средства Военного бюджета НАТО, Программы НАТО по инвестициям в области безопасности и Гражданского бюджета, а также возможные меры эффективности.
8. Основная и неизменная цель НАТО состоит в защите свободы и безопасности всех своих членов политическими и военными средствами. Развивающаяся обстановка в сфере безопасности все больше требует от нас противостоять угрозам и вызовам с использованием военных и невоенных средств целенаправленным, последовательным и устойчивым образом. НАТО будет применять адаптированный и структурированный подход. НАТО использует различные невоенные средства, поддерживающие выполнение трех основных задач Североатлантического союза. НАТО также служит площадкой для укрепления согласованного применения данных средств своими государствами-членами, под их собственным руководством и управлением, а также с другими международными субъектами. Мы продолжим укреплять эффективную, четкую и убедительную стратегическую коммуникацию как существенную часть поддержки выполнения всех трех основных задач Североатлантического союза.
9. В течение более двадцати пяти лет НАТО работает над созданием партнерства с Россией, в том числе с помощью Совета Россия–НАТО (СРН). В то время как Североатлантический союз привержен своим международным обязательствам, Россия продолжает нарушать ценности, принципы, доверие и обязательства, изложенные в согласованных документах, лежащих в основе отношений НАТО и России. Мы вновь подтверждаем наши решения в отношении России, согласованные на встречах в верхах в 2014 г. в Уэльсе и на всех последующих встречах НАТО. Мы приостановили всё практическое гражданское и военное сотрудничество с Россией, оставив при этом открытой возможность для политического диалога. До тех пор, пока Россия не продемонстрирует соблюдение международного права и своих международных обязательств и обязанностей, не может быть возвращения к отношениям «в обычном режиме». Мы будем продолжать реагировать на ухудшающиеся условия безопасности за счет усиления построения наших сил сдерживания и обороны, в том числе посредством передового присутствия в восточной части Североатлантического союза. НАТО не стремится к конфронтации и не представляет угрозы для России. Принятые нами решения полностью соответствуют нашим международным обязательствам и, таким образом, не могут никем рассматриваться как противоречащие Основополагающему акту Россия–НАТО.
10. Мы призываем Россию отменить обозначение Чешской Республики и Соединенных Штатов Америки в качестве «недружественных стран» и воздерживаться от любых других шагов, не соответствующих положениям Венской конвенции о дипломатических отношениях.
11. Наращивание Россией военной мощи в различных сферах, ее более напористое построение сил, новый военный потенциал и провокационная деятельность, в том числе вблизи границ НАТО, а также проводимые ею без уведомления широкомасштабные внезапные учения, продолжающееся наращивание военной мощи в Крыму, развертывание современных ракет двойного назначения в Калининградской области, военная интеграция с Беларусью и неоднократные нарушения воздушного пространства государств-членов НАТО представляют все большую угрозу для безопасности евроатлантического пространства и приводят к нестабильности вдоль границ НАТО и за их пределами.
12. В дополнение к своей военной деятельности Россия также интенсифицировала свои гибридные действия против государств-членов и партнеров НАТО, в том числе опосредованно. Это включает попытки вмешательства в выборы и демократические процессы в государствах-членах НАТО; политическое и экономическое давление и запугивание; широкомасштабные кампании дезинформации; злонамеренную кибердеятельность, попустительство кибер-преступникам, ведущим свою деятельность с ее территории, в том числе тем, которые стремятся вывести и выводят из строя критически важные объекты инфраструктуры в странах НАТО. Сюда также относятся незаконные и разрушительные виды деятельности российских разведывательных служб на территории стран НАТО, некоторые из которых привели к гибели граждан и существенному материальному ущербу. Мы полностью солидарны с Чешской Республикой и другими странами НАТО, которые пострадали таким образом.
13. Россия продолжает диверсифицировать свой ядерный арсенал, в том числе путем развертывания целого ряда комплексов ракет средней и меньшей дальности с целью принуждения НАТО. Россия инвестировала в модернизацию примерно 80 процентов своих стратегических ядерных сил и наращивает свой ядерный потенциал в направлении новых и дестабилизирующих вооружений и целого ряда разнообразных систем двойного назначения. Россия продолжает использовать агрессивную и безответственную риторику в ядерной сфере, уделяя при этом всё больше внимания дестабилизирующим учениям обычных вооруженных сил, в которые включаются системы двойного назначения. Ядерная стратегия России и комплексная модернизация, диверсификация и расширение ею своих систем ядерного оружия, включая качественное и количественное увеличение нестратегического ядерного оружия России, все больше подкрепляют более агрессивное построение стратегического запугивания. Мы продолжим работать в тесном контакте над противостоянием всем угрозам и вызовам, создаваемым Россией.
14. We reiterate our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova within their internationally recognized borders. We call on Russia, in accordance with its international obligations, to withdraw the troops that it has deployed in all three countries without their consent. We strongly condemn and will not recognize the illegal and unlawful annexation of Crimea by Russia and condemn its temporary occupation. Human rights violations and abuses against Crimean Tatars and other local communities must stop. Russia's recent massive military build-up and its destabilizing activities in and around Ukraine are further escalating tensions and eroding security. We call on Russia to end its military buildup and stop restricting shipping in the Black Sea areas. We also call on Russia to stop blocking access to the Sea of Azov and Ukrainian ports. We highly appreciate Ukraine's restraint and diplomatic approach in this context. We strive to facilitate de-escalation. We will also intensify our support to Ukraine. We call for full implementation of the Minsk Agreements by all parties and support the efforts made in the Normandy Format and the Trilateral Contact Group. Russia, as a signatory to the Minsk Agreements, bears significant responsibility in this regard. We call on Russia to stop fueling the conflict by providing financial and military support to the armed groups it supports in eastern Ukraine. We reiterate our full support for the Special Monitoring Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Ukraine. We stress the importance of ensuring its security and full and unhindered access to the entire territory of Ukraine, including Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian border, in accordance with its mandate. We also call on Russia to abandon its recognition of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states; implement the 2008 EU-brokered Ceasefire Agreement; put an end to the militarization of these regions and attempts to forcibly separate them from the rest of Georgia through the ongoing construction of border-like barriers; as well as stop violations of human rights, arbitrary detention and harassment of Georgian citizens. We reiterate our support for the Geneva International Talks. We also call on Russia to take a constructive part in the settlement process in Transnistria. We are committed to supporting and facilitating democratic reforms in the Republic of Moldova through our initiative to strengthen defense capabilities and related security capabilities.
15. We remain open to periodic, substantive and meaningful dialogue with a Russia willing to participate in the NRC on a reciprocal basis in order to avoid misunderstandings, miscalculations and unintended escalation, and to increase transparency and predictability. RNC meetings help us to clearly define our position and we are ready for the next RNC meeting. We will continue to focus our dialogue with Russia on the critical issues before us. The conflict in and around Ukraine is, under current circumstances, the first issue on our agenda. The Alliance remains committed to leveraging existing military channels of communication between the two sides to promote predictability and transparency and reduce risks, and encourages Russia to do the same.
16. Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, continues to pose a direct threat to the security of the people of our countries, as well as to international stability and prosperity. We categorically reject and condemn terrorism in the strongest terms. Allies will continue to fight this threat with determination, determination and solidarity. While states themselves have the primary responsibility for maintaining their internal security and resilience, countering terrorism requires a sustained long-term effort by the entire international community, involving a wide range of instruments and actors. NATO's role in the fight against terrorism contributes to all three of the Alliance's core missions and is integral to the 360-degree approach to deterrence and defense. Allied cooperation adds value to the national efforts and capabilities of Allies to prevent, mitigate and respond, and build resilience to terrorist attacks. We condemn any financial support for terrorism. We also recognize the need to address the prerequisites for the spread of terrorism. Our approach to terrorism and its causes is consistent with international law and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and supports all relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions on combating terrorism. We condemn any financial support for terrorism. We also recognize the need to address the prerequisites for the spread of terrorism. Our approach to terrorism and its causes is consistent with international law and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and supports all relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions on combating terrorism. We condemn any financial support for terrorism. We also recognize the need to address the prerequisites for the spread of terrorism. Our approach to terrorism and its causes is consistent with international law and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and supports all relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions on combating terrorism.
17. We remain fully committed to deepening NATO's role in the international community's fight against terrorism, including through increased situational awareness and analysis, preparedness and response, capabilities, capacity building efforts and partnerships and operations. We continue to implement our 2019 Action Plan year and will update it by the end of this year to accommodate the evolving nature of terrorist threats. We are determined to fulfill our obligations under United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2396, including through our new battlefield evidence policy, which will be facilitated by improved collection, preservation, sharing and analysis of information and data. , within the framework of the NATO mandate. We will continue our work to protect against improvised explosive devices and radiological, chemical, biological and nuclear threats (CBRN). We are developing the capacity to protect our forces from the abuse of technology by terrorists, using emerging technologies to help us fight terrorism. We will also intensify the support we provide to partner countries in order to that they fight terrorism and deprive terrorists of a safe haven, which in turn enhances the security of the Alliance itself. NATO will also continue to engage with partner countries and other international actors as necessary to ensure complementarity and added value. NATO continues to play its role as part of the Global Anti-ISIS / Daesh Coalition, including through the flights of our Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) observation aircraft and mutual support of the structures involved. its interactions with partner countries and other international actors to ensure complementarity and added value. NATO continues to play its role as part of the Global Anti-ISIS / Daesh Coalition, including through the flights of our Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) observation aircraft and mutual support of the structures involved. its interactions with partner countries and other international actors to ensure complementarity and added value. NATO continues to play its role as part of the Global Anti-ISIS / Daesh Coalition, including through the flights of our Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) observation aircraft and mutual support of the structures involved.
18. Almost 20 years later, NATO's military operations in Afghanistan are coming to an end. We have deprived terrorists of the safe haven to plot attacks against us, helped Afghanistan build its security institutions, and provided training, advice and assistance to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces; they will henceforth be fully responsible for ensuring security in their country. We pay tribute to those who lost their lives or were injured, and we express our deep gratitude to all the men and women who have served under the banner of NATO, as well as their families.
19. The withdrawal of our troops does not mean the end of our relations with Afghanistan. We will now open a new chapter. We reaffirm our commitment to continue to support Afghanistan, its people and its institutions in strengthening security and upholding hard-won gains over the past 20 years. Recalling our previous commitments, NATO will continue to provide training and financial support to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, including through the Afghan National Army Trust Fund. NATO will maintain the Office of the NATO Chief Civilian Representative in Kabul to continue diplomatic engagement and strengthen our partnership with Afghanistan. Recognizing the importance of Hamid Karzai International Airport to Afghanistan's strong diplomatic and international presence, and for its connection to the world, NATO will provide transition funding for the continued operation of the airport. We are also intensifying our dialogue on Afghanistan with relevant international and regional partners. We continue to support the ongoing Afghan-led and Afghan-led peace process and call on all actors to help Afghanistan arrive at a lasting, inclusive political settlement that will end the violence; guarantees the human rights of all Afghans, especially women, children and minorities; support the rule of law; and ensure that Afghanistan never again serves as a haven for terrorists. We are also intensifying our dialogue on Afghanistan with relevant international and regional partners. We continue to support the ongoing Afghan-led and Afghan-led peace process and call on all actors to help Afghanistan arrive at a lasting, inclusive political settlement that will end the violence; guarantees the human rights of all Afghans, especially women, children and minorities; support the rule of law; and ensure that Afghanistan never again serves as a haven for terrorists. We are also intensifying our dialogue on Afghanistan with relevant international and regional partners. We continue to support the ongoing Afghan-led and Afghan-led peace process and call on all actors to help Afghanistan arrive at a lasting, inclusive political settlement that will end the violence; guarantees the human rights of all Afghans, especially women, children and minorities; support the rule of law; and ensure that Afghanistan never again serves as a haven for terrorists. which will end the violence; guarantees the human rights of all Afghans, especially women, children and minorities; support the rule of law; and ensure that Afghanistan never again serves as a haven for terrorists. which will end the violence; guarantees the human rights of all Afghans, especially women, children and minorities; support the rule of law; and ensure that Afghanistan never again serves as a haven for terrorists.
20. NATO remains a leading player, actively contributing to international security through operations, missions and activities. We are grateful to our partners for their significant contribution to this effort. The Alliance and NATO Allies support Iraq in its fight against ISIS / Daesh and terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. We commend the continued efforts of the Iraqi government and Iraqi security forces to combat ISIS / Daesh. At the request of the Iraqi government, we will strengthen our support for Iraq through our NATO Mission in Iraq. We will expand our non-combat advisory, training and capacity-building mission to support Iraq in building more effective, resilient, accountable and inclusive security institutions and forces. This expansion of the NATO Mission in Iraq, including the provision of additional support to Iraqi security institutions, will be on-demand, incremental, scalable and based on conditions on the ground. It will be conducted with the full consent of the Iraqi authorities, with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, and in close coordination with relevant partners and international actors, including the Global Anti-ISIS / Daesh Coalition, the United Nations and the European Union.
21. Deterrence and defense are central to NATO based on Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and strong transatlantic ties. We are united and unwavering in our ability and commitment to defend each other. We will maintain and further develop the full range of readily available forces and capabilities needed to provide credible deterrence and defense and provide the Alliance with a wide range of options to tailor our response to specific circumstances and respond to any threat, whether from government or government. non-state actors, wherever they come from, perhaps from different directions in more than one region at the same time. Reaffirming our commitment to three core missions,
22. We welcome the significant progress made in implementing our previous decisions to strengthen NATO's deterrence and defense capabilities and reaffirm our commitment to their full and early implementation. We have accelerated our military adaptation by increasing defense spending, modern capabilities, strengthening our political and military responsiveness, and improving the readiness of our forces. NATO is working on a new military strategy through the implementation of two significant military concepts that will continue to strengthen our ability to provide deterrence and defense against any potential adversary and maintain and develop our military advantage now and in the future. The concept of deterrence and defense provides a single agreed framework for countering, as well as deterrence and defense, in relation to the main threats facing NATO in various areas, and thereby strengthen our readiness to confront challenges, in particular those associated with widespread instability and strategic shocks. The War Concept provides a long-term vision for maintaining and developing NATO's decisive military advantage. Implementation of the concept of deterrence and defense will provide a benchmark for enhanced advance planning to respond to potential crises and conflicts, and will further improve the use and organization of NATO forces in all operational areas and more effective command and control. We develop strategic, focused on specific areas and regional military plans to improve our ability to respond to any unforeseen situations and provide timely reinforcement. We will focus on ongoing peacetime activities to maintain deterrence, including through the presence and dynamic deployment of our forces and exercises, backed by enhanced coordination between NATO member states and the Alliance. Through the implementation of the concept of combat capability, we will ensure that the Alliance continues to develop its military and technological advantage in the light of the evolving nature of conflicts.
23. We are committed to further strengthening and modernizing NATO's force structure to meet current and future deterrence and defense needs. We will provide a flexible, agile and resilient force architecture in all areas, assuming the right forces in the right place at the right time. We will reinforce modern command and control, purposefully adapted to our 360-degree view, dynamic force management, improved response systems and plans. In carrying out these tasks, we will place particular emphasis on the interdependence of geographic location, areas and degree of preparedness. As part of this common effort, we commit to continue to improve the readiness of our forces and the ability of the Alliance to respond quickly, including through the ongoing implementation of the NATO Readiness Strengthening Initiative, designed to improve a culture of readiness and facilitate the provision of forces in a state of alert that allows them to begin mission within 30 days or earlier. We have assembled the entire combat force of the NATO Readiness Initiative, which includes 30 large naval ships, 30 heavy and medium agile battalions and 30 combat air squadrons. They are organized and trained in larger combat formations to provide reinforcement and conduct intensive hostilities or in case of urgent military crisis intervention. which allows them to start a task within 30 days or less. We have assembled the entire combat force of the NATO Readiness Initiative, which includes 30 large naval ships, 30 heavy and medium agile battalions and 30 combat air squadrons. They are organized and trained in larger combat formations to provide reinforcement and conduct intensive hostilities or in case of urgent military crisis intervention. which allows them to start a task within 30 days or less. We have assembled the entire combat force of the NATO Readiness Initiative, which includes 30 large naval ships, 30 heavy and medium agile battalions and 30 combat air squadrons. They are organized and trained in larger combat formations to provide reinforcement and conduct intensive hostilities or in case of urgent military crisis intervention.
24. We will ensure that NATO's command structure is strong, resilient and capable of taking on all elements of effective command and control in the face of simultaneous challenges in all areas and across the full spectrum of tasks, including large-scale collective defense operations. Our two new commands, the Joint Command Headquarters in Norfolk and the Joint Command for Logistics and Support, and the Cyber Operations Center, have reached initial operational readiness. NATO Allies' contributions to command and control through the NATO Force and National Headquarters structure, and strengthening their interaction with the NATO Command Structure, including through the provision of host country support,
25. We will not allow any potential adversary to impede the freedom of movement of NATO troops (forces) by land, air or sea to or within any part of the Alliance's territory. At the heart of our deterrence and defense posture is a compelling force, both on the ground and ready to be reinforced in Europe and across the Atlantic. We will continue to strengthen and regularly exercise the Alliance's ability to rapidly strengthen any threatened NATO member state. We will continue to prioritize, both at the country level and at the Alliance level, Ensuring a favorable area of responsibility for the Allied Supreme Command Europe in order to enhance our ability to support the deployment and sustainability of NATO troops (forces) throughout and towards and out of the Alliance. These efforts include advancing our work on fuel distribution mechanisms. We reaffirm that NATO's efforts to ensure a coherent approach and synergy with the EU in the area of military mobility should continue, including with regard to procedures related to military mobility, which should equally apply to all NATO countries. We continue to strengthen the formation of our naval forces and protect our sea routes of communication. We welcome the establishment in Turkey of the NATO Maritime Security Center of Excellence. We will remain aware of any potential threats to our key subsea infrastructure and will continue to confront these threats with national efforts and collectively as necessary. We welcome the full operational capability of NATO's rapid response air mobility, which has been deployed by Allies to support mission-critical supplies to Allies and partner countries to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.
26. We reaffirm our commitment to a balanced, balanced, coordinated and timely response to Russia's growing and evolving range of conventional warheads and capable of carrying nuclear warheads, the scale and complexity of which is increasing and which poses a significant risk to security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. region from all strategic directions. We will continue to implement a coherent and balanced package of political and military measures to achieve the Alliance's objectives, including an enhanced joint air and missile defense; forward offensive and defensive conventional military capabilities; measures to ensure the safety, security and effectiveness of NATO's nuclear deterrent capabilities; efforts to support and strengthen arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation; reconnaissance and exercises. We have no intention of deploying land-based nuclear missiles in Europe.
27. NATO's Joint Air Defense / Missile Defense is a critical and ongoing task in peacetime, crisis or conflict, contributing to deterrence and defense and the indivisible security and freedom of action of the Alliance, including NATO's ability to provide reinforcement and strategic response. NATO's Joint Air Defense / Missile Defense includes all measures that help contain any air and missile threat or prevent it from fulfilling its mission or reduce its effectiveness. This task is accomplished using a 360-degree all-round approach and targeted adaptation to counter all air and missile threats from all strategic directions.
28. NATO is deepening its mission of a joint air defense / missile defense and we are taking steps to improve the readiness and response of the joint air defense / missile defense forces in times of peace, crisis or conflict, strengthening our ability to ensure that all necessary measures are taken to ensure the security of the Alliance. We take into account the increasingly diverse and complex air and missile threats posed by state and non-state actors, from simple unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to the most advanced hypersonic missiles.
29. NATO member states will continue to work on the joint air defense / missile defense system in order to ensure its further flexibility and adaptability. NATO member states will also continue to effectively conduct training and exercises for their joint air defense / missile defense forces. NATO member states have pledged to improve the capabilities of the integrated air defense / missile defense, including detection, interception, command and control capabilities, in particular through the Alliance's defense planning process. We welcome the establishment in Greece of a NATO Integrated Air Defense / Missile Defense Center of Excellence.
30. Resilience is critical to credible defense and deterrence and the effective implementation of the Alliance's core missions. This is a responsibility of states and a collective obligation, enshrined in Article 3 of the Washington Treaty. Recognizing the significant progress that has been made since we made our commitment to sustainability at the Warsaw Summit in 2016, we today agreed on a reinforced commitment to sustainability that guides us in the next few years. We will continue to take a whole-of-government approach to strengthening the resilience of our societies and meeting NATO's seven core requirements to ensure resilient nations through enhanced civil-military cooperation and enhanced civil preparedness; closer interaction with the people of our countries, the private sector and non-governmental actors. and centers of excellence on resilience established by NATO countries. We welcome the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Resilience Center in Romania. NATO and Allies of the Alliance, acting within their respective mandates, will maintain and enhance the security of our critical infrastructures, key industries, supply chains and communications information networks, including the fifth generation (5G). NATO will continue to build on its own resilience by ensuring our ability to consult, make decisions and act together. We will continue to work closely with our partners and other international organizations,
31. Our countries continue to face threats and challenges from both state and non-state actors who use hybrid activities to attack our political institutions, our public opinion and the safety of our citizens. While the primary responsibility for responding to hybrid threats rests with the affected nation, NATO is prepared, by decision of the North Atlantic Council, to assist any NATO nation at any stage of the hybrid campaign against it, including through the deployment of an anti-hybrid support team. In the event of a hybrid war, the North Atlantic Council could decide to bring into effect Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as in the case of an armed attack. The Alliance and its Allies will continue to prepare, contain and defend against hybrid threats. Individual Allies may, if necessary, consider identifying hybrid activities and taking concerted action, recognizing this as the sovereign prerogative of States. We are increasing our situational awareness and expanding the range of tools we have to counter hybrid threats, including disinformation campaigns, by developing a range of prevention and response options. We will continue to support our partners to strengthen their resilience in the face of hybrid challenges. may consider identifying hybrid activities and taking concerted action, recognizing this as the sovereign prerogative of States. We are increasing our situational awareness and expanding the range of tools we have to counter hybrid threats, including disinformation campaigns, by developing a range of prevention and response options. We will continue to support our partners to strengthen their resilience in the face of hybrid challenges. may consider identifying hybrid activities and taking concerted action, recognizing this as the sovereign prerogative of States. We are increasing our situational awareness and expanding the range of tools we have to counter hybrid threats, including disinformation campaigns, by developing a range of prevention and response options. We will continue to support our partners to strengthen their resilience in the face of hybrid challenges. developing a range of prevention and response options. We will continue to support our partners to strengthen their resilience in the face of hybrid challenges. developing a range of prevention and response options. We will continue to support our partners to strengthen their resilience in the face of hybrid challenges.
32. Cyber threats to the Alliance's security are complex, destructive and violent and are becoming more frequent. This has recently been illustrated by incidents involving ransomware and other malicious cyber activities that seek to infect our critical infrastructure and democratic institutions, which can have systemic consequences and cause significant harm. To meet these evolving challenges, we approved today a comprehensive NATO cyber defense policy that will support NATO's three core missions and overall deterrence and defense capabilities and enhance our resilience. Reaffirming NATO's defensive mandate, the Alliance is determined to use its full potential at all times, in order to proactively provide deterrence and defense and counter the full range of cyber threats, including those carried out in the framework of the hybrid campaign, in accordance with international law. We reaffirm that the decision as to when a cyber attack would trigger Article 5 would be up to the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis. Allies recognize that the impact of significant, malicious, cumulative cyber activity can, under certain circumstances, be considered tantamount to armed attack. We remain committed to acting in accordance with applicable international law, including the UN Charter, international humanitarian law and human rights law. We will promote free, open, a peaceful and secure cyberspace to enhance stability and reduce risk through the support of international law and voluntary norms of responsible government behavior in cyberspace. We will use NATO more as a platform for political consultation among Allies, sharing concerns about malicious cyber activity and sharing information on our countries' approaches and responses, as well as considering possible collective responses. If necessary, we will force the costs of those who have harmed us. Our response must be limited to cyberspace. We will enhance our situational awareness by assisting NATO's decision-making process. Resilience and ability to detect, prevent, Mitigating and responding to vulnerabilities and incursions are critical, as evidenced by the exploitation of the COVID-19 pandemic by malicious cyber actors. Consequently, NATO as an organization will continue to adapt and improve its cyber defenses. Five years after our commitment to cyber defense, we remain committed to the priority of a strong national cyber defense. We are continuing the implementation process related to cyberspace as a separate area of operations. Five years after our commitment to cyber defense, we remain committed to the priority of a strong national cyber defense. We are continuing the implementation process related to cyberspace as a separate area of operations. Five years after our commitment to cyber defense, we remain committed to the priority of a strong national cyber defense. We are continuing the implementation process related to cyberspace as a separate area of operations. We will strengthen the effective integration of Allies' internal cyberspace actions, on a voluntary basis, into the context of Alliance collective defense and operations and missions under strong political oversight. We will continue to strive to develop mutually beneficial and effective partnerships as necessary, including with partner countries, international organizations, industry, academia, while continuing our efforts to enhance international stability in cyberspace. We welcome the recently opened NATO Communication and Information Academy in Portugal.
33. We recognize the growing importance of outer space for the security and prosperity of our countries and for NATO's deterrence and defense. Safe access to space services, products and capabilities is essential to the conduct of NATO operations, missions and activities. We will accelerate our work to deepen and expand our use of space as an operational area, including through the NATO Space Center in Germany and the upcoming creation of a NATO Space Center of Excellence in France, which we welcome. We will raise NATO's awareness of the space environment and better integrate space into our activities, including training and exercises, and efforts to enhance sustainability and innovation. In line with NATO's comprehensive space policy, NATO's approach to space issues will continue to be fully consistent with international law. We support international efforts to promote responsible behavior in space. We believe that attacks in outer space towards or from outer space pose a clear threat to the security of the Alliance and their impact can threaten national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability and can do the same harm to modern societies as a conventional attack. ... Attacks of this kind could trigger Article 5. The decision as to when such attacks would trigger Article 5 would be up to the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis. We support international efforts to promote responsible behavior in space. We believe that attacks in outer space towards or from outer space pose a clear threat to the security of the Alliance and their impact can threaten national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability and can do the same harm to modern societies as a conventional attack. ... Attacks of this kind could trigger Article 5. The decision as to when such attacks would trigger Article 5 would be up to the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis. We support international efforts to promote responsible behavior in space. We believe that attacks in outer space towards or from outer space pose a clear threat to the security of the Alliance and their impact can threaten national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability and can do the same harm to modern societies as a conventional attack. ... Attacks of this kind could trigger Article 5. The decision as to when such attacks would trigger Article 5 would be up to the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis. pose a clear threat to the security of the Alliance and their impact can threaten national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability, and can do the same harm to modern societies as a conventional attack. Attacks of this kind could trigger Article 5. The decision as to when such attacks would trigger Article 5 would be up to the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis. pose a clear threat to the security of the Alliance and their impact can threaten national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability, and can do the same harm to modern societies as a conventional attack. Attacks of this kind could trigger Article 5. The decision as to when such attacks would trigger Article 5 would be up to the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.
34. We continue to act together and confront challenging security conditions. As they change, the Alliance will continue to respond and adapt as needed. Since the Warsaw Summit, we have formed a forward presence in the eastern part of the Alliance. We continue to improve our enhanced forward presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland by aligning with plans and ensuring the ability of the four combat-ready battle groups to act together with the national internal defense forces in an integrated manner. We have increased our contribution to an adapted forward presence on land, sea and air in the Black Sea region and we remain committed to its full implementation. Our security assurance measures, including exercises and various other air, land and sea activities, remain in place and continue to provide the fundamental basic requirement for security assurance and deterrence. We have increased our contribution to the adapted security assurance measures for Turkey and remain committed to their full implementation. We have a number of forces, including the High Readiness Joint Task Force, ready to deploy at short notice to respond to any emergencies and strengthen NATO nations. The process of full implementation of the NATO South Framework as a strong component of NATO's deterrence and defense capabilities continues. Taking into account the progress made since 2016, including the establishment of a Regional Center for the South, we will continue to strengthen our ability to confront threats and challenges from the south, including the Mediterranean area and approaches to it, by strengthening our strategic awareness, our plans and the readiness of our forces. In the Far North, we will continue to carry out the necessary, calibrated and coordinated action to support the security interests of the Alliance. We will seek to strengthen cooperation with relevant like-minded partners for the agreed objectives of NATO's deterrence and defense, in accordance with NATO decisions, policies and procedures, as appropriate and with political implications in mind. our plans and the degree of readiness of our forces. In the Far North, we will continue to carry out the necessary, calibrated and coordinated action to support the security interests of the Alliance. We will seek to strengthen cooperation with relevant like-minded partners for the agreed objectives of NATO's deterrence and defense, in accordance with NATO decisions, policies and procedures, as appropriate and with political implications in mind. our plans and the degree of readiness of our forces. In the Far North, we will continue to carry out the necessary, calibrated and coordinated action to support the security interests of the Alliance. We will seek to strengthen cooperation with relevant like-minded partners for the agreed objectives of NATO's deterrence and defense, in accordance with NATO decisions, policies and procedures, as appropriate and with political implications in mind.
35. We reaffirm our unwavering commitment to all aspects of the Defense Investment Commitment we agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit. Equitable burden sharing is fundamental to the cohesion, solidarity, credibility of the Alliance and its ability to fulfill our fundamental obligations under Article 3 and Article 5. We are individually and collectively committed to further improving the balance in the sharing of costs and responsibilities of Alliance membership. We have made significant progress since the Wales Summit as we have seen real growth in defense spending outside the United States for seven consecutive years. strengthening our collective responsibility to provide capabilities to the Alliance. All NATO member states have increased their defense spending in real terms and this trend will continue. By the end of this year, additional cumulative increases in European NATO countries and Canada will total US $ 260 billion since 2014. Moreover, it is expected that the level of defense spending in the ten NATO countries this year will be 2% of GDP or more. About two thirds of NATO member states plan to reach or exceed the recommended level of 2% by 2024. In addition, in 24 NATO member states, more than 20% of their defense spending goes to major weapons and equipment, including related research and development, and, in line with their national plans, the 27 Allies will meet this recommended 20% target by 2024. Our common security and defense depends on how much money we spend and how we spend it. NATO Allies continue to make a valuable contribution of manpower to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area through NATO-led operations, missions and other activities, as well as through country-led and other-led operations and missions. Allies invest significant resources in preparing their forces, capabilities and infrastructure for the operations of the Alliance and the operations of its Allies. In the coming years, in line with the Defense Investment Commitment and taking into account the significant progress made, We reaffirm our commitment to continue to prioritize our efforts in three main areas: cash, disbursements and contributions. We must and will do even more.
36. We are investing in our military capabilities to meet new and persistent challenges in all operational areas. We continue to provide a range of reliable and sophisticated forces and assets in all areas, including heavier, more superior, technologically advanced, better supported forces and assets at the required level of readiness. We will continue to improve the sustainability, deployability and interoperability of our forces and capabilities to meet the needs of a complex strategic environment as well as high-profile operations. Our national capacity development plans will support full and timely implementation, in particular as required by the Alliance as part of NATO's defense planning process. In light of the pace, breadth and scale of technological transformation as we continue to develop our strengths and capabilities, we recognize the vital importance of research, development and innovation in exploring the opportunities and challenges of emerging and disruptive technologies. This will help us, individually and collectively, to secure our technological edge now and in the future. We continue to work to resolve, as appropriate, the existing dependence on legacy military equipment of Russian origin through state efforts and multinational cooperation. We welcome the modernization of the NATO airborne early warning and control (AWAC) program fleet and the progress of the NATO future surveillance and command force and control program, and the initial operations of NATO's new Ground Observer Force. Through multinational cooperation projects supported by NATO, Allies are committed to working together to develop and acquire new capabilities in key areas such as air refueling, training, precision strike, ammunition, air defense, CBRNZ, autonomous systems and rotorcraft. next generation tools.
37. The pace of technological change has never been faster, creating both new opportunities and risks to the security environment and the way NATO operates. We are determined to maintain our technological advantage and ensure Alliance interoperability to maintain the credibility of our deterrence and defense capabilities. We have recently taken important steps to that end, building on the emerging and disruptive technology roadmap we agreed in 2019, and we have now adopted a strategy to promote and protect emerging and disruptive technologies. This strategy sets out a clear approach to identifying, developing and deploying emerging and disruptive technologies at an appropriate pace, guided by the principles of responsible use, in accordance with international law and taking into account the discussions on the relevant international platforms. Moreover, this strategy aims to maintain our interoperability; safeguarding our sensitive technologies; and actively confronting the threats and challenges posed by the technological developments of others, both now and in the future. Drawing on the vast innovation experience of 30 NATO countries, we will continue to leverage our partnerships, including with the private sector and academia, to maintain our technological excellence. safeguarding our sensitive technologies; and actively confronting the threats and challenges posed by the technological developments of others, both now and in the future. Drawing on the vast innovation experience of 30 NATO countries, we will continue to leverage our partnerships, including with the private sector and academia, to maintain our technological excellence. safeguarding our sensitive technologies; and actively confronting the threats and challenges posed by the technological developments of others, both now and in the future. Drawing on the vast innovation experience of 30 NATO countries, we will continue to leverage our partnerships, including with the private sector and academia, to maintain our technological excellence.
38. The most important responsibility of the Alliance is to defend and defend the territories and populations of our countries from attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. No one should question NATO's resolve if the security of any member state of the organization is threatened. In the face of a diverse, complex and demanding international security environment, NATO is determined to maintain the full range of forces and capabilities needed to contain and defend against any threat to the security and safety of our populations, no matter where the threat comes from.
39. Convincing deterrence and defense is essential as a means of preventing conflict and war and will continue to rely on an adequate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defense forces. Building a robust deterrent and defense force enhances Alliance cohesion and provides important political and military transatlantic ties through equitable and sustainable sharing of roles, responsibilities and burdens. We recognize an increasingly complex security environment with risks associated with changes in the capacity building, doctrine and behavior of potential adversaries and their significant investments in the development, modernization and expansion of their forces and assets.
40. The goal of Allies is to continue to strengthen deterrence as a core element of our collective defense and to contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear allied organization. In response to a more challenging security environment, NATO has taken steps to continue to ensure the safety, security and effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent capabilities. The strategic forces of the Alliance, especially the United States of America, are the supreme guarantee of the security of NATO countries. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France play a deterrent role of their own and make a significant contribution to the overall security of the Alliance. The individual decision-making centers of these NATO countries contribute to deterrence as it complicates the calculations of potential adversaries. The construction of NATO's nuclear deterrent forces is also based on US forward-deployed nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and the provision of capabilities and infrastructure by appropriate NATO member states. Dual-use aircraft provided by NATO member states remain central to NATO's nuclear deterrence mission. The Alliance reaffirms the imperative to ensure the widest possible participation of the relevant NATO member states in the provision of agreed nuclear burden-sharing arrangements in order to demonstrate the unity and determination of the Alliance. Relevant NATO member states will continue to take further steps to ensure continued leadership attention and well-functioning institutional work for the nuclear deterrent. NATO Allies will also continue to ensure greater coherence between conventional and nuclear components of NATO's deterrence and defense capabilities, strengthen effective strategic communication and enhance the effectiveness of NATO exercises to maintain and demonstrate credible deterrence and reduce strategic risk. NATO supports efforts to reduce strategic risk, which is an important contribution to regional and international security. In particular, transparency and dialogue can help avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations.
41. The fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear capabilities is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression. Given the deteriorating security situation in Europe, a credible and united nuclear allied organization is essential. Nuclear weapons are one of a kind. Circumstances in which NATO would have to use nuclear weapons are extremely unlikely. NATO reaffirms that any use of nuclear weapons against NATO will fundamentally change the nature of the conflict. However, should the fundamental security of any member state be threatened, NATO has the strength and capabilities, and is determined to force the adversary to incur costs that would be unacceptable and far outweigh the benefits that any adversary could hope to achieve.
42. Missile defense can complement the deterrent role of nuclear weapons; she cannot replace him. We reaffirm our commitment to continue to provide NATO's ballistic missile defense capabilities, to fulfill the Alliance's core collective defense mission, and to provide full cover and protection for the populations, territory and forces of all European NATO countries against the growing threat of ballistic missile proliferation. NATO's defense against ballistic missiles is purely defensive in nature. The purpose and political principles of NATO's defense against ballistic missiles have remained the same since the 2010 Lisbon Summit. These principles are the indivisibility of the security of the Allies and NATO solidarity, fair sharing of risks and burdens, as well as reasonable challenges, given the threat level, affordability and technical feasibility, and in line with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance. If international efforts succeed in reducing the threats of ballistic missile proliferation, NATO's missile defenses can be adapted and adapted accordingly.
43. NATO ballistic missile defense is based on voluntary contributions from NATO countries, including US funds under the European Phased Adaptive Approach in Romania, Turkey, Spain and Poland, and NATO Ballistic Missile Defense Command and Control - the only component that meets criteria for general funding. Additional voluntary national contributions will provide security. We are committed to completing the complementary key components of NATO's ballistic missile defense command and control, as required to achieve the next major milestone before reaching full operational readiness. Comprehensive political control and oversight by NATO countries is essential, full implementation will be ensured and monitored. We will continue our interaction, depending on the specific case, with third countries in order to increase transparency, strengthen mutual trust and improve the effectiveness of defense against ballistic missiles.
44. NATO's defense against ballistic missiles is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russian strategic deterrence capabilities. NATO's Ballistic Missile Defense is designed to defend against potential threats outside the Euro-Atlantic area. We have repeatedly explained to Russia that NATO's ballistic missile defense system is not capable of operating against Russian strategic nuclear deterrents and there is no intention to rebuild this system in such a way as to have such a potential in the future. And therefore, Russian statements threatening to target NATO countries because of NATO's defense against ballistic missiles are unacceptable and counterproductive. If Russia is prepared to negotiate ballistic missile defense with the Alliance, and subject to Alliance consent,
45. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation make and should continue to make important contributions to the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives and to ensuring strategic stability and our collective security. NATO has a long history of contributing to the cause of disarmament and non-proliferation. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has substantially reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We regret that the conditions for achieving disarmament have not been met since the 2018 Brussels Summit. Allies remain committed together to implement and support existing agreements and commitments on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. We welcome and fully support the agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation to extend the new START Treaty for five years. NATO Allies believe that the New START Treaty contributes to international stability, and Allies reaffirm their strong support for its continued implementation and early and active dialogue on ways to enhance strategic stability. Allies will welcome new strategic negotiations between the United States and Russia on future arms control measures, taking into account the security of all NATO member states. Allies will support further arms control negotiations to enhance the security of the Alliance in the light of the prevailing international security environment.
46. NATO continues to see clearly the challenges posed by Russia, including the qualitative and quantitative increase in Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons. The Alliance will be guided by the experience, in no small measure, of a significant violation by Russia of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), which ultimately led to the termination of this treaty. The Alliance will continue to respond in a balanced and responsible manner to the significant security risks posed by the Russian 9M729 missile and other intermediate and shorter-range missiles. We have agreed on a balanced, coordinated and defensive package to ensure that NATO's deterrence and defense capabilities remain credible and effective, including through potential contributions to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Russia's proposal for a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe runs counter to Russia's unilateral and ongoing deployment of such systems on the continent and would not prevent Russia from building up its potential for such missiles outside of its European territory; therefore, this proposal is neither credible nor acceptable. At the same time, Allies remain open to meaningful arms control discussions and dialogue on mutual transparency and confidence-building measures that take into account the security interests of all NATO member states and enhance security throughout the Alliance. Russia's proposal for a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe runs counter to Russia's unilateral and ongoing deployment of such systems on the continent and would not prevent Russia from building up its potential for such missiles outside of its European territory; therefore, this proposal is neither credible nor acceptable. At the same time, Allies remain open to meaningful arms control discussions and dialogue on mutual transparency and confidence-building measures that take into account the security interests of all NATO member states and enhance security throughout the Alliance. Russia's proposal for a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe runs counter to Russia's unilateral and ongoing deployment of such systems on the continent and would not prevent Russia from building up its potential for such missiles outside of its European territory; therefore, this proposal is neither credible nor acceptable. At the same time, Allies remain open to meaningful arms control discussions and dialogue on mutual transparency and confidence-building measures that take into account the security interests of all NATO member states and enhance security throughout the Alliance.
47. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains a critical bulwark against nuclear proliferation, a cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, and a framework for international cooperation to share the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science and technology. Allies remain firmly committed to the full implementation of the NPT in all its aspects as an indispensable platform and to the strengthening of the NPT in its three mutually complementary areas. We are committed to working towards a meaningful outcome at the forthcoming 10th Review Conference, which provides ample opportunities to promote the preservation, universalization and full implementation of the NPT. The Alliance reaffirms its determination to strive to create a safer world for all and to take further practical steps and effective measures to create the conditions necessary for further negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Allies support the ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world in full compliance with all provisions of the NPT, including Article VI, in an increasingly effective and verifiable manner, conducive to international stability and based on the principle of not compromising security for all. NATO's nuclear agreements have always been fully consistent with the NPT, which remains the only reliable path to nuclear disarmament. The lasting success of the NPT cannot be taken for granted and requires sustained efforts to further its achievements. In this spirit, we call on all States Parties to the NPT to work together towards a successful 10th Review Conference. We reiterate our disagreement with the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty, which runs counter to the Alliance's nuclear deterrence policy, runs counter to the existing non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, may undermine the NPT and does not take into account the current security environment. The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty does not change the legal obligations of our countries in relation to nuclear weapons. We disagree with any argument that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons reflects or contributes in any way to the development of customary international law. We call on our partners and all other countries to realistically analyze the impact of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on international peace and security, including the NPT, and to join us in improving collective security through tangible and verifiable measures that can reduce risks and ensure sustained progress on nuclear disarmament.
48. While the Alliance is not itself a party to any arms control agreement, Allies will make best use of NATO as an important platform for in-depth discussion and close consultation on arms control efforts. aimed at supporting the unity, political cohesion and solidarity of the Alliance. We continue to pay active attention to the collapse of the INF Treaty, due to the actions of Russia, and we are committed to continue to conduct appropriate consultations among NATO member states on these issues.
49. We remain deeply concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by state and non-state actors, as well as their means of delivery and related materials, which poses a threat to the population, territory and troops (forces) of our countries. We condemn in the strongest terms the repeated use of chemical weapons in Syria, as well as their use in Iraq, Russia, Malaysia and for the first time since NATO was founded on the territory of its member state, the United Kingdom. The use of chemical weapons anywhere, anytime, by anyone, for whatever reason, is unacceptable. There can be no impunity for those who use chemical weapons. Therefore, we welcome, as an important step towards accountability, the April 2021 decision of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to suspend Syria's rights and privileges under the CWC. We are determined to abide by the CWC and the global norm prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and to hold accountable those who use chemical weapons for the acts committed, including through our joint commitment under the International Partnership against Impunity for the use of chemical weapons. We support the full implementation of the CWC and the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to counter WMD threats and condemn those who try to obstruct its work. NATO remains committed to ensuring that Allied Allies can protect their populations, troops (forces) and territories from radiological, chemical, biological and nuclear threats (CBRN), including through the revision of NATO's Comprehensive Strategic-Level Policy on Preventing Proliferation WMD and protection against CBRN threats. We are united in our determination to advance the goals and objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We underline the need for the agreement to enter into force and support the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization preparatory committee, including an international data center and an international monitoring system. We call for the immediate commencement and early completion of negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the Conference on Disarmament Report CD / 1299 and its mandate. Meanwhile, the Alliance calls on all States to declare and comply with a voluntary moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
50. We remain committed to conventional arms control as a key pillar of Euro-Atlantic security. We are determined to maintain, strengthen and modernize conventional arms control in Europe based on key principles and commitments, including reciprocity, transparency and host country consent. Russia's continued aggressive military posture, its refusal to fully comply with its obligations under the Treaty on Open Skies, Russia's ongoing selective implementation of the Vienna Document and its prolonged non-compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe continue to undermine security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. NATO member states call on Russia to return to full implementation and adherence to the letter and spirit of all of its international obligations and responsibilities, which is fundamentally important for restoring trust and confidence, military transparency and increasing predictability in the Euro-Atlantic region. We make a specific call on Russia to be open and transparent about its unannounced surprise exercises, large-scale exercises and large-scale troop transfers, in line with its commitments under the Vienna Document, especially in light of its recent unprovoked and unjustified large-scale military build-up in Ukraine and around her. NATO member states stress the importance of modernizing the Vienna Document and welcome the broad support for the comprehensive package of measures proposed to this end. We look forward to intensifying discussions within the Forum on Security and Cooperation, to reach consensus on an updated Vienna Document at the 2021 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) ministerial meeting. In order to preserve the contribution of the Open Skies Treaty to the security of all its States parties, it is imperative that all of them fully comply with its provisions. We will continue to actively support ongoing discussions in the OSCE, including structured dialogue. We call on Russia to participate constructively in all these efforts. We will continue to actively support ongoing discussions in the OSCE, including structured dialogue. We call on Russia to participate constructively in all these efforts. We will continue to actively support ongoing discussions in the OSCE, including structured dialogue. We call on Russia to participate constructively in all these efforts.
51. We reaffirm our full support for the Alliance in achieving the goal of the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea, in accordance with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. We call on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to engage in meaningful negotiations with the United States to achieve this goal. We urge the DPRK to comply fully with its international obligations; elimination of its nuclear, chemical and biological combat potential and ballistic missiles; return to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Comprehensive Nuclear Safeguards and the abandonment of all programs related to these weapons.
52. We are committed to ensuring that Iran never develops nuclear weapons. We welcome the substantive discussions that are taking place among the participants in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and separately with the United States to achieve a return to both the United States and Iran to comply with the JCPOA. We support the goal of restoring the non-proliferation benefits of the JCPOA and ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program. It is imperative that Iran maintains this discussion space, avoiding any further escalation. We strongly support the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its critical monitoring and verification work, which helps ensure Iran's compliance with its obligations under the NPT, as well as its other obligations. The restoration and full implementation of the JCPOA could also pave the way for addressing regional and security concerns, including in support of the non-proliferation regime. We condemn Iran's support for puppet forces and non-state armed actors, including through funding, training and the proliferation of missile technology and weapons. We call on Iran to cease all ballistic missile-related activities contrary to UNSCR 2231, refrain from any destabilizing actions and play a constructive role in support of regional stability and peace. provided by Iran to puppet forces and non-state armed actors, including through funding, training and the proliferation of missile technology and weapons. We call on Iran to cease all ballistic missile-related activities contrary to UNSCR 2231, refrain from any destabilizing actions and play a constructive role in support of regional stability and peace. provided by Iran to puppet forces and non-state armed actors, including through funding, training and the proliferation of missile technology and weapons. We call on Iran to cease all ballistic missile-related activities contrary to UNSCR 2231, refrain from any destabilizing actions and play a constructive role in support of regional stability and peace.
Syria maintains stockpiles of short-range ballistic missiles, whose range extends to parts of NATO countries and our individual partners. Syria uses these missiles extensively against its own population. We remain vigilant against rocket attacks from Syria that could re-strike or target Turkey. We continue to monitor and assess the Syrian ballistic missile threat.
The growing threat posed by ballistic missile proliferation in close proximity to NATO's southeastern borders has been and continues to drive the Alliance's development and deployment of a ballistic missile defense system that is geared towards countering threats outside the Euro-Atlantic region.
53. The conflict in Syria is now in its eleventh year and continues to have serious implications for the stability of the region and the security of NATO's southeastern borders. We remain concerned and vigilant about its consequences. We reaffirm our determination to defend NATO territory and borders against any threats and to overcome the challenges emanating from Syria. The presidential elections held by the Syrian regime on May 26, 2021 cannot be considered free and fair and do not contribute to efforts towards a political solution. We emphasize that stability and security cannot be restored in Syria without a genuine political process in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2254. We call for a nationwide ceasefire and the resumption and expansion of UN cross-border humanitarian assistance for a period of at least 12 months to meet the needs of the people of Syria. We reiterate our gratitude to our NATO ally Turkey for hosting millions of Syrian refugees.
54. NATO member states remain deeply concerned about developments in Belarus since August 2020. Belarus' policies and actions have implications for regional stability and violate the principles underlying our partnership. NATO will remain vigilant and monitor the security implications of the Alliance. The unacceptable forced re-routing of a civilian aircraft in May 2021 and the subsequent arrest of a journalist and his companion aboard the aircraft endangered civilians and severely encroached on political dissent and press freedom. We support independent investigations, including by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). We support measures adopted by NATO countries individually and collectively in response to this incident. We call on Belarus to respect international law, human rights and individual freedoms and to immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners, including those who are members of the Union of Poles in Belarus. A democratic, sovereign and stable Belarus is in our common interests. The NATO countries remain ready for a mutually beneficial partnership between NATO and Belarus, taking into account the political and security environment. We will monitor the scale, reach and impact of the West 2021 exercise and continue to urge Russia and Belarus to act in a predictable and transparent manner, consistent with their international and OSCE commitments. human rights and individual freedoms and immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners, including those who are members of the Union of Poles in Belarus. A democratic, sovereign and stable Belarus is in our common interests. The NATO countries remain ready for a mutually beneficial partnership between NATO and Belarus, taking into account the political and security environment. We will monitor the scale, reach and impact of the West 2021 exercise and continue to urge Russia and Belarus to act in a predictable and transparent manner, consistent with their international and OSCE commitments. human rights and individual freedoms and immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners, including those who are members of the Union of Poles in Belarus. A democratic, sovereign and stable Belarus is in our common interests. The NATO countries remain ready for a mutually beneficial partnership between NATO and Belarus, taking into account the political and security environment. We will monitor the scale, reach and impact of the West 2021 exercise and continue to urge Russia and Belarus to act in a predictable and transparent manner, consistent with their international and OSCE commitments. a sovereign and stable Belarus is in our common interests. The NATO countries remain ready for a mutually beneficial partnership between NATO and Belarus, taking into account the political and security environment. We will monitor the scale, reach and impact of the West 2021 exercise and continue to urge Russia and Belarus to act in a predictable and transparent manner, consistent with their international and OSCE commitments. a sovereign and stable Belarus is in our common interests. The NATO countries remain ready for a mutually beneficial partnership between NATO and Belarus, taking into account the political and security environment. We will monitor the scale, reach and impact of the West 2021 exercise and continue to urge Russia and Belarus to act in a predictable and transparent manner, consistent with their international and OSCE commitments.
55. China's declared aspirations and assertive behavior represent systemic challenges to a rules-based international order and areas of critical importance to the security of the Alliance. We are concerned about coercive policies that are inconsistent with the core values enshrined in the Washington Treaty. China is rapidly expanding its nuclear capabilities with an ever-increasing number of warheads and sophisticated delivery vehicles to create a nuclear triad. China is opaquely modernizing its armed forces and its promulgated strategy of merging military and civilian components. China also cooperates in the military sphere with Russia, including through participation in Russian exercises in the Euro-Atlantic region. We remain concerned about China's frequent lack of transparency and its use of disinformation. We call on China to abide by its international obligations and act responsibly in the international system, including in the areas of space, cyberspace and the naval sphere, in accordance with its role as a major power.
56. NATO, whenever possible, maintains a constructive dialogue with China. Based on our interests, we welcome opportunities to engage with China in areas of relevance to the Alliance and common challenges such as climate change. It makes sense to exchange information on the policies and activities of each party to raise awareness and discuss possible disagreements. The Allies urge China to contribute meaningfully to dialogue, confidence-building and transparency measures regarding its nuclear capabilities and doctrine. Mutual transparency and understanding would benefit both NATO and China.
57. We work together within the Alliance and with like-minded partners, in particular the European Union, to protect critical infrastructure, build resilience, maintain our technological edge and confront these challenges to a rules-based world order.
58. Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time. This is one of the factors that multiply the threats affecting the security of NATO member states, both in the Euro-Atlantic region and in its neighborhood. Climate change tests our resilience and civil preparedness, affects our planning and the resilience of our military and critical infrastructure, and can complicate the environment in which our operations are conducted. Today we approved an action plan for the implementation of our NATO Climate Change and Security Agenda, strengthening our awareness, adaptation, mitigation and advocacy. while ensuring that deterrence and defenses are structured convincingly, and that the priorities for military personnel security and operational and financial efficiency are maintained. To raise awareness of these issues, NATO will conduct an annual assessment of the impact of climate change on its strategic environment, as well as on missions and operations. To adapt to climate change, NATO will integrate climate change considerations into its full spectrum of work, from defense planning and capacity development to civil preparedness and exercises. To help mitigate the effects of climate change, building on best practices from Allies and recognizing that conditions differ from each other, NATO will develop a cartographic methodological approach to assist its member states in measuring greenhouse gas emissions from military facilities and activities, which could help formulate voluntary targets to reduce such emissions. NATO will also strengthen exchanges with partner countries, as well as with international and regional organizations that are active on climate change and security issues.
59. Energy security plays an important role in ensuring our common security. Stable and reliable energy supply, diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources, including the integration of sustainable energy sources, and interconnected energy grids are key and increase our resilience in the face of political and economic pressures. It is imperative to ensure that Allies are not subject to political or coercive energy manipulation that poses a potential threat. In this regard, Allies will continue to strive to further diversify their energy supply, in accordance with their needs and circumstances. Although the government authorities are primarily responsible for these issues, Energy events can have significant political and security implications for NATO countries, as well as affect our partners. Therefore, we will continue to raise our strategic awareness, including through regular consultations and intelligence exchanges between NATO countries, and we will strengthen our ties with relevant international organizations. We will further develop NATO's ability to support government authorities in protecting critical infrastructure, including against malicious hybrid and cyber attacks. We will provide a reliable power supply to our armed forces. we will continue to raise our strategic awareness, including through regular consultations and intelligence exchanges between NATO countries, and we will strengthen our ties with relevant international organizations. We will further develop NATO's ability to support government authorities in protecting critical infrastructure, including against malicious hybrid and cyber attacks. We will provide a reliable power supply to our armed forces. we will continue to raise our strategic awareness, including through regular consultations and intelligence exchanges between NATO countries, and we will strengthen our ties with relevant international organizations. We will further develop NATO's ability to support government authorities in protecting critical infrastructure, including against malicious hybrid and cyber attacks. We will provide a reliable power supply to our armed forces. including from malicious hybrid and cybernetic actions. We will provide a reliable power supply to our armed forces. including from malicious hybrid and cybernetic actions. We will provide a reliable power supply to our armed forces.
60. NATO has long recognized the importance of human security, which focuses on the risks and threats faced by populations in crisis and conflict zones and how to mitigate and respond to them. Taking a human safety approach reflects our values and enhances our operational efficiency. We are committed to ensuring that every effort is made to avoid, minimize and reduce any potential detrimental effects to civilians from our missions or activities, as outlined in our policy to protect civilians. Today, we endorse NATO's new policy on preventing and responding to conflict-related sexual violence, a symbolic reaffirmation of our commitment to combating this type of violence. which leads to long-term stigma and trauma to individuals and families, fosters their magrinalization, disrupts the social fabric of communities, causes displacement, fuels armed actors, promotes protracted conflict and instability, and impedes sustainable peace and reconciliation. We are updating our anti-trafficking policy. Our work on human security also covers the issues of children and armed conflict and the protection of cultural property. NATO will continue to work with its partners, international organizations and civil society to advance our human security agenda, with robust policies and clear operational guidelines, in support of lasting peace and security and the joint defense of our populations.
61. Recognizing the critical importance of the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in all aspects of peace and stability, and the disproportionate impact of conflict on women and girls, including conflict-related sexual violence, we are committed to the full implementation of the agenda on women, peace and security provided by the UN Security Council. NATO's policy and action plan on women, peace and security is helping to better prepare the Alliance for the challenges of today and tomorrow. The NATO Policy on Conflict-Related Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, agreed in 2019, reinforces our commitment to the highest standards of conduct, consistent with our values.
62. We remain committed to NATO's ethics policy and program. Corruption and poor governance undermine democracy, the rule of law and economic development, thus posing security challenges. Implementing measures to strengthen ethics, fight corruption and ensure good governance is important for NATO, its member states and partner countries.
63. NATO's partnerships are essential to the functioning of the organization and will continue to be so. The success of NATO's partnerships is evidenced by their strategic contributions to the Alliance's security and international security. They play an important role in supporting NATO's three core missions and our 360-degree view. They are central to advancing NATO's cooperative security agenda, helping shape our security environment and promoting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, and advancing NATO's political and military objectives. We remain committed to the principles that underlie our relationships with partners and take steps to to make our partnerships more strategic, more consistent and more effective. The Alliance's partnerships are also based on reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect. We will strengthen political dialogue and practical cooperation with our partners. We are grateful to our partners for their significant contributions to NATO situational awareness, operations, missions and activities, including Trust Fund projects. We are aware of the sacrifices they made over the years for Euro-Atlantic and international security. We will continue to improve interoperability, particularly with our partners who have been provided with enhanced capabilities. Recognizing that conflicts and instability in NATO's neighborhood directly undermine the security of Allies, we will continue to intensify NATO's assistance to our partners and the capacity-building support that NATO provides to them. We reaffirm our commitment to enhancing political dialogue and practical cooperation with any State that shares the Alliance's values and interests in international peace and security, and will continue to develop our partnerships in ways that continue to serve the interests of both NATO and partner countries. In line with our Comprehensive Action Plan, we will continue to seek coherence in NATO's toolkit and activities, coordinated approaches with partner countries and organizations such as the UN, EU and OSCE, and further dialogue with non-governmental organizations.
64. The European Union continues to be NATO's unique and essential partner. The strategic partnership between NATO and the EU is essential for the security and prosperity of our countries and the Euro-Atlantic region. NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defense. Developing a coherent, complementary and interoperable defense capability, avoiding unnecessary duplication, plays a key role in our joint efforts to enhance the security of the Euro-Atlantic region. Such efforts, including recent developments, will strengthen NATO, help strengthen our common security, promote equitable burden sharing on both sides of the Atlantic, help provide the necessary forces and capabilities, and support an overall increase in defense spending. Non-EU NATO countries continue to make a significant contribution to the EU's efforts to strengthen its capacity to meet common security challenges. The fullest possible participation of non-EU NATO countries in these efforts is essential to the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU. We look forward to reciprocal steps, reflecting tangible progress, in this area in order to maintain a strengthened strategic partnership. We reaffirm in full all decisions, principles and commitments in relation to NATO-EU cooperation. We will continue to further strengthen our strategic partnership in a spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for different organizational mandates, decision-making autonomy and institutional integrity, as agreed by both organizations.
65. NATO-EU cooperation has reached an unprecedented level with tangible results in countering hybrid and cyber threats, in strategic communication, in operational cooperation, including the naval aspect, in military mobility, defense assets, defense industry and research and development, exercises, countering terrorism and strengthening defense and security capabilities. Political dialogue between NATO and the EU continues to be key to the development of this cooperation. We will continue to develop and deepen our cooperation through the full implementation of the joint set of 74 proposals, which contributes to the coherence and complementarity of our efforts. The current strategic environment and the COVID pandemic underscore the importance of NATO-EU cooperation in light of current and evolving security challenges, in particular on resilience, evolving and disruptive technologies, security implications of climate change, disinformation and growing geostrategic competition. The current selected strategic processes in NATO and the EU provide a unique opportunity to further intensify our consultations and cooperation to enhance the security of our citizens and promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond, while reaffirming that NATO remains a transatlantic structure for a strong collective defense and a critical forum We value the continued close cooperation of the NATO Secretary General with the President of the European Council,
66. We reaffirm our commitment to the Alliance's open door policy in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, which is one of the successful achievements. North Macedonia's accession to NATO last year is further evidence of this commitment. Successive rounds of enlargement have strengthened Euro-Atlantic security by helping to spread and strengthen the rule of law and democratic institutions and practices across the European continent, while respecting the right of all states to seek their own security arrangements, enshrined in the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe. NATO's doors remain open to all European democracies that share the values of our Alliance, are ready and able to take on responsibilities and obligations, associated with membership in the organization, are able to develop the principles of the Washington Treaty, and the adoption of which can contribute to strengthening the security of the North Atlantic region. Expansion decisions are made only by NATO itself; without the involvement of any third party in this process. We remain committed to integrating countries aspiring to join the Alliance, judging each by its achievements. We encourage them to continue to implement the necessary reforms and decisions in order to prepare for membership. We will continue to support their efforts and look forward to them taking the necessary steps towards realizing their aspirations.
67. Allies strongly support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a stable and secure Bosnia and Herzegovina, in line with the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other relevant international agreements, promote domestic reconciliation and urge political leaders to avoid rhetoric of discord. We thank Bosnia and Herzegovina, the candidate country, for its contribution to NATO-led operations. We are committed to maintaining an active political dialogue with Bosnia and Herzegovina and will continue to support all reform efforts, including through NATO headquarters in Sarajevo. We encourage the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina to make full use of NATO's cooperative security instruments. Allies welcome the work of the NATO Cooperation Commission. Allies urge their political leaders to work constructively and demonstrate political will for the benefit of all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina in advancing Euro-Atlantic aspirations through urgently needed political, electoral, economic, defense and rule of law reforms, including through the country's reform program together with NATO,
68. We reaffirm the decision taken at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Georgia will become a NATO member and the MAP is an integral part of this process; we reaffirm all elements of this decision, as well as subsequent decisions, including that each partner will be judged on its achievements. We are firm in our support for Georgia's right to determine its future and its foreign policy course without any outside interference. As an advanced partner, Georgia works closely with the Alliance on a wide range of issues. We commend Georgia's significant contributions to NATO operations, which demonstrate its commitment and ability to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security. We welcome the recent political agreement on the way forward for Georgia and encourage its full implementation by all parties. The agreement paves the way for important reforms that will help Georgia, as a candidate country, move forward in its preparations for membership. We remain committed to making full use of the capabilities of the NATO-Georgia Commission and the Annual National Program to deepen political dialogue and cooperation. We commend the significant progress Georgia has made in the area of reform, and which needs to be continued, in helping Georgia strengthen its defense capabilities and interoperability with the Alliance. Georgia's relationship with the Alliance has all the practical tools to prepare for future membership. We are working closely with Georgia on security in the Black Sea region, in response to Russia's increasingly destabilizing actions, and welcome the steps taken to implement the updated NATO-Georgia Essential Package of Measures. We stand ready to further deepen our support for Georgia, including in strengthening resilience to hybrid threats, training and exercises, and secure communications. We look forward to the next NATO-Georgia exercise in 2022.
69. We reaffirm the decision taken at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Ukraine will become a NATO member and the MAP is an integral part of this process; we reaffirm all elements of this decision, as well as subsequent decisions, including that each partner will be judged on its achievements. We are firm in our support for Ukraine's right to determine its future and its foreign policy course without any outside interference. Annual National Programs within the NATO-Ukraine Commission remain the mechanism by which Ukraine promotes reforms related to its NATO membership aspirations. Ukraine should make full use of all available tools within the NATO-Ukraine Commission to achieve its goal of implementing NATO principles and standards. Ukraine's successful implementation of large-scale, sustainable and irreversible reforms, including those to combat corruption and promote an inclusive political process, and decentralization reforms based on democratic values, respect for human rights, minorities and the rule of law, will be vital in laying the foundations for a prosperous and peaceful Ukraine. Further reforms in the security sector, including the reform of Ukraine's security services, are of particular importance. We welcome the significant reforms already undertaken by Ukraine and urge further progress in line with Ukraine's international obligations and commitments. We will continue to provide practical support for security and defense sector reforms, including through the Comprehensive Assistance Package (WFP). We will also continue to support Ukraine's efforts to increase its resilience in the face of hybrid threats, including by intensifying actions under the auspices of the NATO-Ukraine platform to counter hybrid warfare. We welcome cooperation between NATO and Ukraine regarding security in the Black Sea area. The Enhanced Partner status granted last year furthers the impetus for our already large-scale collaboration and will enhance interoperability, with the potential for more joint exercises, training and situational awareness. Military cooperation and capacity-building initiatives between NATO countries and Ukraine, including the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian brigade, further reinforce these efforts.
70. The Western Balkans is a strategically important region for NATO, as shown by our long-term cooperation and operations. The Alliance remains firmly committed to the stability and security of the Western Balkans and to supporting the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the countries in the region. We will intensify our efforts in the region and strengthen our political dialogue and practical cooperation to support reform efforts, promote peace and stability in the region, and counter malevolent influences from outside actors. Democratic values, the rule of law, internal reforms and good neighborly relations are vital to regional cooperation and the Euro-Atlantic integration process, and we welcome progress in this regard. We value NATO's partnership with Serbia. Strengthening NATO's relationship with Serbia would benefit the Alliance, Serbia and the entire region. We support EU-facilitated dialogue and other efforts to normalize relations between Belgrade and Pristina, and urge the parties to seize the moment and engage in good faith to reach a lasting political solution.
71. We remain committed to continuing NATO engagement in Kosovo, including through the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), which contributes to a secure and secure environment and wider spread of stability in the Western Balkans, and through ongoing capacity building efforts together with the security organizations of Kosovo. Any changes in the structure of our KFOR forces will continue to depend on conditions, not on a timetable.
72. The Alliance's close and mutually beneficial security cooperation with our advanced partners Finland and Sweden, who share our values and contribute to NATO-led operations and missions, is growing in a wide range of ways. We will continue to strengthen our ability to respond quickly and effectively to any common challenges and work together to build our resilience and civic preparedness. We will strengthen our regular and open political dialogue and cooperation in support of our common security, including through the preparation of crisis management, exercises and information exchange and analysis, in particular on the security situation in the Baltic Sea region.
73. We will work more closely with all Western European partners to share experiences, address emerging security challenges and continue our cooperation on operations, missions and other initiatives. We will also strive to further develop relationships with our partners around the world. We are strengthening political dialogue and practical cooperation with our long-standing partners in the Asia-Pacific region - Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea - to advance security through cooperation and support for a rules-based international order. We will discuss common approaches to global security challenges in those issues that affect NATO's interests, exchange views through deeper political engagement; and seek specific areas of cooperation to address common concerns. We will intensify our engagement with Colombia, NATO's partner in Latin America, but on issues of good governance, military training, interoperability, demining and maritime security. We remain open to deepening our political dialogue and intensifying our practical cooperation with our partners in Central Asia, taking into account the state of affairs in the region. We welcome the interest of other global actors in working with NATO to address common security concerns and stand ready to consider further engagement on a case-by-case basis.
74. We are committed to strengthening our long-term engagement with the Middle East and North Africa region. We will strengthen political dialogue and practical cooperation with our partners in the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. It will create stronger defense and security institutions and capabilities, promote interoperability and help counter terrorism. We have modernized our assistance in strengthening the defense capabilities of our enhanced partner Jordan to include further counter-terrorism support and facilitated the establishment of a new Training Center for Women in the Armed Forces. We will continue to work with Tunisia to strengthen our defense potential. We will use the NATO-ICU Regional Center in Kuwait as an important center for education, training and public diplomacy, and we remain open to the potential establishment of other education training centers with interested countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Our Regional Center for the South in Naples is achieving tangible results in its four functions and in promoting our situational awareness and understanding. We will continue our engagement with the African Union and will further develop our relationship with the League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council to strengthen our ability to mutually address security issues of concern. training and public diplomacy and we remain open to the potential establishment of other educational training centers with interested countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Our Regional Center for the South in Naples is achieving tangible results in its four functions and in promoting our situational awareness and understanding. We will continue our engagement with the African Union and will further develop our relationship with the League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council to strengthen our ability to mutually address security issues of concern. training and public diplomacy and we remain open to the potential establishment of other educational training centers with interested countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Our Regional Center for the South in Naples is achieving tangible results in its four functions and in promoting our situational awareness and understanding. We will continue our engagement with the African Union and will further develop our relationship with the League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council to strengthen our ability to mutually address security issues of concern. Our Regional Center for the South in Naples is achieving tangible results in its four functions and in promoting our situational awareness and understanding. We will continue our engagement with the African Union and will further develop our relationship with the League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council to strengthen our ability to mutually address security issues of concern. Our Regional Center for the South in Naples is achieving tangible results in its four functions and in promoting our situational awareness and understanding. We will continue our engagement with the African Union and will further develop our relationship with the League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council to strengthen our ability to mutually address security issues of concern.
75. The deteriorating situation in the Sahel region has implications for NATO's collective security. This region is a theater of complex and interconnected challenges. NATO's approach to the Sahel is currently focusing on our long-standing partnership with Mauritania and we are considering providing additional advice and training support. We will also continue to engage in dialogue with relevant NATO partners, representatives from the Sahel region, international and regional organizations and entities such as the African Union, the G5 Sahel, the UN, the EU, and the Sahel Coalition. NATO will strengthen its engagement with the Sahel Group of 5 entities and remain open to considering, upon request, further engagement in the region.
76. The crisis in Libya has direct implications for the regional stability and security of all NATO countries. We welcome the progress made in Libya, including the recent approval of the Interim Government of National Unity (PNU) and the Presidential Council. We commend the United Nations for its efforts to support a political process in which Libya plays a leading and leading role to promote national reconciliation and unite and strengthen government structures. We call on all relevant authorities and structures in Libya, including the PNU and the House of Representatives, to take the actions outlined in the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum roadmap and to make the necessary preparations for free, fair and inclusive presidential and parliamentary elections in the country on December 24, 2021. We fully support the implementation of UNSCRs 2570 and 2571 and the ceasefire agreement of 23 October 2020. In accordance with our decisions at the Summit, we remain committed to providing advice to Libya, upon request, on strengthening defense and security institutions, taking into account the political and security environment.
77. NATO is an alliance that is constantly renewing itself and adapting to new threats and challenges. NATO is also adapting as an organization. To enhance our political, military coherence and situational awareness, we restructured NATO Headquarters and created the position of Chief Information Officer. We welcome and continue to make progress towards streamlining NATO's intelligence architecture so that the architecture can better provide appropriate, timely support for Alliance operations and decision-making on current and future challenges. We will also continue to strengthen the security of our cyber and communications systems and continue to protect the Alliance from espionage attempts. We will continuously strive for greater coherence,
78. We express our deep gratitude to the Government and people of Belgium for the generous hospitality that NATO has extended over more than five decades to us today on the occasion of the NATO Headquarters Summit. We pay tribute to all men and women in uniform who continue to work daily for our collective security. And we extend our special thanks to all those who made it possible for us to hold a safe and productive Summit despite the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, including NATO medical personnel and the Polish ambulance squad.
79. With our decisions today, we have opened a new chapter in transatlantic relations and set the course for the further adaptation of the Alliance to 2030 and beyond. We look forward to our next meeting in 2022 in Spain, followed by our next meeting in Lithuania.
NATO HQ, Blvd Leopold III
1110 Brussels, Belgium
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